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A Summary of the Thesis 
 
This thesis presents a critique of the partisan control thesis, a common claim in the 
academic literature on the European Parliament that two partisan actors – domestic 
political parties and the European parliamentary groups (EP Groups) – influence how 
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) approach representation. Specifically, it 
investigates whether domestic parties and EP Groups shape how MEPs think about 
and carry out representation, and what factors are linked to variation in the degree to 
which these partisan actors seek and achieve influence.  
 Adopting a mixed-methods research design, this thesis analyses data from the 
2010 EPRG survey of MEPs, and a body of original data gathered by conducting 
interviews with MEPs and officials. Three parties from Finland – KOK, the SDP, the 
PS – and three from the UK – the Conservatives, Labour, and UKIP – are selected as 
case studies. The MEPs examined are affiliated to one of four EP Groups, namely the 
EPP, the S&D, the ECR, and the EFD. This thesis finds that neither domestic political 
parties nor EP Groups exercise the degree of influence that the partisan control thesis 
suggests. Furthermore, it identifies that three factors are linked to the propensity of 
national parties to attempt to influence MEPs, and that a further three factors 
determine the desire and ability of EP Groups to influence MEPs.  
This thesis argues that although it is beneficial that MEPs are given the 
freedom by their parties to carry out their work according to their own judgment, the 
low levels of attention domestic parties pay to the activities of MEPs gives rise to 
concerns regarding the existence of an ‘accountability deficit’ in the EU. The 
pessimistic conclusion is that this deficit is unlikely to be addressed unless parties 
come to place greater value on goals that lie within the context of the EU’s political 
system. 
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Introduction  
 
In recent decades, the unenviable – and arguably impossible – task of addressing the 
European Union’s (EU) democratic deficit has been given primarily to Members of 
the European Parliament (MEPs). As the EU’s competences grew, so did the criticism 
that its decision-making structure did not provide the emerging political system with 
many of the features expected of modern democracies (Weiler et al., 1995; Follesdal 
and Hix, 2006; Hix, 2008). The European Parliament (EP) was democratised with the 
introduction of direct elections in 1979, and empowered to the extent that it now 
serves as a co-legislator, together with the Council of the EU (Hix and Høyland, 
2011: 49, 2013). These radical institutional reforms were carried out in the hope that 
MEPs, through their work, would be able to strengthen the link between citizens and 
the EU’s decision-making system (Rittberger, 2005: 197), and in so doing provide the 
EU with a stronger measure of legitimacy, accountability, and responsiveness. 
 The persistence of claims that the EU suffers from a democratic deficit 
suggests that this twin-track approach of democratising and of empowering the EP 
has not succeeded. While some claim that representation cannot resolve a problem 
caused by the lack of a European demos (Chryssochoou; 2000), others maintain that 
the problem lies, at least in part, in the realms of institutional design. As elections to 
the EP are carried out using various forms of party list proportional representation, 
parties in most countries play a key role in determining which of their candidates are 
elected. It is widely claimed that this control over the outcome of elections provides 
parties with a means of exercising considerable influence over MEPs during their 
tenure (Scully, 2001; Hix, 2002; Hix et al., 2007; Raunio, 2007). As MEPs tend to 
‘promote the interests of political parties and other organized interests over those of 
individual voters’ (Farrell and Scully, 2007: 9), the role that political parties play in 
organizing democracy at the EU level may hinder the efforts of MEPs to solve the 
EU’s legitimacy problems.  
This thesis examines whether two partisan actors – domestic political parties 
and the parliamentary groups in the EP (EP Groups) – influence the behaviour of 
MEPs. The freedom of MEPs to carry out their work according to their own judgment 
is anchored in Rule 2 of the European Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, which states 
that ‘Members of the European Parliament shall exercise their mandate 
independently. They shall not be bound by any instructions and shall not receive a 
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binding mandate’ (European Parliament, 2013: 13). This edict reflects the principle 
that citizens are normatively ‘always the ultimate principals’ where democracy is 
understood as popular sovereignty (Strøm, 2003: 64). Nevertheless, it is accepted that 
MEPs, much like legislators in other settings, may legitimately serve multiple 
masters, or in the language of rational choice scholars, that MEPs are the ‘agents’ of 
multiple ‘principals’ (Scully, 2001; Hix, 2002; Hix et al., 2007; Raunio, 2007; Farrell 
and Scully, 2007). 
MEPs are frequently conceived of as the agents of two principals, namely of 
their domestic political parties and their EP Groups. This is because both types of 
partisan actors are argued to have some control over the degree to which MEPs are 
able to achieve their primary goals, which include re-election, office, and policy 
goals, and are able to use this control to influence the behaviour of MEPs. While it is 
generally held that partisan actors do shape the behaviour of MEPs, the literature 
acknowledges that the degree of partisan control is likely to vary from one MEP to the 
next. Several factors affect the degree to which parties have an incentive to seek 
control of MEPs, and to have the means wherewith to discipline MEPs effectively 
(see Hix et al., 1999; Scully, 2001). The notion of partisan control, referred to in this 
study as the ‘partisan control thesis’, and advanced most strongly by Hix (2002; Hix 
et al., 2007), forms an integral part of scholarly understanding of the behaviour of 
MEPs. 
 While prevalent, the partisan control thesis has faced strong and justified 
criticism from Ringe (2010), who argues that party cohesion should not be taken as 
evidence of party discipline, and who explains the high levels of partisan cohesion 
with reference to the concept of ‘Perceived Preference Coherence’ (PPC). As MEPs 
are unable to develop policy expertise in every area in which the EP is active, they 
seek and follow guidance offered by colleagues within their domestic party 
delegations and Groups. He claims that the PPC dynamic describes the ‘“normal” way 
that MEPs make policy choices’, and therefore explains to a large degree how 
decision-making in the EP takes place (Ringe, 2010: 209).  
The body of literature that directly examines relations between MEPs and their 
national parties also provides evidence that casts doubt on the partisan control thesis 
(Attinà, 1994: 287; Bomberg, 1998, 121–5; Ovey, 2002; Blomgren, 2003; Poguntke 
et al., 2007; Raunio, 2002, 2007; Aylott et al., 2013), although these studies do not 
explicitly question the claims made by Hix and his colleagues regarding the degree of 
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influence that partisan actors exercise. Scully (2001) questions whether it is in the 
interests of domestic party leaders to attempt to implement party discipline in the 
context of the EP. Identifying that the burden of monitoring parliamentary life and the 
work of their own MEPs would be great, he notes that mandating MEPs may also be 
counterproductive, as it would restrict their scope to negotiate their way into winning 
coalitions. Moreover, several studies (Bomberg, 1998; Scully, 2001; Raunio, 2002; 
2007; Aylott et al., 2013) find little evidence of parties issuing voting instructions. 
Indeed, most studies of linkages between domestic parties and their MEPs find that 
parties tend to show scant interest in the activities of their MEPs, and even less in the 
day-to-day work of the EP more generally. As a result, there are strong grounds for 
questioning Hix’s claims regarding the degree of partisan influence. 
 
Research Objectives 
This thesis assesses the partisan control thesis by examining the extent to which 
national political parties and EP Groups seek and achieve to influence how MEPs 
approach representation. The central research question is formulated as follows: 
 
Do partisan actors influence the way MEPs think about and carry out representation? 
 
The terms used above reflect the discussion in Chapter 1 relating to the potential for 
legislators to vary in how they approach the task of acting as representatives. Debates 
relating to the focus of representation demonstrate that there is variation between 
representatives in how they think about – or conceive of – the represented (Judge, 
1999: 12–13). Scholars also identify that there is scope for variation in how 
representatives act on behalf of the represented, or in other words, in how they carry 
out representation (Wahlke et al., 1962; Müller and Saalfeld, 1997; Farrell and Scully, 
2007: 93–4). 
As the literature identifies two types of partisan actors that are potentially able to 
influence the behaviour of MEPs, it is necessary to formulate the following two sub-
questions: 
 
• Sub-question 1a: Do domestic political parties influence the way MEPs think 
about and carry out representation? 
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• Sub-question 2a: Do EP Groups influence the way MEPs think about and 
carry out representation? 
 
The potential for variation in the desire and ability of these two partisan actors to 
influence the behaviour of MEPs identified by the literature, and developed in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis, requires the formulation of two further sub-questions: 
 
• Sub-question 1b: What factors explain variation in the level of influence that 
domestic political parties have on the way MEPs think about and carry out 
representation? 
• Sub-question 2b: What factors explain variation in the level of influence that 
EP Groups have on the way MEPs think about and carry out representation? 
 
The Contribution to the Literature 
There are five main reasons for investigating the partisan control thesis by 
systematically examining the nature of the relationship between MEPs and the two 
partisan actors to which most maintain an affiliation. The first is to address the tension 
within the literature referred to above between studies which claim that the two 
partisan actors – domestic political parties and EP Groups – seek and achieve 
influence on the behaviour of MEPs, on the one hand, and accounts which do not 
suggest that these partisan actors are in a position to do so, on the other. In contrast to 
Ringe (2010), who critically examines the partisan control thesis by examining how 
individual legislators make decisions within the chamber, this study assesses the 
partisan control thesis by examining linkages between parties and MEPs. By adopting 
this approach, the study can take into account aspects of representation that are 
broader than simply decision-making within the EP. For example, it enables the study 
to examine what effect, if any, partisan relations have on the way MEPs relate to 
different societal groups, and on how MEPs apportion their time between different 
forms of political activities and settings.  
The second is to gain a better understanding of how party discipline – a central 
organizing principle of most European legislatures (Bowler et al., 1999a; Dalton et 
al., 2011: 197) – operates in relation to MEPs. This will shed light on the role that 
partisan actors play in assisting citizens to hold MEPs accountable, and provide a 
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means of evaluating the service that parties provide when acting as linkage 
mechanisms between citizens and the exercise of the political authority delegated to 
the EP. It is essential that scholars gain a thorough understanding of whether parties 
fulfil their duties in the context of the EP, as the democratic credentials of the 
institution (van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996; Farrell and Scully, 2007) and of the 
political system of the EU more generally (Follesdal and Hix, 2006; Weiler et al., 
1995) are routinely questioned.  
Thirdly, few of the extant accounts seek to explain variation in the way that 
partisan actors relate to MEPs, and these largely fail to identify factors that account 
for any appreciable degree of variation (see for example, Raunio, 2002). As this thesis 
explains some degree of variation in the desire and ability of partisan actors to 
influence MEPs, it strengthens an aspect of the literature that is particularly weak. 
Fourthly, the thesis aims to contribute to a better understanding of how EP 
Groups operate and how they relate to their affiliated MEPs. Apart from Kreppel’s 
(2002) examination of the two largest Groups in the EP, the European People’s Party 
(EPP) and the Party of European Socialists (PES)1, little systematic research has been 
conducted into the dynamics that operate within Groups. This is particularly the case 
for Eurosceptic Groups, which until recently have been neglected by scholars 
(Almeida, 2010; Startin, 2010; Brack, 2013; Whitaker and Lynch, 2014). The 
European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR) and the Europe of Freedom 
and Democracy Group (EFD), both established in 2009, have not to date been 
examined systematically, and the same applies to the EFD’s precursor, the 
Independency/Democracy Group (IND/DEM). Indeed, little scholarly interest has 
been shown in the dynamics operating within the smaller Groups.2  
Fifthly, the issue of partisan linkages to MEPs requires periodic revisiting. 
While these ties are currently understood to be weak, they are expected to strengthen 
over time. Domestic political parties are expected to improve their linkage systems as 
they gain experience of dealing with MEPs and as the powers of the EP increase 
(Scully, 2001: 13; Raunio, 2002: 105). It is also plausible that MEPs seek to develop 
better means of cooperating with colleagues within and between Groups as they 
become better acquainted with the benefits of intra- and inter-Group cooperation. The 
evidence on which most accounts currently available are based relate to previous 
parliamentary terms, and there is genuine reason to expect the nature of partisan 
relations to have developed in the meantime. By providing evidence relating to the 
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current parliamentary term, the findings presented in this thesis complement and build 
on those of earlier studies. 
 
Research Design and Methodology 
The division of the four sub-questions into two categories reflects the fact that two 
steps need to be taken to address the study’s central research question. The first task is 
to demonstrate empirically that partisan actors3 either do or do not influence the 
behaviour of MEPs. The task of measuring the degree to which one societal actor 
exercises influence on the behaviour of another is onerous. This study presents an 
analytical framework which is based on the four necessary conditions of partisan 
control. It is argued that to be in a position where they can systematically influence 
MEPs, partisan actors must desire to influence the behaviour of MEPs, communicate 
wishes to MEPs, provide MEPs with threats and rewards, and obtain information 
regarding the behaviour of MEPs. The empirical component of the thesis addresses 
the first set of sub-questions by examining whether partisan actors fulfil these four 
preconditions of control.  
Where parties do not fulfil these preconditions, the possibility that they 
intentionally influence the behaviour of MEPs can be ruled out. However, fulfilling 
the four preconditions is not a sufficient condition of party influence.4 Therefore, in 
cases where they do fulfil these preconditions, the investigation will proceed to 
examine whether MEPs or officials from the partisan organizations believe that the 
partisan actor exercises influence on the behaviour of MEPs. 
If there is evidence to suggest that at least some domestic parties and EP 
Groups attempt to shape how MEPs approach representation, the second stage of the 
analysis is to examine what factors explain variation in the degree to which partisan 
actors seek and exercise influence over MEPs. Previous studies have argued that a 
number of factors may affect the degree to which partisan actors seek and achieve 
control of MEPs (Hix et al., 1999; Scully, 2001; Raunio, 2007). These include factors 
relating to the partisan actor itself, such as its size, its status as a governing party, and 
its ideological positioning; factors relating to the MEPs, such as experience, career 
goals, and age; and factors relating to the institutional environment, such as the type 
of electoral system used, the timing of national and European elections, and the 
procedure used to deal with the policy issue at hand. There is currently little empirical 
evidence in support of claims that these factors act as sources of variation in the 
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degree to which partisan actors seek and achieve influence. Nevertheless, the 
discussion in Chapter 2 demonstrates that there is a distinct possibility that the nature 
of the relationship between MEPs and the two partisan actors varies considerably 
from one parliamentarian to the next, with potentially vast consequences for the 
degree to which parties can expect to shape the behaviour of MEPs. 
The issue of variation is examined by testing a series of fifteen hypotheses that 
are presented in Chapter 2. As there are a total of 766 MEPs, from over 190 domestic 
political parties, with most affiliated to one of seven EP Groups, it is necessary to 
develop a research design which is able to deal with the potential for extensive 
variation. If the expectations are justified, the research design will also need to 
provide a means of measuring the degree to which different factors lead to variation. 
This will make it possible to address Sub-questions 1b and 2b. 
The difficulties that lie in accumulating the necessary data on such a large 
number of relationships between partisan actors and MEPs for the findings to be both 
robust and externally valid are, in practice, insurmountable. One way of dealing with 
the potentially vast degree of variation would be to analyse data generated by a survey 
that is representative of the chamber in terms of the factors that are expected to lead to 
variation. Ideally, it would be possible to generate new data, which explicitly deals 
with the degree to which partisan actors fulfil the four preconditions of influence. The 
survey would also provide data on the extent to which MEPs feel that their thinking 
and behaviour is shaped by the demands made by partisan actors, together with data 
on various aspects of the way MEPs approach representation. However, due to the 
logistical limitations associated with this research project, and the difficulties faced by 
other researchers conducting similar research in generating sufficiently large and 
representative samples (see critique of the 2010 EPRG MEP survey in Chapter 2), this 
is not feasible. 
 
A mixed-methods approach 
In light of these challenges, the research design of this thesis is based on a mixed-
methods approach. The first empirical component of the thesis features cross-national, 
large-n analysis of data gathered by a major survey of MEPs carried out by the 
European Parliament Research Group in 2010 (Farrell et al., 2011). This analysis 
serves three purposes. Firstly, it provides a means to identify whether domestic 
political parties fulfil two of the four preconditions of control, and secondly, to test 
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whether certain factors are related to the propensity of parties to fulfil these two 
preconditions. Thirdly, it makes it possible to examine whether there is a relationship 
between various factors that are believed to empower the party relative to MEPs and 
indicators that MEPs approach representation in ways that are consistent with the 
expectations of the partisan control thesis. For example, the analysis provides a means 
of examining whether there is a link between the use of a centralised candidate 
selection system and the degree to which MEPs prioritize party interests.  
Analysis of this survey data is valuable. By rendering feasible the task of 
dealing with the extensive sources of variation, the analysis provides a way of 
identifying trends that are general across the EU. However, there are four major 
limitations associated with the strategy of relying exclusively on this approach in 
addressing the central research question. Firstly, questions may be raised regarding 
the validity of the data, due to the possibility that questionnaires were completed by 
individuals other than the MEPs themselves. Secondly, the survey did not ask 
respondents on all aspects of the partisan actor-MEP relationship in which this study 
is interested. Thirdly, the ability of the multivariate analysis to identify trends may be 
limited due to the fact that relatively few responses were received on some survey 
items (see Chapter 2 for a more detailed critique of the data). Fourthly, the claims that 
can be made on the basis of the quantitative analysis are rather general in nature, as 
care must be exercised when making causal inferences in cases where statistically 
significant relationships are identified. 
 Due to these four limitations, it is necessary to supplement the quantitative 
analyses by drawing on another body of data to address the central research question. 
The second empirical component of the study features analysis of qualitative data, 
gathered from a series of interviews with individuals with first-hand experience of 
MEP-partisan relations. Interviewees included MEPs and their assistants, officials 
from domestic political parties and the EP Groups, and officials from the Permanent 
Representations to the European Union. Analysis of such data makes it possible to 
form a far more detailed and nuanced account of how partisan actors relate to their 
MEPs, and what effect this has on the behaviour of MEPs. While the survey data 
analysis may assist in identifying which factors lead to partisan control, it is less able 
to explain why these factors have this affect, or to describe and to explain how MEPs 
respond to various sources of pressure from partisan actors. As well as providing a 
means of corroborating and explaining the statistical findings, analysis of the 
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qualitative data provides further information about the nature of the relationship 
between partisan actors and MEPs, together with an additional means of investigating 
whether these relationships affect the way MEPs approach their roles. Therefore, by 
adopting a mixed-methods approach, it is possible to draw on the strengths of both 
types of methods, while at the same time overcoming many of their weaknesses. 
 
Country case selection 
The qualitative case studies are selected on the basis of four criteria. The four criteria 
are related to the factors that are linked to the level of incentive and potential that 
partisan actors have to influence MEPs, as outlined in the discussion of the theoretical 
framework in Chapter 2. Firstly, the domestic parties that feature have been selected 
from ‘old’ Member States, that is, from countries that joined the EU before 2004. 
While parties from ‘new’ Member States may still be experimenting with different 
ways of structuring relations with MEPs, the countries from which cases have been 
selected have been members of the EU for a sufficient amount of time for the 
relationship between domestic political parties and their MEPs to have stabilized. 
This selection criterion means that it is not possible to examine in the qualitative 
component of the study whether domestic parties differ in how they structure relations 
with MEPs between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States. It also limits the extent to which 
the findings of the qualitative analysis can be generalized to parties and MEPs from 
‘new’ Member States. Nevertheless, even if parties from ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member 
States currently differ in how they structure relations with MEPs, it is at the very least 
possible that with time, parties from ‘new’ Member States will come to deal with 
MEPs in a manner similar to that of parties which have greater experience of being 
represented in the EP. 
The necessity of choosing a limited number of case studies can lead to 
questions being raised regarding the external validity of the findings (Yin, 2009: 15). 
It is not practical for this thesis to examine a selection of cases that is genuinely 
representative of the multiplicity of the partisan agent-MEP relationships that exist. In 
response to this, the second selection criterion is that the cases are chosen from the 
two countries that provide the settings in which domestic parties have the least and 
the greatest incentive and potential to influence MEPs. The rest of the universe of 
domestic political parties are assumed either to be similar to the cases examined, or to 
be no less and no more prone to seeking influence on MEPs than those featured in the 
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analysis. By selecting case from two such countries, it is not only possible to test 
whether the partisan control thesis applies to any domestic party, but also to examine 
whether it only applies to parties with a strong incentive and theoretical ability to 
influence MEPs. It also makes it possible to identify how much variation exists 
between cases that lie at the two extremes. 
The two countries from which cases are selected are Finland and the UK. 
Finland is chosen because its parties appear to have less of an incentive to influence 
the behaviour of their MEPs, and more limited prospects of success, than parties from 
many other Member States. Scholars argue that party influence stems from the power 
parties have over the ability of MEPs to realise their personal goals, and that the 
parties’ ability to shape the re-election chances of MEPs serves as their ‘ultimate 
instrument of control’ over the behaviour of MEPs (Raunio, 2007: 141). EP elections 
in Finland are conducted using an open-list system, with the constituency 
corresponding to the whole area of Finland. Voters cast a ballot in favour of their 
preferred candidate and this registers as a vote for that candidate’s party. Seats are 
allocated to each party on a proportional basis using the d’Hondt formula, with the 
mandate bestowed on the party’s candidates according to the number of personal 
votes each candidate receives. Unlike parties operating under closed- and ordered-list 
systems, Finnish parties are unable to list candidates in order of preference. They 
consequently have less control over the election prospects of their candidates than 
parties from many other Member States, and therefore appear to be in a far weaker 
position to influence the behaviour of their MEPs.  
Further, it may be the case that Finnish parties are less able than others to meet 
the costs of undertaking the activities required for a party to be in a position where it 
can influence the behaviour of their MEPs. Despite the fact that Finnish parties 
receive state funding, their organizations are relatively small, and the number of party 
members is modest in most cases (Raunio and Tiilikainen, 2003: 60). As a result, the 
extent to which they are able to designate resources towards activities such as 
monitoring the work of MEPs is expected to be more limited than in the case of 
parties from larger Member States. 
 Finnish parties may also have a lesser incentive to attempt to influence the 
behaviour of their MEPs than many other parties. As the number of MEPs from each 
Finnish party represented in the EP is low (at a maximum of three MEPs during the 
2009–14 parliamentary term), as is the total number of MEPs who are from governing 
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parties (at nine MEPs since the 2011 national election), it appears that neither the 
parties nor the government have a strong incentive to attempt to use MEPs to realise 
goals at the EU level. Finnish parties may feel that they have a considerable incentive 
to work closely with MEPs who act as rapporteurs, as even individual MEPs are able 
to extensively shape policy outputs when writing parliamentary reports (Corbett et al., 
2011: 9). However this applies to all parties represented in the EP. Further, the 
incentive for Finnish parties to demand that MEPs focus their activities around 
domestic politics may also be relatively small, as all Finnish parties represented in the 
EP have considerably more national parliamentarians than MEPs. Examining case 
studies from Finland therefore makes it possible to identify the extent to which 
parties, whose desire and ability to influence the behaviour of its MEPs appears, in 
theory, to be low, seek to do so. 
 In contrast, British parties appear to have a greater incentive to influence the 
behaviour of their MEPs, and better prospects of success, than parties from many 
other Member States. The use of a closed-list electoral system for EP elections in the 
UK appears to place parties in a strong position vis-à-vis their MEPs. These elections 
are conducted on a regional basis, with the country’s 735 parliamentary seats divided 
between 12 constituencies. Parties put forward a list of candidates in each region, and 
voters cast a single ballot in favour of a party’s list with no means of registering a 
preference for an individual candidate. Seats are allocated to each party on a 
proportional basis using the d’Hondt formula in England, Scotland, and Wales, while 
the Single Transferable Vote (STV) system is used in Northern Ireland. As British 
parties are able to list candidates in order of preference, they have extensive control 
over the election prospects of their candidates. They consequently appear to have a far 
more potent tool to influence the behaviour of MEPs compared with parties from 
countries operating open- and ordered-list systems. 
In addition, the two largest British parties appear to be better placed than most 
to meet the costs of undertaking the activities required to influence the behaviour of 
MEPs. Compared with parties from across Europe, the Conservative Party and the 
Labour Party have large party organizations centrally, as well as at the grassroots 
level. Further, as the Conservatives, UKIP, Labour, and the Liberal Democrats have 
more than 10 seats each in the EP, they may be in a better position than other parties 
to use EP funds to employ EP-based coordinators to strengthen their links to MEPs. 
 21 
 The fact that these four British parties have a far greater number of 
parliamentary seats than most of the other parties represented in the EP also suggests 
that they have a greater incentive to attempt to influence the behaviour of their MEPs. 
These four parties appear to have a clear incentive to attempt to use their MEPs to 
assist the party to realise policy and electoral goals at the EU and national levels. The 
considerable opposition to the EU that exists within the UK may provide British 
parties with a further reason for wishing to influence MEPs’ behaviour. Support by 
MEPs for integrationist measures can cause parties acute embarrassment, as can 
instances where the actions of MEPs conflict with the preferences of party leaders 
(The Guardian, 2001, 2011; The Financial Times, 2008a; The Daily Telegraph, 
2008). British parties may therefore exhibit a greater willingness than parties in other 
Member States to invest in the measures necessary to influence the behaviour of 
MEPs. 
In addition, by sourcing the case studies from Finland and the UK, it is 
possible to examine whether there is a link between the type of electoral system used 
and the desire and ability of parties to influence their MEPs. This factor is particularly 
important to the investigation, as the partisan control thesis rests primarily on the 
assumption that the control of domestic parties over the reselection prospects of 
MEPs enables them to compel MEPs to act according the parties’ wishes. 
 
Within-country case selection 
The third criterion used as a basis for selection is that the cases from within both 
countries differ on many of the factors that are expected to lead to variation in the 
degree to which partisan actors seek and exercise control over MEPs (King et al., 
1994: 139–40). These include factors such as the parties’ ideological positions, their 
status as a governing party, and the size of their delegations in the EP. By including 
such variation within the case selection, it is possible to examine whether there is 
empirical support for the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2 relating to different 
sources of variation. 
The fourth consideration is that there is a correspondence between the three 
Finnish parties and the three British parties regarding the factors that are expected to 
lead to variation in how they structure relations with MEPs. As each of the three 
Finnish parties share relevant characteristics with their counterparts in the UK, it is 
possible to make a series of three cross-country pair-wise comparisons, and this 
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facilitates the task of identifying the effect of country-level factors. These 
comparisons provide a means of triangulating the findings relating to specific 
independent variables. The ability to carry out such a triangulation strategy is 
particularly valuable, as a relatively large number of factors are hypothesised to lead 
to variation in the dependent variables. It may be the case that the analysis of cases 
from one country identifies a relationship between several factors and the dependent 
variables, but that the evidence from the other country suggests that not all of these 
factors act as sources of variance in the dependent variable. Such a contradictory 
finding would suggest one of two explanations: either that some of the findings 
relating to the first country are spurious, or that some source of country-level 
variation acts as an intervening variable. 
The three Finnish cases selected are the National Coalition Party (KOK), the 
Social Democratic Party (SDP), and The Finns Party (PS). KOK and the SDP are two 
of Finland’s largest parties. They have well-developed central party organizations and 
have long histories of being in government. Both are currently governing parties and 
are broadly pro-integrationist. In contrast, the Eurosceptic PS is a relative newcomer, 
having made the electoral leap from a fringe party to one which holds a considerable 
number of national parliamentary seats in recent years. The size of the PS’ party 
organization is smaller than that of the other two parties, in terms of its level of 
expenditure and in terms of the number of party members. While KOK is positioned 
on the centre-right of the ideological scale, the PS is positioned slightly to the left of 
centre, and the SDP is positioned slightly further to the left. The number of MEPs 
from each party varies between each case, and each party’s MEPs are affiliated to 
different EP Groups. 
The three domestic parties selected from the UK – the Conservatives, Labour, 
and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) – reflect in many ways those 
selected from Finland. The former two dominate British electoral politics and have 
spent time during the 2009–14 EP term as governing parties.6 In contrast, and in a 
manner similar to the PS, UKIP has only demonstrated a potential to be a party with 
major electoral appeal in recent years, and its party organization is considerably 
smaller than that of the Conservatives and Labour.  
There are three measures whether the degree of correspondence between the 
three British parties and the three Finnish parties is slightly weaker. Firstly, the British 
parties exhibit slightly weaker levels of support for the EU than their Finnish 
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counterparts. While Labour is broadly pro-integrationist, the Conservatives are 
moderately Eurosceptic (Bale, 2006; Heppell, 2013), with UKIP taking an even 
stronger Eurosceptic position (Whitaker and Lynch, 2014). Whereas the discourse 
surrounding the EU in Britain compels Labour to be slightly less pro-integrationist 
than the SDP, the Conservatives are far less pro-integrationist than KOK, and UKIP’s 
Euroscepticism is stronger than that of the PS. Secondly, there is a slight discrepancy 
between the British and the Finnish parties in terms of their location on the left–right 
ideological spectrum. While the Conservatives are situated on the centre-right of the 
ideological scale, similar to KOK, and Labour takes its position on the centre-left, 
similar to the SDP, there is a difference between the populist right-wing policies that 
UKIP espouses and the more centrist populism of the PS. 
Thirdly, there is a slight discrepancy between the EP Groups to which the 
MEPs of British parties and their Finnish counterparts are affiliated. The SDP and 
Labour’s MEPs are affiliated to the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats 
(S&D) Group, and the PS’ MEP and the majority of UKIP’s MEPs are affiliated to 
the EFD Group. However, KOK’s MEPs are affiliated to the EPP, while the 
Conservatives’ MEPs are affiliated to the ECR Group. Despite these three slight 
discrepancies, these parties serve as appropriate cases on which to draw in examining 
the four sub-questions presented above and these differences do not hinder the 
investigation.  
This discussion of EP Group affiliation demonstrates how basing case 
selection on the MEPs’ affiliation to domestic parties provides an appropriate means 
of selecting cases which can be examined to address the aspect of the central research 
question that focuses on EP Groups. The selection makes it possible to investigate 
whether four Groups seek and exercise influence on the way MEPs carry out 
representation. The cases include the two dominant Groups, the EPP and the S&D, 
together with two of the smaller and most recently formed Groups, the ECR and the 
EFD. In the case of the S&D and the EFD, this examination takes place from the 
perspective of MEPs affiliated to two national delegations that differ in fundamental 
ways in both instances. The fact that Labour and UKIP have large delegations 
suggests that their MEPs are able to play a leading role within the S&D and the EFD 
respectively. However, the MEP–Group dynamics are expected to be different from 
the point of view of the SDP’s two MEPs, and the PS’ single MEP. The ability to 
compare the experiences of two dissimilar national delegations in each instance is 
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especially valuable, as it provides a means of examining in detail whether the nature 
of the relationship between MEPs and the EP Group varies according to the size of 
the delegation. 
 
Interview methodology 
As part of this project a total of 59 semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
current and former MEPs7, their staffs, EP Group advisors, national party officials (in 
most instances the General Secretary or the International Secretary), and officials of 
the Permanent Representation to the EU of Finland and the UK. All MEPs from the 
selected parties were invited to participate, and interviews were sought with a member 
of their staffs in cases where the MEP declined. Group officials were identified as 
potential interviewees primarily on the basis of nationality. While, in principle, 
officials service the work of all MEPs regardless of nationality, it is clear that in 
practice they often work more closely with MEPs from their own Member States. 
This is especially true of the smaller Groups, and is also true of the larger Groups in 
the area of public relations.8 As a result, Finnish and British Group officials were 
targeted, although several officials of other nationalities were also interviewed. 
Interviewees were questioned at length on a range of issues, including how the 
two types of partisan actor structure relations with MEPs, whether these actors fulfil 
the four preconditions of influence, the extent to which MEPs feel able to operate 
independently of the two partisan actors, and how MEPs carry out various aspects of 
their work and relate to various groups that they may wish to represent. The duration 
of most interviews was between 30–35 minutes, with some shorter at around 15–20 
minutes, while others lasted around 60 minutes. The questioning differed slightly 
according to the position of the interviewee, however the same themes were covered 
during all interviews. The majority of these interviews were conducted in Brussels 
during a ten-week period between April and July 2012, with further interviews 
conducted in Brussels in November 2012. Finnish national party officials were 
interviewed in Helsinki during the autumn and winter of 2012 and British national 
party officials were interviewed in various locations in the UK during the summer and 
autumn of 2013. All interviews were conducted face-to-face and recorded, apart from 
three, which were conducted by telephone. 
Several potentially sensitive and normatively charged issues were discussed 
during the interviews. The thesis is essentially interested in whether partisan actors 
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are able to provide elected politicians with inducements to think and act in ways that 
are contrary to their own judgment (Birch, 1971: 97). It was therefore necessary to 
discuss issues that partisan actors and MEPs alike may under certain circumstances 
wish to hide from the public domain, most notably practices relating to partisan 
discipline, and the degree to which domestic parties are actively engaged in EU 
policy-making processes. Despite the potential for respondents to be unwilling to 
provide information and views on some of these issues, the interviews were 
characterized by a high degree of candidness almost without exception. It is likely 
that this was facilitated by the fact that interviewees were granted anonymity and that 
special measures are taken in the case of small parties to protect the identity of 
interviewees. In most instances, interviewees are referred to by their positions, 
however this information is not disclosed in the case of interviewees from the smaller 
parties examined. 
Conducting interviews with such a wide variety of actors directly engaged in 
the MEP-partisan actor relationship yielded a particularly valuable source of data. As 
the different types of actors had experience of dealing with MEPs and partisan actors 
in a variety of settings, they were able to provide information and perspectives on 
differing aspects of the various partisan actor-MEP relationships. While MEPs were 
able to offer evidence relating to first-hand experience of dealing with their domestic 
parties and their EP Groups, domestic party officials were able to provide information 
on the domestic parties’ practices relating to EU policy formulation and promotion, 
and a view on the party-MEP relationship from the home capital. EP Group officials 
were able to provide detailed information on the nature of intra-Group dynamics. Put 
differently, by selecting interviewees from these backgrounds it was possible to 
extensively triangulate the accounts provided by MEPs and other Brussels-based 
actors on the one hand, with the information provided by officials based in the 
national capitals on the other. 
 The qualitative component of the thesis also makes use of secondary sources 
to complement the interview data. The analysis draws on reports provided by news 
outlets on issues such as public disagreements between MEPs and their domestic 
parties and the processes undertaken by parties to select candidates for the 2014 EP 
elections. This provides an additional means of verifying the information provided by 
respondents. 
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An Outline of the Study 
This thesis is organized as follows. The first chapter begins the task of presenting the 
thesis’ theoretical framework. Drawing on rational choice accounts, processes of 
democratic governance are conceptualised as two chains: a chain of delegation which 
stands for the transfer of authority from citizens to decision-makers, and a chain of 
accountability which runs in the opposite direction. It is argued that political parties 
are able to assist citizens in holding legislators accountable, but that they may instead 
coerce representatives to act in accordance with party interests rather than with the 
public interest. It is therefore argued that while parties should pay attention to the 
work of legislators to assist citizens to hold them accountable, they should not use 
their power to compel representatives to prioritize party interests over those of voters. 
Building on this theoretical discussion, the second half of Chapter 1 provides an 
overview of the academic literature on MEPs that focuses on studies which examine 
how national political parties and EP Groups structure relations with their MEPs. 
Studies which claim that these two partisan actors are able to exercise considerable 
influence on the behaviour of MEPs are identified as advancing the partisan control 
thesis. Attention is drawn to the tension that exists between these accounts and those 
that cast doubt on the assertion that partisan actors extensively influence the 
behaviour of MEPs. In so doing, the discussion situates this study in relation to the 
extant literature. 
The second chapter develops the discussion of the study’s theoretical 
framework presented in the first chapter by focusing more closely on the plausibility 
of the partisan control thesis. Drawing on the new institutionalist accounts of Scully 
(2001) and Raunio (2007), it is argued that partisan actors may indeed be able to 
influence the behaviour of MEPs if they are willing to incur the costs associated with 
carrying out the activities necessary for achieving influence. Partisan actors would, 
however, be required to bear significant costs to be in a position where they develop a 
potential to influence the behaviour of MEPs, as they would need to fulfil four 
conditions: to hold interests relating to the behaviour of MEPs, to communicate these 
interests to MEPs, to provide MEPs with incentives to act in accordance with those 
interests, and to monitor MEPs’ behaviour in order to ensure that any threats issued 
are credible. The study’s analytical framework, which is based on examining whether 
the partisan actors fulfil these four preconditions, is presented. The chapter 
subsequently puts forward fifteen hypotheses relating to factors that are expected to 
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lead to variation in the degree to which partisan actors seek and exercise influence on 
MEPs, before providing an overview of the research design, data sources, and the 
case study selection. 
Chapter 3 takes the first empirical step in investigating whether partisan actors 
influence MEPs by presenting analysis of data from the 2010 EPRG survey of MEPs 
(Farrell et al., 2011). The findings indicate that many domestic political parties and 
EP Groups at least partly fulfil the preconditions of holding and communicating 
legislative preferences in the form of voting recommendations to MEPs. However, the 
evidence examined does not suggest that partisan actors are able to compel MEPs to 
focus exclusively on partisan interests. MEPs claim to place a greater emphasis on 
territorial representation compared with domestic partisan representation, and 
attribute even lower levels of importance to representing their EP Groups. Further, 
MEPs claim that they are free to vote at parliamentary division on the basis of their 
own conception of the public interests. The chapter 3 also casts doubt on the notion 
that leaders are able to use their control over the reselection prospects of incumbents 
to systematically control their behaviour. It finds that the leadership of many parties 
plays a subordinate role to that played by other party organs in the candidate selection 
procedure. The analysis yields few insights into the determinants of partisan control. 
None of the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2 are supported, and very few factors are 
identified as explaining variation in the degree to which MEPs accord importance to 
representing their domestic parties and EP Groups. No theoretically grounded 
explanation can be provided for these findings. 
 Chapters 4 and 5 present the analysis of qualitative data relating to MEPs 
selected from the six national parties discussed above. Chapter 4 draws on evidence 
relating to the MEPs of three Finnish parties, who operate in a setting in which levels 
of domestic party control is expected to be low. None of these domestic parties wish 
to influence any aspect of the way MEPs carry out their work, or meet any of the 
other three preconditions for party control. Indeed, the findings demonstrate that 
MEPs act with considerable independence from their parties, and that these parties 
treat MEPs as largely peripheral actors. In contrast, two of the Groups to which the 
MEPs featured in the analysis are affiliated, the EPP and the S&D, are found to 
influence the behaviour of MEPs. Unlike the pro-integrationist EPP and S&D Groups, 
the Eurosceptic EFD Group does not attempt to influence the behaviour of its MEPs. 
This is because the Group was established by its affiliated delegations in 2009 on the 
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understanding that it exists primarily to provide access to funding and administrative 
resources rather than to coordinate policy.  
 In examining the partisan relations of MEPs affiliated to three British parties, 
Chapter 5 finds some evidence of domestic parties attempting to influence the 
behaviour of MEPs. The Conservatives and Labour only attempt to influence how 
MEPs vote, and do so only in rare instances. In contrast, UKIP’s leadership sets out 
broad principles by which MEPs must abide, but provides little guidance regarding 
how MEPs should act from day to day. The limited nature of these attempts to 
influence MEPs cast doubt on the notion that features of EP life such as voting 
cohesion within domestic party delegations are explained by centralised systems of 
party discipline. The findings relating to EP Groups reflect those presented in the 
previous chapter, with evidence of far weaker coordination within the two 
Eurosceptic Groups, the EFD and the ECR, compared with the pro-integrationist 
S&D. Despite the fact that the S&D Group does not operate a strict system of 
discipline, Labour MEPs feel compelled to follow the S&D’s voting 
recommendations unless there is reason to do otherwise. 
 These findings are drawn together in Chapter 6, which serves as the thesis’ 
Conclusion. This chapter argues that neither domestic political parties nor EP Groups 
exercise the degree of influence on the behaviour of MEPs that the partisan control 
thesis suggests. Three factors are identified as being linked to the propensity of 
national parties to attempt to influence MEPs, namely the electoral system, the degree 
to which the candidate selection system is centralized, and the size of the party’s 
delegation in the EP. A further three factors are found to determine the desire and 
ability of EP Groups to influence MEPs. These factors are the size of the EP Group in 
terms of the number of affiliated MEPs, the centricity of the Group on the left–right 
scale, and attitudes towards integration.  
The Conclusion discusses the findings, and their implications for 
understanding MEPs and both types of partisan actors. This discussion claims that the 
institutional context in which MEPs operate does not constrain their ability to make 
decisions independently of their domestic parties and EP Groups. As MEPs place 
great importance on representing their domestic parties despite the lack of pressure to 
do so, it is appropriate to think of MEPs largely as voluntary or willing partisan 
agents, rather than as agents who seek to evade the control of their domestic partisan 
principals. Further, it is argued that there is a disinclination for domestic party leaders 
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to mandate MEPs, and that this is primarily because party leaders have little interest 
in realising their election, policy, and office goals (Strøm, 1990) through the work of 
MEPs. This suggests that parties operating in a system of multi-level governance may 
not be multi-level goal-seekers, and that the state level remains the most important 
one for domestic political parties. The thesis closes with a normative response to the 
findings. It claims that the reluctance of domestic political parties to hold MEPs to 
account is problematic, and that the ‘accountability deficit’ that exists in the EU will 
not be resolved at least until parties pay more attention to the activities of their MEPs. 
This is unlikely to happen unless parties come to place greater value on goals that lie 
within the context of the EU’s political system. 
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1 The PES changed its name to the ‘Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
and Democracts in the European Parliament’ (the S&D Group) at the beginning of the 
2009–14 parliamentary term. 
2 For an example of a typically brief discussion on the smaller Groups, see Raunio, 
1997: 52. 
3 This thesis is sensitive to the fact that national political parties are not unitary actors 
(Katz and Mair, 1993). Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity the reporting of the 
analysis follows the example of others in defining the national party as ‘roughly 
equivalent to the party leadership’ (Scully, 2001: 9; Mühlböck, 2012: 609). 
4 As evidence from other legislatures suggest (Jensen, 2000; Norton, 2003), fulfilling 
the four preconditions is not strictly a necessary condition of party influence. An MEP 
may decide to follow a request from the party despite there being little incentive to do 
so, and in the knowledge that the party is unlikely to learn of how he or she acted. 
5 Only 72 MEPs were elected from the UK at the 2009 election. The UK was awarded 
an additional parliamentary seat in December 2011, due to the provisions made in the 
Lisbon Treaty. This seat was awarded to Anthea McIntyre, Conservatives (West 
Midlands). 
6 After thirteen years in power, Labour was defeated at the 2010 general election, 
paving the way for the Conservatives to form a coalition government with the Liberal 
Democrats. 
7 The three former MEPs interviewed were both professionally active in Brussels 
during the 2009–14 parliamentary term and maintained close links to their former 
delegations in the EP during this period. 
8 Group officials are in many cases members of a domestic party that is affiliated to 
the Group. 
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Chapter 1: Governance, Representation, and the European Parliament 
 
Two primary objectives are fulfilled in this chapter. The first is to begin the process of 
presenting the thesis’ theoretical foundations. This is accomplished by examining the 
role that political parties and elected representatives play in democratic governance, 
and the consequences that their actions have for the way that democracy operates. 
Two key claims emerge from this discussion. Firstly, the way representatives 
approach representation matters, because this has considerable implications for the 
degree to which the system of representation provides for key functions, such as 
legitimacy, accountability, and responsiveness. Secondly, while parties can assist 
citizens by acting as an accountability mechanism, they can take advantage of their 
influence on representatives to act in ways which benefit the party to the detriment of 
the interests of citizens. 
The second aim of the chapter is to examine these claims in the context of the 
EU, and more specifically, in the context of the work of MEPs. The expectations 
made of the representation provided by MEPs are juxtaposed with claims that the EP 
has failed to provide the EU with the key functions of representation. Following a 
discussion on what is currently known about how MEPs approach representation, the 
chapter considers the extent to which partisan actors shape the way MEPs think about 
and carry out their work. A tension is identified between accounts which suggest that 
partisan actors can – and do – influence the behaviour of MEPs, and those that 
suggest that the linkages are too weak for parties to be in a position to do so. As there 
is a potential for parties to compel MEPs to act in ways that are not in the interests of 
citizens, the conclusion argues that the nature and consequences of these partisan 
relations require further investigation. 
 
Democracy and the Logic of Delegation 
In representative democracies, the authority to make political decisions is vested in 
elected officials rather than exercised directly by citizens. The conduct of governance 
can be viewed as a chain of delegation from citizens to those who govern (Müller, 
2000; Strøm, 2003: 59) and the nature of the chain varies according to the institutional 
form that the system of government takes. In parliamentary democracies, for example, 
citizens delegate to elected representatives; legislators delegate to the executive 
branch by selecting a prime minister from within their rank; the head of government 
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delegates to heads of executive departments; and ministers delegate to civil servants, 
who implement public policy (Müller et al., 2003: 19–20; Strøm, 2003: 64–6). 
Conversely in presidential systems, citizens delegate to a number of elected public 
officials, who in turn delegate to civil servants (Strøm, 2003: 65–6). 
There are potentially considerable advantages for citizens in large polities to 
delegate power to representatives. Direct participation in governance would require 
citizens to invest considerable time and energy in political activity, limiting the degree 
to which they are able to undertake other desirable pursuits, such as economic activity 
(Bealey, 1988: 36; Beetham, 1992: 47). Governance is becoming increasingly 
technical and citizens recognize the value of selecting individuals with greater 
expertise to carry out public policy on their behalf (Strøm, 2003: 57). Further, 
delegation provides a means for societies to deal with social choice and collective 
action problems. The former relates to the difficulties collectivities face in reaching 
decisions that are based on the aggregation of preferences (Arrow, 1951; Kiewiet and 
McCubbins, 1991: 23), while the latter refers to the fact that individuals often have 
incentives to behave in ways that undermine the interests of the broader population 
(Hardin, 1968; Olson, 1965; Strøm, 2003: 58). 
Yet the delegation that representative democracy entails ‘is inherently risky’ 
(Müller et al., 2003: 4). The potential danger is that in transferring authority to others, 
citizens may lose control over the way the competences delegated are exercised, with 
the result that they are poorly served by those whom they have selected to act on their 
behalf. By losing control over their representatives, citizens effectively ‘abdicate’ 
(Müller et al., 2003: 4), and governance is carried out under the ‘rule of the politician’ 
rather than ‘by the people’ (Schumpeter, [1943] 1976: 269). To guard against this 
potential, constitutional mechanisms exist at each stage in the chain of delegation to 
provide a means for the delegating actor to hold the authorized actor to account 
(Müller, 2003: 20). A ‘chain of accountability’ runs in the reverse direction to that of 
the chain of delegation, and it is the existence of accountability mechanisms that 
make ‘democratic regimes democratic’ (Müller, 2003: 20). 
Agency theory, or the principal–agent framework, serves as a valuable tool in 
examining issues relating to accountability and the dangers of delegating political 
authority in representative democracies (Strøm et al., 2003a; Kiewiet and McCubbins, 
1991). It is not surprising that a range of scholars working in the field of party politics 
draw on the framework, as it ‘lends itself to rigorous and precise theoretical 
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reasoning’ (Müller et al., 2003: 5), provides ‘a means of depicting and understanding 
a phenomenon – party power – that often eludes rigorous definition and 
operationalisation’, and is also ‘simple and parsimonious’ (Aylott et al., 2013: 16). 
The framework views every link in the chain of delegation as a principal–
agent relationship, or as a relationship in which the principal delegates authority to the 
agent and seeks to ensure that the agent acts in the ways that best serve the principal’s 
interests. The concept of agency loss refers to the difference between the outcome 
resulting from delegation, relative to the outcome that would have resulted from the 
principal carrying out the activity herself with the aid of unlimited information and 
resources (Lupia, 2003: 35).9 Where agency loss is high, the outcome of the agent’s 
actions differs considerably from the principal’s ideal outcome.10 In political contexts, 
where information and resources are limited, there is considerable scope for agency 
loss. Yet despite the existence of this potential, citizens may still often find that it is in 
their interests to delegate to political agents (Lupia, 2003: 35–6), especially if they are 
able to form mechanisms to contain these agency losses. 
Agency losses become problematic where there are preference divergences 
and information asymmetries between the principal and the agent, two features of 
political life that principals regularly face (Strøm, 2003: 61). The first of two 
problems relating to principals operating under incomplete information is ‘hidden 
information’, whereby ‘principals do not fully know the competencies or preferences 
of their agents or the exact demands of the task at hand’ (Strøm, 2003: 85–6; Kiewiet 
and McCubbins, 1991: 25). There is a danger that the principal will not select an 
appropriate agent, a problem known as adverse selection. The second danger, that of 
‘hidden action’, emerges where the principal is unable to observe the agent’s actions 
and is consequently unable to judge whether the agent is acting in their best interests 
(Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991: 25–6; Strøm, 2003: 86). This potentially gives rise to 
moral hazard.  
As is clear from this discussion, once delegation has taken place, political 
agents may be tempted to act in ways that prioritize their own interests rather than 
those of the principal. Strøm identifies the three ways in which agents may 
‘misbehave’ as policy divergence or policy shirking, leisure shirking, and rent seeking 
(2003: 61–2; Strøm et al., 2003b: 712–13; Manin et al., 1999: 40). Policy shirking 
occurs when politicians pursue their own policy agendas in the knowledge that these 
do not conform to the preferences of citizens and is a common concern for citizens 
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and scholars alike (Strøm et al., 2003b: 712–13). Leisure shirking arises when agents 
do not exert themselves in the principal’s service, and the result is that the principal’s 
interests are not optimally served (Strøm et al., 2003b: 711; 708). Rent seeking agents 
exploit their authority to obtain material gain to the detriment of the principal’s 
interests (Strøm et al., 2003b: 708).  
The existence of agency problems indicates that a tension lies at the heart of 
representative forms of democracy. One of the primary reasons for delegating 
political authority to elected representatives is that citizens are unable or unwilling to 
acquire the necessary information and skills to govern themselves. While citizens 
desire well-informed agents, the risks associated with moral hazard increases as the 
discrepancy between the informational levels of citizens and of their representatives 
increases (Strøm et al., 2003b: 740). As a divergence has always existed between the 
preferences of political principals and their agents, it appears that adverse selection 
and moral hazard will continue to be ‘governance problems’ as long as citizens call 
on the services of political representatives (Strøm et al., 2003b: 740). 
Despite the clear potential for agency problems, however, political principals 
who are able to hold agents accountable may succeed in containing agency losses. In 
the context of delegation, accountability is viewed in two ways. Where accountability 
is understood ‘as a process of control’, the agent is only seen as accountable to the 
principal if the principal can ‘exercise control over the agent’ (Lupia, 2003: 35). 
Where accountability is understood as ‘a type of outcome’, the agent is only viewed 
as accountable to the principal if the agent acts in the principal’s interests, regardless 
of whether the principal has a measure of control over the agent (Lupia, 2003: 35). It 
is the former notion of accountability which is relevant for this study. Responsiveness 
(whether this is understood as responsiveness to the wishes or to the interests of 
citizens) is a key function that is desired of systems of political representation (Birch, 
1971), and it is when principals have some measure of control over agents that 
responsiveness is most likely to emerge. 
 
Political Parties, Delegation, and Accountability 
Three forms of oversight mechanisms can assist citizens to ensure accountability (or 
control) of their democratic representatives, namely internal or constitutional 
constraints, external constraints, and political parties (Strøm, 2003: 64; Bergman and 
Strøm, 2004; Aylott et al., 2013: 3–10). Internal or constitutional constraints refer to 
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checks that are to be found within the chain of delegation. The legislative branch, for 
example, to which citizens delegate power, itself delegates authority to the executive 
branch, and attempts to hold executive actors accountable by scrutinising their work 
(Strøm et al., 2003c: 665). The activities of entities that exist independently of the 
chain of delegation, such as supranational, subnational, and judicial actors, can 
function as external constraints on the political agents of citizens. Actions undertaken 
by citizens through direct democratic means, such as referenda, also function as 
external constraints. These constraints target ex post accountability, guarding against 
the dangers of moral hazard (Strøm et al., 2003c: 697–8). 
 Of the three accountability mechanisms identified by the literature, the role 
that political parties can play in facilitating citizen control of political agents is of 
greatest significance to this thesis. Parties are able to assist voters to mitigate adverse 
selection problems by serving as ‘a mechanism to align preferences between voters 
and politicians’ at the first stage of delegation, by advocating programmes, and by 
putting forward candidates who have the appropriate skills and who support the 
programmes (Strøm et al., 2003c: 651–3; Dalton et al., 2011: 6–7). Indeed, aligning 
preferences between citizens and politicians is the ‘principal normative role of 
political parties in democratic societies’ (Strøm et al., 2003c: 654). As parties acquire 
reputations, the costs that citizens must bear in acquiring the information necessary to 
make electoral decisions diminish because party labels provide an indication of how 
the candidates would act if elected (Müller, 2000: 313; Strøm et al., 2003c: 653). 
Parties also align preferences at all subsequent stages of the chain of delegation 
(although their ability to control the behaviour of civil servants is more limited than 
that of agents at other points in the chain) (Müller, 2000: 319). In short, ‘political 
parties are the central mechanism to make the constitutional chain of political 
delegation and accountability work in practice’ (Müller, 2000: 330; see also 
Klingemann et al., 1994: 5). This is especially the case in the parliamentary 
democracies of Western Europe, where parties use ‘the full range of ex ante and ex 
post mechanisms to contain agency loss’ (Müller, 2000: 330; Aylott et al., 2013: 6–7). 
The ability of parties to assist citizens in controlling their political agents rests 
on the degree to which citizens are able to use party labels as reliable sources of 
information (Strøm, 2003: 68). Three conditions must be met for this to be the case: 
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First, partisanship must be associated with systematic and relatively 
transparent differences in the bundles of goods and policies that governments 
produce. Second, party labels and the policy differences that they represent 
must bear some relationship to the preferences of the voters. Third, voters 
must have a way of holding the representatives of any given party responsible 
for its performance in office.  
(Strøm et al., 2003c: 653) 
 
A broader requirement for party labels to serve as reliable information, and for parties 
to function as mechanisms of citizen control throughout the chain of delegation, is 
that parties are able to induce their agents to act cohesively (Strøm, 2003: 68). The 
concept of party representation is based on a four-step cycle, in which parties present 
programmes and personnel to the electorate; citizens choose between the range of 
policy packages and the politicians on offer; the successful party or parties seek to 
implement their programmes once in office; and the parties are judged on their 
performance at the subsequent election (Judge, 1999: 71). As indisciplined parties are 
unlikely to be able to fulfil the commitments they make at elections, citizens cannot 
use the information provided by their party label as a basis for delegating ‘policy 
aggregation to party leaders’ (Strøm, 2003: 69; APSA, 1950; Thies, 2001). In short, 
undisciplined parties do not assist citizens to contain agency losses. 
 The logic of party representation relies on cohesive parties, and it does not 
matter whether cohesion is due to preference convergence or to the ability of leaders 
to coerce party agents to follow commands (Ozbudun, 1970: 305; Bowler et al., 
1999b: 4–5). At times, the demands of party discipline require party leaders to compel 
elected representatives ‘to vote for a policy which is contrary to the apparent interests 
of his [sic] constituents, contrary to the prevailing opinion in his constituency, and 
contrary to his own personal judgment about what is best for the country’ (Birch, 
1971: 97). In light of the potentially considerable resistance which parties can expect 
to face from elected representatives in such circumstances, they must often provide 
politicians with incentives if they are to achieve cohesion. As parties are able to assist 
politicians to realise their electoral, policy, office goals, among others (see discussion 
on the goals held by political actors in Chapter 2), they have plenty of scope for 
incentivising party loyalty (Strøm et al., 2003c: 653). This is reflected in the fact that 
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parties achieve a high degree of cohesion within many democratic legislatures (Dalton 
et al., 2011: 197; Ranney, 2001: 11686). 
 In assisting citizens to contain agency losses, therefore, parties facilitate 
representative democracy. In doing so, they make a major contribution to society, as 
representative forms of democracy provide a means for modern societies to make 
collective decisions while avoiding the costs that direct forms of democracy entail. 
Yet the role that parties play in organizing representative democracy is not wholly 
unproblematic (Bergman et al., 2003: 130). In carrying out the functions that facilitate 
citizen control of their political agents at various stages in the chain of delegation, 
parties can also create further agency problems.  
Parties assist citizens by aligning preferences and reducing informational 
discrepancies between citizens and their agents at different stages of the chain of 
delegation. They achieve this primarily by ensuring party cohesion. As the goals of 
individual politicians diverge at least periodically from those of their parties (see 
discussion in Chapter 2), the existence of cohesive parties suggests that leaders 
exercise considerable influence over the behaviour of representatives. As it is 
inevitable that the interests of parties and the citizens that vote for them will diverge 
from time to time, parties may use their control of elected representatives to compel 
them to act according to party interests rather than to those of citizens.  
While citizens are normatively ‘always the ultimate principals’ where 
democracy is understood as popular sovereignty (Strøm, 2003: 64), their political 
agents may find that the incentives to treat their party as their main principal are 
greater. As the discussion in the next chapter demonstrates, parties are able to assist 
elected representatives to realise election, policy, and office goals (Strøm, 1990). 
Consequently, there is a danger that citizens may lose their control over the 
democratic process, and (to paraphrase Schumpeter) that governance is carried out 
under the rule of parties rather than ‘by the people’ ([1943] 1976: 269). The risk is 
particularly acute where both the degree of party control of political agents, and the 
level of informational discrepancy between parties and citizens, are high. De Winter 
and Dumont highlight the dangers of ‘partitocracy’ in the case of Belgium (2006: 957; 
De Winter et al., 1996), arguing that the imposition of the rigid party discipline that is 
needed for coalition stability severely limits the ability of national parliamentarians 
‘to represent the policy preferences of their voters’ (2006: 967). 
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 The discussion on the role that political parties can play in strengthening or 
undermining accountability at various stages in the chain of delegation provides a 
basis for making normative claims regarding the way political parties should relate to 
their elected representatives. To assist citizens to hold representatives accountable, 
parties have a duty to pay attention to the work of representatives, monitoring whether 
they work diligently, and in a manner that reflects their party affiliation and any 
personal pledges made during the electoral campaign. It is particularly important that 
parties carry out this oversight activity in contexts where there is low public interest 
in and knowledge about the work of the representatives and the institution of which 
they are members, where the voters have little or no means of registering a 
preferential vote for individual candidates, and where parties receive extensive public 
funding. 
Further, parties have a duty to discipline representatives who do not operate in 
a manner that conforms to the expectations of the party’s voters, even in instances 
where doing so in a public manner (for example, by withdrawing the party whip) 
causes the party embarrassment. However, parties should only attempt to control the 
behaviour of representatives to achieve outcomes that the party’s elected 
representatives collectively view as serving the public good. They should refrain from 
using disciplinary measures to compel elected representatives to prioritize the 
interests of the party as an organization to the detriment of the interests of those who 
elected the representatives. While it may appear idealistic to expect parties to act 
according to these principles in instances where it does not serve their interests, these 
principles do offer a basic framework for evaluating the contribution made by 
political parties to public life. 
 
Representatives and Representation 
The discussion so far has outlined the possibilities that delegation offers modern 
societies in facilitating collective decision-making, together with the challenges that 
citizens face in ensuring that governance is carried out in their interests. The focus has 
remained on issues relating to the ‘representational transmission of power’ (Sartori, 
1987: 30), and little has been said about political representatives and the role that they 
play in democratic politics. In her classic account, Pitkin defines representation as 
‘the making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present 
literally or in fact’ (1967: 8–9, ital. in original). Political representatives (however 
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conceived) make the people (however conceived) present by acting on their behalf 
and in their interests, in a manner that is ‘at least potentially responsive to them, yet 
not normally in conflict with their wishes’ (Pitkin, 1967: 222; Judge, 1999: 2). Where 
there is a lack of responsiveness, questions are asked of the legitimacy of the political 
regime (Wessels, 2007: 846; for a thorough discussion of the four forms of 
responsiveness, see Eulau and Karps, 1978: 62–70). There is a paradox at the heart of 
the concept of representation, in that the represented is ‘simultaneously both present 
and not present’ (Pitkin, 1967: 9). This paradox is a feature of representation which 
citizens are able to exploit in the context of collective political decision-making. 
Political representation provides a means by which citizens can avoid the costs and 
the challenges that direct participation in governance processes entail, while at the 
same time having some form of presence at the heart of government.  
Pitkin’s definition of what it means to represent substantively is broad in that 
it does not specify who represents or is represented, how representatives should act, or 
how representatives should relate to the views and policy demands of those that they 
represent (Judge, 1999: 12; Farrell and Scully, 2007: 93; Wessels, 2007: 838). This 
lack of specificity reflects the fact that there is considerable scope for variation in how 
representatives think about and carry out their roles, both within and between political 
settings. The issue of the focus of representation directs attention to the question of 
who is represented. While legislators may conceive of the represented in different 
ways, it is at the level of societal groupings that political representation takes place 
rather than at the one-to-one level of citizen and legislator (Judge, 1999: 13). As 
Pitkin (1967: 221–2) explains: 
 
Political representation is primarily a public, institutionalized arrangement 
involving many people and groups, and operating in the complex ways of 
large-scale social arrangements. What makes it representation is not any single 
action by any one participant, but the over-all structure and functioning of the 
system, the patterns emerging from the multiple activities of many people. 
 
Legislators may choose from a range of societal groups when deciding which interests 
to promote, including territorial or geographical groups, usually based on the 
constituency or on the whole body politic; functional interest groups; descriptive 
groups, such as ethnic minorities; or political parties and their supporters (Judge, 
1999: 12–13). It is inevitable that the interests of these different societal groups will 
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diverge at least periodically, and representatives need to decide the interests of which 
group they will prioritize through their activities as policy advocates. 
 As representatives in most settings are elected by geographically defined 
districts or constituencies, it may be expected that legislators pay special 
consideration to the representation of these areas. The empirical evidence suggests 
that there is a strong sense in which representatives prioritize the concerns of their 
constituencies in certain political settings. Mayhew (1974), for example, finds that 
Members of the US House of Representatives are particularly sensitive to the needs of 
their electoral districts, and that the behaviour of these legislators is driven to a 
considerable degree by electoral considerations. As Mayhew identifies a high degree 
of responsiveness, he is able to claim that the ‘electoral connection’ between citizens 
and their representatives is strong. It is less clear whether legislators place such a 
strong focus on territorial representation in other settings, especially in the 
parliamentary democracies of Western Europe, where representatives often pay 
greater heed to their parties. The tendency to select the party as the basis for 
representation is found to be particularly strong in countries operating party-centred 
electoral systems (Wessels, 2007: 839–40, 1999; Esaiasson, 2000: 61–2). These 
contrasting findings give rise to the claim that institutional differences affect the way 
representatives approach their work. 
 The issue of the style of representation directs attention to the question of how 
much ‘policy discretion and independence’ the representative is afforded by their 
constituents, and to the nature of the ‘power relationship’ between the representative 
and the represented (Judge, 1999: 13). While analytically distinct (Eulau et al., 1978: 
117), the focus and style of representation provide the two aspects that underlie the 
role orientation of legislators, or the ‘basis’ on which representatives act (Wessels, 
2007: 846).  
Eulau and colleagues identify three stylistic approaches adopted by legislators 
as that of the trustee, the delegate, and the politico (1978: 118). Trustees are free 
agents who follow their own judgment. A number of practical considerations can lead 
representatives to adopt the role of a trustee: 
 
The represented may not have the information to give intelligent instructions; 
the representative is unable to discover what his clienteles want; preferences 
remain unexpressed; there is no need for instructions because of a presumed 
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harmony of interests between representative and represented… (Eulau et al., 
1978: 118) 
 
At the other extreme, rather than relying on their own judgment, legislators who adopt 
the role of a delegate act on instructions from their constituents, even when this 
deviates from their own understanding of the constituents’ interests. Recognizing that 
many legislators do not find themselves operating at the extremes of the trustee-
delegate scale, the authors introduce the role of politico to categorise representatives 
who oscillate between a trustee and a delegate orientation depending on the situation 
(Eulau et al., 1978: 119). As governance becomes ever more complex, with many 
issues ‘beyond the comprehension of the average citizen’, legislators are increasingly 
called on to act as trustees (Eulau et al., 1978: 119–20).  
Indeed, Wessels argues that the practice of examining the position of 
legislators on the trustee-delegate scale – that is, the stylistic dimension of 
representation – is a ‘relatively useless’ endeavour, as many constitutions define 
parliamentarians ‘as independent and responsible only to their own conscience’ 
(2007: 840). In light of the demand for party discipline that is a feature of 
parliamentary life in many contexts, the trustee-delegate issue may be more fruitfully 
applied to the relationship between legislators and their parties rather than to that 
between legislators and constituents. It is by examining this issue that it emerges that 
‘political representation in liberal democracies more often than not is party 
representation’ (Wessels, 2007: 842). This suggests that the partisan control thesis 
applies in the context of most democratic legislatures. 
As well as differing in the way they conceive of and relate to the represented, 
representatives also vary in how they spend their time and energies. At the most basic 
level, politicians must decide how to divide their time and resources between the 
constituency and the legislature (Fenno, 1978: 33–4). The evidence clearly indicates 
that there is considerable variation in the degree to which legislators are attentive to 
their constituencies, together with differences in how legislators carry out 
constituency service (Fenno, 1978; Cain et al., 1987; Norris, 1997). Both personal 
factors, such as family considerations, and political factors, such as electoral 
competition, serve as sources of variation in legislators’ ‘home styles’ (Fenno, 1978: 
50; Norton and Wood, 1990). Politicians must also prioritize when operating in the 
setting of the legislature. Faced with competing demands on their time, they must 
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decide ‘whether to work on a committee report, prepare a speech, meet with interest 
groups or constituents, attend a party meeting, undertake research, attend a committee 
meeting, attend a plenary debate and speak in plenary’, among other potential forms 
of action (Hix et al., 2007: 72). These considerations indicate that representatives are 
required to make decisions regarding how they approach representation and that there 
is scope for them to vary in how they think about and carry out their work. 
 
The Functions and Consequences of Representation 
It is clear from the discussion above that there is considerable scope for variation as 
regards how elected representatives conceive of the represented and how they carry 
out representation, and that this potential is realised in contemporary practice. 
Nevertheless, the potential for variation should not be taken as an indication that the 
choices made by representatives are of no consequence. Indeed, the way politicians 
approach representation matters. It matters because it affects the degree to which the 
system of representation provides the political system with key functions. 
Birch identifies three general functions that political representation may fulfil, 
and eight specific functions: 
 
1. Popular control: to provide for a degree of popular control over the 
government. 
a. Responsiveness: to ensure that decision makers are responsive to 
the interest and opinions of the public. 
b. Accountability: to provide a way of holding political leaders 
publicly accountable for their actions. 
c. Peaceful change: to provide a mechanism for replacing one set of 
leaders by another without violence. 
 
2. Leadership: to provide for leadership and responsibility in decision 
making.  
a. Leadership: to provide for the recruitment of political leaders and 
the mobilization of support for them. 
b. Responsibility: to encourage political leaders to pursue long-term 
national interests as well as reacting to immediate pressures. 
 
3. System maintenance: to contribute towards the maintenance and smooth 
running of the political system by enlisting the support of citizens. 
a. Legitimation: to endow the government with a particular kind of 
legitimacy. 
b. Consent: to provide channels of communication through which the 
government can mobilize consent to particular policies. 
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c. Relief of pressure: to provide a safety valve through which 
aggrieved citizens can blow off steam and to disarm potential 
revolutionaries by engaging them in constitutional forms of 
activity. 
(adapted from Birch, 1971: 107–8) 
 
The concept of political representation itself provides no suggestion that any 
of these functions should be viewed as inherently more desirable than any other 
(Birch, 1971: 124–5), although the need for some functions may be viewed as more 
pressing than others in certain contexts. While all democratic systems fulfil the eight 
functions at least partially, systems of representation vary in the degree to which they 
provide for different functions (Birch, 1971: 108). Consequently, it is necessary to 
evaluate systems of political representation, paying close attention to the degree to 
which they provide the functions most pressingly required by the political system 
which they serve. In the process, it is also prudent to identify factors that may affect 
the degree to which the system of representation is able to provide these key 
functions. 
 Two of the arguments posited thus far in this chapter are that the way 
representatives approach their work determines the extent to which the political 
system is furnished by various functions, and that political parties are able to shape 
behavioural decisions made by representatives in ways that do not necessarily benefit 
citizens. These observations highlight the importance of gaining a thorough 
understanding of the role that partisan actors play in organizing democratic politics. 
This is especially the case in contexts where the functions that are expected of a 
system of political representation are clearly lacking. One such context is that of the 
European Union (EU), as the following section elucidates. 
 
Representation and the European Union 
The measure of political authority delegated to the EU has increased considerably in 
recent decades. Bearing in mind that EU law is binding and the fact that the EU’s 
competences span an extensive range of policy areas, ‘it is foreseeable – if not already 
the case – that European legislation will overtake the national legislation of the 
member-states in importance’ (Thomassen and Schmitt, 1999: 3). Indeed, in certain 
areas of policy-making, such as agriculture, the environment, and competition, the EU 
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has ‘essentially replaced’ national states as ‘the locus of meaningful power’ 
(Warleigh-Lack and Drachenberg, 2010: 210).  
The growth in the EU’s competences has led to concerns that the 
accountability mechanisms available at the EU level are too weak (Smismans, 2013: 
342–4). In the first decades of the integration project, the powers delegated to the 
supranational level were limited and related primarily to technical issues. Public 
interest in these developments was low, and as the powers were exercised by 
technocrats rather than through democratic participation, the project relied on a 
‘permissive consensus’ that was based on satisfaction with its policy outputs 
(Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970: 41; Smismans, 2013: 342). As the EU’s 
competences and activities grew, its reliance on output legitimacy increasingly came 
to be viewed as inadequate, and the claim that the EU suffers from a ‘democratic 
deficit’ became widespread (Follesdal and Hix, 2006; Weiler et al., 1995). Citizens 
did not have a set of directly elected representatives on whom they could rely to 
defend their interests at the EU level. It was not until 1979 that elections to the EP 
were held, and its role remained marginal until over a decade later. The ability of 
national parliamentarians to hold EU decision-makers to account remains severely 
restricted due to the EU’s institutional structure (O’Brennan and Raunio, 2007; 
Raunio, 1999; 2009). EU policy-making has historically been dominated by national 
government ministers in the Council and by government-appointed Commissioners, 
and deliberations are often conducted in private. As a result, national parliaments are 
unable to provide effective oversight of EU processes and ‘governments can 
effectively ignore their parliaments when making decisions in Brussels’ (Follesdal 
and Hix, 2006: 534–5).  
 Efforts at addressing the democratic deficit have centred on the twin-track 
approach of democratising the EP by holding elections and empowering the chamber. 
Since 1979 MEPs have been directly elected every five years, with elections taking 
place as national contests across EU Member States. As the EU has grown, so has the 
chamber. While the first round of elections returned 410 MEPs, there are 766 MEPs 
since Croatia’s accession in July 2013. Successive increases in the growth of the EP’s 
powers have seen the EP transformed from a ‘talking shop’ that played a peripheral 
role in the integration project to a powerful elected co-legislator that finds itself at the 
heart of European governance (Rittberger, 2005; Scully, 2010; Hix and Høyland, 
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2013). When created in the form of the Common Assembly (CA) of the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 the chamber’s lack of budgetary or 
legislative powers rendered the institution largely toothless. Today, the EP partakes as 
an equal to the Council in most instances of EU policy-making, has extensive powers 
of oversight over the Commission and Council, which carry out the EU’s executive 
functions, and wide-ranging budgetary powers (Corbett et al., 2011: 272). As a result, 
scholars increasingly view the EU as a ‘two chamber legislature in which the Council 
represents the states and the European Parliament represents the citizens’ (Hix and 
Høyland, 2011: 49; Corbett et al., 2011: 4).  
Nevertheless, the concerns regarding the EU’s democratic credentials have 
persisted. Chryssochoou (2000) has argued that the fundamental problem with the EU 
is that it lacks a demos, defined as ‘a composite citizen body, whose members share 
an active interest in the governance of the larger polity and who can direct their 
democratic claims to and via the central institutions’ (Chryssochoou, 2010: 382). The 
lack of ‘a sense of common identity’ amongst the governed (Chryssochoou, 2010: 
382) makes the task of securing the acceptance of minorities for majoritarian 
decisions challenging (Smismans, 2013: 343). A related concern is that the EU’s 
institutional structure is too different from what citizens are used to, and as a result 
citizens are unable to identify with it or to see it as democratic (Follesdal and Hix, 
2006: 356). 
 Other objections relate to the role of the EP within the EU, and to the way that 
European elections are conducted. The crucial function that parliaments serve in 
ensuring executive accountability is strongly linked to their ability to form and to 
bring down governments. While the EP plays a prominent role in the appointment of 
the Commission, even the reforms of the Lisbon Treaty does not give it the right to 
elect the leadership of the EU’s executive branch. There is no direct link between EP 
elections and the composition of the Commission and it is the national governments 
who are the ‘agenda-setters’ in the process of forming the Commission (Follesdal and 
Hix, 2006: 535; Smismans, 2013: 343).  
 Critics also argue that EP elections do not act as a mechanism that enables 
citizens to decide the direction of the EU or of the EP (Follesdal and Hix, 2006: 536; 
Hix, 2008). Elections are not fought on European issues or as contests for governing 
power between rival policy platforms. Voters consequently have no ‘strong sense at 
all of affecting critical policy choices at the European level and certainly not of 
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confirming or rejecting European governance’ (Weiler, 1995: 4). While there is some 
link between voting behaviour and questions of EU-level representation (Blondel et 
al., 1998; Hobolt et al., 2009), this is weak (Folesdal and Hix, 2006: 536). Many 
voters take advantage of the opportunity that EP elections afford to register a protest 
vote against governing parties, while lending support to smaller parties that they 
would not ordinarily support (Marsh, 1998: 606; Hix and Marsh, 2007; Marsh, 2007). 
Citizens and parties alike view these elections as less important than their national 
equivalents, which is not surprising as ‘no government is at stake, merely the political 
balance in the Parliament’ (Corbett et al., 2011: 32). Turnout levels are low and have 
declined consistently since 1979, even as the powers of the EP have grown (Scully, 
2010: 171–2). In short, EP elections are the archetypal second-order elections (Reif 
and Schmitt, 1980; van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996). As a result, there is little sense 
that voters confer a mandate on the representatives elected, or that elections function 
as a mechanism for connecting citizens with the EU. 
 This section has made clear that high expectations are made of MEPs. 
Through their work as political representatives they are expected to serve as a linkage 
mechanism between the people of 28 states and a political system which few citizens 
understand, and of which an ever declining number approve. Despite the low levels of 
public awareness of their work (Farrell and Scully, 2007: 31–3), MEPs are given the 
task of serving as a source of several of the key functions outlined by Birch (1971), 
features of political life which the EU continues to lack. The rest of the chapter 
provides an overview of current understanding of how the EP operates as a 
transnational representative institution, of how MEPs approach representation, and of 
the role that partisan actors play in structuring the context in which MEPs work. In so 
doing, the discussion draws attention to the fact that while there is a range of 
important activities that MEPs can carry out on behalf of citizens, partisan actors may 
be able to shape the behaviour of MEPs according to their own interests and to the 
detriment of those of citizens. In short, it presents the notion that parties may be 
exacerbating the agency losses that citizens suffer when delegating authority to MEPs 
rather than minimising these losses by holding MEPs to account. 
 
Life and Politics in the European Parliament 
In terms of how it operates as an institution, the EP differs in many ways from most 
national legislatures. This is perhaps not surprising bearing in mind that it is the ‘only 
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transnational directly elected representative institution in the world’ (Judge and 
Earnshaw, 2007: 148). The Parliament is based in three different locations, each in a 
different country. Whereas most committee work is undertaken in Brussels, MEPs 
undertake a 400km commute to Strasbourg each month to attend plenary sessions, 
while the institution’s secretariat is based in Luxembourg. The chamber brings 
together MEPs from 28 Member States, elected from the lists of nearly 200 domestic 
political parties. It features an unparalleled degree of multilingualism (Corbett et al., 
2011: 2), with members deliberating in any of the EP’s 24 working languages, into 
which all documents are translated (Corbett et al., 2011: 42). The challenges of 
communication, together with the fact that most of the EP’s work in carried out in 
committees, largely explain why proceedings tend to lack the spontaneity and drama 
of deliberations in many national parliaments (Scully, 2010: 170).  
Further, the EP is similar to the US Congress, ‘but unlike the national 
parliaments of all the EU Member States’ in that it does not select a government from 
within its ranks and the executive is therefore not dependent on a parliamentary 
majority (Corbett et al., 2011: 2; 9). Individual MEPs are able to play a far more 
influential role in defining policy than ‘back-benchers’ in most national parliaments, 
where the executive dominates the policy process. Draft legislation ‘is truly only a 
draft version’, and considerable rewriting takes places before the EP and Council 
agree on a final wording (Ringe, 2010: 13). The EP delegates the task of policy 
development to its 20 committees, which in turn delegate each issue to rapporteurs, 
who guide legislation through the chamber. Astute rapporteurs can gain significant 
influence over the final wording of a policy document, as the views outlined in a 
report become Parliament’s official position if approved by a vote in plenary. Every 
year ‘thousands of amendments to draft legislation put forward by ordinary back-
bench MEPs end up on the statue book’ (Corbett et al., 2011: 9; Benedetto, 2005; 
Costello and Thomson, 2010; Yoshinaka et al, 2010). Other positions of genuine 
influence include Committee Chairs and Group coordinators. The former hold 
considerable power over committee agenda and are able to speak on behalf of their 
committee, while the latter play a role in allocating rapporteurships, in resolving 
political disagreements, and in coordinating voting (Corbett et al., 2011: 147–51; 
Judge and Earnshaw, 2008: 176). 
Due to the lack of a governing majority in the EP, the chamber’s decisions are 
based on a fluid majority, with coalitions forming around each issue individually. 
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Rather than sitting according to nationality, MEPs form parliamentary groupings (EP 
Groups) based on ideological orientation. Most MEPs were affiliated to one of seven 
Groups during the 2009–14 parliamentary term, with a small minority opting to 
remain unattached. Political life in the EP revolves around these Groups in many 
ways. They play a central role in forming parliamentary majorities, as ‘MEPs vote 
predominantly along Group lines’; in selecting the President and Vice-Presidents, 
committee chairs, and rapporteurs; in setting the parliamentary agenda; and in 
allocating speaking time (Corbett et al., 2011: 78). 
In addition, while parliamentarians in most settings have some sense of 
representing a geographical area, the sense in which MEPs relate to a constituency is 
likely to differ from that of national parliamentarians.11 The number of constituents 
that MEPs are called on to ‘represent’ is far higher than is the case for national 
parliamentarians (Judge and Earnshaw, 2008: 98). Following the 2009 EP elections, 
for example, each MEP served a mean of 679,000 EU citizens. The figure varied 
considerably between Member States, from a high of 906,000 for Spanish MEPs to a 
low of 81,000 in the case of MEPs from Luxembourg (Corbett et al., 2011: 29–30). 
This compares with an average of one Member of the House of Commons per 93,487 
British constituent, one Member of the Bundestag per 134,262 German constituent, 
and one Member of the Assemblée nationale per 109,557 French constituent 
(Earnshaw and Judge, 2008: 98, figures relate to 2006). The sense of distance that 
exists between representatives and constituents may be compounded by the fact that 
the areas from which MEPs are elected also tend to be far greater compared with 
those from which domestic politicians are elected. National constituencies were used 
as a basis for the 2009 EP elections in twenty Member States, while the elections 
were conducted regionally in a further six Member States, with Germany operating a 
mixed system (Corbett et al., 2011: 17–8).  
Despite these idiosyncrasies, the EP shares three main similarities with 
national legislatures. Firstly, much like in most national legislatures contestation 
within the EP takes place primarily ‘along a left-right dimension’ (Hix et al., 2007: 
66; Kreppel and Tsebelis, 1999). Secondly, in terms of its basic function, the EP 
corresponds to Norton’s definition of legislatures as:  
 
constitutionally designated institutions for giving assent to binding measures 
of public policy, that assent being given on behalf of a political community 
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that extends beyond the government elite responsible for formulating those 
measures. 
 (Norton, 1990: 1, cited in Judge and Earnshaw, 2008: 10). 
 
Thirdly, regardless of the differences outlined in this section between the EP 
and domestic legislatures, the function of MEPs is essentially the same as that of 
representatives operating in other settings, which is to provide citizens with political 
representation by acting on behalf of citizens in political contexts. The institutional 
design of the EP, both in terms of its committees and its plenary sessions, provide 
MEPs with settings in which to pursue policy goals and to give voice to the concerns 
of various societal groups. Most MEPs serve as full members of one or two 
committees and as a substitute on a few others (Corbett et al., 2011: 146), and 
constituency interests frequently shape their choice of committees (Whitaker, 2011: 
173). The plenary setting offers MEPs a number of mechanisms to express opinions 
on issues unrelated to the policies that are under discussion in the EP at a given time. 
These include the ‘one-minute speeches’ (Corbett et al., 2011: 195; 203; 341; 
Westlake 1994a: 177) and the two weekly Question Time sessions (Judge and 
Earnshaw, 2008: 218–19). MEPs may also present written and oral questions to the 
Commission and Council (Raunio, 1996a: 362–3). 
The following section applies many of the theoretical insights provided in the 
first part of this chapter by examining what is currently known about MEPs as 
individuals, how they relate to various groups, and how they act on behalf of the 
represented. As well as providing a basis for understanding how MEPs operate as 
representatives, this discussion provides grounds for examining in greater detail the 
nature of relations between MEPs and partisan actors. 
 
MEPs as Representatives 
Understanding of various aspects of the representation provided by MEPs has 
increased considerably over the last two decades. In certain ways, this representation 
is viewed as having improved over time. For example, MEPs have become more 
representative of citizens in the descriptive sense. While the EP shares the descriptive 
bias that is a feature of most legislatures in being disproportionately male, middle 
class, and middle aged (Beauvallet et al., 2012: 8–11; see also Judge and Earnshaw, 
2008: 92 and Hix and Lord, 1997: 82),12 it has come to feature greater levels of 
gender equality than most national legislatures. Over a third (35%) of MEPs elected 
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in 2009 were female, compared with 24% of national parliamentarians (Corbett et al., 
2011: 53, figures refer to September 2009). There are also ways in which the 
representation provided by MEPs has improved in the substantive sense (Pitkin, 
1967). The widespread absenteeism of earlier years has diminished as MEPs have 
increasingly come to view their role as a full time occupation (Scully, 2010: 168). 
While some political parties use the EP as a ‘political retirement home’ for former 
leaders, ‘most members work hard’ (Scully, 2010: 168; Hix et al., 2007: 72–3). 
Recent work has broadened understanding of how MEPs carry out 
representation. Similar to legislators in other settings, MEPs must choose between 
different conceptions of representation and must ‘prioritize their activities’ on a daily 
basis (Farrell and Scully, 2007: 93–4; Hix et al., 2007: 72). The need to be selective 
may be even more important for MEPs than for legislators in other contexts. It takes a 
substantial amount of time for most MEPs to travel between the three settings in 
which they are active, namely the constituency, Brussels, and Strasbourg. The scope 
for influencing policy outcomes provides MEPs with an incentive to engage in policy 
work that back-benchers in most other settings do not share. Additionally, with the 
differences in language and cultures, the setting in which MEPs operate provides 
challenges that politicians do not face in domestic settings. 
Farrell and Scully (2007) demonstrate that MEPs attach at least some value to 
carrying out a range of political activities. Considering the EP’s considerable powers, 
it is unsurprising that MEPs view ‘working on legislation’ as by far the most 
important aspect of their work. They also attach considerable importance to 
articulating ‘important societal needs and interests’, to activities relating to 
‘parliamentary oversight’, and to ‘developing common strategies for EU policies’. 
Less importance is accorded to representing the interests of ‘individual citizens’ and 
to the task of mediating ‘between different interests in society’ (Farrell and Scully, 
2007: 106). 
However, little is known about how, or even whether, MEPs carry out 
constituency service. While MEPs spend much of their time abroad, most attempt to 
maintain regular contact with citizens in their home countries, with over 90% 
claiming to spend at least some time undertaking political work every week in their 
home countries (Farrell and Scully, 2007: 123–4; Scully, 2005: 73). Again, this may 
not be entirely surprising, bearing in mind that a considerable number of MEPs have 
experience of being active in domestic politics. Over a third of MEPs elected in 2009 
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(35.7%) had previously served as national parliamentarians, while more than 100 
MEPs had domestic ministerial experience, and eleven had served as prime minister 
or president (Corbett et al., 2011: 55–8). Further, the high level of turnover that the 
EP sees from one term to the next suggests that many MEPs’ experience of domestic 
politics is recent. Reflecting an historic trend, only 49.6% of MEPs elected in 2009 
had served in the previous term (Corbett et al., 2011: 51).  
Nevertheless, the links between MEPs and citizens are weak. The level of 
postal and electronic correspondence that MEPs receive from constituents is 
‘extremely low’, even in the case of the UK, where the tradition of constituency 
service is strong (Bowler and Farrell, 1993: 55; Farrell and Scully, 2007: 175–6; 
Shephard and Scully, 2002: 162–7). The fact that MEPs are drawn from 28 Member 
States, each with its own political history, culture, and institutions (Farrell and Scully, 
2007: 103–4), suggests that there is likely to be considerable differences in the 
importance MEPs attach to constituency work in general, and to the types of activities 
that MEPs carry out in their constituencies. As the degree of variation in the ‘home 
styles’ (Fenno, 1978) of MEPs is currently unknown, it follows that there is no way of 
explaining variation in the event that any exists. 
Scholars have also raised concerns regarding the degree of congruence 
between the views of MEPs and those of citizens on key issues relating to integration. 
Studies by Marsh and Wessels (1997) and Thomassen and Schmitt (1997) identify 
that MEPs are considerably more favourable to integration than citizens. These 
concern are tempered somewhat by the findings presented by Scully (2005: 94–8) and 
Franklin and Scarrow (1999) which indicate that there is a broad similarity in the 
views held by national and European parliamentarians on issues relating to 
integration. 
In addition to the concerns raised regarding the level of contact between MEPs 
and citizens and the degree of congruence between the views of the representatives 
and the represented, scholars also fear that MEPs are provided with incentives to 
prioritize the advancement of party interests ahead of those of constituents. Studies 
which examine how MEPs relate to various societal groups (Raunio, 1996b, 1997: 
125–80; Farrell and Scully, 2007) have shown that MEPs attribute importance to 
representing several groups. According to Farrell and Scully, the greatest importance 
is attached to representing those who voted for their party and ‘all people in my 
member state’, followed by their national party, the EP Group and ‘all people in 
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Europe’. As a result, the authors claim that ‘most MEPs have little problem in 
acknowledging that their representative role is one with numerous dimensions’ and 
that they are ‘agents’ of several ‘principals’ (2007: 105).  
However, in examining how MEPs approach representation, Farrell and Scully 
find a link between the electoral system and the choices MEPs make regarding which 
societal groups and types of activities to prioritize. In contrast to MEPs elected under 
more open electoral systems, those who depend on their position on party lists for 
their re-election tend to ‘promote the interests of political parties and other organized 
interests over those of individual voters’ (Farrell and Scully, 2007: 9; 136–7). This 
suggests that parties exploit their control of the re-election prospects of MEPs to 
compel them to act in ways that prioritize the party’s interests to the detriment of 
those of citizens. This is an alarming finding, bearing in mind that parties are called 
on to assist citizens to contain rather than to exacerbate agency losses, as the 
discussion presented earlier in the chapter makes clear. In light of this claim, the 
following section examines current understanding of the role that political parties play 
in structuring the work of MEPs. 
 
MEPs and the Partisan Control Thesis 
Questions relating to the nature of the relationship between MEPs and two actors –
national political parties and the EP Groups – have stimulated considerable scholarly 
interest over the last two decades. A specific concern of the literature is the degree to 
which these two types of actors are able to influence the way MEPs think about and 
carry out their work. There is a clear discrepancy within the literature between studies 
that claim that these two actors are able to exercise considerable influence on MEPs 
(Hix, 2002; Hix et al., 2007; Faas, 2003; Lindstädt et al., 2011; Raunio, 2012a) and 
studies that either dispute this claim explicitly (Ringe, 2010), or that present evidence 
which casts doubt on this assumption (Aylott et al., 2013; Blomgren, 2003; Bomberg, 
1998; Poguntke et al., 2007; Raunio, 2000, 2002, 2007; Scully, 2001). In examining 
accounts of the behaviour of MEPs and of the links between MEPs and these two 
types of partisan actors, this section identifies a strand in the literature which 
advances the partisan control thesis. The section proceeds to question the thesis, 
drawing on studies that argue that MEPs act largely independently of these partisan 
organizations. Finally, a case is made for re-examining the nature of the relationship 
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between MEPs and these partisan actors, in order to further understanding of the basis 
on which MEPs make decisions relating to representation. 
 
The ‘partisan control thesis’ 
The partisan control thesis is based on the notion that national political parties and EP 
Groups are able to provide MEPs with incentives to modify their behaviour. 
Successive studies have applied the principal–agent framework to the relationship 
between MEPs and these two partisan actors, conceiving of MEPs as agents, and of 
domestic parties and EP Groups as principals which seek to control their behaviour 
(Scully, 2001; Raunio, 2007; Hix, 2002; Hix et al., 2007). It is argued that the 
influence of national parties stems from their ability to control the prospects of MEPs 
in gaining re-election or in acquiring positions in domestic politics. EP Groups, in 
contrast, can use their control of parliamentary resources, such as positions of 
seniority, assignments, and speaking time in plenary, to coerce MEPs to follow 
instructions. The plausibility of this foundational argument – that partisan actors are 
able to use incentives to shape the behaviour of MEPs – is discussed in greater detail 
in the following chapter. The rest of the discussion in this chapter focuses on the 
empirical evidence which supports and undermines the partisan control thesis. 
 Studies of voting at roll call divisions demonstrate that EP Groups (Attinà, 
1990, 1992; Quanjel and Wolters, 1993; Brzinski, 1995; Raunio, 1996b, 1997; Hix 
and Lord, 1997; Kreppel 2002; Hix, 2001, 2002, 2004; Hix and Noury, 2009; Hix et 
al., 2005, 2007) and national party delegations (Hix et al., 2007) are highly cohesive. 
Examining voting behaviour during the 1999–2004 parliamentary term, Hix and 
colleagues find that MEPs vote with their parties at 95.48% of roll call divisions, with 
their EP Groups in 90.70% of instances, and with both their Groups and their parties 
in 88.92% of instances (2007: 137; see Figure 1). These findings have been 
interpreted in two ways. The first relates to the nature of the relationship between 
national party delegations and their EP Groups. Conflicts between Groups and 
national party delegations are argued to be surprisingly low, and it is claimed that 
national parties ‘voluntarily decide not to vote against’ the Group where they identify 
a potential for conflict (Hix et al., 2007: 133). This may be because the national party 
believes that Group cohesion assists it to realise long-term policy objectives or 
because it expects to be rewarded by the Group (Hix et al., 2007: 138). 
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The second interpretation of voting practices relates to the basis on which 
MEPs make behavioural decisions and to the relationship between MEPs and their 
Groups and domestic parties. As MEPs tend to vote with their domestic parties rather 
than with their Groups in cases of conflict, it is claimed that MEPs are ‘ultimately 
controlled by their national parties rather than their European political groups’ (Hix et 
al., 2007: 138; 133). Hix and Lord (1996) find that this control was typified at the 
confirmation of Jacques Santer as Commission President in 1994. MEPs from all 
national parties represented in the Council voted against their Groups in cases where 
the preferences of the domestic party leadership conflicted with those of Group 
leaders. The fact that the degree of cohesion has remained high throughout the period 
in which the chamber has been elected (Hix et al., 2007: 138) suggests that domestic 
parties have always controlled their MEPs. 
 
 
Figure 1: Voting with/against national parties and EP Groups in the fifth 
parliament (1999–2004).  
Note: The figure shows every vote by every MEP in the fifth European 
Parliament (excluding MEPs that were not attached to an EP Group or whose 
national party had fewer than three MEPs). Each MEP ‘vote decision’ was 
categorised as a vote either (1) with or against the majority of the MEP’s 
national party delegation and (2) with or against the majority of the MEP’s EP 
Group.  
(Adapted from Hix et al., 2007: 137) 
 
Supporting the basic tenets of Hix and colleagues’ claims regarding domestic 
party control, Farrell and Scully (2007) find that MEPs whose re-election prospects 
are more reliant on their parties tend to focus on party activities. Based on analysis of 
a survey of MEPs, this finding is particularly interesting, as it suggests that parties are 
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able to influence the way MEPs approach different aspects of their work as 
representatives more broadly than simply at parliamentary divisions. 
Despite the loyalty of MEPs to their national parties, the Groups are still 
argued to affect the behaviour of MEPs, even if this influence is ‘less direct’ (Hix et 
al., 2007: 145). National parties collectively formulate the Group positions, before 
using ‘their own power to discipline the MEPs to follow the European party line’, 
sometimes even when they do not agree with that position (Hix et al., 2007: 146). The 
claim that the behaviour of MEPs is shaped by both types of partisan actors, but that 
the influence of national parties is greater than that exercised by the EP Groups, 
remains prevalent (Hix, 2010: 236; Raunio, 2012a). Indeed, many scholars accept the 
partisan control thesis without question and have presented its assumptions as a 
central part of their theoretical framework in recent studies (Meserve et al., 2009; 
Lindstädt et al., 2011, 2012; Klüver and Spoon, 2013: 2–3). 
 
Ringe’s critique of Hix et al. (2007) 
Evidence provided by two forms of contributions cast doubt on the partisan control 
thesis. This section focuses on the first, which primarily comes in the form of Ringe’s 
(2010) monograph. He critiques how Hix and colleagues assume that voting cohesion 
is brought about by party control. The second body of work, which is the focus of the 
next section, finds that the relationship between MEPs and their domestic parties is 
weak in most cases.  
Two main objections have been raised to Hix et al.’s (2007) findings. Firstly, 
scholars question the extent to which their findings, based on behaviour at roll call 
divisions, are generalizable to parliamentary divisions conducted by a show of hands 
and electronic voting. Roll call voting is only used in a minority of divisions, with 
estimates ranging between 15% and a third of all votes (Kreppel and Tsebelis, 1999; 
Thiem, 2006: 2; Hix et al., 2007: 29). Westlake claims that there is, in fact, no 
accurate way of measuring the percentage of divisions taking place by roll call (2007: 
346–7).  
Doubts over the degree to which findings relating to roll call divisions are 
generalizable to voting behaviour at divisions taken by other means also stem from 
the fact that these divisions are not typical of all parliamentary divisions. Group 
leaders strategically ask for votes to be taken by roll call to demonstrate the cohesion 
of their Group or to reveal divisions in a rival Group (Carrubba and Gabel, 1999; 
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Gabel and Carrubba, 2004; Hug, 2006; Thiem, 2006), and ask for divisions to be 
taken by roll call on some issues more than on others (Carrubba et al., 2006; Høyland, 
2010). Hix and colleagues respond to these criticisms by claiming that because EP 
Groups tend to ask for roll call voting ‘on issues that are important to them’, the 
procedure is used to make the most important decisions (2007: 30). Others reject this 
claim, stating that EP Group leaders make ‘sure that the most important votes are 
specifically not decided by roll-call’ (Gabel and Carrubba, 2004: 5; Westlake, 2007: 
346; Judge and Earnshaw, 2008: 143–5). Even if it is accepted that partisan actors 
influence behaviour at roll call divisions, this debate indicates that there are grounds 
to question whether they do so at divisions taken by other means. 
Secondly, Ringe maintains that it is inappropriate to use aggregate-level data 
to draw inferences about ‘how individuals make decisions on the EP floor’ (2010: 4). 
High levels of voting cohesion is not necessarily a product of party discipline, and the 
statistical analysis carried out by Hix et al. does not fully interrogate ‘the causal 
relationship between party control and party cohesion’ (Ringe, 2010: 4). Focusing 
attention on Group cohesion, Ringe argues that the Groups are structurally weak and 
lack ‘the traditional tools of party control and the capacity to satisfy their members’ 
vote- or office-seeking ambitions’ (2010: 4). As turnover levels at EP elections are 
high, MEPs seek short-term incentives, and they are unlikely ‘to trade payoffs in the 
present for uncertain office benefits in the future’ (Ringe, 2010: 4). 
Instead, Ringe explains the high degree of cohesion by arguing that as MEPs 
are unable to acquire the expertise necessary to make accurate choices in a broad 
range of policy areas, they seek guidance from MEPs within their domestic party 
delegations or their Groups who are experts. Despite the risk that they do not hold 
common preferences with their expert colleagues, relying on the advice of colleagues 
is the most efficient way of dealing with an environment of ‘competing interests, 
substantive uncertainty, and asymmetrically distributed information’ (Ringe, 2010: 5–
7). Group positions are defined by MEPs who are policy experts, and who ‘serve as 
the de facto leadership of their party groups’ on their specialist issues (Ringe, 2010: 
213). The fact that MEPs are more likely to perceive that their preferences coincide 
with expert legislators from their own national political parties than from their Groups 
explains why cohesion levels within national delegations is higher than within the 
Groups. Ringe’s account redefines the concept of partisan leadership in the context of 
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the EP, and serves as a cogent explanation of how MEPs make policy-related 
decisions. 
 
Studies of relations between national parties and MEPs 
Scholars examining the nature of relations between MEPs and their domestic parties 
present a second body of evidence which casts doubt on the veracity of the partisan 
control thesis. Writing in the period before the introduction of direct elections, Hearl 
and Sargent (1979) find that domestic parties largely ignored the work of their MEPs. 
Over a decade later, Attinà similarly found that ‘almost all national political parties 
pay little attention to the activities of MEPs and easily consent that competition and 
coalition in the European Parliament develop independently from competition and 
coalition in state parliaments’ (1994: 287). Rather than MEPs complaining of 
interference from their domestic political parties, Bomberg’s examination of green 
parties offers an account which demonstrates that some MEPs desire greater support 
than domestic parties are able to provide:  
 
Green MEPs were given no definition of what key points to work for and 
implement through the EU. … The MEPs receive neither coherence from the 
party nor support from the grassroots. As members of a distant parliament, 
they enjoy freedom but no guidance, independence but little respect. For the 
Green MEPs, the possibilities and freedom provided by the unique green 
mandate are ultimately outweighed by its paradoxical consequences. 
(Bomberg, 1998: 123; 125). 
 
There is thus little evidence that national parties attempt to control the 
behaviour of MEPs by systematically issuing voting instructions backed up by a 
system of threats and rewards. Writing in 1997, Hix and Lord note that there had been 
to date only two instances of national parties issuing voting instructions to MEPs on a 
regular basis: ‘the French Socialists in the early 1980s and the British Labour Party 
since 1994’ (1997: 129). Examining data provided by the 2001 MEP survey, Scully 
(2001) finds that the practice of national party leaderships issuing voting instructions 
is very limited. On a scale of 1 (‘On Almost Every Vote’) to 5 (‘Never’), only 15.0% 
of responses lie above the midpoint and over two-thirds of MEPs (67.9%) indicated 
that they receive voting instructions from the party leadership ‘Never’ or ‘Nearly 
Never’ (Scully, 2001: Table 2).  
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In another large-n study, Raunio found that less than one in ten MEPs (8.5%) 
received voting instructions ‘on a regular basis’, with under a third (32.2%) receiving 
instructions ‘on issues of fundamental importance’ to parties, and nearly half of MEPs 
(47.5%) never receiving voting instructions from their domestic political parties 
(2002: 100). As few parties demonstrate any interest in the work of MEPs, and limit 
such interest to ‘nationally important’ issues, Raunio is able to claim that MEPs are 
‘relatively independent from their parties’ (2002: 105). Despite these findings, Raunio 
finds that the ‘information and control links between MEPs and the national parties 
have increased as the EU and its Parliament have acquired more powers’ (2002: 105). 
Growing interest from political parties is not necessarily seen as a positive 
development for politics within the EP. Raunio cautions that increased party 
interaction may constitute ‘serious problems for the EP and its party groups’ as it may 
impede coalition formation processes within the EP (2002: 88).  
 Raunio’s study made a valuable contribution to understanding of the links 
between domestic parties and MEPs at a time when the study of the field was 
underdeveloped. Nevertheless, as the author acknowledges (Raunio, 2002: 105), the 
strong focus on quantitative analysis limits the degree to which the findings are able 
to provide insights into the nature of these relationships and, in particular, into the 
way that the relationship affects how MEPs carry out their work. The data relating to 
the regularity with which voting instructions are issued serves as a prime example. 
While the regularity with which voting instructions are issued is identified, it is not 
possible to gain an understanding of whether those instructions affect the voting 
behaviour of MEPs. Further, the study offers little in the way of analysis of what 
variables may explain this variation between parties, further than noting that EP 
Group affiliation has ‘little explanatory value’ (Raunio, 2002: 100). 
In a later study, which focuses on Finnish case studies, Raunio establishes that 
Finnish parties have little control over MEPs. No party ‘has ever instructed its MEPs 
how to vote, nor have any of the parties invested resources in monitoring what their 
MEPs do in Brussels’ (2007: 141). Parties expect little from MEPs: most national 
delegations are expected to report back to the party executive once or twice a year and 
to inform party officials of developments taking place in EU politics more regularly 
as issues arise (Raunio, 2007: 141–2). It is therefore not surprising that the level of 
contact between MEPs and party officials is low, and ‘depends to a large extent on the 
personality and ideological profile of the MEPs, with enormous variation both within 
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and between parties’ (Raunio, 2007: 140). There is very little formalised contact 
between MEPs and the party leadership as policy coordination takes places at 
working group level rather than at party leadership level. Taking these considerations 
together, it is clear that ‘Finnish MEPs act rather, if not very, independently’ (Raunio, 
2007: 142).  
 Raunio’s study also seeks to explain variation in the degree to which domestic 
political parties engage with their MEPs. Proceeding from the rationalist assumption 
that ‘the level of contacts or control between national parties and their MEPs depends 
on the costs and benefits of such control for national parties’, he hypothesises that 
four factors determine the degree to which parties attempt to and succeed in 
controlling MEPs: ‘The rules of the electoral system, the size of the member state and 
the national party delegation in the EP, and the cohesion of the party over European 
integration’ (Raunio, 2007: 131). As the author acknowledges (Raunio, 2007: 142), 
the research design adopted, based on data gathered from interviews conducted with 
Finnish party officials, is not entirely appropriate for testing these hypotheses. A 
single country study where the electoral system and size of the Member State are 
constant factors, and where there is little variation in the size of national party 
delegations in the EP or in the levels of party cohesion over European integration 
does not offer a rigorous basis for examining these potential sources of variation.  
However, Raunio argues that the electoral system is partly to explain for the 
weak nature of relations between parties and MEPs. Not only does the open-list 
system free MEPs from the control of parties to a certain extent by removing one 
potential instrument of control from the parties’ armoury, but it also leads MEPs to 
spend time directly engaged with their constituents, leaving them with little time to 
develop contacts with the party leadership. This tendency is reinforced by the fact that 
the whole country forms a single constituency (Raunio, 2007: 142). However, due to 
the limitations of the research design, the claim that the open-list ‘electoral system 
clearly impacts on MEPs’ behaviour’ cannot be substantiated (Raunio, 2007: 143, 
ital. added). 
Blomgren (2003) explores whether the nature of the relationship between 
MEPs and their domestic parties leads to variation in the parliamentary roles that 
MEPs adopt. Selecting as case studies MEPs from three types of parties – social 
democratic, right wing, and the greens – in Ireland, the Netherlands, and Sweden, 
Blomgren also finds that links between MEPs and their parties are weak. Reflecting 
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other studies, he finds that most parties ‘struggle to include MEPs in their 
organizational set-up’ (2003: iv) and lack understanding of and interest in the work of 
MEPs (2003: 296). He also finds that MEPs experience a ‘growing hostility’ towards 
them within their parties (2003: 196–7). None of the variables for which Blomgren 
tests explain why MEPs adopt different role orientations (2003: 307). Neither the 
degree to which candidate selection is centralised, the type of electoral system used, 
or even the practice of forming contracts between the MEPs and their parties has any 
appreciable influence on how MEPs carry out their work (2003: 306; 310). 
A more recent major study of the nature of relations between MEPs and their 
parties largely reflects Blomgren’s findings. Poguntke and colleagues (2007) examine 
how thirty parties from six West European Member States have adapted to EU 
integration, and pay some attention to the degree to which these parties engage with 
their MEPs. Despite the growth in the powers of the EU and its elected chamber, as 
well as the additional funds that the EP makes available, they find that there has only 
been a marginal increase in the number of officials employed by the parties to deal 
with EU affairs (Aylott, 2007: 169). Further, as national parties ‘pay fairly little 
attention’ to their delegations in the EP, MEPs operate with extensive autonomy from 
their parties (Ladrech, 2007: 218). The degree of coordination between parties and 
their MEPs is low in virtually all cases (Aylott et al., 2007: 200–2), as interest shown 
by national parties in the activities of MEPs is limited to instances where their work 
attains salience domestically (Luther, 2007: 43). In many cases, especially in 
Germany, it is the MEPs themselves who seek to build stronger links to their parties 
and to ensure that their behaviour corresponds to their parties’ preferences (Poguntke, 
2007: 124). As a result, rather than ‘being held accountable by their national parties’, 
MEPs are understood to follow a ‘supply-side logic of accountability’ (Poguntke, 
2007: 124). 
The finding that parties pay little attention to the work of MEPs may be 
surprising, bearing in mind that parties could use MEPs to achieve policy goals and to 
gain from their expertise when developing EU policy. Ladrech explains this lack of 
engagement with MEPs by arguing that party elites would risk their own standing in 
their organizations by empowering MEPs and party officials who are EU experts 
(2007: 226). The result of the current state of affairs is that MEPs remain marginal 
actors within their parties, and that there is even animosity and a degree of distrust 
between party elites and MEPs in some cases (Carter and Ladrech, 2007: 77–8). 
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These findings provide a further indication that MEPs have considerable autonomy 
over their behaviour, especially in terms of their activities within the EP. 
In a recent study, which examines the delegation of authority and 
accountability mechanisms in Nordic parties, Aylott et al. (2013) also find that 
Danish, Finnish, and Swedish MEPs operate largely autonomously, and tend to have a 
greater degree of independence from their party than national parliamentarians 
(Aylott et al., 2013: 77–8). There is little monitoring of the work of MEPs, reflecting 
the apparent lack of interest from national parties (Aylott et al., 2013: 111; 115). 
 With most studies suggesting that parties have not taken any significant steps 
to engage with their MEPs, evidence from the case of the British Labour Party during 
Tony Blair’s time as Prime Minister stands as an outlier. The party established the 
‘link system’ to coordinate policy between the European Parliamentary Labour Party 
(EPLP) and government ministers (Ovey, 2002; Messmer, 2003). Government 
ministers selected an MEP in each policy area to act as their eyes and ears in the EP, 
and to assist with the development of the government’s EU policy. The link MEPs 
were appointed to the ministerial team and, in exchange for direct access to ministers 
and the opportunities provided to influence policy, were required to support the 
government (Messmer, 2003: 205).  
Writing soon after the link system was established, Messmer suggests that the 
link system enabled strong coordination between the government and the EPLP. He 
notes that link MEPs would attend ministerial meetings ‘once or twice a month’, with 
even more frequent communication taking place by telephone and email (Messmer, 
2003: 206). In a slightly contrasting account, Ovey finds that there was considerable 
variation in the degree to which different Labour ministers utilised the link system, 
and that there remained a degree of detachment between the EPLP and the party in 
government during this period (2002). Nevertheless, it appears that the party 
maintained far stronger links to its delegation of MEPs at that time than most parties. 
There is also evidence to suggest that parties pay some attention to their MEPs 
in cases where there is a potential for them to cause embarrassment to their parties 
domestically. The process of confirming Jacques Santer as Commission President in 
1994 serves as the most prominent example (Hix and Lord, 1996). As this was an 
issue of particular sensitivity to the governing parties (who had selected Santer during 
negotiations in the Council), they placed a considerable degree of pressure on their 
MEPs to vote in favour of Santer’s confirmation and their efforts were successful. As 
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the potential for MEPs to cause embarrassment to their parties has increased 
alongside the growth in the EP’s powers, even parties that otherwise show a lack of 
interest in EU affairs are expected to pay attention to their MEPs when issues that 
attain saliency domestically emerge (Raunio, 2002: 100–101; Brown Pappamikail, 
1998: 211–15).  
Finally, Whitaker presents evidence in two studies that suggests that national 
parties engage with the EP’s committees in ways that ‘further their policy aims’ 
(2011: 168; 2005). He finds that national parties are over-represented on EP 
committees ‘whose jurisdictions have higher salience to them’ (2011: 169) and that 
national parties ensure that MEPs who are members of ‘legislatively active 
committees’ are representative of the preferences of the wider national party 
delegation (2011: 169–70; 2005: 24). 
 
Studies of relations between EP Groups and MEPs 
The literature on the transnational parliamentary Groups is vast (see, for example, 
Fitzmaurice, 1975; Pridham and Pridham, 1981; Bardi, 1989, 1994; Raunio 1996b, 
1997; Kreppel, 2002; McElroy and Benoit, 2007, 2010; Hix et al., 2007), and recent 
methodological advances have enabled scholars to considerably further understanding 
of these entities. While the extensive literature on roll call voting leaves little doubt 
that the mainstream Groups act in a highly and increasingly cohesive manner at 
parliamentary divisions (Brzinski, 1995; Kreppel 2002; Faas, 2003; Thomassen et al., 
2004; Hix 2002; Hix et al., 2007; Hix and Noury, 2009), less is known about whether 
this cohesion is brought about as a result of Groups proactively taking steps towards 
discipline (Ringe, 2010).  
Kreppel notes that ‘the internal development of the party groups is perhaps the 
least studied aspect of the European Parliament’ (2002: 177). Despite her important 
contribution to understanding the two largest Groups in the EP, the EPP and the 
Socialist Group, little systematic work has been carried out on the dynamics that 
operate within Groups. This is especially the case on the issues of whether, how, and 
under what conditions they attempt to enforce discipline. Further, until recently 
(Whiatker and Lynch, 2014), scholars have shown little interest in the smaller Groups, 
despite the fact that some of these Groups frequently play a key role in coalition 
formation processes within the chamber. 
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Corbett et al. present the standard view of how Groups operate, noting that 
while they follow ‘the British tradition’ of issuing voting guidance with an indication 
of the importance of the division, these whipping systems are ‘less strict than in most 
national parliaments’ for three reasons (2011: 121).  Indiscipline is less risky in the 
EP than in most national legislatures, where it could lead to a government’s downfall; 
the diversity within Groups makes it difficult to present a unified position which is 
acceptable to all MEPs; and Groups have few effective sanctions with which to 
discipline MEPs (Corbett et al., 2011: 121; Raunio, 1997: 52). The Groups’ ability to 
use their control over desirable parliamentary assignments as a means of incentivising 
the behaviour of MEPs is undermined by the fact that domestic parties have 
considerable say in the allocation process (Hix et al., 2007: 135; Kreppel, 2002: 202). 
Indeed, Kreppel claims that the standard practice within the two largest Groups of 
transferring the allocation of assignments to the leaders of national delegations 
‘debilitates the group leadership and makes it all but impossible to control individual 
members through the effective use of benefits and sanctions’ (2002: 203–4). 
Westlake (1994b: 238) claims that there is little enforcement of discipline by 
the Groups and that: 
 
the ‘Whip’ is normally nothing more than a list, prepared by the group 
secretariats and circulated to members’ benches in the hemicycle before 
voting periods, setting out the recommended group position on each 
amendment as well as on final resolutions and reports.  
 
Indeed, Hix et al. claim that Group cohesion stems from the use of discipline by the 
leaders of national party delegations in the EP rather than the use of discipline by 
Group leaders (2007: 146). According to this view, it is the fact that delegation 
leaders use their ‘power’ to compel MEPs to follow what is usually both the 
delegation and the Group preference that explains the high level of cohesion within 
national delegations and Groups (Hix et al., 2007: 146). Nevertheless, further research 
is required into the dynamics operating within Groups, as little systematic research 
has been conducted into the whipping practices of those organizations. 
 
The state of the literature on relations between MEPs and partisan organizations 
The large number of studies that in some way touch upon the subject of MEP–party 
linkages suggests that this is a topic that is well served by the literature. In truth, the 
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literature on partisan linkages is far weaker than the discussion presented in this 
chapter suggests. Many of the studies referred to take as their main focus issues other 
than linkages between MEPs and their parties (Poguntke et al., 2007; Aylott et al., 
2013), and consequently do not provide detailed accounts of the control mechanisms 
employed by parties. As the main focus of many of these studies does not relate to 
questions relating to party control of MEPs, there is no systematic examination of 
whether partisan organizations enforce discipline, and it is only in rare instances that 
scholars draw on frameworks that assist them to examine party control rigorously (for 
example, Raunio, 2007). It is therefore unsurprising that few scholars examine 
variation in the propensity of parties to seek and to achieve control of their MEPs. 
Further, the ability of studies that do examine the determinants of such variation 
systematically to reach robust conclusions is limited for methodological reasons as 
noted above (most notably, Raunio, 2007; Aylott et al., 2013: 201–2). 
In addition, the way that empirical findings are reported in some of the most 
promising studies is problematic. Rather than reporting evidence pertaining to 
individual parties, much of the discussion deals with collections of parties at the 
country level. The failure to distinguish between cases within individual countries 
limits understanding of how individual parties actually relate to their MEPs (see, for 
example, the analysis of Finnish parties in Aylott et al., 2013: 110–15). This is 
particularly unfortunate due to the considerable scope that exists for within-country 
variation, as the next chapter argues. There is also a tendency for the conclusions 
reached to be rather general and vague. For example, having examined all parties with 
representation in the EP from three Member States, Aylott et al. resort to postulating 
that the state of affairs described ‘could be … [because] party leaderships see little 
point in expending the energy required even to try to exercise such control’ (2013: 
200, ital. added). 
While a substantial degree of interest is shown in certain aspects of MEP–
Group relations, current studies tend to focus on analysis of roll call divisions, and 
very few studies examine the nature of relations between MEPs and their Groups in 
detail. Further, little evidence is presented to substantiate some of the claims made 
regarding Group relations. Aylott et al. (2013: 113), for example, provide no evidence 
at all in support of the claim that:  
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an MEP who is interested in pursuing his or her career within the group 
hierarchy, and a national party delegation that seeks future influence over its 
group’s position, cannot afford to deviate [from the guidance issued by the 
group] too often.  
 
In short, there remains considerable scope to develop understanding of the 
relationship between MEPs and the two partisan actors that appear to play a key role 
in the political lives of MEPs. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has begun the task of presenting the thesis’ theoretical foundations. It has 
identified that elected representatives can approach representation in various ways, 
and that they are able to prioritize the interests of different societal groups in varying 
degrees. Drawing on the principal–agent framework, the discussion has demonstrated 
that there are risks inherent in delegating authority to elected representatives, as they 
may have incentives to act in ways that do not promote the interests of citizens. By 
acting as an accountability mechanism, political parties can assist citizens to mitigate 
the agency losses that can emerge when delegating authority. However, parties may 
exacerbate agency losses if they coerce representatives into promoting party interests 
when they diverge from the interests of the wider public. 
Building on this theoretical discussion, the second half of the chapter 
examined the academic literature which informs understanding of the degree to which 
partisan organizations are able to influence how MEPs approach their work as 
representatives. Despite the fact that evidence of parties mandating MEPs is sparse, 
the notion that democratic politics in the EP is driven extensively by the diktat of 
national party leaders, with the views of EP Group leaders playing the role of an 
intervening variable, remains widespread. Leading scholars perpetuate the notion that 
partisan actors are able to use their control of reselection procedures to guide the 
behaviour of MEPs (Hix, 2010: 236; Klüver and Spoon, 2013: 2–3; Lindstädt et al., 
2011, 2012; Meserve et al., 2009; Raunio, 2012a), undeterred by the emergence of 
convincing accounts that challenge this view (Ringe, 2010). One reason for the 
durability of the partisan control thesis, despite the opposing empirical evidence, is 
the fact that it is only explicitly challenged by a single study (Ringe, 2010), one which 
provides an alternative account of decision-making within the EP, rather than one 
which focuses primarily on partisan linkages. 
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This study engages in the debate by examining whether two partisan actors – 
national political parties and EP Groups – seek to influence the behaviour of MEPs, 
and whether or not they succeed. It also seeks to establish which factors are linked to 
the desire and ability of partisan actors to influence MEPs. In so doing, this 
investigation develops understanding of the role that these two partisan actors play in 
shaping the decisions that MEPs make regarding how to approach representation. It 
also provides a basis on which to develop understanding of the role that partisan 
actors play in the chain of accountability in the context of the EP. The following 
chapter takes the first step in this endeavour by examining the theoretical basis of the 
party control theory. It also presents hypotheses relating to variation in the extent of 
partisan control, and provides a discussion of the study’s analytical framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 67 
                                                
9  Strøm’s account in the same volume (2003: 61) presents a contrasting 
understanding, viewing agency loss as the difference between what the outcome of 
the agent’s behaviour relative to that of the principal’s behaviour had the principal 
decided to carry out the activity herself rather than delegate. The problem with 
Strøm’s understanding of agency loss is that it expects the principal to be able to carry 
out the activity in a manner that leads to a better outcome than if the agent carried out 
the activity. This is not consistent with Strøm’s expectation that authority is often 
delegated to political agents because they are better equipped to carry out the activity 
than the principal. Another definition is provided in the volume’s concluding chapter 
(Strøm et al., 2003b: 705): ‘Agency loss is the damage suffered by a principal because 
an agent lacks the skills or incentives to complete the tasks delegated to him, or in 
other words the difference between the policy obtained through delegation and the 
principal’s most desired (and feasible) outcome.’ 
10 As Lupia notes, agency loss does not mean that the principal’s interests would be 
better served by carrying out the activity herself: ‘Agency loss is zero when the agent 
takes actions that the principals would have taken given unlimited information and 
resources. … most political principals do not have unlimited information and 
resources. Therefore, it is impossible for them to be perfect agents for themselves … 
Therefore, finding that delegation causes agency loss does not imply that the outcome 
is bad or even suboptimal.’ (2003: 35–6, ital. in original) 
11 Other than possibly in the case of countries such as the Netherlands and Israel, 
where the area of the state is not divided into constituencies for national elections. 
12 The mean age of MEPs following the 2009 election was 51.2 (Beauvallet et al., 
2012: 10–11), and there is an over-representation of professionals, while manual and 
agricultural workers are under-represented (Beauvallet et al., 2012: 8–9; Judge and 
Earnshaw, 2008: 92). 
 68 
Chapter 2: A Framework for Analysis 
 
The previous chapter identified that there is a tension within the literature on the 
European Parliament, between studies that claim that partisan actors extensively 
influence the behaviour of MEPs and those that cast doubt on this assertion by stating 
that the relationship between parties and MEPs is very weak. The discussion led to the 
conclusion that it is prudent to examine whether partisan actors influence the 
behaviour of MEPs. This chapter develops the discussion of the thesis’ theoretical 
framework presented in Chapter 1 by drawing on insights provided by scholars from 
the tradition of rational choice institutionalism. The aim is to examine the plausibility 
of the idea that partisan actors influence the behaviour of MEPs, and to identify which 
factors may affect the degree to which partisan actors attempt to influence the 
behaviour of MEPs, and succeed in their efforts. The theoretical insights provided by 
the discussion serves as a basis for developing the thesis’ analytical framework, which 
is presented in the later sections of the chapter. 
 The first of five sections considers the basis on which MEPs make behavioural 
decisions, and contends that their behaviour is driven by their desire to realise up to 
five core goals: election, office, policy, personal gain, and future career. The second 
section outlines how two types of partisan actors – domestic political parties and EP 
Groups – may be able to control the degree to which MEPs are able to realise their 
goals. Drawing on the work of Scully (2001), it claims that they may attempt to use 
this control to influence the behaviour of MEPs, as long as they are willing to incur 
the costs associated with carrying out the activities necessary for achieving influence. 
The third section identifies the four activities that partisan actors must undertake if 
they are to exercise systematic influence on the behaviour of MEPs, and posits that 
they may not be able to exercise influence even if they fulfil these four preconditions 
of influence. The fourth section asserts that there is likely to be variation in the degree 
to which partisan actors desire and are able to influence the behaviour of MEPs. The 
section features a discussion of the factors that are expected to lead to this variation, 
and presents fifteen hypotheses relating to these potential sources of variation. The 
arguments put forward in these four sections are synthesised in the conclusion. 
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Legislators and Behavioural Decision-Making 
As Chapter 1 has demonstrated, representatives can vary extensively in how they 
think about and carry out representation. When carrying out the substantive activity of 
representation, understood as ‘acting for’ citizens (Pitkin, 1967), politicians must 
decide whom it is that they choose to represent, how they relate to this group, and 
how they wish to act on its behalf. These are decisions that representatives make 
constantly, rather than once and for all at the commencement of their term. As Farrell 
and Scully explain: 
 
Choices between alternative visions and practices of representation are a daily, 
practical reality for elected politicians. Facing potentially infinite calls on a 
finite quantity of time and energy, elected politicians have to prioritize their 
activities. And in practice, as much previous research has shown, 
parliamentarians differ considerably in the priorities they select and the 
models of representation that they follow.  
(2007: 93–4, see also Wahlke et al., 1962; Müller and Saalfeld, 1997) 
 
This applies equally to MEPs as it does to legislators in other settings, as they too 
must choose from a range of activities that they are able to carry out on behalf of 
different groups (Corbett et al., 2011: 64; Hix et al., 2007: 72). 
 In its discussion of the perils of delegating authority to elected representatives, 
Chapter 1 also indicated that political agents do not always act on the basis of their 
conception of the principal’s interests. Indeed, the discussion noted that there may be 
considerable scope for elected representatives to pursue their own interests, even 
when their actions conflict with the interests of their constituents. The risk of adverse 
behaviour was argued to be particularly high in contexts such as the EP where 
ordinary citizens frequently do not have access to appropriate accountability 
mechanisms. Drawing on insights from the tradition of rational choice 
institutionalism, this section examines the basis on which MEPs make behavioural 
decisions, and argues that their behaviour is driven by their desire to realise up to five 
core goals. 
 
The relationship between legislators’ goals and behaviour: a review of the literature 
According to the rationalist tradition, political actors hold core goals and their 
behaviour is driven by their desire to realise these goals (Schlesinger, 1966; Black, 
1972; Fenno, 1973; Hibbing, 1986; Hix et al., 1999; Mayhew, 1974; Strøm, 1990; 
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Müller and Strøm, 1999). Political parties and individual politicians must continually 
choose from a range of activities to undertake, and must decide how to carry out this 
activity. The decisions made are based on their evaluation of which activity best 
serves their efforts to realise these aims. For Mayhew (1974) the primary goal is 
election, as it is a precondition of realising any other aim. He finds that as Members 
of the US House of Representatives are aware that citizens will evaluate their 
performance at the ballot box, they feel compelled to give priority to their 
constituents’ interests, even if this means sacrificing the interests of other groups, 
such as that of their political parties and even the interests of the nation as a whole. 
This dynamic, which Mayhew calls the ‘electoral connection’, drives the way House 
Members carry out representation and holds significance consequently for the way 
politics is conducted within the chamber. 
In another Congressional study, Fenno finds that House Members hold three 
‘basic’ goals, ‘re-election, influence within the House, and good public policy’, and 
two additional goals, ‘a career beyond the House’ and ‘private gain’ (1973: 1, ital. in 
original). He finds that ‘All congressmen probably hold all three goals’, but that 
Members differ in their ‘mix of priorities and intensities’ and that the way a legislator 
prioritizes goals can change over time (Fenno, 1973: 1). House Members pursue the 
combination of goals that are most important to them by carrying out committee 
work, an activity that they consciously undertake ‘in ways calculated to achieve such 
goals’ (Fenno, 1973: 1). As not all committees provide equal opportunities to realise 
particular combinations of goals, House Members seek membership of those which 
offer the greatest potential for realising the goals that are important to them. The 
finding that House Members are usually unable to service their three main goals 
through their committee work corresponds to the claim made in later theoretical 
accounts that legislators are aware that they must prioritize between different goals 
when deciding which activities to carry out (Strøm, 1990; Hix et al., 1999).  
Strøm (1990) develops a framework which views the behaviour of political 
parties as being driven by three goals: (re-)election, office, and policy. Bringing 
together three strands of theoretical literature concerning the behaviour of political 
parties, he presents a conception of parties either as being ultimately vote-seeking, 
office-seeking, or policy-seeking. The vote-seeking party wants to maximize its vote 
share (Downs, 1957); the office-seeking party aspires primarily to hold governmental 
office; the policy-seeking party’s focus is on enacting its policy goals, although it is 
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likely to focus its efforts on securing governmental office as a means of maximizing 
its influence over the policy process. Rather than identifying three types of parties 
with fundamentally different goals, Strøm argues that all parties make trade-offs 
between these three interrelated goals. They do so on the basis of the evaluation by 
influential individuals within the party of the institutional environment in which the 
party operates. Vote-seeking, office-seeking, and policy-seeking behaviour are not 
necessarily ‘mutually conflicting’ as a party may, for example, have as its sincere 
policy preference the ‘electorally optimal’ position (Strøm, 1990: 571). However, 
there will be times ‘when party objectives do conflict’ and in such instances the party 
must make a trade-off between the three main goals (1990: 570).  
Hix et al. (1999) develop a behavioural theory of MEPs that draws heavily on 
Strøm’s (1990) framework, although the attempt at applying his framework in the 
context of MEPs is not entirely successful. In line with Mayhew (1974) the ‘vast 
majority’ of MEPs13 view re-election as their single primary goal, rather than the 
three goals that Strøm offers (Hix et al., 1999: 12). Notwithstanding this, MEPs 
pursue three ‘strategies’ to achieve the goal of re-election, namely reselection, policy, 
and office (Hix et al., 1999: 12). As part of their reselection efforts, ‘MEPs must 
pursue actions that promote the interests of the sections within their domestic political 
parties’ that control the process of selecting candidates for EP elections (Hix et al., 
1999: 12).  
MEPs pursue policy aims in order ‘to win the support of domestic constituents 
and support groups’ that include but are not exclusive to those related to their party 
(Hix et al., 1999: 12). As MEPs do not carry out executive functions in the EU’s 
political system, the office goals that MEPs target are understood differently from 
those sought by legislators in many other political systems. MEPs strive to ‘increase 
their personal profile’ within the chamber and to become ‘key agenda-setting’ figures. 
To this end they will attempt to ‘secure positions of authority and prestige’ within the 
institution, such as a committee chair, a rapporteurship on an important piece of 
legislation, the leadership of a national party delegation or an EP Group, or a position 
within the Presidency of the EP (Hix et al., 1999: 12). 
There appears to be a fundamental difference between Hix et al. (1999) and 
Strøm’s (1990) understanding of the goals held by political actors and how they relate 
to behaviour. For Strøm, political actors hold (re-)election, policy, and office as three 
goals, and their behaviour is driven by their desire to realise these goals. For Hix et al. 
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(1999), MEPs pursue reselection, policy, and office ‘strategies’ to achieve their 
primary goal of re-election (1999: 12, ital. added). If the behaviour of MEPs is 
ultimately driven by re-election concerns, they will only pursue policy and office 
strategies in ways that will support their re-election efforts. This suggests that they are 
only ever likely to give priority to their policy and office goals in cases where this 
improves their long-term electoral prospects.14 If, on the other hand, MEPs pursue 
policy and office goals as ends in themselves as suggested by Strøm (1990), in 
addition to pursuing these goals as a means of servicing their re-election ambitions, 
they are likely to make different decisions regarding which goals they prioritize. 
Hix et al. explicitly treat reselection, policy, and office instrumentally, as 
strategies to achieve the goal of reselection (Hix et al., 1999: 12). However, it is 
implicit in their work that MEPs hold policy and office goals independently of their 
goal of being re-elected. The authors state that MEPs are sometimes required to 
choose ‘between rival goals’ (1999: 14) and that ‘[a]t different points in time, in 
response to different stimuli, and faced with different strategic choices, politicians 
may favour one set of goals over others’ (1999: 13). They also refer to an MEP’s 
‘personal policy aims’, suggest that MEPs ‘may be ideological[ly] attached to a piece 
of legislation’, and raise the question of how an MEP should act when his or her 
policy aims conflict with those of the domestic party and those of the EP Group 
(1999: 14). In essence therefore, while their model may appear to be different from 
Strøm’s, in practice Hix et al.’s understanding of the role that reselection, policy, and 
office ambitions play in shaping the behaviour of MEPs is broadly the same as 
Strøm’s. In fact, one of the authors provides a more convincing account in a later 
study, arguing that MEPs hold three goals: election, office, and policy (Scully, 2005: 
82–6). 
According to Hix and colleagues, and in line with Strøm’s account, MEPs are 
not always ‘forced to make any choice between rival goals’ (Hix et al., 1999: 14). 
There will be times when ‘personal policy aims, the majority in the EP Group and the 
national party leadership may all point an MEP to vote or otherwise behave in a 
particular way’ (1999: 14). At other times however, an MEP is faced with the 
dilemma of having to choose between ‘their personal ideological feelings, the position 
of their party group (which would increase their chances of promotion within the EP), 
or with their national party leadership (which would increase their chances of re-
selection)’ (1999: 14). It may be the case for example that an MEP may support a 
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piece of legislation, while the national party leadership is opposed to it, and the 
majority in the EP Group has decided to register an abstention at the parliamentary 
division (1999: 14). 
 Several factors are expected to shape the behavioural decisions that MEPs 
make, and the emphasis that they place on realising different goals in a particular 
setting. Hix et al. identify five factors relating to the domestic institutional structure: 
the type of electoral system used for EP elections, the timing of national elections, the 
nature of the party system, the policy location of the MEP’s party, and whether the 
MEP’s party is in government or in opposition (1999: 15–17). Three factors 
pertaining to the ‘supranational institutional context’ are expected to affect the 
behavioural decisions made by MEPs: the type of procedure used and the current 
stage of the procedure, whether the MEP’s party is represented in the European 
Commission, and the EP electoral timetable (Hix et al., 1999: 17–18). To summarize, 
Hix et al. claim that the behaviour of MEPs is shaped by their wish to realise goals, 
and that contextual factors affect the decisions that they make regarding which goals 
to prioritize. 
 
The relationship between the goals and the behaviour of MEPs: a revised account 
The notion that the behaviour of MEPs is driven by their desire to realise goals, and 
that contextual factors shape the decisions that they make regarding which goals to 
prioritize, appears eminently plausible. However, there is a need to re-examine the 
issue of what goals MEPs hold.  
It is entirely conceivable that MEPs are similar to legislators and political 
parties in other contexts (Fenno, 1973; Mayhew, 1974; Strøm, 1990) in that they hold 
election goals. Other than in the case of those intending to retire from politics at the 
end of a parliamentary term, MEPs may wish to be re-elected to the EP or to gain 
election to a domestic legislature. It is also conceivable that most MEPs wish to 
realise policy goals, not simply as a means of promoting their chances of re-election, 
but because they wish to see the policy enacted (or, in the case of non-legislative 
issues, because they wish to raise awareness of an issue). Membership of the EP 
provides MEPs with a platform for promoting issues that relate to domestic and 
European policy-making. As the powers of the EP have grown, MEPs have been 
provided with an ever-greater means of enacting public policy and of shaping political 
discourse. 
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The notion that MEPs hold office goals is also compelling. However, office 
goals are understood differently in the context of MEPs compared with what Strøm 
means when referring to the ‘spoils’ of office that political parties seek (1990: 570). 
As the EU’s executive functions are carried out by the Commission and by Member 
State governments on behalf of the Council, spoils such as positions of government 
office at the EU level are not available to MEPs. As a result, MEPs must seek the 
spoils that their own institution can provide them, and these take the form of influence 
and prestigious roles within the chamber, and the respect of colleagues. This 
understanding of ‘office’ goals correspond to Hix and colleagues’ use of the term in 
the context of MEPs (1999) and to Fenno’s understanding of the goal of ‘House 
influence’ (1973: 5) in the context of the US Congress, another setting where 
legislators do not have direct access to the benefits of executive office. MEPs may 
also hold office goals that relate to the domestic political context, as they wish to hold 
a position of governmental office at the state or sub-state level. It is clear that many 
MEPs view their tenure within the EP as a stepping stone to domestic office goals 
(Scarrow, 1997: 259–60; Meserve et al., 2009; Høyland et al., 2013: 6). 
Hix and colleagues (1999) do not identify Fenno’s two additional goals of 
legislators – ‘a career beyond the House’ and ‘private gain’ (1973: 1) – as factors that 
drive the behaviour of MEPs. This is not surprising, as their aim is to offer a 
framework for understanding the types of activities MEPs pursue in their quest for re-
election. However, it is likely that the behaviour of MEPs is also driven by their 
desire to realize these two goals. Firstly, it is likely that most MEPs seek to derive at 
least some measure of ‘private gain’ from their service as MEPs. Their activities as 
MEPs provide most with their primary source of income, and it is worth drawing 
attention to the fact that attendance levels increased when the level of claimable 
allowances was linked to participation at EP divisions. Non-monetary rewards are 
also on offer to MEPs, as their position provides them with social status and with a 
means of developing desirable personal connections. Most MEPs will avoid behaving 
in ways which could result in them being compelled to resign their positions, as they 
would lose their source of income and status, and their ability to realise their other 
goals would diminish. 
Secondly, the goal of a ‘career beyond the House’ is particularly relevant in 
the context of the EP as the average career span of MEPs is relatively short. The level 
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of turnover of MEPs at elections and during parliamentary terms is high. Indeed, it 
has consistently been the case that only around half of MEPs elected had served 
during the previous parliamentary term (Corbett et al., 2011: 51–2; Whitaker, 2011: 
36). In addition to the domestic office goals which are available, service within the EP 
provides members with opportunities to pursue lucrative careers in the private sector 
upon their exit from the chamber. It is entirely reasonable to expect that the behaviour 
of MEPs is shaped at least in part by the ambitions that they hold for the period 
following their departure from the EP. MEPs who intend to develop a non-political 
career at a later date can be expected to seek membership of a committee that is 
relevant to the area in which they wish to find employment. They may also seek 
positions of prestige and authority that will assist them to market themselves to 
potential employers, and to focus on developing professional connections during their 
time as parliamentarians. In contrast, MEPs who wish to serve until their retirement 
are more likely to focus on activities that will assist them to realise a combination of 
their re-election, office, and policy goals. 
 
Partisan Actors and MEPs 
The above section considered the basis on which MEPs make behavioural decisions, 
and argued that their behaviour is driven by their desire to realise up to five core 
goals. This section examines the plausibility of the notion that two types of partisan 
actors – domestic political parties and the EP Groups – are able to control the degree 
to which MEPs are able to realise their goals, and that they may attempt to use this 
control to influence the behaviour of MEPs. While the section argues that these 
claims are compelling, it draws on the work of Scully (2001: 12) and Raunio (2007: 
144) in explaining that partisan actors may find the costs involved in attempting to 
influence MEPs prohibitive. 
 Domestic parties have considerable control over the ability of MEPs to realise 
their goal of re-election. All re-election seeking MEPs require the support of their 
parties in the form of a place on the party’s list of candidates (Hix, 2002: 691). 
Further, where the elections are conducted using closed- or ordered-list systems, the 
party has extensive control over the prospects of individual candidates (Hix et al., 
1999: 15; Scully, 2001: 21; Raunio, 2007: 133–4). This is less true of candidates 
seeking election in countries using open-list systems, however parties are still able to 
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influence the outcome in favour of certain candidates by focusing their electoral 
campaigns on individual candidates. MEPs who wish to gain election to a domestic 
legislature are also reliant on their parties to realise their election goals.  
Domestic parties may also be able to assist MEPs to realise policy goals by 
mobilising the negotiating power of the party’s delegation of MEPs within the EP 
Group. This may assist MEPs to advance their policy preferences as the Group 
formulates its positions, or assist MEPs to acquire parliamentary assignments which 
they can use to shape the chamber’s decisions.  
The ability of domestic parties to shape the degree to which MEPs are able to 
realise office goals within the EP is limited by the fact that parliamentary assignments 
and positions are delegated first to the EP Groups and then allocated following a 
discussion between the national delegations (Kreppel, 2002: 202–4). However, 
successful office-seeking domestic parties are able to shape the degree to which 
MEPs realise office goals outside the EP. Many MEPs wish to become members of 
the national government and they require the support of their parties to fulfil this 
ambition. There is a long tradition of MEPs leaving the EP mid-term to take up posts 
in their national capitals15 and of MEPs entering national politics following a career in 
the EP and becoming government ministers.16 As well as assisting MEPs to realise 
office goals by furthering their political careers following their departure from the EP, 
domestic parties may also be able to support MEPs wishing to pursue non-political 
careers by facilitating access to appointed positions and to a network of contacts.  
While EP Groups have little direct control over three of the five goals held by 
MEPs, namely those of re-election, a career beyond the house, and personal gain, 
there is reason to believe that they extensively control the degree to which MEPs are 
able to realise office and policy goals within the EP. As voting in the EP takes place 
largely on the basis of Group affiliation, it is clear that the prospects of realising 
policy goals are enhanced considerably if the Group lends its support, especially in 
cases where the MEP is affiliated to one of the three largest Groups. MEPs also 
depend on their Groups for the opportunity to raise policy issues in the plenary 
setting, as speaking time is allocated to the Groups, who divide the allotted time 
between the MEPs that they select to speak (Corbett et al., 2011: 197). Groups also 
control access to the chamber’s prized positions and assignments, such as the 
positions of President and Vice-Presidents of the EP, Quaestors, committee chairs, 
and rapporteurships. They also control access to leadership positions within the 
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Groups, such as the Group Presidency, Bureau membership, and the role of Group 
committee coordinators (Hix et al., 2007: 134–5). 
This discussion supports the notion that domestic parties and the EP Groups 
have a genuine potential to control the degree to which MEPs are able to realise their 
goals. It is therefore eminently plausible that they may attempt to use this control to 
influence the behaviour of MEPs, as several studies which advance the partisan 
control thesis suggest (Hix, 2002; Hix et al., 2007; Raunio, 2012a). However, it is not 
necessarily the case that partisan organizations of these two types attempt to influence 
MEPs’ behaviour, or that they succeed in doing so. Scully notes that domestic parties 
may not wish to influence the legislative behaviour of MEPs (2001: 14–15]). As the 
EP comprises of such a large number of national delegations, there are few instances 
where a single delegation is likely to play a crucial role in the coalition formation 
process. By providing rigid instructions, Scully argues that parties constrain the 
ability of MEPs to negotiate their way into winning coalitions (2001: 14–15; see also, 
Hix and Lord, 1997: 129). Therefore, it may best serve the party’s interests to give 
MEPs the independence to carry out their work according to their own judgment, 
despite the risk that the preferences of MEPs do not necessarily correspond precisely 
to those of the party.  
 
The Preconditions of Partisan Influence 
Having identified that domestic parties and EP Groups have some means of 
incentivising the behaviour of MEPs, this section considers in greater detail what 
activities partisan actors are required to undertake if they are to develop a potential for 
influencing MEPs. It is clear that partisan organizations must bear considerable costs 
if they are to operate systems of discipline which provide the party with beneficial 
outcomes. In addition to the costs that partisan actors must incur in providing 
appropriate guidance to their MEPs, those seeking to develop a potential to 
systematically influence MEPs are required to fulfil four conditions, each of which 
entails further costs.  
Firstly, parties must have a desire to influence the behaviour of MEPs. Much 
like MEPs, domestic parties are goal-seeking actors whose conception of their 
interests varies between cases and over time, depending on the incentive structure 
facing them at a given point (Strøm, 1990). Whereas MEPs hold five goals – election, 
office, policy, personal gain, and a career beyond the house – domestic parties only 
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pursue the first three (Strøm, 1990). Further, while parties and their MEPs share three 
types of goals, the specific goals that these actors hold may differ. For example, there 
was clearly a difference between the policy goals held by the British Labour Party and 
the party’s MEPs on the issue of the UK’s opt-out from the Working Time Directive. 
While the party leadership secured an agreement in the Council for the UK to retain 
its opt-out, Labour MEPs voted against the principle in the EP and contradicted the 
leadership publicly (BBC News, 2008a; The Financial Times, 2008a). 
Parties will find no reason to attempt to influence the behaviour of MEPs 
unless they actively and systematically develop preferences regarding policies under 
consideration by the EP and unless they remain informed about the preferences of 
MEPs. It is only then that they will know whether there is a discrepancy between their 
interests and those of their MEPs. A party that takes little interest in the work of its 
MEPs, and one that does not invest resources in monitoring developments within the 
EP, may therefore be unaware that it stands to gain from guiding the behaviour of its 
MEPs.  
Secondly, partisan actors must communicate their wishes to MEPs. Unless 
MEPs know how a partisan actor would wish them to act, they have no way of taking 
the views of the partisan actor into account when making decisions. Thirdly, partisan 
actors must provide MEPs with threats, and with promises of rewards. As goal-
seeking actors MEPs have little reason to behave in ways other than those which 
serve their own interests, unless parties proactively engage with the incentive 
structure facing them. These threats or promises of rewards do not necessarily need to 
be particularly significant to ensure compliant behaviour, especially if the MEP’s 
interest in the issue or attachment to a deviating position is weak. For example, 
knowledge that partisan colleagues will disapprove may be enough to compel MEPs 
to follow guidance in many instances. 
Fourthly, partisan actors must obtain information about the behaviour of 
MEPs. If they fail to do so the threats issued will not be credible, as MEPs will realise 
that their parties will not become aware of whether their behaviour corresponds with 
the actor’s wishes. There are two ways of obtaining this information. The most 
effective but costly way is to proactively monitor the behaviour of MEPs, what the 
principal–agent literature refers to as undertaking ‘police patrols oversight’ 
(McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984: 166; Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991: 32). A less 
costly way is to require MEPs to report regularly about their actions, or alternatively 
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to acquire this information from an interested third party, a technique that is known as 
‘fire alarm oversight’ (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984: 166). While these two 
approaches are less effective, the information gathered may be sufficient, depending 
on the type of behaviour that the partisan actor wishes to influence. 
As the costs incurred by partisan actors who fulfil these four preconditions of 
influence may be considerable, some may not believe that the potential returns 
warrant the necessary investment. Further, while these are four necessary conditions 
of partisan influence, they are not sufficient conditions. It is only a potential to 
influence MEPs that partisan actors develop by fulfilling these conditions, and there is 
no guarantee that they will influence the behaviour of MEPs. A partisan actor may 
issue all kinds of threats, but an MEP may decide to ignore them. The perceived 
benefits for the MEP of defying the partisan actor may outweigh the costs. 
 This discussion of the four preconditions of influence serves as a basis for 
developing the first component of the thesis’ framework of analysis. Sub-questions 1a 
and 2a are concerned with whether domestic political parties and EP Groups 
respectively influence how MEPs approach representation. In addressing these sub-
questions, the analysis focuses on the issue of whether these partisan actors fulfil the 
preconditions of control. 
 
The Potential for Variation in Partisan Influence 
At the end of the 2009–14 parliamentary term, there are 766 MEPs in total, affiliated 
to one of over 190 domestic political parties, and to one of seven EP Groups (other 
than in the case of the 27 non-attached MEPs). There is expected to be variation in the 
extent to which domestic parties and EP Groups attempt to influence the behaviour of 
their MEPs, and in the extent to which they are successful in doing so. This is for 
three reasons. Firstly, it is reasonable to expect that some domestic parties and EP 
Groups will have a greater incentive than others to influence the behaviour of MEPs, 
and are therefore more likely than others to be willing to make the investment 
necessary to meet those costs. Secondly, it is reasonable to expect that some partisan 
actors will be better placed than others to deal with the costs involved with 
influencing the behaviour of MEPs. Thirdly, the type of activity that parties wish to 
influence is likely to vary between parties, and the costs incurred while undertaking 
the activities required to influence the behaviour of MEPs varies depending on the 
type of behaviour that partisan actors wish to influence.  
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There are theoretical grounds for expecting certain factors to be linked to these 
three types of variation. These three types of variation are in turn linked to variation 
in the dependent variables, those being the degree to which partisan actors attempt to 
influence MEP, and the degree to which they succeed in doing so. These factors can 
be divided into three categories: as factors that relate to the institutional context, as 
factors that relate to the partisan actor, and as factors that relate to the MEPs as 
individuals. The following section discusses how these factors are expected to lead to 
variation in the dependent variables, and presents fifteen hypotheses that are tested in 
subsequent chapters. 
 
Institutional factors 
The first range of factors that are expected to lead to variation in the desire and ability 
of partisan actors to influence the behaviour of MEPs relate to the institutional context 
in which partisan actors and MEPs operate. Several institutional factors may lead to 
variation in the propensity of partisan actors to seek and to exercise influence on 
MEPs. These include the domestic and European electoral timetable (Lindstädt et al., 
2011; Meserve et al., 2009), the length of the Member State’s membership of the EU, 
the procedure used (Hix et al., 1999: 17), and the complexity of the political space 
(Scully, 2001: 15). However, the analysis of institutional considerations presented in 
this thesis focuses on the factor that is assumed to have the most significant effect on 
the degree to which partisan actors are able to influence the behaviour of MEPs. This 
factor is the type of electoral system used for EP elections. 
 
The electoral system 
Scholars who apply the principal–agent framework to the relationship between MEPs 
and their political organizations invariably suggest that domestic parties may be able 
to use their control of the re-election prospects of MEPs to influence their behaviour 
(Hix et al., 1999: 12; Scully, 2001: 21; Raunio, 2007: 141). As EP elections are 
organized as national contests and conducted under any of three types of electoral 
systems, there remains a considerable degree of variation in how EP elections are 
conducted across the EU. In closed-list systems, candidates are elected in the order in 
which they are presented by parties; in ordered-list systems, there is limited scope for 
candidates to climb the party list by attracting personal votes; in open-list systems 
parties provide a list of candidates who are elected according to the proportion of 
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votes gained by the party and according to the number of personal votes gained 
relative to their party colleagues. The type of electoral system used has consequences 
for the degree to which individual candidates are dependent on their domestic 
political parties for their election. Where the re-election prospects of incumbent MEPs 
are less dependent on their parties, the scope for parties to influence their behaviour is 
likely to be more limited than in cases where MEPs are more dependent on the party 
for their re-election (Hix et al., 1999: 24–7). This leads to the following expectation:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Parties from countries operating more closed electoral 
systems are more likely to attempt to influence the behaviour of their 
MEPs, and are more likely to succeed, than parties from countries 
operating more open electoral systems. 
 
Factors relating to the partisan actor 
In addition to factors relating to the institutional framework, there are theoretical 
grounds for expecting factors relating to the partisan actor itself to lead to variation in 
the degree to which the partisan actor seeks and achieves influence on the behaviour 
of MEPs. 
 
Candidate Selection System 
The sections within parties that are responsible for selecting and ordering candidates 
on domestic party lists vary between parties (Raunio, 2007: 134). In some parties, it is 
the central party leadership that decides how the party list is composed, and which 
candidates will receive most support from the party during the campaign. In others it 
is the leadership of the party’s regional organization. Many parties draw up short-lists 
and offer members the chance to select candidates. Parties with centralised candidate 
selection systems appear to have a greater potential to shape the incentive structure 
facing MEPs than parties where members play a prominent role in candidate 
selection. This is because party members do not constitute a unified actor to the same 
degree as the party leadership. Compared with the party leadership members will find 
it more difficult to develop coherent preferences regarding the behaviour of MEPs, 
and to use the threat of deselection as an instrument to influence their activities. As a 
result, parties with centralised selection systems are more likely to succeed in their 
attempts to influence the behaviour of their MEPs. Realising this, they are also 
 82 
expected to be more eager to attempt to influence the behaviour of their MEPs. These 
considerations give rise to the following expectation: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Parties operating centralised candidate selection systems 
are more likely to attempt to influence the behaviour of their MEPs, and 
are more likely to succeed, than parties operating decentralised candidate 
selection systems. 
 
While the MEPs of parties with decentralised candidate selection systems are 
expected to have the freedom to operate with a greater degree of independence from 
their parties, they are also expected to spend more time in contact with party members 
than MEPs from centralised parties. This is because the need to develop links with the 
party membership is more pressing for MEPs whose reselection prospects are 
dependent on the support of ordinary members. 
The candidate selection systems used by some parties have in-built measures 
that make it easier for incumbent MEPs to gain a position on the party’s list compared 
with their non-incumbent challengers, and to gain a high position on the list where 
that is applicable. Parties that offer incumbency protection have a more limited 
potential to influence the behaviour of their MEPs, and will therefore be less prone to 
attempt to influence MEPs, and less successful in their attempts. 
 
Governing status 
Parties in government are expected to have a greater incentive to influence the 
behaviour of their MEPs compared with parties in opposition. As governing parties 
are represented in the Council, the EU’s other legislative chamber, they have a clear 
incentive to ensure that their MEPs support a position that complements that 
advanced by party leaders in Council negotiations (Meserve et al., 2009: 1020–1). 
While the desire of governing parties to influence behaviour is expected to manifest 
itself most evidently in the context of parliamentary divisions, governing parties also 
have an incentive to encourage their MEPs to acquire ‘positions of power in the EP, 
as this will reduce the likelihood of the EP taking a different position to the Council’ 
(Hix et al., 1999: 17). Such positions include rapporteurships, Committee Chairs, and 
the role of the EP Group coordinator on parliamentary committees. As governing 
parties are subject to greater scrutiny than those in opposition, the scope for conflict 
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between MEPs and the party leadership to cause embarrassment is greater. This 
provides governing parties with a further incentive to ensure that their MEPs toe the 
party line. 
In addition to possessing a greater incentive to attempt to influence the work 
of their MEPs than opposition parties, the costs associated with undertaking the 
activities necessary for exercising influence, such as monitoring the work of MEPs, 
are lower. This is because governing parties are able to use the machinery of 
government to carry out some of this activity on their behalf. As a result, the efforts of 
governing parties are more likely to be met with success than those of opposition 
parties. These considerations lead to the following expectation: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Governing parties are more likely to attempt to influence 
the behaviour of their MEPs, and are more likely to succeed, than 
opposition parties. 
 
It is possible that opposition parties will be more likely to demand that their 
MEPs focus on domestic political activity than parties in government. As the saliency 
of EP legislative politics is low, parties may regard the potential electoral benefit of 
undertaking such activity as lower than domestic political activity. It remains a 
possibility that opposition parties wish that their MEPs focus on legislative work in 
the EP, as this avenue represents one of few opportunities available to parties in 
opposition to realise policy goals. However, as parties are assumed to prioritize 
domestic re-election goals over EU policy goals (Hix et al., 1999: 8), it is plausible 
that opposition parties will ask their MEPs to focus on domestic political activity. 
This leads to the following expectation: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Governing parties wish their MEPs to focus on legislative 
activity in the EP, while opposition parties desire MEPs to focus on 
domestic political work. 
 
The number of MEPs affiliated to the partisan actor 
Domestic parties with large delegations in the EP have a greater incentive to attempt 
to influence the legislative behaviour of MEPs than parties with smaller delegations 
(Raunio, 2007: 134), as they have a greater potential to realise policy goals within the 
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chamber. It remains the case that parties who demand that their MEPs adhere to 
‘strictly-defined positions’ limit the ability of their MEPs to bargain effectively, and 
risk finding themselves outside winning coalitions (Scully, 2001: 14–16). However, 
these risks may be reduced considerably if there is strong coordination between the 
party’s central office and the leadership of the party’s delegation in the EP, as the 
delegation leadership is in a strong position to respond to events as they unfold within 
the chamber. 
Parties with large delegations are also more likely to attempt to ensure that 
their MEPs act cohesively in legislative contexts as the potential for embarrassment is 
higher than in the case of parties with smaller delegations. The scope for disunity to 
exist within a delegation increases in line with the size of the delegation. A 
considerable proportion of parliamentary votes are taken by roll call, and resources 
such as VoteWatch.eu have greatly facilitated the task of monitoring voting behaviour 
at roll call votes. As a result, the potential for disunited delegations to cause 
embarrassment for their parties domestically is high. 
 As well as having a greater incentive to influence the behaviour of MEPs, the 
costs of monitoring the activities of MEPs and of following bargaining processes 
within the EP are easier to bear for parties with large delegations. As a party’s number 
of MEPs increases, so does the scope for it to demand that their MEPs pool a 
proportion of their parliamentary allowance to employ delegation staff. These 
individuals could carry out a coordinating function, both within the delegation and 
between the delegation and the party central office. Of course, even a party with only 
a single MEP could demand that one of the MEP’s assistants focus on the task of 
liaising with the party leadership. However, this would have a far greater impact on 
the MEP’s capacity to work compared with a situation where funds from the 
allowances of several MEPs are pooled to employ a coordinator. These considerations 
lead to the following expectation: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Domestic parties with large delegations of MEPs are more 
likely to attempt to influence the behaviour of MEPs, and are more likely 
to succeed, than domestic parties with small delegations of MEPs. 
 
As the relative size of the Groups to the chamber as a whole are greater than 
the relative size of individual delegations to the whole chamber, an individual Group 
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has a far greater chance of playing a key role in coalition formation processes. In 
practice, the support of at least one of the two largest EP Groups is necessary to 
ensure the passage of parliamentary measures, with ALDE, the third largest Group, 
often playing a pivotal role in negotiations (Kreppel, 2002: 142–51; Hix et al., 2007: 
147–60). While some effort is made to reach agreements that have the support of as 
many Groups as possible, most outcomes are based on compromises between at least 
two of the three largest Groups. This suggests that the larger Groups are more likely 
to obtain an outcome that is close to their ideal point, and therefore have a greater 
incentive to influence the legislative behaviour of their MEPs to secure such 
outcomes. 
 Larger Groups are also more likely to succeed in influencing the legislative 
behaviour of MEPs. They have a greater potential than smaller Groups to operate an 
effective system of threats and rewards, as they control the most desirable 
parliamentary assignments and posts (Hix, 2002: 690–1; Kreppel, 2002: 199). Larger 
Groups are also in a stronger position to monitor the behaviour of MEPs, as they have 
more advisors than smaller Groups. These considerations give rise to the following 
expectation: 
 
Hypothesis 6: Larger EP Groups (in terms of the number of affiliated 
MEPs) are more likely to attempt to influence the legislative behaviour of 
their MEPs, and are more likely to succeed, than smaller Groups. 
 
Resources and organizational capacity 
The costs associated with influencing the behaviour of MEPs are high. Well-
resourced domestic parties that have large, highly developed central party 
organizations are consequently expected to have a greater potential to influence their 
MEPs. As they realise this, they are also expected to show a greater willingness to 
attempt to influence their MEPs. Organizational capacity is dependent on a 
combination of factors. These include the organization’s annual expenditure, the total 
number of staff, together with the number of staff employed to deal with EU affairs. It 
also includes the length of time that the organization has existed. The literature on 
domestic party adaptation demonstrates that parties take time to modify their 
organizations when reacting to institutional changes taking place at the EU level 
(Poguntke et al., 2007). This leads to the following expectation: 
 86 
 
Hypothesis 7: Domestic parties with large organizational capacities are 
more likely to attempt to influence the behaviour of MEPs, and are more 
likely to succeed, than domestic parties with limited organizational 
capacities. 
 
These considerations are also expected to apply to EP Groups. Their resources 
are virtually directly correlated to the number of affiliated MEPs. Two of the seven 
EP Groups, the ECR and the EFD, were created as new entities in 2009. They may 
therefore have a less well-developed organizational capacity than Groups with a 
similar number of affiliates, but with a longer history, such as the Greens/EFA Group. 
These considerations give rise to the following expectation: 
 
Hypothesis 8: EP Groups with large organizational capacities are more 
likely to attempt to influence the legislative behaviour of their MEPs, and 
are more likely to succeed, than EP Groups with smaller organizational 
capacities. 
 
Ideological position 
Hix et al. (2007: 147–60) identify the left–right ideological axis as the primary 
dimension along which political contestation takes place in the EP. Scully claims that 
the ‘location of the [party’s] delegation on the political spectrum of the EP’ is a 
potential source of variation in the propensity of parties to attempt to influence the 
legislative behaviour of MEPs (2001: 18). Centrist parties are more likely to be 
approached by potential coalition partners than extremist parties, and are therefore 
more likely to be able to realise their policy goals. However, it is unclear whether 
parties will feel that their interests are best served by allowing MEPs the freedom to 
negotiate according to their own judgment or by mandating MEPs to follow pre-
defined positions (Scully, 2001: 18; see also Hix and Lord, 1997: 129; Hix et al., 
1999: 16). There is no reason to expect that this factor will lead to variation in the 
degree to which partisan actors succeed in their efforts. Following Scully’s example 
(2001: 18), two variants of the hypothesis relating to this issue are specified, as 
follows: 
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Hypothesis 9a: Domestic parties that are positioned towards the centre of 
the left–right ideological spectrum are more likely to attempt to influence 
the legislative behaviour of MEPs, and are more likely to succeed, than 
domestic parties that are positioned further from the centre. 
 
Hypothesis 9b: Domestic parties that are positioned away from the centre 
of the left–right ideological spectrum are more likely to attempt to 
influence the legislative behaviour of MEPs, and are more likely to 
succeed, than domestic parties that are positioned towards the centre. 
 
In the case of domestic parties, a key issue is how to strike a balance between 
ensuring that MEPs act in a manner that corresponds to the interests of the party, 
while at the same time giving MEPs enough flexibility to negotiate their way into a 
winning coalition. These pressures do not apply to Groups in the same way. Since one 
of the core functions of Groups is to follow developments within the EP, they will 
always have a broadly accurate idea of what their interests are as negotiations take 
place within the EP. They are therefore always able to provide informed guidance to 
MEPs. As the centrist Groups are more likely to be approached by potential coalition 
partners, they are more likely to be able to realise their goals through the work of 
MEPs. Consequently, they have a greater incentive to attempt to influence the 
behaviour of their MEPs than Groups that are positioned away from the centre of the 
left–right ideological scale. As there is a correlation between the centrism of Groups, 
their organizational capacity, and the (dis)incentives they are able to offer MEPs, the 
efforts of centrist Groups to influence MEPs are expected to be more successful. This 
leads to the following expectation: 
 
Hypothesis 10: Groups that are positioned towards the centre of the left–
right ideological spectrum are more likely to attempt to influence the 
legislative behaviour of their MEPs, and are more likely to succeed, than 
Groups that are positioned away from the centre of the left–right 
ideological spectrum. 
 
 
 
 88 
Views on integration 
Pro-integrationist MEPs are expected to be more likely to diasgree with their partisan 
organizations than Eurosceptic MEPs. This is because there will be a range of 
integrationist policy options available to pro-integrationist MEPs, and consequently 
some scope for dissenting opinions. Conversely, Eurosceptics are likely to base 
legislative decisions on their view of whether a measure furthers integration. Pro-
integrationist parties are therefore more likely to attempt to influence the behaviour of 
their MEPs than Eurosceptic parties. 
 Since there tends to be a considerable discrepancy between the policy 
preferences of the minority of MEPs who hold Eurosceptic views and those of MEPs 
who hold more favourable views towards integration, Eurosceptic MEPs are likely to 
play a largely peripheral role in parliamentary negotiations. Realising that they have 
little scope for realising policy goals within the EP, Eurosceptic domestic parties are 
less likely to attempt to influence the parliamentary behaviour of MEPs. Lacking a 
desire to influence the parliamentary behaviour of MEPs, Eurosceptic domestic 
parties are less likely to develop systems for monitoring the work of their MEPs 
within the chamber and are therefore less likely to be able to influence MEPs than 
pro-integrationist parties. These considerations give rise to the following expectation: 
 
Hypothesis 11: Integrationist domestic parties are more likely to attempt 
to influence the parliamentary behaviour of MEPs, and are more likely to 
succeed, than Eurosceptic parties. 
 
While most Eurosceptic parties are very eager to gain election to the EP, the 
question of how their MEPs should act once elected presents them with a challenge. 
Such parties may feel that it is appropriate for MEPs to engage in EU legislative 
processes, as this provides a means to defend the Member State’s interests at the EU 
level. However, parties may prefer that their MEPs refrain from engaging in 
parliamentary work, possibly with the exception of delivering plenary speeches that 
are critical of the EU. They may realise that the scope for realising policy goals within 
the EP is limited and that there are risks involved in undertaking such work. They 
may feel that the participation of their MEPs in EU policy processes could lend the 
integration project a sense of legitimacy, and that there is a danger that MEPs may 
unintentionally act in ways that result in the creation of additional EU legislation. 
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This would not only run contrary to the party’s core policy goal, but could also cause 
embarrassment to the party and affect its future electoral performance.  
Further, Eurosceptic parties may worry that their MEPs are more susceptible 
to being influenced by the forces of institutional socialisation than MEPs who are 
already broadly in favour of integration (for a discussion on institutional socialisation 
in the context of the EP, see Scully, 2005: 69–88). While there is little evidence to 
suggest that attitudes on integration change during the course of the parliamentary 
term in the case of MEPs who enter the chamber as pro-integrationist (Scully, 2005: 
141), it has yet to be demonstrated that Eurosceptic MEPs do not ‘go native’. 
 Eurosceptic parties have less to gain from their MEPs focusing on 
parliamentary work than pro-integrationist parties, while they also tend to have a 
greater incentive to ask them to carry out domestic political work. The Eurosceptic 
parties represented in the EP tend to have relatively small organizations, and tend not 
to have a tradition of extensive representation in their national legislatures. While 
some, such as the Finns Party, have made considerable headway at the most recent 
national election (Arter, 2011), to date the electoral success of other Eurosceptic 
parties, such as UKIP, are limited to EP elections and other second-order contests 
(Reif and Schmitt, 1980; van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996). Compared with more 
established parties, Eurosceptic parties have greater scope to benefit from having their 
MEPs concentrate on developing the party organization and attempting to broaden the 
appeal of the party by carrying out extensive domestic political work. This tendency 
is likely to be compounded by the fact that the core policy goal of Eurosceptic parties 
can only be realised in the domestic political context, as membership of the EU is an 
issue that is determined by the national parliaments. 
Together, these points suggest that Eurosceptic parties will want their MEPs to 
focus on a narrower range of activities than pro-integrationist parties, who will expect 
their MEPs to strike a more equal balance between the various activities that 
representatives traditionally undertake. As the costs of monitoring exclusively 
domestic political work are lower than the costs of monitoring a range of activities, 
Eurosceptic parties are expected to enjoy greater success in influencing how MEPs 
allocate their time. These considerations lead to the following expectation: 
 
Hypothesis 12: Compared with pro-integrationist parties, Eurosceptic 
parties are expected to desire that their MEPs carry out more work in the 
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home country, and are more likely to be successful in determining how 
MEPs allocate their time. 
 
As there is a tension between the ideology of Eurosceptic parties and the idea 
of conducting politics on a transnational basis, it is expected that Eurosceptic Groups 
operate as a loose coalition of national delegations and that decisions are taken at the 
level of individual national delegations rather than at the Group level (cf. Whitaker 
and Lynch, 2014). As a result, the scope for Eurosceptic Groups to develop a 
transnational will that is independent of its affiliated national delegations is far more 
limited than is the case with pro-integrationist Groups. As the potential for 
Eurosceptic Groups to develop an interest that is not shared with its affiliates is 
limited, they have a lesser incentive than integrationist Groups to attempt to influence 
the behaviour of affiliated MEPs. 
 The ability of Eurosceptic Groups to influence the behaviour of MEPs is also 
expected to be lower than that of pro-integrationist Groups. As the two Eurosceptic 
Groups are small, their access to parliamentary positions and assignments is 
restricted, and this limits their ability to incentivise the behaviour of MEPs. Compared 
with their integrationist peers, Eurosceptic MEPs are less likely to desire 
parliamentary assignments, as the EP is unlikely to approve a version of a 
parliamentary report that corresponds closely to their preferences.  
The ability of Eurosceptic Groups to implement a system of Group discipline 
is further undermined by the fact that Eurosceptic MEPs are unlikely to feel that it is 
legitimate for a transnational political organization to influence the way they carry out 
their work as representatives. If Eurosceptic Groups were to operate strict systems of 
discipline, MEPs may choose to forgo benefits such as policy and administrational 
support in favour of greater independence. Conversely, pro-integrationist MEPs may 
be more willing to compromise with their Group colleagues, as they view this as a 
means of promoting the development of a transnational political system, which they 
view as desirable in itself. These considerations give rise to the following expectation: 
 
Hypothesis 13: Integrationist Groups are more likely to attempt to 
influence the behaviour of MEPs, and to succeed, than Eurosceptic 
Groups. 
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Factors relating to individual MEPs 
Thus far, this discussion has provided reasons for thinking that the desire and ability 
of domestic political parties and EP Groups to influence the behaviour of MEPs varies 
according to factors relating to the institutional context and to partisan actors. It is 
also likely that the potential for partisan actors to influence MEPs varies according to 
factors relating to individual MEPs. The partisan control thesis rests on the 
assumption that partisan actors take advantage of their ability to shape the incentive 
structure facing MEPs as part of their efforts to influence the behaviour of MEPs. It 
follows that the degree to which partisan actors are able to influence the behaviour of 
an MEP depends on the degree to which the MEP is dependent on the partisan actor 
to realise his or her goals. 
 
Political experience  
A link is expected between the level of political experience that MEPs have and the 
degree to which they are dependent on the party to realise their goals. Indicators of a 
politician’s level of experience include factors such as whether they currently hold, or 
have held, any positions of seniority within the domestic party or Group, positions 
within the national government, or a senior position within the political system of the 
EU.17 Broadly speaking, MEPs who have held such offices are likely to have 
developed a personal political support base and may be less reliant on partisan actors 
to realise future goals. It is also possible that they are approaching the end of their 
political careers and do not hold lofty ambitions for the future. This leads to the 
following expectation: 
 
Hypothesis 14: Parties are more likely to seek, and to achieve, to influence 
the behaviour of MEPs in the case of those who have less political 
experience than in the case of MEPs who have more political experience. 
 
A similar logic applies regarding the level of influence that Groups exercise on MEPs. 
However, due to limitations relating to the data available, this issue is not examined in 
this thesis. 
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A summary 
This section has presented the factors that are expected to be associated with variation 
in the degree to which domestic parties and EP Groups seek and achieve influence on 
the behaviour of MEPs. The section has presented fifteen hypotheses relating to 
variation in the degree to which partisan actors attempt to influence the behaviour of 
MEPs, and succeed in their efforts. These hypotheses serve as the second of two 
components of the thesis’ framework for analysis, and are tested in the following four 
chapters. This analysis serves as a means of addressing Sub-questions 1b and 2b, 
which ask what factors explain variation in the level of influence domestic political 
parties and EP Groups respectively exercise on MEPs. 
  
Conclusion 
This chapter has developed the discussion of the thesis’ theoretical framework 
presented in Chapter 1, and has outlined the study’s analytical framework. Building 
on the claim made in Chapter 1 that elected representatives do not necessarily 
prioritize the interests of their constituents when making behavioural decisions, this 
chapter examined the basis on which MEPs act. It argued that MEPs’ behaviour is 
driven by their desire to realise five types of core goals: election, policy, office, 
personal gain, and future career.  
The chapter also examines the logic underlying the core claim of the partisan 
control thesis, which is that since partisan actors are able to control the degree to 
which MEPs are able to realise their goals, they may use this control to influence the 
behaviour of MEPs. This claim is deemed entirely plausible. Echoing Scully (2001), it 
is argued that partisan actors must be willing to incur costs if they are to develop a 
potential to influence MEPs. Partisan actors must carry out four activities if they are 
to develop such a potential: to hold interests relating to the behaviour of MEPs, to 
communicate these interests to MEPs, to provide MEPs with incentives to act in 
accordance with those interests, and to monitor MEPs’ behaviour.  
The final part of the chapter argued that the degree to which partisan actors are 
willing to bear the costs of carrying out these activities is expected to vary, together 
with the potential that they have to influence MEPs. As a result, some domestic 
parties and EP Groups are expected to be more likely than others to attempt to 
influence the behaviour of MEPs, and to enjoy greater success. The factors that are 
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expected to serve as the source of this variation are discussed to substantiate these 
claims. 
These theoretical insights serve as a basis on which to develop the thesis’ 
analytical framework. Investigating whether partisan actors fulfil the four 
preconditions of partisan influence identified in this chapter provides a means of 
addressing Sub-questions 1a and 2a. These ask whether domestic political parties and 
EP Groups respectively influence how MEPs approach representation. Fifteen 
hypotheses are developed on the basis of the discussion of the factors that are 
expected to lead to variation in the degree to which partisan actors seek and achieve 
influence. These hypotheses are tested in the following chapters and serve as a means 
of addressing Sub-questions 1b and 2b. These sub-questions ask which factors explain 
variation in the level of influence exercised by domestic political parties and EP 
Groups respectively. Chapter 3 begins the task of addressing the study’s four sub-
questions by examining data from the 2010 EPRG Survey of MEPs (Farrell et al., 
2011). 
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13 All MEPs other than those not seeking re-election. 
14 The exception is where an MEP prioritizes policy work during a parliamentary term 
to the detriment of party-based activity knowing that while increasing their profile 
within the chamber does not serve their immediate reselection interests, it is likely to 
improve their long-term re(s)election prospects. 
15 Of the thirteen Finnish MEPs elected in 2009, two (Heidi Hautala, Greens; Carl 
Haglund, Swedish People’s Party) had left the EP by the summer of 2012 to take up 
positions in the national government; Ana de Palacio y del Valle-Lersundi left the EP 
mid-term in 2002 to become Spain’s (first female) foreign minister; Toomas Hendrik 
Ilves was elected President of Estonia soon after leaving the EP mid-term in 2006. 
16 To provide three British examples, Nick Clegg currently serves as leader of the 
UK’s Liberal Democrats and Deputy Prime Minister; Geoff Hoon held a number of 
ministerial posts in the British government between 1997 and 2009; John Prescott 
served as an appointed MEP from 1975–79 and would later serve as the UK’s Deputy 
Prime Minister. 
17 However, the signifiers of seniority, status, and experience, listed above do not 
necessarily serve as signifiers of whether an MEP is free from, or dependent on, 
partisan actors. It is possible that an MEP holds a valued position because a partisan 
actor has given that position to the MEP on the understanding that it will be 
reallocated if the MEP fails to act in accordance with the actor’s demands. 
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Chapter 3: Analysis of the 2010 EPRG MEP Survey 
 
This chapter takes the first empirical step in examining whether domestic political 
parties and EP Groups affect the way MEPs approach representation by drawing on 
data from the 2010 EPRG MEP Survey (Farrell et al., 2011). The chapter is divided 
into seven sections. The first section presents the dataset and discusses its uses and 
limitations in addressing the study’s research question. The second section 
investigates issues relating to the focus and style of representation, examining how 
MEPs relate to various groups which they may choose to represent, and how they vote 
when the interests of different groups conflict. The third section explores how MEPs 
spend time working on behalf of the represented. In so doing, it places the work that 
they carry out on behalf of, and in relation to, their domestic parties in the context of 
the other forms of activity that they undertake.  
The fourth section examines various issues that are expected to shape the 
relationship between MEPs and the two partisan actors. It starts by examining the role 
played by different party actors in the candidate selection systems to determine 
whether party leaders are able to use their control of party lists as an incentive. It 
proceeds to examine the degree of contact between MEPs and their domestic parties, 
before investigating whether domestic parties and EP Groups provide voting 
instructions to MEPs. It closes by providing evidence on the degree to which EP 
Groups implement a system of discipline. 
The fifth and sixth sections employ multivariate regression analysis in an 
attempt to identify whether several of the factors discussed in the previous chapter are 
associated with the regularity with which domestic parties issue voting instructions on 
the one hand, and with variation in the degree to which MEPs attach importance to 
representing their domestic parties and EP Groups, on the other. In short, these 
analyses provide a means of testing seven of the fifteen hypotheses presented in 
Chapter 2, namely Hypotheses 1, 2, 5, 9a, 9b, 11, and 14. The seventh section 
summarizes the findings and offers some concluding remarks.  
The chapter finds that while most domestic political parties and EP Groups 
provide voting recommendations and maintain regular contact with MEPs, they do 
not appear to exercise extensive influence on MEPs. The overwhelming majority of 
MEPs claim that they are free to vote at parliamentary division on the basis of their 
own conception of the public interest, and there are few signs that MEPs are driven to 
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focus primarily on activity related to their domestic parties or EP Groups. Few factors 
are identified as predictors of the regularity with which domestic parties issue voting 
instructions, and the only variables identified as explaining any appreciable variation 
is the parties’ country of origin. 
 
The Dataset 
The 2010 MEP Survey (Farrell et al., 2011) is the third survey of MEPs conducted by 
the European Parliament Research Group (EPRG): the first two were carried out in 
2001 and in 2006. The three surveys feature similar but not identical questions, and 
while the 2001 survey was administered in paper format, the surveys have been 
administered via an online system in more recent years. In 2010, respondents were 
asked a series of questions on seven themes, some of which are of direct relevance to 
this study’s research question. The survey was partially completed by 270 
respondents, with most individual survey items attracting around 200 responses. As 
the leaders of the research team note, the sample is ‘reasonably representative of the 
EP as a whole’ regarding the nationality and EP Group affiliation of respondents (Hix 
et al., 2011: 9). 
It is easy to see why some scholars believe that these surveys provide ‘a rich 
dataset of MEP preferences’ (Hix et al., 2011: 10), as respondents address a vast 
number of issues in detail. For the purposes of this study, it is possible to examine the 
three issues that are of central importance in addressing the central research question: 
how MEPs approach representation and the degree of variation in this respect; 
whether domestic political parties and EP Groups undertake some of the activities 
required for them to develop a potential for influencing their MEPs; and whether 
certain factors are systematically linked to variation in how MEPs approach 
representation. The task of addressing the research question is particularly difficult 
bearing in mind that a large number of factors potentially affect the degree to which 
domestic parties and EP Groups influence MEPs (see Chapter 2). In this context, the 
cross-national, large-n nature of the data is a considerable asset, as it provides a 
means of including many of these variables in the analyses in a manageable way, and 
facilitates the task of identifying trends that relate to MEPs from across the EU. These 
broad trends can be corroborated and examined in greater detail in later chapters by 
employing qualitative methods. 
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However, there are potential issues with the internal validity of the data. As 
the surveys are self-administered, there is no way of knowing whether the responses 
were provided by the MEPs themselves or by their assistants, and there is scope for 
measurement error in cases where the data was not provided by MEPs. It is 
questionable whether over a third of MEPs took the time to complete (or to partially 
complete) the survey. The three surveys carried out by the EPRG are lengthy. With 
over 230 individual survey items, it is estimated that a respondent would take 15–20 
minutes to complete the 2010 questionnaire if they responded to each question. It is 
clear that most MEPs deal with a strenuous workload, and when considering the role 
that assistants play in easing an MEP’s burden, it is difficult to escape the possibility 
that the task of responding to the survey was delegated to an assistant in many cases. 
This is unproblematic where the survey item asks for the type of factual information 
that assistants could be expected to know, such as ‘When did you first become an 
MEP?’ However, the accuracy of responses on a scale of 1–5 on the importance of 
articulating ‘important societal needs and interests’ must be questioned if the 
respondent is an assistant. Consequently, care must be taken when interpreting the 
results, as some findings are likely to be more reliable than others. The issue of 
measurement validity is addressed where relevant when reporting the findings. 
 Further, while the survey provides data on a range of issues that are relevant 
for this study, it is necessary to be cautious and realistic in making inferences based 
on the findings of the statistical analysis. These data cannot be expected to provide a 
comprehensive picture of the nature of the party–MEP relationship, or of how factors 
associated with this relationship shape how MEPs approach representation. Data on 
the regularity of issuing voting instructions, for example, do not offer deep insights 
into the degree to which parties are able to control the voting behaviour of MEPs. 
They provide little indication of how MEPs react to these recommendations, and of 
whether MEPs feel under any obligation to follow instructions.  
It is possible, for example, that a party only offers instructions on very 
important matters, but makes it clear to their MEPs that they will not be reselected if 
they fail to conform to the party’s wishes. Another party may issue recommendations 
regularly, but make clear to MEPs that they are free to vote as they see fit. The survey 
data would be unable to convey this reality, and would in fact provide a completely 
misleading picture. Care must therefore be taken when analysing these findings to 
ensure that findings are triangulated with evidence generated from qualitative 
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research. On balance, however, it is clear that there is a value in analysing these data 
as the analysis presented in this chapter provides valuable insights into issues relating 
to the central research question. 
 
MEPs and the Focus of Representation 
The first task is to form a picture of how MEPs conceive of the represented, or in 
other words, of how MEPs relate to various groups which they may wish to represent, 
and how MEPs prioritize between the interests of these groups when acting as 
representatives. Chapter 1 argued that representatives vary in their focus of 
representation, and in their analysis of the 2006 EPRG MEP survey Farrell and Scully 
(2007) demonstrate that this is true in the case of MEPs. By drawing on the 2010 
dataset it is possible to replicate Farrell and Scully’s analyses and confirm their 
findings, as well as to expand current understanding of how MEPs relate to their 
parties and to other groups when making behavioural decisions. 
 Respondents were asked to indicate on a 1–5 scale (with 1 denoting ‘of little 
importance’ and 5 denoting ‘of great importance’) how much importance they 
attributed to representing various groups, including ‘All [the] people in Europe’, ‘All 
[the] people in my member state’, ‘All the people who voted for my party’, ‘All the 
people in my constituency/region’, ‘My national party’, ‘My European political 
group’, and ‘Women’ (Table 1).18 Bearing in mind that Hix et al. (2007) view MEPs 
primarily as the agents of two principals, namely the national party and the EP Group, 
it is interesting that MEPs claim to attach a marginally greater level of importance to 
representing ‘All the people in my constituency/region’ (mean importance = 4.14) and 
all citizens in their Member States (4.04) than to representing their national party 
(3.94), party voters (3.97), and their EP Group (3.84). The task of representing all 
European citizens (3.60) and women (3.44) is deemed less important, although these 
scores lie above the mid-point on the 5-point scale.19 The standard deviation values 
make it clear that there is some variation between MEPs in the level of importance 
that they accord to representing the interests of various groups. At the aggregate level, 
MEPs accord a high level of importance to representing many groups, including 
citizens who live in their region and in their Member State more generally, their 
national parties, party voters, and their EP Groups.  
The differences in the mean averages are small, however the results of a series 
of paired samples t-tests carried out on the data indicate that there is a meaningful  
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difference between the means of some of these variables. For example, the analysis 
indicates that there is a statistically significant difference between the means of the 
measures of the importance of representing constituents and all the people in the EU t 
= 4.136, p < .001, the importance of representing constituents and women t = 6.861, p 
< .001, and the importance of representing constituents and the national party t = 
2.573, p = .011. The latter finding is particularly noteworthy in the context of this 
study, since it reinforces the suggestion that MEPs place greater value on representing 
ordinary citizens than on representing their national parties. These very simple 
findings demonstrate that in contrast to the expectations of the partisan control thesis, 
MEPs view territorial representation as slightly more important than partisan 
representation, although these differences should not be overstated. 
Nevertheless, the paired samples t-tests indicate that there is no statistically 
significant difference at the p < .05 level between several pairs of variables, including 
the importance of representing the national party and all the citizens of the Member 
State, the importance of representing the national party and party voters, and the 
importance of representing the national party and the EP Group. The significance of 
the latter finding is that it suggests that there is little difference between the level of 
importance MEPs attribute to representing what some of the literature claims is their 
two most powerful principals: their national party and their EP Group.  
While these data provide a general picture of the focus of representation, they 
should be regarded as a crude measure of the importance MEPs attach to acting on 
behalf of different groups. The views of MEPs regarding who should be the object of 
their representational activities may have little bearing on how they actually carry out 
their work. It is perfectly possible that MEPs believe that it is more important to 
represent one group than another, but that they find it is difficult to put this into 
practice because of the pressures to which they are subject. For example, while MEPs 
may provide a higher score for territorial representation than for partisan 
representation because they believe it to be more important, their work may still be 
characterised more by partisan representation than by territorial representation 
because of the pressure partisan actors exert on them.  
Another issue relates to whether respondents were able to display differences 
in the level of importance they attribute to representing different groups when 
responding to the survey. The question of which groups are seen as more important 
than others is vital, because certain decisions need to be made in favour of one group  
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and against others. It is not surprising that the majority of responses are 4 or 5 on the 
5-point scale, as the task of representing several of these groups is clearly important. 
It is not likely that an MEP would say that representing any societal groups is not 
important, other than possibly in the case of Eurosceptic MEPs, who may not place 
great value on representing citizens outside their Member States. Since it is likely that 
MEPs view some groups as being more important than others, and the use of a larger 
response scale would have yielded a clearer measure of these distinctions. 
Testing for correlations between responses to the survey items dealing with 
the importance of representing various groups raises further questions regarding 
whether respondents were able to make a genuine distinction between the level of 
importance they attach to representing different groups (Table 2). There are strong 
positive correlations between the responses to many of the questions, even in cases 
where there is little theoretical grounds for a link, for example between 
constituency/regional representation and EP Group representation (r  = .439, p < 
.001). It is only in the case of one pair of variables (‘My national party’ and ‘All 
people in Europe’) that no statistically significant correlation is found at the p < .05 
level, and in all other cases the relationship is positive. Out of the twenty correlating 
relationships identified, the correlation between eight pairs of variables is of moderate 
strength (r < .40, >.20, p < .05), while eleven variables are strongly correlated (r > 
0.40, p < .05). These positive correlation relationships suggest that MEPs who attach 
a great deal of importance to representing a certain group also tend to believe that 
representing most other groups is very important as well. These data therefore make 
the task of gauging which interests MEPs prioritize when those of two groups are in 
conflict very difficult. 
Data from another part of the survey can be used to shed light on the issue of 
how MEPs act when the interests of various groups are in conflict. Respondents were 
asked whether they were ‘most inclined’ to follow their own judgment, to follow the 
views of national party voters, to follow the views of their national party leadership, 
or to follow the views of their EP Group where these views conflict (Table 3). The 
overwhelming majority of MEPs (69.4%) claim that they would be most inclined to 
follow their own judgment, with an additional 17.2% claiming that they would act in 
this way as a second choice. Only 14.1% would tend to vote with the EP Group as a 
first choice, 10.8% with the national party leadership, while a mere 6% would follow 
the views of party voters. 
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Table 3: Basis of voting in cases of conflict 
	   Follow	  own	  
judgment	  (%)	  
Follow	  party	  
voters	  (%)	  
Follow	  party	  
leadership	  (%)	  
Follow	  EP	  Group	  
leadership	  (%)	  
1st	  choice	   69.4	   6.0	   10.8	   14.1	  
2nd	  choice	   17.2	   30.4	   16.8	   34.8	  
3rd	  choice	   7.0	   31.0	   41.1	   21.7	  
4th	  choice	   6.5	   32.6	   31.4	   29.3	  
N	   186	   184	   185	   184	  
Q5.2 ‘Which of these are you most inclined to do’ in instances where ‘people have 
different views concerning matters before the European Parliament?’ 
	  
This suggests that the bulk of MEPs believe that their role is to promote their 
own conception of the public interest and that they do not feel obligated to act 
according to the wishes expressed by voters, by their national party leadership, or by 
their EP Group. In other words, the data suggest that MEPs largely correspond to the 
trustee model of representation presented in Chapter 1. However, while the data also 
suggest that most MEPs would tend to vote according to their own judgment rather 
than on the basis of the views expressed by these three groups, the data do not 
indicate what balance MEPs would strike between the interests of various groups. It is 
possible that most MEPs feel free to vote according to their own judgment, but that 
the interests of one particular group tends to feature more prominently than those of 
other groups when making these decisions. The only information that is available 
regarding these issues is that small minorities of MEPs would tend to promote party 
voters (6.0%), the party leadership (10.8%), and the EP Group leadership (14.1%) 
regardless of the nature of the conflict between the interests of different groups. 
There are two reasons why MEPs may believe that it is more important to 
promote the interests of their EP Group than to act according to their personal 
conviction. MEPs may take the view that successful policy-making in the EP over the 
long term is dependent on strong EP Group cohesion, and some may see Group 
cohesion as a means of fostering a supranational political system, a goal in itself. 
However, the data do not indicate that these considerations shape how MEPs make 
voting decisions. When asked whether voting with the position of the EP Group when 
it conflicted with one’s personal convictions is a worthy principle, a clear majority of 
respondents (54.3%) indicated that they disagreed (Table 4). While fewer than one in 
five (19.0%) noted that they agreed with the principle, it is worth noting that this is 
still a surprisingly large minority. The fact that over a quarter (25.7%) indicated that 
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they neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement probably reflects the feeling that 
views on this issue may depend largely on the specific context of the parliamentary 
division taking place.  
On the whole, respondents rejected the notion of voting with the EP Group in 
cases of conflict between the Group and the MEP’s constituents (Table 5). Two-fifths 
of respondents (41.8%) noted that they would prefer to vote according to the views of 
constituents rather than those of the EP Group, while over a third (36.7%) indicated 
that they had no clear view on the issue. Again, however, a relatively large minority 
(21.5%) maintain that it is more appropriate to vote according to the interests 
expressed by the Group than those voiced by constituents. 
 
Table 4: Views on loyalty towards EP Group in cases of conflict (I)20 
‘MEPs	  should	  remain	  loyal	  to	  EP	  group	  at	  EP	  divisions’	  	  
Agree	  completely	  (%)	   5.7	  
Agree	  (%)	   13.2	  
Neither	  agree	  nor	  disagree	  (%)	   25.3	  
Disagree	  (%)	   42.0	  
Disagree	  completely	  (%)	   13.8	  
N	   174	  
Q5.4.2 ‘If the opinions of the European political group appear in 
conflict with one's own opinions, it is correct to vote with the 
European political group’. 
 
Table 5: Views on loyalty towards EP Group in cases of conflict (II)21 
‘MEPs	  should	  vote	  with	  constituents	  rather	  than	  with	  EP	  group’	  
Agree	  completely	  (%)	   7.6	  
Agree	  (%)	   33.1	  
Neither	  agree	  nor	  disagree	  (%)	   37.2	  
Disagree	  (%)	   18.6	  
Disagree	  completely	  (%)	   3.5	  
N	   172	  
Q5.4.3 ‘If a member of parliament is under pressure from constituents, 
it is correct that s/he votes against the expressed will of the European 
political group’. 
 
In examining the representational focus of MEPs, this section has confirmed 
the findings of a previous study that MEPs attach a great deal of importance to 
representing a number of groups (Farrell and Scully, 2007: 105). The finding that 
MEPs view territorial representation as slightly more important than partisan 
representation is of direct relevance to the examination of partisan influence. The 
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discussion demonstrates that when the interest of these groups conflict, the 
overwhelming majority of MEPs feel free to promote their own conception of the 
public interest, and to vote at parliamentary division on the basis of those views. This 
runs contrary to the partisan control thesis, which claims that MEPs are compelled to 
prioritize partisan interests over those of other groups. 
 
MEPs and Representational Action 
The next task is to examine how MEPs spend time acting on behalf of the groups that 
they represent. Doing so provides an indication of whether MEPs are driven to focus 
primarily on activity related to their domestic parties or EP Groups. As Chapter 1 
explains, there is a variety of activities from which MEPs must choose when deciding 
how to carry out their work as representatives. The options include (but are not 
limited to) focusing on various aspects of parliamentary work, such as drafting 
legislation or engaging in activities relating to parliamentary oversight, publicizing 
themselves as politicians and their work through the media, and undertaking political 
activities within their Members States (Hix et al., 2007: 72; Farrell and Scully, 2007: 
93–4). The survey data provides some means of identifying which activities MEPs 
prioritize over others, although the survey questions focus mainly on parliamentary 
activities at the expense of those related to constituency service and media work.  
Respondents were asked to indicate on a scale from 1–5 (with 1 denoting ‘Of 
little importance’ and 5 denoting ‘Of great importance’) the level of importance they 
attribute to carrying out various activities (Table 6). However, as it is unlikely that 
respondents will view any activity as unimportant, it is likely that many viewed the 
scale as effectively running from 3–5. Consequently, any differences in mean values 
should be emphasised. 
The activity that MEPs hold as most important of those regarding which they 
were questioned is working on legislation. The mean value on the 1–5 scale is 4.32, 
and more than four out of five respondents (82.8%) noted that they viewed this 
activity as important or very important. There is a clear difference in the importance 
of legislative work and parliamentary oversight, which attracted a mean score of 3.72, 
and where only 62.2% responded with a value above the midpoint on the scale of 1–5. 
Together with legislative work, MEPs also view the task of articulating ‘important 
societal needs and interests’ as important. At 4.11, the mean value of this item is 
slightly lower than that of legislative activity, and 74.9% gave a response that lay  
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above the midpoint. Activity aimed at ‘developing common strategies for EU 
policies’ is also viewed as worthy, attaining a mean value of 3.90, with 69.4% of 
responses above the midpoint. The tasks of mediating between different interests in 
society, and of representing the interests of individual citizens, are perceived as being 
less important, attaining mean values of 3.46 and 3.11 respectively. These data 
demonstrate that while MEPs may attribute broadly similar levels of importance to 
representing the interests of various groups, they differentiate between the value of 
carrying out various forms of policy-related activities. 
The discussion in Chapter 1 demonstrated that the EP’s committees provide a 
setting in which MEPs have a genuine opportunity to influence policy outcomes, and 
that the bulk of the institution’s activity is centred on its committees. Committee  
membership is one of the factors that can most extensively shape the way MEPs work 
on behalf of the represented. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect that domestic 
parties or EP Groups who wish to influence the way MEPs carry out their work 
attempt to guide MEPs to their own preferred choice of committee(s). The data 
provides a means of examining the degree to which partisan considerations played a 
role in the committee membership of MEPs at the beginning of the 2009–14 
parliamentary term. 
The descriptive statistics reported in Table 7 suggest that for most MEPs, the 
choice of committee is based primarily on their own wishes and judgment. The 
overwhelming majority of MEPs (85.3%) indicate that they chose their committee 
largely based on their view that it covered important issues, by responding with a 
value of 4 or 5. This compares to 69.5% of MEPs, for whom the importance of the 
committee to their voters played an important role in the decision. Around two-thirds 
(66.1%) noted that their personal interest in the issues dealt with by the committee 
was important, while professional expertise influenced the decision of 64.8% of 
respondents.  
It is clear that national political parties and EP Groups played a far less 
influential role in these decisions, despite the fact that the distribution of committee 
positions may be one of the instruments that these two actors can use as part of their 
efforts to enforce discipline. Only 20.5% of respondents indicated that the national 
party played a role in the decision, while the figure is only 15.5% in the case of the 
EP Groups. It remains a possibility that the EP Groups and national delegations 
provided these minorities of MEPs with positions on committees in which they held  
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little interest. However, MEPs clearly do not believe that EP Groups and national 
delegations control access to committees with an iron fist. 
While the data do not enable us to directly compare the importance MEPs 
attribute to policy-related activities with other forms of activity traditionally 
associated with the work of a representative, they do provide some evidence regarding 
the extent to which MEPs focus on political work in their Member States (Table 8). 
Reflecting the findings of previous studies (Scully, 2005: 73; Farrell and Scully, 
2007: 123), the 2010 survey data suggest that MEPs regularly spend time on political 
work in their home countries. Over half (58.5%) indicate that they spend at least some 
time each week on domestic political work. As travelling between the home country 
and the EP’s centres in Brussels and Strasburg takes considerable time and effort for  
most MEPs, this finding suggests that a considerable number of MEPs view 
undertaking activities in their Members States as an integral part of their work.  
 
Table 8: Time spent undertaking political work in home country	  
Most	  of	  my	  time	  each	  week	  (%)	   10.0	  
Some	  of	  my	  time	  each	  week	  (%)	   48.5	  
Limited	  time,	  mostly	  at	  weekends	  (%)	   31.0	  
Little	  or	  no	  time	  (%)	   2.0	  
Varies	  too	  much	  to	  say	  (%)	   8.5	  
N	   200	  
 Q4.3 ‘How much time do you spend on political work in your home country 
rather than work at the European Parliament?’ 
 
It is possible that the data underemphasises the amount of political work that 
MEPs undertake domestically. Reflecting the way parliamentary business is 
scheduled, most MEPs arrive in Brussels or Strasbourg on Monday afternoon and 
return to their Member States on Thursday afternoon. Due to the wording of the 
response options on the questionnaire,22 it is possible that many respondents who 
devote substantial amounts of time to political work in their home county indicated 
that they only spend ‘limited time, mostly on weekends’ on domestic political 
activity, as this activity is centred on weekends. Furthermore, because of modern 
communication technology and practices, MEPs are able to carry out work that is 
related to domestic politics when abroad. Citing the difficulties of travelling within 
his vast constituency, one British MEP explained that he carries out as much 
constituency service as possible by telephone from his EP office in Brussels.23 
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Further, as the survey question asks respondents how much time they spend on 
political work in their home countries, rather than ‘on domestic political work’, it is 
possible that the data again underplays the amount of time some MEPs spend 
undertaking such activities. 
Data relating to the regularity of contact between MEPs and various groups 
provide some indication of the importance that certain extra-parliamentary activities 
play in the overall work of MEPs (Table 9). For example, the degree of contact with 
ordinary citizens gives an indication of the importance that MEPs attach to 
constituency service, while the regularity with which they interact with journalists 
suggests how much time they devote to media work, and contact with party members 
indicates how actively they engage in party work. The fact that a larger proportion of 
MEPs are in contact with ‘ordinary citizens’ (67.0%) on a weekly basis than with any 
other group that features in the survey, reinforces the findings made that MEPs spend 
considerable time on political work in their constituencies. This suggests that, for 
many MEPs, dealing directly with citizens plays an integral part in their 
understanding of their role as representatives. It is also clear that many MEPs 
regularly spend time on media work. The majority (58.3%) are in weekly contact with 
journalists, while 89.6% interact with journalists at least once a month. The fact that 
91.0% of MEPs are in monthly contact with party members suggests that they nearly 
all carry out some work within their party organizations, even if this only entails 
attending meetings with local party members.  
The findings presented in this section demonstrate that MEPs accord a great 
deal of importance to carrying out legislative work, and to their role as spokespeople 
for society. The findings also suggest that the typical MEP spends time carrying out 
activities in a range of settings and believes that extra-parliamentary tasks such as 
constituency service, media work, and party activities are all part of a representative’s 
role. There is therefore no suggestion that MEPs are driven to focus primarily on 
activity related to their domestic parties or EP Groups.  
Nevertheless, the discussion has been limited in its ability to explain precisely 
how MEPs carry out activities on behalf of the represented, further than to make 
generalisations about how MEPs prioritize between activities related to policy-
making, the media, their domestic parties, and their constituents. It remains possible 
that domestic parties and EP Groups compel MEPs to carry out these activities in a 
manner that promotes partisan interests. These limitations are mainly due to the  
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quantitative nature of the data and to the range of issues that the survey examines. It is 
necessary to analyse qualitative data to provide a more nuanced understanding of how 
MEPs carry out activities on behalf of the represented, and that task is undertaken in 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
Evidence of Partisan Control 
The previous chapter argued that domestic political parties and EP Groups must 
undertake a range of activities if they are to develop the potential for influencing 
MEPs. These were identified as having a preference regarding the behaviour of 
MEPs, communicating these preferences to MEPs, providing MEPs with incentives to 
follow this guidance, and monitoring the behaviour of MEPs. While the 2010 EPRG 
MEP survey does not contain data on every one of these activities, this section 
examines the data that is available and investigates whether domestic political parties 
and EP Groups fulfil the first two preconditions of influence. The section begins, 
however, by investigating which organs within domestic political parties are 
influential in candidate selection procedures. This discussion provides a means of 
investigating the claim that party leaders can use their control over the candidate 
selection process as a disciplinary tool. 
 
Candidate selection processes 
As noted in Chapter 1, it is frequently argued that party leaders in countries operating 
closed and ordered lists are able to use their control of the party’s lists at EP elections 
to influence the behaviour of MEPs (Hix et al., 1999; Hix, 2002; Faas, 2003; Raunio, 
2007, 2012; Hix et al., 2007). For this notion to be plausible, party leaders must, at a 
minimum, play a dominant role in the selection of candidates. However, candidate 
selection can be in the hands of the national party leaders, of regional party leaders, or 
of ordinary party members. 
The survey data demonstrates that there is considerable variation from one 
party to the next in the level of importance of these three groups in candidate selection 
processes (Table 10). While around half of respondents indicated that national party 
officials (56.2%) and regional and/or local officials (48.5%) play at least a relatively 
important role in such processes, it is also clear that the role played by these two 
groups in many parties is of minor importance. Nearly a quarter of respondents noted 
that national officials (23.6%) and regional and/or local party officials (24.0%) have  
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Table 10: The role played by various party organs in candidate selection 
	   National	  party	  
officials	  (%)	  
Regional/Local	  
party	  officials	  (%)	  
Individual	  party	  
members	  (%)	  
1	   10.7	   11.6	   9.4	  
2	   12.9	   12.4	   18.8	  
3	   20.1	   27.6	   28.6	  
4	   9.9	   30.7	   21.9	  
5	   26.3	   17.8	   21.4	  
N	   224	   225	   224	  
Q2.3 ‘In your party, how important are the following groups in the selection 
of candidates for the European Parliament?’ Options: 1 (Not at all Important) 
/ 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 (Extremely Important) 
 
little influence on the composition of the party’s list. The role played by individual 
party members attracted fewer responses above the midpoint compared with the other 
two groups, however it is clear that members play an important role in the selection 
process which leads to the election of nearly half of all MEPs (42.3%). Nevertheless, 
over a quarter (28.2%) of MEPs indicate that ordinary party members have little 
influence on the way that party lists are drawn up. 
A considerable percentage of responses to all three survey items lie at or 
around the midpoint of the response scale, suggesting that in many parties more than 
one group has some influence over the outcome of selection processes. Around two-
thirds of responses to the survey items on the role of the three groups are between 2 
and 4,24 while between 20% and 30% of the three sets of responses lay at the midpoint 
of the scale. By testing for correlations between responses to the three survey items, it 
is possible to gauge whether particular groups tend to share the role of leading the 
candidate selection process. As Table 11 shows, there is a strong positive correlation 
(r = .595, p < 0.05) between the perceived importance of the roles played by national 
party officials and regional party officials in candidate selection. This suggests that in 
cases where selection is mainly in the hands of party officials, the task tends to be 
carried out jointly by officials at the national and regional levels.  It can be inferred 
from this that even the actor that has the greatest potential to act as a successful 
principal – the party leadership and its officials – is usually unable to act 
independently in using its ‘ultimate instrument of control’ (Raunio, 2007: 141), 
namely the threat of deselection. 
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Table 11: Correlations of the values attributed to the importance played by different 
groups in candidate selection 
	  
National	  party	  
officials	  
Regional/Local	  
party	  officials	  
Individual	  party	  
members	  
National	  party	  officials	  
	  
0.59****	   -­‐0.05	  
Regional/Local	  party	  officials	  
	   	  
0.03	  
Individual	  party	  members	  
	   	   	  **** = p < .001 
 
The discussion relating to the processes used by parties to select candidates for 
EP elections has shown that it is inappropriate to conceive of domestic political 
parties as unitary actors, whose leaders can use their control of the selection process 
to influence the behaviour of MEPs. If the nature of the party–MEP relationship is 
extensively shaped by the degree to which party leaders control the candidate 
selection process, the nature of this relationship must vary considerably between 
cases. This also suggests that there is considerable variation in the extent to which 
parties that attempt to influence MEPs are successful. These insights challenge the 
partisan control thesis. 
 
Contact between MEPs and their political parties 
Parties wishing to influence the behaviour of MEPs must have, and must 
communicate their wishes to MEPs, as the first two preconditions of party control 
outlined in the previous chapter specify. The survey provides data relating to the 
regularity of contact between MEPs and various groups, including members of the 
domestic party, members of the national party executive, and the leadership of the EP 
Group. Unfortunately, it does not provide data relating to the regularity of contact 
between MEPs and the domestic party leaders or central party officials. Nevertheless, 
it is still possible to use this data to develop an account of the relationship between 
MEPs and the two partisan actors, and to identify the extent to which the degree of 
partisan interaction varies between MEPs. Since this understanding of partisan 
relations is based on the regularity of interaction between MEPs and partisan actors, it 
is inevitable that the picture of the relationship presented will be rudimentary. A more 
nuanced account of this interaction is formed in subsequent chapters by analyzing in-
depth interview data relating to specific cases. 
Data relating to the regularity of contact between MEPs and various groups 
were reported earlier in this chapter to demonstrate that party activity is a prominent 
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feature of the work of many MEPs. The same data can be drawn on again to examine 
whether various sections within domestic parties, together with EP Groups, 
communicate with MEPs (Table 12). The evidence demonstrates that most MEPs are 
in regular contact with party members, with such interaction taking place on a weekly 
basis in the case of most MEPs (51.1%), and at least once a month in the 
overwhelming majority of cases (91.1%). This suggests that MEPs are aware of the 
concerns of party members, and are therefore able to distinguish between the 
preferences of party members and those of other groups within the party, such as the 
leadership, or the national party delegation within the EP.  
While it is clear that MEPs are in regular contact with party members, the 
degree to which these data provide an insight into the nature of the relationship 
between MEPs and party members is limited. It is important to note that this contact 
does not equate to influence. Further, the form and duration of the contact is not 
specified, and it would be beneficial to know more about the type of members that 
MEPs are in contact with, together with their number, and whether this contact tends 
to take place with the same members. In many cases, members of an MEP’s family 
are party members, as are many constituency aides, and it would be reasonable for 
MEPs in such a situation to respond to this question with ‘weekly’. There is a great 
deal of difference between this form of contact and meetings with party members who 
may take a more critical outlook on the MEP’s work. 
Contact with members of the national party executive is far less frequent than 
with ordinary party members, although it is regular in most cases (Table 12). While 
just over a quarter of MEPs (28.0%) are in weekly contact with members of their 
party’s national executive, over three-quarters (76.7%) are in contact at least once a 
month.  The role played by the national party executive, and the nature of relations 
between its members and the party’s elected legislators, can vary. In some cases its 
significance within the party is considerably lower than that of the party leader and 
his or her inner circle, and of party officials employed to carry out the day-to-day 
running of the party. In other parties, members of the executive are powerful figures, 
even those who do not serve as legislators. There is no doubt that in most cases 
members of national party executives have extensive opportunities to communicate 
the preferences of the body on which they serve to MEPs. However, additional data 
relating to the nature and regularity of contact between MEPs and party officials 
would serve as more valuable evidence for learning about the nature of the 
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relationship between MEPs and their domestic parties. 
It comes as little surprise that most MEPs are in very regular contact with the 
leadership of their EP Groups (Table 12). For the majority of respondents (51.9%) 
this contact occurs on a weekly basis, while a further third (33.3%) state that they are 
in monthly contact with the leadership. Fewer than one in six MEPs (14.9%) are in 
contact with their EP Group leadership less often than on a monthly basis. While 
further research is required to identify what kind of interaction takes place and 
whether this affects the way MEPs carry out their work, it appears reasonable to 
suggest that a continual dialogue takes place between MEPs and their EP Group 
leaders, and that EP Group leaders can ensure that MEPs are constantly aware of their 
views. 
While regular contact is not a sufficient condition of influence, it is one of four 
preconditions. Therefore, these data do not rule out the possibility that the leadership 
of EP Groups can exercise a degree of control over MEPs. One issue to highlight with 
reference to this data is the fact that most Groups delegate responsibility over issues 
relating to committees to the Group’s committee coordinator. If EP Groups influence 
the way MEPs carry out legislative activity, coordinators are likely to play a central 
role in this, especially in the context of day-to-day issues. It is not clear whether 
respondents understand ‘the Group leadership’ as including the Group’s coordinators, 
or whether the term is understood as referring exclusively to the Group’s Bureau. It 
would be possible to develop understanding of the nature of the MEP–EP Group 
relationship further if data were available that differentiated between the regularity of 
contact with the Group leadership, defined as the Group’s Bureau, and with the 
Group’s committee coordinators. 
 
Voting instructions and partisan discipline 
As the discussion of Hix et al.’s (2007) study in Chapter 1 outlined, one manifestation 
of the ability that partisan actors are claimed to have to influence the behaviour of 
MEPs is the high levels of voting cohesion at parliamentary divisions. The survey 
data provides no evidence in relation to the use of threats or rewards to provide MEPs 
with an incentive to follow voting instructions. However, it does provide data on the 
regularity with which various Groups issue MEPs with ‘voting recommendations’, the 
second of four preconditions of enforcing a disciplined whipping system. This data 
also provides some indication of how much attention parties and EP Groups pay to  
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the work of their MEPs and to politics within the EP. Parties who do not view the EP 
as an institution in which their interests can be advanced are unlikely to issue voting 
guidance. Similarly, parties which do not keep abreast of developments are unlikely 
to feel that they have much to gain from mandating their MEPs.  
Evidence of parties failing to provide voting instructions would suggest that 
party discipline is not the cause of the high levels of voting coherence observed, and 
would raise questions regarding claims made to this effect (Hix, 2002; Hix et al., 
2007). However, indications that parties refrain from issuing voting instructions does 
not necessarily serve as evidence that they do not pay attention to the work of their 
MEPs, or maintain a close relationship with them. 
 Respondents were asked to indicate on a 1–5 scale (with 1 representing 
‘never’ and 5 representing ‘on almost every vote’) how often they receive 
recommendations from various organizations, and the results are reported in Table 13. 
The data demonstrates that while MEPs seldom receive voting recommendations from 
their national party leaderships (mean = 2.20), they regularly receive such guidance 
from the national party delegation in the EP (mean = 3.63).25 EP Groups issue voting 
recommendations more regularly than any other type of actor (mean = 4.2). Three –
quarters of respondents (75.5%) gave the EP Group a value higher than 3, compared 
with 59.4% with reference to the national party delegation, and 11.9% in the case of 
the national party leadership. Less than a third of MEPs (31.8%) noted that they 
receive voting instructions from within their national party delegation ahead of 
virtually every division, although 81.8% of MEPs receive guidance from the 
delegation on a relatively regular basis, offering a response with a value of 3 or 
higher. When asked about voting instructions offered directly by the national party 
leadership, the majority of respondents (67.9%) offered a value of 2 or lower, while 
only 11.9% offered a response with a value of 4 or higher.  
These findings demonstrate that the leaders of some domestic parties provide 
instructions as part of attempts to influence the voting behaviour of their MEPs. 
Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that few domestic party leaders do so regularly. 
Further research is necessary to explore the possibility that national party leaderships 
issue voting instructions through the leadership of the national delegation within the 
EP rather than directly. The survey data does not provide a means of undertaking this 
task. 
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Table 13: The regularity with which MEPs receive voting instructions 
from various groups 
Regularity	   National	  party	  
leadership	  (%)	  
National	  party	  
delegation	  of	  MEPs	  (%)	  
EP	  Group	  
leadership	  (%)26	  
1	   27.46	   9.90	   3.7	  
2	   40.41	   8.33	   7.4	  
3	   20.21	   22.40	   13.3	  
4	   8.81	   27.60	   20.7	  
5	   3.11	   31.77	   54.8	  
Mean	   2.20	   3.63	   4.2	  
Mode	   2	   5	   5	  
N	   193	   192	   193	  
Q5.1 ‘How often do you receive recommendations on which way to vote 
from the following parties or groups?’	  	  Options: 1 (Never) / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
(On almost every vote) 
 
While an appreciable number of MEPs receive instructions from their 
domestic party delegations and from their EP Groups, it is surprising that voting 
instructions are not provided on a more regular basis. It has been demonstrated that 
MEPs from national political parties with at least three seats in the EP vote with their 
national party colleagues at 95.48% of roll call divisions, and with their EP Group 
colleagues in 90.70% of instances (Hix et al., 2007: 137). If the survey data is 
accurate, a potential explanation for the discrepancy between the degree of 
congruence and the prevalence of issuing voting instructions is that domestic parties 
and EP Groups issue voting instructions for roll call divisions, but not for all votes 
taken by other means. In truth, it appears likely that the data relating to the regularity 
with which EP Groups issue voting instructions suffers at least somewhat from 
measurement error. The interview-based evidence presented in subsequent chapters 
demonstrates that EP Groups provide voting instructions at virtually all divisions. 
Evidence that domestic leaders and domestic party delegations provide MEPs 
with voting recommendations less often than EP Groups does not conflict with Hix et 
al.’s finding that domestic party cohesion is higher than Group cohesion (Hix et al., 
2007: 137). It may be the case that MEPs tend to follow the guidance issued by their 
Groups in the absence of instructions from their domestic party leaders or their 
delegation in the EP, but vote with their domestic party colleagues where differences 
emerge. However, it is not possible to use the survey data to examine this issue 
further. 
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The data suggests that there is little variation between EP Groups in terms of 
the regularity with which they provide voting recommendations, with the clear 
exception of the EFD Group (Table 14). The mean values of responses to the survey 
item relating to the regularity of voting instructions for all other Groups are above 4, 
and this indicates that MEPs receive guidance in preparation for the overwhelming 
majority of divisions. In contrast, it appears that MEPs affiliated with the EFD receive 
voting guidance at only half of EP divisions (mean = 2.60). This discrepancy is 
explored in greater detail in subsequent chapters. However, a potential explanation for 
this discrepancy includes the fact that as the EFD was formed only a year before the 
survey was administered, the Group may not have been able to develop a system for 
issuing voting recommendations at this time. In addition, the Euroscepticism shared 
by members of the EFD Group may not be a natural catalyst for close transnational 
cooperation. The issue of whether there are statistically significant differences 
between Groups in the regularity with which they issue voting instructions is 
examined later in this chapter as a means of testing Hypothesis 13. 
	  
Table 14: The regularity of voting instructions from EP Group leadership 
Group	   Mean	   Std.	  Dev.	   N	  
EPP	   4.32	   1.10	   66	  
S&D	   4.15	   1.12	   53	  
ALDE	   4.23	   1.12	   31	  
Greens	   4.07	   0.80	   15	  
ECR	   4.50	   0.76	   8	  
GUE/NGL	   4.40	   0.89	   5	  
EFD	   2.60	   1.43	   10	  
Mean value of responses to the question (Q5.1) ‘How often do you receive 
recommendations on which way to vote from the following parties or 
groups?’  1 = Never, 5 = On almost every vote 
 
It is worth emphasising again that it is not immediately clear from these data 
whether the practice of mandating MEPs affects the voting behaviour of MEPs. 
However, it is clear that other than in the case of the EFD, EP Groups regularly 
communicate their preferences to MEPs, fulfilling one of the preconditions for 
systematically influencing the behaviour of MEPs. 
 Despite the fact that the survey does not contain data directly relating to 
whether domestic political parties and EP Groups attempt to enforce discipline, it is 
possible to get some sense of the dynamics operating within EP Groups. One survey 
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item deals specifically with the issue of whether MEPs believe that it is legitimate for 
Group leaders to use disciplinary measures such as ‘the denial of particular 
parliamentary posts’ in their pursuit of Group unity. By indicating whether MEPs 
believe that such measures are legitimate, it is possible to gauge whether it is feasible 
for EP Groups to take such steps (Table 15). If a large percentage of MEPs do not 
believe that it is legitimate, it is unlikely that Groups would employ such measures. 
Doing so may give rise to a situation where disgruntled MEPs would leave their 
Groups, thereby substantially weakening those Groups.  
Nearly half (45.5%) of respondents do not believe that the use of disciplinary 
measures by EP Group leaders is legitimate, while around a quarter (21.9%) do not 
hold clear views on the issue. Almost a third of MEPs (32.6%) believe that such 
measures are appropriate, and this indicates that views are divided on this issue. 
However, as only a minority of MEPs show a clear preference for Groups to employ 
disciplinary measures in their search for unity, it is difficult to believe that Groups 
would be able to enforce discipline strictly over the long term. 
	  
Table 15: Views on the legitimacy of EP Group leaders enforcing discipline27 
Agree	  completely	  (%)	   8.3	  
Agree	  (%)	   24.3	  
Neither	  agree	  nor	  disagree	  (%)	   21.9	  
Disagree	  (%)	   32.5	  
Disagree	  completely	  (%)	   13.0	  
N	   169	  
Q5.4.6 ‘The leader of a European political group should, as far as possible, 
ensure the unity of that European political group. In doing so the use of far 
reaching means, such as the denial of particular parliamentary posts (e.g. seats 
on committees), is legitimate.’ 
 
Table 16: Views on the degree of EP Group unity28	   	  
Should	  be	  much	  more	  unified	  (%)	   8.5	  
Should	  be	  a	  little	  more	  unified	  (%)	   26.7	  
The	  degree	  of	  unity	  is	  about	  right	  (%)	   59.1	  
The	  degree	  of	  unity	  should	  be	  eased	  (%)	   1.7	  
The	  degree	  of	  unity	  should	  be	  substantially	  reduced	  (%)	   0.6	  
Don’t	  know	  (%)	   3.4	  
N	   176	  
Q5.5 ‘Very generally, what is your opinion on the unity of your European 
political group?’ 
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Having identified that there is little support for the principle of Group leaders 
actively enforcing discipline, the data also makes it possible to examine whether 
MEPs believe that the degree to which Groups enforce discipline in practice is 
appropriate (Table 16). Respondents were asked whether they believe that the degree 
of Group unity is satisfactory. Those indicating that the ‘degree of unity is about right’ 
or that the Group should be more unified suggest that their Group does not enforce 
discipline in an overly strict manner. Those who desire greater unity possess sufficient 
political awareness to understand that this would entail enforcing Group discipline 
more strictly. Conversely, those indicating that the degree of unity should be eased 
suggest that they feel constrained in their ability to act independently of the Group 
leadership. A clear majority (59.1%) indicated that the degree of unity is appropriate, 
with a further 35.2% of respondents suggesting that steps should be taken to ensure a 
greater degree of Group unity. Very few respondents (2.3%) believe that Group unity 
should be eased. Despite the high degree of Group cohesiveness that Hix et al. identify 
(2007: 137), the lack of resentment at the role played by EP Groups in their attempts 
to ensure unity suggests that Groups do not enforce discipline strictly. This issue 
receives further attention in subsequent chapters. 
 
A summary 
This section has examined whether EP Groups and domestic political parties from 
across the EU fulfil some of the preconditions for influencing the way MEPs carry out 
their work as representatives. The investigation of whether domestic party leaders 
control candidate selection procedures found that in many cases their role is either 
subordinate or complementary to those of other sections within the party, such as 
regional leaders and ordinary members. This finding, together with the considerable 
variation between cases, moderately diminishes the plausibility of the idea that party 
leaders from across the EU are able to use their control over the reselection prospects 
of incumbents to systematically control their behaviour. 
Nevertheless, the analysis has found evidence that some domestic parties and 
EP Groups have preferences regarding the behaviour of MEPs and communicate these 
to their MEPs. As a result, these partisan actors fulfil the first two preconditions of 
influence. Few cases were identified where parties and Groups do not maintain 
regular contact with MEPs and provide them with voting recommendations. The task 
of identifying whether any factors are systematically linked to the propensity of 
 123 
partisan organizations to carry out these activities is undertaken in the following 
section.  
 
Domestic Parties and the Practice of Issuing Voting Recommendations 
Despite the fact that the survey data is only able to shed light on whether parties and 
Groups fulfil a limited number of the preconditions of influence, by employing 
multivariate analysis it is possible to examine two issues that are of great interest. The 
first issue is whether certain types of domestic parties have a greater propensity for 
issuing voting recommendations (either directly or through the leadership of the 
delegation in the EP) than others.29 Evidence to this effect would suggest that parties 
sharing these characteristics have a greater desire and potential to influence the voting 
behaviour of their MEPs, although it does not conclusively demonstrate that they do 
enjoy greater success in influencing the behaviour of MEPs. Such findings would not 
serve as a measure of the extent to which parties attempt to influence other aspects of 
how MEPs approach their roles as representatives, or the extent to which they succeed 
in their efforts. The second issue of interest is whether the factors highlighted in the 
previous chapter are systematically linked to the importance which MEPs attribute to 
partisan representation. This issue is investigated in the next section. 
 Two sets of seven OLS regression models are formed and these take as their 
dependent variable the regularity with which domestic party leaders issue voting 
instructions (Tables 17a and 17b) and the regularity with which the leadership of the 
national delegation in the EP issue voting instructions (Tables 18a and 18b). The 
independent variables are specified in the same way across both sets of seven models. 
The independent variables are selected on the basis of the discussion in Chapter 2, and 
their inclusion in the models provide a means of testing eight of the hypotheses 
presented in that chapter. The first model considers factors relating to the MEP’s 
background, namely gender (coded ‘1’ for male MEPs, and ‘2’ for female MEPs), the 
number of years since they were first elected to the EP,30 and whether they have held 
a position in their national parliament, or in their national government (both coded 1 = 
‘yes’, 2 = ‘no’). These variables are included in all subsequent models to control for 
individual-level non-ideological sources of variation.  
The second model examines various aspects of the MEP’s and of the party’s 
political ideology. Measures of the position of the party and of the MEP on the left– 
right ideology scale and on the European integration scale (1–10) are included, in 
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their original form, as well as in a form folded around the midpoint of the scale.31 The 
latter measures make it possible to identify whether the extremity of the views of the 
party or of the MEP is linked to the dependent variable. The measure of the party’s 
position on the left–right ideology scale in the folded form provides a means of 
testing Hypotheses 9a and 9b. While Hypothesis 9a expects centrist parties to be more 
likely to attempt to influence the legislative behaviour of MEPs than less centrist 
parties, this expectation is reversed in Hypothesis 9b. The measure of the party’s 
position on the European integration scale makes it possible to test Hypothesis 11, 
which expects integrationist parties to be more likely to attempt to influence the 
parliamentary behaviour of MEPs than Eurosceptic parties. 
The third model includes a variable indicating whether the MEP was elected 
in a country that was an EU Member State before the 2004 enlargement (coded as 1 = 
‘old Member State’, 2 = ‘new Member State’), dummy variables for MEPs from 
countries operating open and order lists systems for EP elections (the use of a closed 
list system serves as the reference category), and a variable indicating the number of 
seats the respondent’s party won in 2009.32 The measures relating to the type of 
electoral system used for EP elections provide a means of testing Hypothesis 1, which 
expects parties from countries operating more closed electoral systems to be more 
likely to attempt to influence the behaviour of their MEPs than parties from countries 
operating more open electoral systems. Including a variable that indicates the number 
of seats won by the respondent’s party in 2009 makes it possible to test Hypothesis 5, 
which posits that parties with large delegations of MEPs are more likely to attempt to 
influence the behaviour of MEPs than domestic parties with small delegations of 
MEPs. 
Model 4 includes two variables relating to the MEP’s status and level of 
experience. These take the form of two dummy variables which indicate whether the 
respondent has experience of serving as the leader of their national party’s delegation 
in the EP and of holding any of a range of senior positions within the EP, namely EP 
Group Coordinator, EP Group President, committee chair or vice-chair, EP Vice-
President or Quaestor, or EP President (coded as 1 = ‘yes’, 2 = ‘no’).33 These 
variables provide a means of testing Hypothesis 14, which posits that parties are more 
likely to attempt to influence MEPs who have less political experience than MEPs 
who have more political experience. 
 125 
Model 5 examines the importance of national party officials, regional and 
local officials, and individual party members in the selection of candidates, with each 
variable measured on a 1–5 scale. These measures serve as a means of testing 
Hypothesis 2, which expects parties operating centralised candidate selection systems 
to be more likely to attempt to influence the behaviour of their MEPs than parties 
operating decentralised candidate selection systems. 
Model 6 includes a series of country dummy variables (0 = ‘not from country’, 
1 = ‘from country’), with Belgium selected as the reference category. Reflecting the 
claim that MEPs act as the agents of their EP Groups as well as of their domestic 
parties (Hix, 2002; Hix et al., 2007), Model 7 includes a series of dummy variables 
for EP Group affiliation and the EPP is used as the reference category. Following 
customary practice, the significance threshold of 0.05 is used. However, the 
discussion draws attention to potentially informative findings that emerge in instances 
where independent variables attain significance at the p < .10 level. 
 The investigation begins by examining whether factors associated with the 
party–MEP relationship are linked to the regularity with which the leadership of 
domestic political parties issue voting instructions. Respondents were asked to 
indicate on a 1–5 scale, with 1 denoting ‘never’ and 5 ‘on almost every vote’, how 
often they ‘receive recommendations on which way to vote from’ their ‘national party 
leadership’ and from their ‘national party delegation of MEPs’. The two measures are 
taken as separate dependent variables for each set of OLS regression models. Since 
the values of the dependent variables run on a 1–5 scale, the data can be interpreted as 
continuous or categorical, and the use of OLS regression reflects the decision to treat 
it as continuous data. The main advantage of this approach is that the results are 
clearer and easier to interpret.34 As the regression analysis is run using the ‘enter’ 
method, cases with missing data for any variable were not included in the model, and 
as a result, the number of cases in many of the OLS models featuring in this section is 
around 135. Considering that there were 736 MEPs when the survey was conducted, 
the sample size is relatively small. 
 The dependent variable taken for the first set of seven OLS regression models 
is the regularity with which domestic party leaderships issue voting recommendations 
(Tables 17a and 17b). None of the variables included in models 1, 2, 4, or 5 attain 
statistical significance at the p < .05 level. Model 3 indicates that the leaderships of 
parties operating under open electoral systems (b = .56, p < .05) are more likely to  
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issue voting instructions than those operating under a closed list system. The 
difference of half a point on a scale from 1–5 is small. Model 6 indicates that parties 
from one of the smallest EU Member States, Cyprus (b = 2.69, p < .05), are 
considerably more likely to issue voting instructions than those from Belgium. Model 
7 demonstrates that MEPs affiliated with the Greens/EFA (b = -.88, p < .01) tend to 
receive instructions from their domestic party leadership less often than MEPs from 
the EPP.  
The first two of these three findings run contrary to expectations. In contrast to 
the evidence presented above, Hypothesis 1 expects the leadership of parties 
operating under open-list systems to issue voting instructions less often than those of 
parties operating under other systems. Several considerations presented in Chapter 2 
suggest that parties from small Member States, such as Cyprus, have less of an 
incentive to mandate their MEPs. The costs of monitoring activity within the EP is 
disproportionally high for parties whose organizations are almost inevitably smaller 
than those from larger countries, while the degree of influence which they can hope to 
gain within the EP by ensuring that their delegations vote cohesively is more limited. 
It may be the case that reasons that are specific to the political culture of Cyprus 
explain the greater propensity of its parties to issue voting instructions. A more likely 
explanation is that a spurious finding has emerged from an analysis which features 
only one Cypriot response. The discussion in Chapter 2 provides no explanation for 
the finding that MEPs affiliated to the Greens/EFA receive voting instructions from 
their national party leaders less regularly than MEPs affiliated to the EPP. However, 
the finding is not surprising, as the Greens/EFA is the most cohesive Group in the EP 
(votewatch.eu, accessed 22/10/13). 
 The regularity with which the leaderships of national party delegations in the 
EP issue voting recommendations is taken as the dependent variable of the second set 
of seven models (Tables 18a and 18b). None of the variables included in models 1–5 
predict variation in the regularity of issuing voting guidance. Model 6 demonstrates 
that the leadership of party delegations from several countries are more likely to issue 
voting recommendations than those from Belgium, namely those from Denmark (b = 
2.77, p < .01), Germany (b = 1.47, p < .05), Ireland (b = 1.74, p < .01), France (b = 
2.22, p < .01), Italy (b = 1.67, p < .01), Malta (b = 2.92, p < .05), The Netherlands (b 
= 1.67, p < .05), and the UK (b = 2.65, p < .01). While the majority of these countries 
were EU members before the 2004 enlargement, it is worth noting that the variable  
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differentiates between MEPs from countries that gained membership before 2004 and 
since 2004 does not attain significance at the p < .05 level in any of the models. Party 
delegations affiliated to the Greens/EFA are less likely than others to issue voting 
instructions (b = -1.25, p < .01) than the EPP, reflecting the findings regarding the 
regularity with which the national party leadership issues voting instructions. 
Non-attached MEPs (b = -2.52, p < .001) are far less likely to receive 
guidance from their national delegations compared with MEPs affiliated to the EPP. 
This may be explained by the fact that many non-attached MEPs have few, if any, 
party colleagues, and that the survey did not provide a means of indicating that the 
respondent is not part of a national delegation. While the dummy variable for 
affiliation to the ECR Group (b = 1.05, p = .053) very narrowly failed to attain 
significance at the p < .05 threshold, the finding strongly suggests that the national 
delegations affiliated to this Group are more likely to issue voting recommendations 
than those affiliated to the EPP. This propensity to act may be explained by the fact 
that there are many issues on which the affiliated national delegations disagree, 
especially in the area of social policy. Chapter 5, which features the UK case study, 
discusses this issue further. 
 Thus far, very few factors have been identified as predicting the regularity 
with which these two types of partisan actors issue voting instructions, and there is 
little support for any of the hypotheses tested. The only variable that explains any 
appreciable level of variation is the parties’ country of origin. Most of the factors 
which are expected to be linked with the regularity with which voting instructions are 
issued do not attain statistical significance at the designated level. These findings do 
not conclusively demonstrate that there is no systematic link between these factors 
and the regularity with which these party actors issue voting instructions, only that 
these data are unable to demonstrate a link. It is entirely conceivable that the ability of 
the analysis to identify linkages has been hindered by the relatively small number of 
cases. Bearing in mind the concerns raised at the chapter’s outset regarding 
measurement validity, it is also possible that these linkages are obscured by 
measurement error in the data.  
However, the possibility remains that the null hypothesis is correct, and that 
there is no variation in the degree to which partisan actors seek and achieve influence 
on MEPs. Due to the concerns raised regarding the robustness of the analyses, 
examination of other data sources is necessary before it is possible to confidently state 
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that the null hypothesis is correct. For this reason, trends relating to the tendency of 
parties to issue voting instructions, and how MEPs respond to this guidance, are two 
issues that are investigated further in subsequent chapters.  
 
Explaining Variation in the Focus of Representation 
By forming multivariate regression models, it is possible to identify whether the 
factors highlighted in the previous chapter are systematically linked to the importance 
that MEPs attribute to partisan representation. MEPs who are heavily mandated by 
their domestic parties or EP Groups are likely to acknowledge that representing one or 
both of these organizations is an important feature of how they approach 
representation. Measures of the importance that MEPs attach to partisan 
representation may therefore be able to provide some indication of the degree of 
influence that partisan actors have on MEPs. However, as these measures do not serve 
as proxy measures of the degree of influence the partisan actors exercise on MEPs 
they do not provide a means of testing the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2. 
Descriptive data reported earlier in the chapter (Table 1) indicated that MEPs 
accord a high level of importance to representing many groups, including citizens 
who live in their region and in their Member State more generally, their national 
parties, party voters, and their EP Groups. Two sets of OLS regression models were 
formed according to the specification of the seven models reported in Tables 17a and 
17b. A further model is included to examine whether a relationship exists between the 
dependent variables and the regularity with which MEPs receive voting 
recommendations from various partisan actors.  
The first series of eight models seeks to identify factors that predict variation 
in the level of importance that MEPs attribute to domestic ‘party representation’ 
(Tables 19a and 19b). Other than the variables relating to the country of origin, only 
two attain significance at the p < .05 threshold. Model 3 establishes that MEPs 
operating under ordered-list electoral systems (b = .72, p < .001) are more likely to 
attribute a great deal of importance to party representation than those operating under 
closed lists. This is a noteworthy finding that runs contrary to the expectation 
presented with Hypothesis 1 that it is MEPs elected under closed-list systems that are 
required to place the greatest emphasis on domestic party representation. With a 
predicted value of 0.72 higher than other MEPs on a 1–5 scale, the difference between 
MEPs elected under ordered-list and MEPs elected under other electoral systems is  
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appreciable. As MEPs from closed-list systems are more dependent on their parties 
for their election than those elected via ordered-list, it is difficult to provide a 
theoretically compelling explanation for the tendency of MEPs operating under 
ordered lists to attach a greater level of importance to party representation. 
Furthermore, there is no indication that MEPs from countries operating open-list 
systems, and who may therefore feel that they have a personal mandate, think that 
party representation is less important than MEPs from other countries.  
A notable and slightly unexpected finding emerging from Model 5 is that 
MEPs from parties in which ordinary members play an important role in candidate 
selection are more likely to value party representation (b = .24, p < .05). Chapter 2 
argues that party leaders have a greater potential for influencing MEPs than party 
members. Therefore, as Hypothesis 2 posits, the importance of the role played by 
central party officials in candidate selection is expected to be more closely linked to 
attitudes towards party representation than the importance of the role played by 
ordinary party members. 
Model 6 provides evidence that there is considerable country-level variation in 
the attitudes of MEPs towards the importance of party representation. MEPs from 
Finland (b = -1.61,  p < .05),  Romania (b = -1.41, p < .001), and France (b = -1.18, p 
< .05) are considerably less likely to accord a high level of importance to party 
representation than their Belgian colleagues. There appears to be no simple 
explanation for this trend, as these three countries differ in many ways.  
A further eight models were formed to test for predictors of variation in the 
importance accorded to EP Group representation, with all non-attached MEPs 
excluded from the analysis (Tables 20a and 20b). Again, few factors are identified as 
predicting the level of importance attached to representing the EP Group, and none of 
these factors are relevant to the discussion of the determinants of partisan influence 
that features in Chapter 2. 
Model 2 indicates that MEPs from national parties that are positioned towards 
the right of the left–right ideological scale view Group representation as more 
important than MEPs from parties on the left (b = .23, p < .05). Each unit change to 
the right on the left–right ideology scale that runs from 1 to 10 represents a difference 
of a quarter point on the 1–5 scale used to measure the level of importance attributed 
to EP Group representation. The differences predicted between cases towards the  
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extremes of the ideological scale are substantial. In practice, the level of variation 
between most MEPs is likely to be modest, as most are elected from centrist parties.  
MEPs from a number of countries are statistically significantly less likely to 
value Group representation than their Belgian colleagues, namely those from the 
Czech Republic (b = -2.63, p < .001), Germany (b = -1.29, p < .01), Ireland (b = -
1.17, p < .05), France (b = -1.06, p < .05), Italy (b = -.96, p < .05), Luxembourg (b = -
2.06, p < .05), Malta (b = -2.02, p < .05), Netherlands (b = -1.55, p < .05), Portugal (b 
= -1.62, p < .01), Finland (b = -2.17, p < .001), Sweden (b = -1.23, p < .05), and the 
UK (b = -1.75, p < .01).  
Two potentially interesting findings provided by Model 7 fail to attain 
significance at the p < .05 level, but do attain significance at the p < .10 level. MEPs 
affiliated to the ECR (b = -.93, p = .06) and GUE/NGL (b = -.85, p = .08) tend to 
accord a lower level of importance to Group representation than MEPs from the EPP. 
The coefficients denote that the distinction in both cases is close to a full point on a 1–
5 scale, and this represents a considerable difference. This finding is not wholly 
unexpected, as it reflects the expectations set out in Hypothesis 13. Eurosceptic MEPs 
affiliated to the anti-federalist ECR Group are not likely to be as enthused about 
transnational cooperation as their more pro-integrationist colleagues. Interview 
evidence gathered as part of this research,35 but not reported in the subsequent case 
study chapters, strongly suggests that GUE/NGL operates in a far looser manner than 
other Groups. This is reflected in the fact that the Group’s level of cohesion is the 
lowest of all, other than the EFD (votewatch.eu, accessed 22/10/13). Model 8 
provides no evidence to suggest that the regularity with which domestic party 
leaderships, the leadership of party delegations in the EP, or EP Groups issue voting 
instructions, is linked to the importance MEPs attach to representing their EP Groups.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed data from the 2010 EPRG MEP Survey to examine whether 
domestic parties and EP Groups influence how MEPs carry out representation. 
Specifically, the chapter set out to identify how MEPs relate to various groups whom 
they may wish to represent, how MEPs act when the interests of these various groups 
are in conflict, and whether domestic parties and EP Groups issue voting instructions. 
It also sought to ascertain whether any factors associated with the relationship 
between MEPs and these two actors are systematically linked to variation in the 
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degree to which voting instructions are issued, or to variation in the value that MEPs 
attribute to representing the two partisan actors. 
 The examination of the representational focus of MEPs did not yield evidence 
suggesting that partisan actors are able to compel MEPs to focus exclusively on 
partisan interests. Indeed, MEPs attach a great deal of importance to representing a 
number of groups, and believe that territorial representation is slightly more important 
than domestic partisan representation. They attribute even lower levels of importance 
to representing their EP Groups. Further, partisan actors do not appear to have 
extensive influence on the voting behaviour of MEPs. When the interests of various 
groups conflict, the overwhelming majority of MEPs claim that they are free to vote 
at parliamentary division on the basis of their own conception of the public interest. It 
remains unclear how strongly the interests of partisan organizations shape this 
conception. 
 The analysis of how MEPs spend their time indicated that MEPs carry out the 
full range of activities traditionally associated with political representatives, such as 
engaging in policy-making processes, undertaking media work, carrying out political 
work in their constituencies, and partaking in activities relating to their political 
parties. There are consequently few signs that MEPs are driven to focus primarily on 
activity that is related to their domestic parties or EP Groups. Nevertheless, this does 
not rule out the possibility that these two actors put pressure on MEPs to carry out 
these activities in a manner that promotes their partisan interests. Since most MEPs 
spend a great deal of time on domestic political work, and since the distance between 
Brussels and the MEP’s Member State is great in most instances, EP Groups appear to 
have limited influence on the way that MEPs carry out the extraparliamentary aspects 
of their roles. 
 The findings indicate that most domestic political parties and EP Groups fulfil 
the preconditions of influencing MEPs on those issues regarding which the survey 
provides data. They communicate their legislative preferences in the form of voting 
recommendations, and they maintain regular contact with MEPs. The role played by 
many party leaders in selecting candidates was found to be either complementary or 
subordinate to those of other sections within the party, such as regional leaders and 
ordinary members. As a result, doubt was cast on the notion that the leaderships of 
political parties from across the EU are able to use their control over the reselection 
prospects of incumbents to systematically control their behaviour. Further, it was 
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established that EP Groups do not employ harsh disciplinary measures to ensure that 
MEPs vote according to their wishes. These findings challenge the partisan control 
thesis. 
 The chapter tested seven of the fifteen hypotheses presented in Chapter 2. It 
did so by examining the sources of variation in the degree to which domestic parties 
seek to influence the parliamentary behaviour of MEPs, and the sources of variation 
in the degree to which MEPs accord importance to representing both types of partisan 
actors. None of the seven hypotheses tested were supported, and very few factors are 
identified as predictors of the regularity with which domestic parties issue voting 
instructions, or of the degree to which MEPs accord importance to representing their 
domestic parties and EP Groups. The only variables identified as explaining any 
appreciable variation in the regularity with which domestic parties issue voting 
instructions is the parties’ country of origin. Contrary to expectations, MEPs from 
countries operating ordered-list systems, as well as MEPs from parties where ordinary 
members play an important role in candidate selection, were identified as being 
slightly more likely to value party representation. No theoretically compelling 
explanation can be provided for either of these findings. The analysis relating to the 
importance of representing EP Groups was unable to identify any factors with 
predictive power that are relevant to the hypotheses. In summary, the expectations 
regarding factors that affect the degree to which domestic parties seek to influence 
MEPs, or the degree to which MEPs value representing both partisan actors, are not 
supported by the data. This is surprising, because the discussion presented in Chapter 
2 suggests that these factors have a considerable effect on the degree to which 
partisan actors seek and achieve influence. 
There are three potential reasons why the analyses did not identify the 
expected trends. The first reason concerns measurement error in the data. As noted at 
the outset of this chapter, it is highly likely that assistants responded on behalf of their 
MEPs in at least some cases, and where this occurred there is scope for measurement 
error on certain survey items. For example, the discrepancy between the accounts 
provided in this chapter relating to the regularity with which EP Groups issue voting 
instructions and those featured in later chapters suggests that this is one measure on 
which the data suffers from error. However, the data is considered to be accurate on 
most of the measures on which the analysis presented in this chapter is based.  
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The second reason concerns the low number of cases included in the 
multivariate analyses. In most models, only approximately 135 observations are 
considered, and the scarcity of cases limits the ability of the analysis to identify 
trends. Consequently, it is possible that expected linkages between variables remain 
unidentified, despite the fact that they exist in reality.  
The third potential reason why expected linkages were not identified is 
because they do not exist, and because the statistical results simply confirm the null 
hypothesis. However, due to the low number of observations included in the analysis, 
it is not possible to confidently state that the null hypothesis is correct in instances 
where the results do not attain statistical significance at the p < .05 level. 
Since it is not possible to specify which of these three explanations is correct, 
it is necessary to examine an alternative body of data. This task is undertaken in the 
subsequent chapters, where the findings of an analysis of qualitative data relating to 
MEPs from six domestic political parties and four EP Groups are reported. This 
analysis makes it possible to corroborate the findings of this chapter, and to examine 
whether further, previously unidentified, linkages exist. In addition, the analysis 
makes it possible to state with greater precision whether partisan actors influence the 
way MEPs approach their work, and if they do, to identify what enables them to do 
so. 
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18 The survey did not offer a ‘don’t know’ option. 
19 These findings differ slightly from those of Farrell and Scully (2007: 105) who, in 
examining the data collected by the same team in 2006, found that the representation 
of party voters was given the highest median value (4.35), followed by all the people 
in the Member State (4.28), and then constituents (4.16). However, the median value 
of the importance of representing the national party (4.03) suggested that it was fourth 
on the MEPs’ list of priorities during the previous parliamentary term, reflecting the 
findings presented in this chapter relating to the current term. 
20 Non-attached MEPs are excluded from the analysis. 
21 Non-attached MEPs are excluded from the analysis. 
22 The first three response options are ‘Most of my time each week’, ‘Some of my 
time each week’, and ‘Limited time, mostly on weekends’. 
23 Interview, 25/4/12. 
24 62.9% in the case of national officials, 70.7% in the case of regional/local officials, 
and 69.3% in the case of party members.  
25 The fact that not all MEPs have colleagues from the same national party (and are 
therefore not members of a ‘national party delegation’) raises questions about the 
validity of this data. While some MEPs who are without a national delegation may not 
have responded to this question, others may have opted for ‘never’. While the ‘never’ 
responses are relatively low (9.9%), the lack of a response option signifying that the 
MEP is the party’s only representative creates the potential for some, if limited, 
measurement error. 
26 Non-attached MEPs are excluded from the analysis. 
27 Non-attached MEPs are excluded from the analysis. 
28 Non-attached MEPs are excluded from the analysis. 
29 This analysis is not repeated in the context of EP Groups due to the concerns 
outlined earlier in the chapter regarding the measurement validity of the data relating 
to the regularity with which EP Groups issue voting instructions. 
30 This does not necessarily equate to the number of years that a respondent has 
served as an MEP. The survey question asks respondents to indicate the year in which 
they were ‘first elected to the EP’ and it is possible that the respondent has not served 
continuously as an MEP since this date. 
31 In omitting these variables from the other models to control for ideological sources 
of variation the analyses presented in this section replicate that presented in a 
significant study in the field (Farrell and Scully, 2007). Further, omitting these 
variables from the other models makes for more parsimonious models and reduces the 
risk that statistically significant findings are obscured. 
32 In some cases parties joined forces at the 2009 EP elections, but the elected MEPs 
reverted to using their usual party labels during the parliamentary term. In such cases, 
the value used reflects the number of MEPs representing the party during the 
parliamentary term. The respondent from the Partitu di a Nazione Corsa (France), 
who was elected as part of the Europe Écologie ticket, is given a value of 1, while 
respondents from the Europe Écologie party are given a value of 13. The respondent 
from the Partido Nacionalists Vasco (Spain) is given a value of 1, as she was elected 
from the list of the Coalición pir Europa, who won two seats. (The other is a member 
of the Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya, who did not respond to the survey.) 
The CDU and CSU are treated as different parties, with respondents from the CDU 
given a value of 34 and the CSU a value of 8. In the case of Finland, one respondent 
is coded as ‘independent’ in the dataset. As it is clear that this MEP is Mitro Repo, 
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who is currently affiliated to the Social Democratic Party, the number of MEPs from 
the party is given a value of 2 in his case, together with his party colleague. The Finns 
Party and the Finnish Christian Democrats formed an electoral alliance and won a 
total of two seats. As a result, both parties are coded as having one MEP. 
33 The dummy variable indicates that the MEP has served in one of these position in 
cases where a positive response is given to any of the five survey items. However, 
only respondents who provide a negative response to all five survey items are coded 
as not having held a position of this type. The data is recorded as ‘missing’ unless 
responses are provided for all five survey items. 
34  Since the dependent variables are measured on an ordinal scale the most 
appropriate technique to use is ordinal logistic regression. However, the scope for 
forming the desired ordinal logistic regression models is limited due to the fact 
that the assumption of proportional odds is violated in several cases. The analysis 
carried out using OLS regression in this section was also carried out using ordinal 
logistic regression (other than in cases where the data violated the assumption of 
proportional odds) and these findings are reported in Appendix A. The fact that the 
ordinal logistic regression findings support those identified by the OLS regression 
analyses to a considerable extent indicates that it is appropriate to use OLS regression 
analysis as part of the investigation undertaken in this section. 
35 Interview with a GUE/NGL official, 20/6/13. 
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Chapter 4: Finland 
 
This chapter addresses the study’s four sub-questions by examining the partisan 
relations of MEPs affiliated to three Finnish political parties. Selecting parties from 
Finland provides a means of interrogating the partisan control thesis in the context of 
domestic parties that appear to have less of an incentive to influence the behaviour of 
their MEPs, and to have more limited prospects of success, than many others from 
across the EU (see discussion in Chapter 2). The three parties selected are the 
National Coalition Party (KOK), the Social Democratic Party (SDP), and the Finns 
Party36 (PS). The MEPs from these parties are affiliated to three EP Groups, namely 
the EPP, the S&D, and the EFD Groups respectively.  
 The chapter opens with a discussion on the partisan actors selected and how 
they relate to the expectations set out in the hypotheses. The chapter proceeds to 
examine whether the three domestic parties fulfil the four activities that partisan 
actors must undertake in order to develop a potential to influence their MEPs, as 
presented in Chapter 2. These four preconditions of influence are: to hold interests 
regarding the behaviour of MEPs, to communicate these interests to MEPs, to provide 
MEPs with incentives to act in accordance with those interests, and to monitor the 
behaviour of MEPs. The investigation subsequently examines whether certain factors 
are linked to variation in the propensity of domestic parties to attempt to influence 
MEPs and to variation in the level of success that such attempts attain. Nine of the 
eleven hypotheses that relate to domestic parties are tested. The chapter subsequently 
repeats these investigations in the context of the MEPs’ relations to their EP Groups, 
and all four of the hypotheses that relate to the EP Groups are tested. 
Since the domestic parties chosen as case studies are very different in nature 
(see following section), the degree to which they attempt to, and succeed in, 
influencing the behaviour of their MEPs is expected to vary considerably. Despite this 
expectation, the findings demonstrate a consistency across all three cases. The level of 
the parties’ engagement in the work of their MEPs is very low and there is little 
evidence to suggest that parties attempt to influence any aspect of the way in which 
MEPs carry out their work. None of the three parties fulfil the four preconditions of 
influence. The parties featured in this chapter show little desire to influence how 
MEPs act and very seldom do they communicate any wishes or requests to their 
MEPs. It comes as little surprise therefore that they do not provide MEPs with threats 
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or promises of rewards for acting in specific ways. As parties do not take any 
meaningful measures to monitor the work of their MEPs, and as the linkages between 
MEPs and their parties are very weak in all three cases, it is clear that parties know 
very little about the work of their MEPs.  
These findings demonstrate that MEPs act with considerable independence 
from their parties (cf. Raunio, 2007), and that parties treat MEPs as largely peripheral 
actors. The parties’ lack of interest in the work of their MEPs suggests that this state 
of affairs is likely to continue, especially as parties would need to transform the way 
they operate if they are to work more closely with their MEPs in future. The findings 
relating to Finnish parties challenge the claim that domestic parties systematically 
influence the behaviour of MEPs (Hix et al., 2007). As none of the three parties seem 
to show any interest in influencing the behaviour of their MEPs, there is no support 
for the nine hypotheses relating to domestic parties that are examined in this chapter. 
In contrast, two of the Groups to which the MEPs featured in the analysis are 
affiliated, the EPP and the S&D, influence the behaviour of MEPs. The EFD Group 
does not influence the behaviour of its Finnish MEP. This follows expectations and 
supports the four hypotheses relating to EP Groups that are tested in this chapter. 
 
The Cases 
Since the 2011 national parliamentary elections, KOK has been the largest party in 
the Finnish Parliament, the Eduskunta, holding 44 of the 200 seats. The party is one 
of Finland’s three traditionally large parties, having consistently garnered around 20% 
of the vote at national parliamentary elections since 1970. It attracted 20.4% of votes 
cast at the most recent elections in 2011, and became the largest party in the national 
parliament for the first time (Arter, 2011: 1284). The party has spent the 
overwhelming majority of the period since the mid-1980s in government. Jyrki 
Katainen, the party chair, became Prime Minister following the 2011 election and 
leads a six-party governing coalition. The party currently holds six ministerial posts, 
including the ‘Europe and Foreign Trade’ portfolio.  
Following Finland’s entry into the EU in 1995, the party was represented by 
four appointed MEPs until the first EP elections were held in 1996, and the party 
returned four MEPs at the 1996, 1999, and 2004 EP elections. Three sitting MEPs 
gained re-election at the 2009 elections, namely Eija-Riitta Korhola, Sirpa 
Pietikäinen, and Ville Itälä. The latter left the EP in February 2012 to become 
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Finland’s member of the European Court of Auditors (YLE, 2011) and was replaced 
by Petri Sarvamaa. The three MEPs are affiliated to the EPP Group, the largest EP 
Group. KOK is a pro-integrationist, centre-right party. With approximately 41,000 
members, the party is Finland’s third largest on this measure (Kauppalehti, 2011). As 
the party with the largest number of domestic parliamentarians, it receives the greatest 
level of public funding (Raunio and Tiilikainen, 2003: 66). These funds amounted to 
€7.48m in 2013 (The Finnish Government, 2013). 
 Similar to KOK, the SDP is one of Finland’s traditional three main parties. It 
has consistently garnered around 25% of the vote at national elections in the post-war 
period, although its share of the vote decreased to 19.1% at the 2011 national 
elections, representing its worst result since 1917 (Arter, 2011: 1285). The party has 
been regularly represented in government as part of coalitions, and is currently the 
second largest partner in the governing coalition. Three of the party’s representatives 
served consecutively as President of Finland between 1982 and 2012 (SDP, 2013). 
Following Finland’s entry into the EU in 1995, the SDP was represented by 
four appointed MEPs, and the party returned four MEPs at the 1996 and at the 1999 
EP elections. The party won three seats in 2004, and has been represented by Liisa 
Jaakonsaari and Mitro Repo since the 2009 election. Both are affiliated to the S&D 
Group. The SDP positions itself as a centre-left party, and is pro-integrationist, having 
supported Finland’s accession to the EU and its adoption of the Euro. The number of 
party members stands at around 50,000, and by this measure it is Finland’s second 
largest party (Kauppalehti, 2011). The SDP received €7.14m in public funds in 2013 
(The Finnish Government, 2013). 
 The PS is in many ways different from KOK and the SDP. Founded in 1995, 
effectively as a successor to the peripheral Finnish Rural Party (Arter, 2010: 485–6; 
2012; Raunio, 2012b: 5–6), the party has made considerable strides forward in terms 
of its electoral popularity in recent years. Its vote share rose from 1.6% at the 2003 
national parliamentary elections to 9.8% at the 2009 EP elections (Arter, 2010: 487), 
and it experienced a further major breakthrough at the 2011 national parliamentary 
elections, where it gained 19.1% of the vote. Overnight, its parliamentary party group 
emerged as the third largest, with 39 seats out of 200, having hitherto been the 
smallest group, with a mere five mandates (Arter, 2011: 1291). This success has 
represented a genuine challenge to the three main parties in Finland, and the party has 
emerged from playing a marginal role within the Finnish party system to being a 
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genuine potential coalition partner. Jyrki Katainen, KOK’s leader, expected to include 
the PS as part of his coalition government following the 2011 election (Arter, 2011: 
1285–6). In the event, Timo Soini, the leader of the PS, announced that the party 
would not form a coalition government because of his party’s reluctance to provide 
bail-out assistance to Portugal (Arter, 2011: 1285–6; 1293–4). The party’s success has 
been dependent to a considerable extent on the popular appeal of Soini, who has led 
the party since 1997. He attracted the largest number of personal votes of all 
candidates in Finland at the 2008 local elections, the 2009 EP elections, and the 2011 
national parliamentary elections (Arter, 2010: 488; Helsingin Sanomat, 2011).  
 The PS formed an electoral coalition with the Christian Democrats to contest 
the 2009 EP elections (Rannanpää, 2010: 77).37 Two MEPs were elected from the 
joint list of candidates, Timo Soini, and Sari Essayah of the Christian Democrats. 
Upon his entry to the EP in 2009, Soini became his party’s first ever MEP. However, 
he left the EP following the 2011 election to take up his seat in the national 
parliament. Soini’s position was filled by Sampo Terho, who continued the PS’ 
affiliation to the EFD Group.  
 Reported in March 2011 as having approximately 5,000 members (Kauppalehti, 
2011),38 the party membership is small compared to the three parties with similar 
levels of representation in the national parliament. Further, the party has not had the 
same opportunity to develop a network of local branches as its more established 
opponents. The PS received €6.63m in state funding in 2013 (The Finnish 
Government, 2013). However, since parties are allocated funds in proportion to the 
number of domestic parliamentary seats that they hold, the level of state funding the 
party received was considerably lower until its success at the 2011 national elections. 
Consequently, the fledgling party’s resources were very limited until around the mid-
point of the 2009–14 European parliamentary term. 
 The academic literature has yet to reach consensus on the PS’ ideological 
classification. Arter persuasively argues that the PS should be viewed as ‘a populist 
radical right party in the West European tradition’, due to its ‘mix of traditional 
conservatism (socio-cultural authoritarianism) and ethno-nationalism (nativism)’ 
(2010: 503; 502). However, the party’s economic views, especially its market-based 
critique of the EU, leads most commentators to view it as a centre-left party (Raunio, 
2012b: 6; 15–16; 22; Paloheimo and Raunio, 2008; Jungar and Jupskås 2011; 
Ruostetsaari 2011), a claim that is supported by the fact that it drew much of its 
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support from left-wing voters at the 2007 national parliamentary election (Arter, 
2010: 501). Consequently, the PS is viewed as a centre-left party for the purposes of 
the analysis presented in this thesis. The party’s Euroscepticism is considerably more 
moderate than those of its partners in the EP such as UKIP or the Lega Nord. While it 
has noted its opposition to further integration, it has not sought Finland’s withdrawal 
from the EU or from the Eurozone (Raunio, 2012b: 20). Nevertheless, as ‘the 
ideology of the PS is fundamentally at odds with European integration’ (Raunio, 
2012b: 21) it can be used as an appropriate case to examine how Eurosceptic parties 
structure relations with their MEPs.  
 Due to the differences that exist between the parties, it is possible to test nine 
of the eleven hypotheses relating to domestic parties that are presented in Chapter 2. 
As the three parties occupy different positions on the left–right ideology scale, with 
the SDP and KOK positioned to the left and to the right of the centre respectively, and 
the PS occupying a more centrist position than the SDP, it is possible to test 
Hypotheses 9a and 9b. Hypothesis 9a expects the PS to attempt to control the 
legislative behaviour of MEPs to a greater extent than KOK and the SDP, although 
there is no expectation that the PS is more successful. Hypothesis 9b states the reverse 
of Hypothesis 9a. As the number of MEPs affiliated to each party varies from one (in 
the case of the PS) to three (in the case of KOK), it is possible to test Hypothesis 5. 
While these differences are minor, KOK is expected to have a slightly greater 
incentive to engage with its MEPs than the other two parties due to the fact that its 
delegation in the EP is larger. Hypothesis 5 expects KOK to go to greater lengths in 
its attempts to influence the behaviour of MEPs and to be more successful at doing so 
than the SDP. The PS is expected to show a weaker desire and lower levels of success 
than the SDP. The level of variation between the three parties is expected to be small. 
On certain issues there are similarities between KOK and the SDP, while the 
PS provides a contrasting case. These factors reinforce the expectation that the 
engagement with MEPs will be closer in the case of the two older parties compared 
with the PS. As governing parties, KOK and the SDP are expected to put pressure on 
their MEPs to act in ways that complement the government’s strategy in the Council 
(Hypothesis 3) and to focus their efforts on legislative work (Hypothesis 4). This is 
particularly the case for KOK. As the party holds the posts of Prime Minister and 
Minister for European Affairs, the potential for its MEPs to cause embarrassment may 
be higher, as is the party’s potential to realise policy goals at the EU level. Several 
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factors give rise to the expectation that the efforts of KOK and the SDP to influence 
the behaviour of its MEPs meet with greater success than those of the PS, including 
their status as governing parties (Hypothesis 3). These two parties have a more 
extensive organizational capacity than the PS. They have better-established and 
better-funded secretariats, and as they have considerable experience of being 
represented in the EP, it is reasonable to expect that they have developed more 
effective systems for enforcing discipline (Hypothesis 7). Due to its Eurosceptic 
stance, the PS is expected to be less likely to attempt to influence the legislative 
behaviour of its MEP compared to other parties (Hypothesis 11), but to be more eager 
to see its MEP focus on political work in Finland (Hypothesis 12). 
 Regarding the potential for parties to vary in how they relate to different 
MEPs within their ranks during the parliamentary term, there are considerable 
differences between the MEPs from two of the parties featured in this analysis. Two 
of KOK’s MEPs at the time of writing are individuals with considerable experience of 
operating as politicians (Eija-Riitta Korhola and Sirpa Pietikäinen), while the other 
MEP (Petri Sarvamaa) has only begun a career as a politician mid-way through the 
2009–14 parliamentary term. One SDP MEP (Liisa Jaakonsaari) has had a successful 
career in domestic politics and held a ministerial post before entering the EP, while 
the other (Mitro Repo) did not have a career in politics before his entry to the EP in 
2009. As the differences between the MEPs are great, it is possible to test Hypothesis 
14, which expects parties to exercise greater levels of influence on the behaviour of 
MEPs who have less political experience than on the behaviour of MEPs who have 
more political experience. 
While Finnish parties are unable to use their control of party lists to offer 
incentives to MEPs seeking re-election, they can act in two ways that affect the 
electoral prospects of individual candidates. Firstly, parties are able to deny re-
election seeking MEPs a position on the party’s list. Secondly, there are a number of 
techniques that a party can use during its electoral campaign to further the prospects 
of preferred candidates. These include focusing the party’s campaign resources on its 
preferred candidates, providing these candidates with more extensive coverage in 
party-funded campaign material, and putting them forward as the party’s 
representatives when asked for an individual to take part in media events. In light of 
this, were it to emerge that variation exists between the parties in how they select 
candidates and how they relate to different candidates during electoral campaigns it 
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would be possible to test Hypothesis 2. The expectation is that parties operating 
centralised candidate selection systems achieve greater influence over MEPs, as do 
parties that vary in their degree of support for individual candidates during the EP 
electoral campaign. However, since the three parties examined operate along similar 
lines with regard to these issues, it is not possible to test Hypothesis 2 in this chapter. 
In addition to testing nine hypotheses relating to domestic parties, it is also 
possible to test the four hypotheses relating to the EP Groups. All four hypotheses 
give rise to the expectation that the EPP and the S&D Groups are more likely to 
attempt to influence the legislative behaviour of their MEPs, and are more likely to 
succeed, than the EFD Group. The EPP and the S&D Groups are larger than the EFD 
Group in terms of the number of affiliated MEPs (Hypothesis 6) and organizational 
capacity (Hypothesis 8), are closer to the centre on the left–right ideological scale 
(Hypothesis 10), and are pro-integrationist, in contrast to the Eurosceptic EFD 
(Hypothesis 13). 
 
Candidate Selection and the Election Campaign 
KOK selects its twenty candidates centrally, following a period where individuals 
interested in running as a candidate at the EP election are encouraged to apply. 
Incumbent MEPs are effectively guaranteed a position on the party’s list.39 Officially, 
the party does not select ‘top candidates’ or give preference to individual candidates 
in any way.40 Each candidate is expected to run a campaign independently of the 
party’s campaign, and to raise funds and plan their campaigns independently of the 
party’s central organization.41 The party runs a national campaign and works with its 
local branches to organize events throughout the country in which candidates are 
invited to participate.42  All candidates are treated equally in the party’s poster 
campaigns, with each poster featuring a photograph of all candidates and information 
about them.43 Despite the fact that candidates appear to receive equal treatment, one 
respondent suggested that the party gives preferential treatment to certain candidates 
in a very subtle way, for example by channelling publicity towards them by 
nominating them to act as the party’s representative when approached by media 
outlets.44 
Similarly to KOK, the SDP fielded twenty candidates for the 2009 EP 
election.45 The party’s executive committee, a body of fourteen individuals, selected 
approximately half the candidates, the remainder being selected by the party’s 
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Council, an organ comprising of sixty members, who are mainly representatives of 
the party’s local branches.46 While the candidate selection process was democratic in 
the formal sense, the party leadership, especially the party’s General Secretary, had 
extensive influence over the process.47 As a result, the candidate selection system 
should be regarded as centralised. Party officials note, however, that rather than being 
in a position where they could use the selection system to exclude undesirable 
individuals, the need to find twenty candidates who had a realistic prospect of 
attracting votes to the party through their personal popularity presented a genuine 
challenge.48  
As regards the SDP’s campaign in 2009, officials claim that each candidate 
was treated equally.49 The party offered to contribute up to approximately €10,000 to 
the campaign of each candidate on condition that the candidates’ campaign 
organizations pledged an equal sum.50 Only around ‘a quarter’ of candidates received 
the full amount of financial support from the party, with ‘around half’ receiving a 
lower amount.51 Campaign material commissioned by the party, such as poster 
advertisements, featured all candidates, and the party did not show any preference for 
individual candidates.52 This is despite the fact that some party officials feel that the 
party may stand to benefit from highlighting candidates who are strongly associated 
with the region in which the advertisement campaign is run.53 The only circumstances 
under which some candidates would receive additional assistance from the party 
would be in the case of candidates seeking election for the first time and who required 
assistance in forming a campaign organization. The party would be willing to assist 
such candidates in the task of finding an appropriate campaign manager.54 
While the EP elections in 2009 were the first at which the PS were successful, 
it is difficult to draw conclusions from the evidence relating to the party’s campaign 
that can act as a reliable guide to future campaigns. This is because of the exceptional 
role that the leader played in the campaign, and because the party may not approach 
future EP elections in a similar way as a result of the changes to its position within the 
Finnish party system. Nevertheless, the evidence does highlight the informal and 
leadership-centred nature of the candidate selection system. Prospective candidates 
initially approached the party leader, Timo Soini, to state their desire to seek 
candidature and, following their nomination, required the approval of the party’s 
executive committee.55 It is clear that the party leadership, and in particular the party 
leader, had extensive control over the process of selecting candidates. The issue of 
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whether the party gave preferential treatment to individual candidates is largely 
irrelevant because of the manner in which the candidature of Soini dominated the 
party’s campaign. There is no doubt that Soini’s success was based on his personal 
appeal rather than on the party providing his campaign with preferential support. The 
PS contested the election as ‘a completely open race’,56 giving no preference to any of 
its candidates, including regarding its use of publicity material.57 Even Soini was 
treated equally, with one respondent explaining that it was clear to all that he did not 
need any preferential treatment from the party, as ‘he’s big enough’ to win the 
election on his own.58 
Despite the centralised nature of the candidate selection system used by the 
PS, the party clearly feels that the personalised nature of the electoral contest in 
Finland severely limits its ability to affect the outcome of the election in favour of any 
of its candidates.59 The main criteria for selecting candidates are ‘to be well-known in 
the whole country’,60 to have the potential to attract votes on the basis of personal 
appeal, and to be free from scandal.61 Senior individuals within the party are aware 
that ‘only a couple’ of party members currently fulfil the first two of those criteria.62 
The party will have a strong sense of which of its candidates are likely to attract the 
largest number of personal votes at the next election in 2014, but will provide all 
candidates with ‘the same money and other supports’.63 Candidates at the 2014 EP 
election were not required to sign a contract stating their loyalty to the party in the 
event of their election,64 as was expected of candidates at the 2011 parliamentary 
elections (Arter, 2011: 1291). 
 
Staffing and Communication Practices 
At first glance, KOK appears to allocate more resources in terms of staff members to 
issues relating to international and European affairs than any other party in Finland. 
There are four officials who are in various ways involved with international affairs, 
including an International Officer, an advisor on issues relating to the national 
parliament’s Grand Committee, which deals with EU affairs, a coordinator on issues 
relating to the transnational movement of the European People’s Party (rather than 
EPP’s parliamentary Group), and an advisor who follows proceedings on the national 
parliament’s defence committee.65 As these officials do not work exclusively on these 
briefs, the extent to which the party is able to engage with international issues is more 
limited than the staffing figures suggest. In comparison, the SDP and the PS both 
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have a full-time International Officer who deal with issues relating to the parties’ 
work in the context of the EU and more broadly. 
Despite the number of staff employed, KOK does not have ‘any kind of 
organized system’ for communicating directly with its MEPs,66 and contacts between 
the party and the MEPs are ‘loose’.67 MEPs have the right to attend and to speak at 
meetings of the party’s weekly board meeting,68 although they seldom attend as 
meetings are usually held on Wednesdays, when MEPs are attending to parliamentary 
business in Brussels or Strasbourg.69 There is some direct contact between MEPs and 
the Party Secretary and other officials in the central party organization, but this 
contact takes place mainly in cases where the party ‘happens’ to engage with an issue 
related to the EU.70 Officials acknowledge that the party’s connections to its MEPs do 
not ‘work so well’.71  Party officials are in more regular contact with the assistants of 
MEPs.72 It should not be inferred from this that the party maintains reasonably close 
relations to its MEPs and that assistants act as facilitators of party–MEP interaction. 
Rather, the fact that the party interacts primarily with assistants rather than with the 
MEPs themselves is, in itself, evidence of the party’s inability to form and maintain 
strong links with its MEPs. The party’s links to the four Finnish EPP officials are also 
moderately stronger than those to MEPs.73 The party values these links primarily for 
the flow of information that they facilitate, especially as the responsibilities of some 
of these officials include media relations.74  
KOK’s links to its MEPs have always been weak, with one respondent 
suggesting that they had ‘never’ been ‘closer’ than at present, and that factors such as 
whether the party is in government has very little effect on how the party structures 
relations with its MEPs.75 It is clear that both the MEPs and party officials are 
dissatisfied with the current state of affairs. An official noted that the links have not 
been ‘close enough’ and that they should be ‘tighter’. An EP-based official expanded 
on this, explaining that: 
 
Both sides have complaints. The MEPs’ view is that they are forgotten here 
and [that] the party is not interested in them, and the party’s view is that the 
delegation neglects the party and is not very eager to cooperate.76 
  
The party considered how it might be able to address the issue following the 2009 
election, but did not implement any substantial changes in how it structures relations 
with its MEPs. It is currently thinking of ways ‘to work together’ more closely 
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following the 2014 election.77 One idea under consideration is to require candidates to 
sign a contract stating that they will keep in contact with the party at least once a 
month. Officials claim that at present it is difficult to persuade MEPs to maintain 
contact once elected as they are able to reject requests from the party, invoking the 
excuse that they have ‘no time’.78 It is believed that agreeing on a system in advance 
of the election is more likely to work, as MEPs may feel a moral obligation to abide 
by the agreement.79  
While KOK officials believe that the party has the resources necessary to form 
stronger links with its MEPs, they acknowledge that the party would find it very 
challenging to form particularly strong links, and that it would require ‘time’ to 
implement even an elementary system for communicating. 80  Further, they 
acknowledge that it would be more realistic for the party to form relationships with 
the assistants of MEPs rather than with the MEPs themselves, as the MEPs lack the 
time to interact with the party.81 Another proposal under consideration at the time of 
writing is that a party official should travel to Brussels for a ‘half-day meeting’ every 
other month.82 It is illuminating that a party official acknowledges that the task of 
building links with the party is so low on an MEP’s list of priorities, and it 
demonstrates that there is little that the party can offer to its MEPs in terms of threats 
or rewards. If the party does not appear to be greatly interested in its MEPs, it seems 
that the feeling is mutual. 
There is a greater level of cooperation between KOK’s MEPs and its members 
of the national parliament than there is between MEPs and the party’s central 
organizations (cf. Raunio and Tiilikainen, 2003: 60). This contact takes place 
independently of the party and is based on personal connections. 83  There is 
considerable variation in the regularity of this contact, with MEPs who have 
experience of serving as national parliamentarians maintaining closer links to the 
party’s national parliamentarians.84 The way responsibilities are divided between the 
party’s central organization and the party’s group of national parliamentarians 
explains, in part, why the central party organization’s engagement with its MEPs is so 
limited, and why MEPs are in more regular contact with parliamentarians than with 
party officials. While the role of the party’s central organization is to deal with long-
term issues, and to form strategies for the next ‘five or ten years’,85 the party’s group 
of national parliamentarians is more focused on day-to-day politics.86 
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This may also explain to a limited degree why the central party organization 
sees little reason to attempt to influence the behaviour of its MEPs. While the national 
parliamentary group has a greater incentive than the party organization to attempt to 
persuade MEPs to act in certain ways, the party’s national parliamentarians have, in 
theory, a more limited ability than the party to put pressure on MEPs. 
Parliamentarians do not have access to the instruments of persuasion that the party 
could potentially use. Consequently, there appears to be no actor in, or related to, the 
party that has both the will and the resources to influence the behaviour of MEPs. 
Similarly to KOK, the SDP structures relations with its MEPs in a very loose 
manner. This is reflected in the fact that the party’s two MEPs are organized within 
the party structure as a ‘technical group’ that is viewed by the party leadership as an 
organ that is ‘independent’ of the central party organization.87 In terms of formal 
channels of communication, one MEP is a member of the party’s executive body, and 
both are members of the party’s European Working Group.88 The MEP is very rarely 
able to attend meetings of the party executive as they are held on Thursday mornings, 
when the EP is usually in session, and there is no pressure on the MEP to attend the 
meetings.89 The attraction of leaving the EP before the conclusion of its weekly 
business to attend meetings of the party executive committee is low due to the fact 
that issues relating to the EU are discussed relatively infrequently.90 Meetings of the 
European Working Group take place approximately once a month, and while the 
schedules of the MEPs do not always enable them to be present, meetings are 
arranged at a suitable time in cases where the party is eager to discuss issues with its 
MEP.91 It is mainly the party’s broader ‘policy lines for the future’ which are 
discussed at these meetings rather than issues relating to ‘day-to-day’ policy-
making.92 As a result, the extent to which the party leadership is able to use these 
meetings to develop preferences relating to the behaviour of MEPs in specific 
instances, and to communicate these preferences to their MEPs, is limited. 
Most substantive communication takes place informally, via emails and 
telephone calls. Despite the fact that MEPs feel that they have a ‘good relationship’ 
with party leaders on a personal level, they claim that it is ‘very, very difficult’ for 
them to exchange views with party officials.93 It is only rarely that it is possible to 
develop a coordinated position, and one MEP noted that trying to discuss policy 
issues with the party organization was often ‘mission impossible’.94 The ability of the 
party to use the ‘delegation’ structure to facilitate communication with its MEPs has 
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decreased since 2009. In the previous parliamentary term (2004–9) the party’s 
delegation of three MEPs held bi-weekly meetings to discuss policy issues in detail. 
This practice did not continue following the 2009 election,95 when the party returned 
two MEPs, both of whom were new. It is likely that a similar arrangement would need 
to be established if the party wished to strengthen its links to its MEPs, as it would be 
easier for the party to coordinate with and monitor the work of its MEPs were the 
delegation to operate in a more structured manner.  
It is not surprising that links between the SDP’s delegation of MEPs and the 
party central office are perceived to be weak. While the party’s central organization is 
substantial by Finnish standards, the level of resources it allocates to dealing with EU 
issues is modest. The International Officer is not expected to follow the passage of 
individual pieces of EU legislation, or to provide policy advice on specific issues to 
MEPs.96 One MEP noted that the party’s engagement with EU affairs is ‘very weak’, 
and that its interest mainly revolves around the work of its Minister of Finance at 
meetings of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council.97 MEPs feel that their 
efforts to discuss issues relating to the EU are hindered by the party’s apparent lack of 
awareness of the EU’s agenda.98  
Surprisingly, bearing in mind that the SDP is a major coalition partner in the 
Finnish Government, one MEP emphasised that the party does not even seem to be 
aware of the issues that are to be discussed in meetings of the Council of the EU until 
shortly before they are held.99 This respondent noted that because EU policy-making 
processes are undertaken with such speed, especially when major decisions are taken 
by the EP or by the Council of the EU, party meetings held to discuss developments 
in the EU ‘are always too late’.100 MEPs and party officials alike suggest that it is 
easier to hold discussions between MEPs and prominent party figures on legislative 
issues compared with more pressing issues, such as the response to the Eurozone 
crisis, as legislative processes offer more time for discussions to take place.101 It is 
noteworthy that the methods used by the party to coordinate with its MEPs have 
remained unchanged since the party entered government as part of the coalition 
following the 2011 Finnish parliamentary election.102 This suggests that the party’s 
governing status has no bearing on how it structures relations with its MEPs. 
Similarly to the case of KOK, it is clear that links between the SDP’s MEPs 
and its national parliamentarians are stronger than the links of its MEPs to the party 
central office (cf. Raunio and Tiilikainen, 2003: 60).103 At the time of the research, 
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the Chair of the Finnish Parliament’s Grand Committee, the Committee responsible 
for issues relating to the EU, was Miapetra Kumpala-Natri of the SDP. There is 
frequent contact between the party’s MEPs and the Grand Committee’s Chair, as well 
as between the MEPs and SDP members of the committee.104 A party official 
acknowledged that the party fails to maintain adequate links with its MEPs, and that 
this is an issue which the party needs to address in future.105 A proposed solution is to 
further improve the links between the MEPs and the party’s national parliamentarians 
who are members of the Grand Committee.106 It is noteworthy that this proposed 
solution would not result in the party organization itself developing stronger ties to its 
delegation of MEPs, but rather that it would lead to the strengthening of ties between 
national and European parliamentarians. The official’s suggestion, together with the 
scale of the transformation required if the party is to develop strong links with its 
MEPs, suggests that the nature of the relationship between MEPs and the party 
organization will see little change in future. 
 In contrast to the two other cases, it is clear that links between the PS and its 
MEP were strong during the first two years of the 2009–14 parliamentary term. The 
MEP in question, Timo Soini, guided the party’s main organs while undertaking his 
role as party leader. Unsurprisingly, the party did not establish a formalised system 
for maintaining links to its MEP during Soini’s time as an MEP, nor has such a 
system been developed since his departure. As links between the party and its MEP 
are based on informal connections, there is an inevitability to the fact that the party’s 
links with Soini’s replacement, Sampo Terho, are considerably weaker. The MEP has 
been ‘quite isolated’ from the party organization,107 partly due to the need for him to 
focus on adapting to life within the EP, and partly due to the fact that the party’s 
priority has been to establish relations with its new cohort of national 
parliamentarians.108 The MEP had only met ‘high-ranking people from the party’ 
twice during his first year in office. 109 Meetings with senior party members and 
officials take place on an ‘ad hoc’ basis, with requests made for the MEP to ‘come 
and tell us something’ if paths happen to cross.110  
Much of the communication that takes place between the MEP’s office and 
other PS party figures is conducted through a local assistant, who is based in 
Helsinki.111 The MEP’s local assistant is described as ‘the only living link’ between 
the MEP and the party, and as the connection that has ‘kept the relationship at least 
alive’.112 While the assistant visits the Finnish Parliament regularly to ‘exchange news 
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and views’ with national parliamentarians,113 the MEP’s links to the party’s national 
parliamentary group remain very weak. The MEP had not met a considerable number 
of the party’s Eduskunta members a full year following the successes of the 2011 
national election. This lack of contact has hindered the process of exchanging views 
to the extent that the party’s EP-based affiliates often do not know what the party’s 
national parliamentarians ‘think about the EU’.114 
The fact that the links are weak are not surprising, bearing in mind the sudden 
growth of the party’s national parliamentary group and the fact that neither the MEP 
nor 34 of the PS’s national parliamentarians were full-time elected politicians until 
the spring of 2011. These linkages are likely to strengthen over time, especially if 
some of the party’s national parliamentarians will be elected to the EP in 2014, as 
some officials expect.115 A further possible explanation for the weak links between 
the party and its MEP is that only one of the MEP’s five assistants (including the 
Group official specifically assigned to the MEP) is a party member, the others 
selected on the basis of their professional merit.116 A result of this may be that the 
level of informal contact between the MEP’s office and the party’s central 
organization is more limited than would be the case if a greater number of assistants 
were personally linked to the party. 
Despite the weak connection between the party organization and the MEP, 
there are strong direct links between the MEP and the party leader, and this 
connection represents the MEP’s main link to the party. An official suggested that the 
relationship is likely to be very different from that between most Finnish MEPs and 
their party leaders as the two are ‘more like friends’ than might be the case in other 
instances.117 Meetings are held with the party leader on a monthly basis,118 and further 
informal communication takes place when required.  
  There have been some loose requests from the party for the MEP to maintain 
more regular and systematic contact with the party,119 however the strain put on the 
party organization since it became ‘seven times bigger … in one single night’120 has 
meant that such efforts have not been regarded as a priority for the party. 
Nevertheless, both the party and the MEP’s office maintain that steps must be taken to 
strengthen linkages between the party and its representation in the EP in future.121 The 
party appears to rely heavily on personal relations between the MEP and the party 
leader, and despite the periodic exchanges, there remains a lack of a formalised 
system for facilitating regular contact. This does not greatly impede the exchange of 
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information between the MEP and the party leader. However, with the PS expected to 
gain at least one additional seat at the 2014 EP election (Raunio, 2014), it is possible 
that the connections between the party leadership and any new MEPs may not be as 
strong. 
 
Providing Guidance on Various Aspects of Representation 
KOK does not have a model of representation for its MEPs to follow. A party official 
acknowledged that the party does not have a clear idea of how MEPs should carry out 
their work, and that it does not provide MEPs with guidance on how much time they 
should spend in Finland, or on how to divide their time between different activities.122 
When discussing what, if anything, MEPs are ‘expected’ to do, the official talked in 
very general terms of the types of activities the party ‘hopes’ that MEPs will carry 
out.123 The party rarely ask MEPs to undertake specific activities, and it is clear that 
party officials show a great degree of understanding when MEPs decline requests to 
attend meetings, as officials are aware that it can be ‘quite difficult for them to take 
part’ because of the calls on their time.124 Further, the fact that the party plays no part 
in arranging most of the public events at which MEPs participate in Finland125 
undermines the idea that parties attempt to control such appearances so as to 
maximise their benefit to the party. It is clear that the party does not choreograph such 
events, nor does it attempt to discourage MEPs from promoting policies that conflict 
with those of the party. 
Reflecting how KOK does not communicate in a systematic manner with its 
MEPs and does not provide guidance on how MEPs should carry out their work, the 
party also lacks a formalised system for providing policy advice. One MEP noted that 
the support from the party central office for day-to-day committee work was ‘non 
existent’.126 This MEP stated that the lack of attention paid to the work of MEPs and 
the party’s loose contacts with them was ‘understandable’.127 This is because of the 
pressures of political life, combined with the fact that the party’s ‘focus’ (as well as 
the media’s) is on domestic politics (cf. Hix et al., 1999: 8).128 Another interviewee 
noted that MEPs would not approach the party for policy advice when dealing with 
parliamentary reports, or other tasks requiring specialist knowledge, ‘because the 
expertise needed is normally nowhere near the party’.129  
KOK does not issue voting instructions to its MEPs,130 and an official claims 
that it would not consider doing so.131 An MEP explained that while the party would 
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sometimes identify an issue as ‘important’ and explain why, it ‘would be unheard of’ 
for MEPs to receive direct guidance on how to act.132 An official confirmed this 
account, noting that the party would sometimes ‘send them wishes’, but only on a 
‘very hot topic for Finland’.133 Such instances arise rarely, and the party does not 
apply pressure on its MEPs to act according to its wishes during such exchanges. An 
MEP explained that ‘I would be really appalled’ if ‘anyone’ attempted to influence 
the voting behaviour of MEPs, as it would encroach on ‘the sovereignty of the 
deputy’.134 This feeling is even stronger in cases where the MEP had made it clear to 
the electorate that (s)he disagreed with the party on a certain issue. An MEP explained 
that (s)he would not follow party policy in cases of such conflict ‘because [XX,000] 
people voted for me and I just can’t go with the party’.135 It is clear that this MEP 
feels a greater duty to enact promises made to the electorate than to act according to 
party policy.  
It is also clear that the party does not operate a system of threats and rewards 
in relation to its MEPs and that thinking in those terms is anathema to the party. 
Sources in Brussels and in Helsinki acknowledged that the party would have little 
effect on its MEPs even if it did attempt to apply pressure,136 as it does not have the 
‘kind of power’ necessary to provide MEPs with a strong enough incentive to modify 
their behaviour.137 This applied equally to instances where the party desired that its 
MEPs act in certain ways within the EP, and to a hypothetical case where an MEP 
would neglect an aspect of their work that is traditionally seen as essential, such as 
being active in Finland.138 The fact that the party failed in its attempts to establish a 
system whereby MEPs were tasked with monitoring specific EP committees on behalf 
of the party139 underlies the difficulties that the party has in influencing its MEPs once 
elected.  
An MEP appeared very relaxed with the issue of dealing with requests from 
the party, explaining that ‘If what [party officials] say makes sense to me, then I do it. 
If it doesn’t, then I don’t.’140 This MEP would clearly not be deterred from acting 
against the wishes of the party, and would be perfectly willing to provide an 
explanation to the party leadership: ‘I explain it “OK, for this and this reason, what 
you are proposing doesn’t make sense”. Or, “I’m not in favour, so no, I’m not going 
to do it”.’ 141  An MEP acknowledged that there is a significant degree of 
correspondence between the party’s broad outlook and the ideological orientations of 
MEPs, noting that ‘I wouldn’t be there in the party’ if this was not the case.142 
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However, the MEP noted that there are issues on which there is a fundamental 
disagreement between MEPs and the party, but even so that the party does not 
actively discourage its MEPs from voicing dissenting opinions.143 
An official acknowledged that the party is happy for MEPs to base their 
decisions regarding voting matters on the discussions that take place within the EP 
Group.144 Confirming this account, an EP-based affiliate claimed that the party ‘does 
not know anything about the [content of the] voting lists’ that are provided by the EPP 
Group, and stated that ‘There has not been a single person from the party who has 
ever, ever, ever checked the voting lists’.145 The fact that the party is content for 
MEPs to make decisions relating to their parliamentary work on the basis of 
discussions within the EP Group rather than within the domestic party, together with 
the fact that the party only rarely communicates its interests to MEPs, serves as 
evidence of the party’s lack of desire to engage with the EP’s day-to-day business. 
This interpretation contradicts the claim that the high degree of voting cohesion 
within national delegations are brought about due to pressure from the national party 
(Hix et al., 2007: 133). 
When carrying out policy-related work, KOK MEPs enjoy a great deal of 
freedom to make decisions not only independently of their domestic party, but 
independently of other related actors, such as the national government, and their party 
colleagues in the domestic parliamentary group. While the party ‘sets the [broad 
policy] framework’, it is for MEPs to translate those general policy aims into 
decisions regarding forms of action from day to day.146 As part of this process, MEPs 
consult with a range of sources when developing a policy position, including with 
Finnish government ministers, civil servants, party colleagues in the national 
parliament, academic and business experts, and national and transnational interest 
groups.147 Despite the fact that some of these actors may be expected to put pressure 
on them to defend certain policy positions in the EP, MEPs are very eager to 
emphasise that they ‘don’t take guidance’ from any of these sources.148 
Much as the MEPs are willing to act against party policy where they disagree 
with it, they are also willing to act against the preferences of the Finnish government 
where they disagree with their position. One MEP asked rhetorically ‘how could I 
take advice from them?’ on an issue where there is a fundamental disagreement.149 
MEPs are aware that the government’s negotiating positions may not correspond to 
their views or reflect the views of the party, as they are arrived at as ‘a political 
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compromise’ between the six coalition partners.150 There is little pressure from the 
government directly, and no pressure is channelled through the Finnish Permanent 
Representation to the EU.151 The organization provides MEPs with information about 
the positions taken by the Finnish Government in the Council and regarding how the 
negotiations in the Council are progressing: 
 
What they offer and what is very helpful and what I need is [that] they tell the 
Finnish positions of the Council, so that I know what the Finnish government is 
thinking about. … And I can discuss... what is going on in the Council and what 
is the Finnish thinking there. So it helps me to understand.152 
 
The party’s MEPs consult the views of the Finnish Government regardless of whether 
the party is in government, although there is the perception that it is ‘a bit easier to get 
information’ when the party is in government.153 
Similarly to KOK, the SDP provides little guidance to MEPs about how they 
should carry out their work. A party official noted that ‘there is no code of conduct or 
any written rules’ that outline how MEPs should act. 154 The official claimed that due 
to the quasi-autonomous status of the delegation of MEPs within the party structure, it 
is not appropriate for the party to give ‘any orders or direct guidance’ to the MEPs.155 
As suggested by the fact that MEPs do not accept all invitations to address party 
meetings, it is clear that party officials feel powerless to influence how MEPs divide 
their time between undertaking different activities, and between different locations. 
MEPs organize their work schedules independently of the central party organization, 
and the party views this as a perfectly valid way for them to operate.156 
As regards giving MEPs specific instructions on specific issues, a senior 
official acknowledged that the party does not have the ‘resources nor [the] 
willingness’ to issue voting instructions.157 While ‘discussions’ take place between 
MEPs and the party on some policy issues, the official noted that the process of 
translating the party’s broad policy positions into actions at parliamentary divisions is 
left to the MEPs.158 Party officials show little desire to influence the parliamentary 
behaviour of the party’s MEPs, realising that the potential for them to derive benefit 
from controlling their actions is limited when the party has only ‘two out of 732 [sic]’ 
parliamentary mandates.159 Officials note that the issue may appear different for 
officials from parties with larger delegations in the EP, especially for those affiliated 
to the largest parliamentary Group, the EPP.160 An additional reason provided by one 
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official to explain why the party does not intervene in the work of its MEPs is the 
principle that MEPs have the right to carry out their work independently of the party 
as they have been elected on the basis of a personal vote.161 
Respondents based in Brussels offer a more cynical explanation for the party’s 
‘hands-off’ approach to dealing with its MEPs, namely that the party is uninterested 
in the work of its MEPs. One EP-based party affiliate reacted with incredulity when 
asked whether the party issued voting instructions to its MEPs, claiming that the party 
was not in a position to do so on most issues even if it wished to, as it lacked the 
necessary knowledge of EU affairs.162 Noting that any attempts by the party to issue 
such guidance would be firmly rejected by the delegation, the respondent noted that 
some EP-based affiliates would initially ‘be happy’ to receive voting instructions, as it 
would indicate that ‘somebody there would have woken up and gone like “Oh my 
god, [the MEPs] are doing something important!”’163 The respondent identified three 
mutually reinforcing tendencies that may explain the party’s low level of engagement 
with its MEPs: a ‘lack of interest’, ‘lack of resources’, and a ‘lack of 
understanding’.164 The low priority afforded by the party to EP politics is reflected by 
the fact that, unlike in the case of other parties, SDP ministers rarely meet with MEPs 
when they attend Council meetings in Brussels.165 These views are broadly shared by 
an MEP, who confirmed that the party showed a ‘lack of interest’ in the work of its 
MEPs.166  
The remarks of party officials lend these views a degree of credence. They 
acknowledge that the considerable geographic distance between Finland and Brussels, 
and the time involved in travelling, hinder their efforts to maintain links with their 
MEPs.167 One official claimed that the weak links, together with the lack of public 
interest in EU affairs, made it difficult for party officials to develop a Eurocentric 
mentality.168 A factor that further discourages the party from engaging more intensely 
with the work of their MEPs is the fact that issues emerge in the EP and in the 
national context at different times,169 and that there is a natural tendency for the party 
to focus on issues that are current in the context of domestic politics. This evidence 
reinforces Hix et al.’s claim that national parties are primarily focused on realising 
goals in the context of domestic politics (1999: 8). 
A party that refrained from issuing voting instructions to its MEPs could still 
exercise considerable influence over its MEPs if they sourced information or policy 
advice from party officials. One MEP specified that there is no one in the SDP who is 
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on hand to provide policy advice or guidance, and it is clear that MEPs from the SDP 
rely mainly on their assistants in the European Parliament and on Group advisors for 
support on policy issues.170 They are also very willing to source advice from the 
Finnish Permanent Representation to the EU. One respondent noted that their office is 
in daily contact with the Finnish Permanent Representation to the EU and stated that 
their relationship is ‘very good’.171 However, there is no suggestion that the MEP 
feels under pressure from Finnish Permanent Representation to follow the policy lines 
of the Finnish Government. 
The PS may be expected to hold very firm opinions on how MEPs should 
carry out their work, as the leader recently served as an MEP. While Soini is said to 
hold some views on the issue and has provided ‘some advice’ to his replacement,172 
there is no model that the MEP is expected to follow, and the party leadership has 
‘never given any orders’ relating to the behaviour of its current MEP.173 There are 
some general expectations, such as that the MEP carries out some work in Finland, 
especially when elections are held, but the party provides no specific guidance on 
how he should divide his time.174 When discussing day-to-day scheduling, one 
respondent noted that ‘Mr Terho is doing what Mr Terho is doing, and [the decision 
has] nothing to do with the party … Mr Terho makes his own decisions’.175  
While the PS does not have a clear idea of how its MEP should carry out his 
work as a representative in the general sense, the party is clear regarding the approach 
that its MEP should take when engaging with EU policy-making. The MEP is 
expected to oppose any proposals to increase the power of the EU or measures that 
would result in an increase in the cost of Finnish membership. Despite the 
independence that the MEP enjoys to decide for himself how to act there are, in 
theory, some limits on the actions of a PS MEP at parliamentary divisions. An official 
stated that it would be ‘a very big mistake’ for an MEP to vote against an issue that is 
important to the party and its voters, and that it would be ‘clear’ if they had done so as 
the party’s views on most issues leave little room for interpretation.176 It is not clear 
what measures the party would take against an MEP who acted in this way. As the 
party does not believe that this would ever happen, it has never issued an MEP with 
threats.  
The PS does not provide any specific voting instructions or any guidance that 
may be construed as such.177  Indeed, the MEP’s office has ‘called [the party 
leadership] a few times to ask’ for advice on parliamentary divisions and for 
 169 
clarification regarding the ‘party line’ on certain issues.178 The party leadership will 
‘sometimes’ suggest which reports and issues the MEP should follow, although again, 
any recommendations are provided in the spirit of consultation rather than as firm 
guidance. The party is aware that there are ‘many things happening at the same time 
in the parliament of Europe, so it’s impossible to be involved in everything’, and lets 
the MEP decide on which issues and activities to spend his time.179 This evidence 
again contradicts the partisan control thesis. 
One proposed explanation for this laissez-faire approach is that the PS has 
always existed as ‘a big group of independent people’180 and has consequently found 
it difficult to exert party discipline. If so, it is possible that as the party succeeds in 
enforcing stricter levels of discipline within its national parliamentary group, it may 
attempt to enforce a similar system of discipline in relation to its MEP(s). However, 
this eventuality is unlikely. Despite holding firm views on the EU and despite the fact 
that there exists a potential for the party to realise policy goals at the EU level (by 
successfully opposing efforts at further integration), the party’s primary focus, 
similarly to other parties, is on domestic politics.181 The evidence provided by the 
other two Finnish case studies suggests that parties whose focus is on domestic 
politics do not subject their MEPs to party discipline. 
Further, the PS feels that it benefits from the work of its MEP in two ways, 
and the party is not required to limit the independence of an MEP to any meaningful 
extent to continue to derive these benefits. The main benefit appears to be that having 
an MEP provides the party with a means of sourcing information about the EU and 
the EP directly from within the chamber in a way that it was unable to do before its 
first MEP was elected in 2009.182 The second benefit is that the party is able to use the 
MEP to attract attention to the party, especially at elections. Finnish MEPs are able to 
build a national profile relatively easily as, in contrast to national parliamentarians, 
they represent a national constituency.183 While it appears plausible that the party will 
attempt to strengthen its links to its MEP as its organizational capacity grows, the 
party appears to have little incentive to strengthen its grip on its EP representation in 
the medium term. 
 
Monitoring, Reporting, and Party Discipline 
As the mechanisms used by the three parties to coordinate with their MEPs are so 
weak, it is not surprising that they do not go to great lengths to monitor the work of 
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MEPs. KOK does not monitor the work of its MEPs or their voting behaviour, and its 
reporting requirements of MEPs are minimal.184 MEPs are expected to write an 
annual report that provides an overview of their activities, and one of the party’s three 
MEPs are required to address the party’s biennial congress.185 Rather than serving as 
an opportunity for the party to gather information about the way that its MEPs are 
carrying out their work, the main function of this event is to provide the relevant MEP 
with an opportunity to boost his or her profile within the party.186 Every edition of the 
party’s magazine features a column written by an MEP. The purpose of this is to offer 
a discussion on a topical issue related to the EU ‘so that people can follow what’s 
going on’, rather than to provide the party with a means of monitoring the work of 
MEPs.187 The party expects MEPs to attend ‘the party conference and peer party 
meetings as often as possible’, although officials acknowledge that there is little 
pressure on MEPs to attend such meetings, as they ‘can’t force [MEPs] to come … 
we just hope’ that they will.188  
KOK sources most of its information about developments in the EP from 
Finnish EPP officials. A monthly newsletter is prepared on behalf of the delegation 
and is distributed to the party during the plenary week, and Finnish EPP officials also 
feed information directly to party supporters and to the public more generally through 
social media.189 Despite these efforts, it is clear that MEPs and party officials alike are 
aware that the party knows little about the activities of MEPs.190 The party would be 
required to make radical changes to the way it monitors the work of its MEPs if it 
were to successfully operate a disciplinary system. The extent of the changes 
required, together with the lack of appetite that the party demonstrates to exercise 
greater influence on the behaviour of its MEPs, suggests that the party will not 
attempt to operate a system of party discipline in future. 
 The SDP does not monitor the work of MEPs, or expect them to report back to 
the party in detail about their behaviour. The only formal reporting requirement is for 
MEPs to attend the ‘statutory meeting’, which takes place between the MEPs and 
representatives of the party organization twice a year. 191 At these meetings MEPs 
must provide representatives of the party’s central organization with an overview of 
their work during the previous period and their intentions for the next period.192 The 
degree to which such exchanges enable the party to follow the work of MEPs is 
limited, and MEPs are aware that the party is not monitoring their work.193 There is 
no obligation on MEPs to be present at the party’s largest gathering, its bi-annual 
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Congress.194 Nevertheless, MEPs do attend the Congress and give presentations about 
their past and future work. An official noted that ‘it would be insane from their point 
of view not to be there’, as the event presents such a valuable opportunity to maintain 
and develop their status within the party.195 MEPs are also invited to the party Council 
meetings, a more modest event which takes places on alternate years when the party 
Congress does not meet, and to deliver keynote speeches if they choose to attend. 
They also periodically address meetings of local party branches.  
None of these appearances are mandatory. SDP officials acknowledge that 
MEPs do not always accept invitations to address party meetings, and – realising the 
time pressures that MEPs are faced with – concede that there is little the party can do 
to compel them to attend. As these appearances do not happen in a regular and 
systematic way, they cannot be considered to provide the party with a means of 
gaining oversight of the work of MEPs. There is little scope for the party to use these 
events to gather information about its MEPs, further than to gain a brief overview of 
the main activities in which the MEPs are engaged. Rather than party officials 
proactively seeking information, it is clear that it is for MEPs to take the initiative in 
informing the party when an issue strikes them as being of importance to the party. A 
Helsinki-based official noted that as colleagues in Finland focus on day-to-day 
domestic issues they tend to ‘forget that there [are] some people and some life also 
outside Finland’.196 As a result, if MEPs view an issue as important, it is for them to 
‘simply send an email or they make a phone call’ and to ask the party if it would 
‘mind taking this [issue] into consideration’.197 
SDP officials claim that they ‘trust’ that MEPs ‘follow the party lines in broad 
terms’, but acknowledge that there are instances where they have voted against the 
party’s preferences.198 There are ‘no consequences’ for such deviations,199 according 
to party officials, a claim which EP-based party affiliates do not dispute.200 Officials 
are aware that attempting to undertake even minimal monitoring of the legislative 
work of MEPs would entail considerable costs. Providing a further explanation for the 
lack of voting instructions, an official noted that the party lacks the resources to 
monitor the voting behaviour of its MEPs even in the case of roll call divisions.201  
Elected representatives may be expected to relish minimal party oversight, as 
attention from the party is likely to be linked to efforts to control their behaviour. 
However, an SDP MEP stated that the party should provide more oversight of the 
work of its MEPs, and claimed that the lack of attention makes the task of acting as an 
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MEP more difficult.202 This is because parties that show an interest in the work of 
MEPs are thought to be better placed to offer support. 203 A party affiliate opined that 
with the resources available, it would be ‘impossible’ for the party to develop a means 
of coordinating policy with its MEPs in a systematic manner and to monitor their 
behaviour. 204  The respondent estimated that establishing a system to facilitate 
meaningful contact between the party and its delegation in the EP would require 
employing two full time members of staff based in the EP, as these coordinators 
would need to follow the work of at least two committees.205 The prospect of tasking 
MEP’s assistants or S&D Group staff with the role of acting as party coordinators 
would not be feasible unless they were relieved of their current duties.206 As a result, 
it is clear that the expense incurred in maintaining a strong relationship with the 
party’s delegation would be prohibitive even for one of Finland’s largest political 
parties. 
 There is no formal expectation that the PS’s MEP reports to the party,207 
although the MEP does write a column in every edition of the party magazine and 
authors a blog, which is updated weekly.208 While the party monitors the work of its 
MEP in a cursory manner, its ability to do so in a reliable and systematic way is 
limited, due to the fact that it sources its information through one of the MEP’s 
assistants.209 In some instances there could be an incentive for the assistant (who is 
employed directly by the MEP) to present the information in a manner that benefits 
the MEP, especially if the party attempted to intervene in the work of the MEP.  
Further, even if the party were to develop an interest in the MEP’s voting 
behaviour, it realises that it would be ‘impossible’ to follow this behaviour because of 
the large number of parliamentary divisions.210 Nevertheless, the communication that 
takes place between the MEP’s office and the party’s central office enables the party 
to ‘have some idea’ of what the MEP is doing.211  The party’s affiliates in the EP 
believe that the party should take a greater interest in their work, especially as they 
feel that their ability to mobilise effectively within the chamber is limited due to the 
fact that the party currently only has a single MEP.212 An interviewee based in 
Helsinki believed that having only one MEP also makes it more difficult for the party 
to know what is going on in the EP,213 although the evidence presented in this chapter 
suggests that Finnish parties with larger delegations do not have a greater awareness 
of the work of their MEPs than does the PS. 
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Within-Party Variation 
As the three parties examined lack formalised systems for communicating with 
MEPs, it is not surprising that there is considerable variation in the nature of the 
party–MEP relationship within individual parties. While KOK formally relates to its 
three MEPs in a similar manner, officials acknowledge that there is considerable 
variation in the extent to which the party is in contact with different MEPs.214 This 
variation is primarily a result of the willingness of MEPs to respond when approached 
by the party. As an official explained:  
 
We try to be in the same kind of connection with everyone, but of course some 
people are easier to get connected and easier to work with and it actually 
shows. And when you know who you get information from and who answers, 
you start to operate with him or her.215 
 
Similarly in the case of the SDP, the lack of a formalised system for 
maintaining contact with MEPs means that the extent to which the party is able to 
coordinate with MEPs and to monitor their work depends on the ‘personal 
relationships’ that party officials have with MEPs.216 Again, in the formal sense, the 
party deals with both MEPs in a similar way. Despite the differences between the two 
MEPs in terms of the positions of influence that they hold within the party, the role 
that they play within the party as MEPs is officially the same.217 However, there is 
considerable variation in the nature of the relationship between the party and its two 
MEPs, and this is not surprising as the MEPs have such contrasting backgrounds.218 
An official stated that while the party would treat the MEPs in the same way, it is 
‘easier’ for the longer-serving party member to maintain close links with various 
actors within the party, especially as that MEP has an assistant located in the party’s 
headquarters.219 
 While there are extensive differences in the nature of the relationship between 
domestic parties and their individual MEPs, the evidence challenges Hypothesis 14, 
which expects parties to work more closely with, and to achieve greater influence 
over, less experienced MEPs. Links between the parties and the MEPs are based on 
personal connections, and as more experienced MEPs have stronger connections 
within the party, they appear to be in more regular contact with senior party members 
than less experienced MEPs. However, as KOK and the SDP do not attempt to 
influence the behaviour of their MEPs, these differences in the nature of the party–
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MEP relationship within the two parties does not affect the degree to which these two 
parties exercise influence on their MEPs. Nevertheless, the possibility remains that 
parties that do attempt to influence the behaviour of their MEPs achieve greater 
success with some of their MEPs than with others. 
 
Fulfilling the Preconditions, and Perceptions on the Degree of Independence 
It is possible to apply the evidence presented thus far in the chapter to Sub-question 
1a, which asks whether domestic political parties influence the behaviour of MEPs. 
None of the three parties examined in this chapter carry out the activities that are 
required for influencing the behaviour of MEPs. While KOK sources some 
information regarding the work of its MEPs from EPP officials, it does not fulfil any 
of the four preconditions of party influence in a meaningful way. The central party 
organization shows little interest in engaging with the work of its MEPs, and even less 
interest in influencing their behaviour. Consequently, it is clear that the party’s MEPs 
enjoy extensive freedom to define their role as representatives independently of the 
party, and to make decisions related to specific policy issues based on their own 
judgment. MEPs and party officials realise that MEPs are afforded extensive 
independence to approach their work as they wish. MEPs view this independence as 
‘a good thing’, although they note that with this ‘freedom’ comes additional 
‘responsibility’, as they must be more self-reliant than if the party engaged with them 
more intensely.220  
KOK’s lack of action may be explained by the fact that party officials are 
perfectly happy with the way MEPs carry out their work. However, due to the lack of 
communication between the party and its MEPs, and the lack of monitoring, the party 
has little way of knowing if MEPs carry out their work in a manner that complements 
its broader strategy. The party may be content with their work in the sense that it is 
not aware of any instances where MEPs carried out activities in a manner that was 
harmful to the party. However, it is clear that the party does not go to any lengths to 
ensure that MEPs carry out their work in a way that benefits the party. The central 
party organization’s lack of interest in influencing how MEPs carry out their work, 
together with the large-scale changes needed in the way that the party structures its 
relations with MEPs if it is to gain any influence, suggests that KOK’s MEPs will 
continue to operate independently of the party in future.  
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Similarly, the SDP does not fulfil any of the preconditions of influencing 
MEPs. It does not hold any views on how MEPs should carry out their work in 
general terms, nor does it develop specific policy preferences in the case of most 
issues discussed in the EP. The party does not view the practice of mandating its 
MEPs as legitimate and is not in any case particularly interested in maximising its 
ability to realise goals through their actions. The system used to communicate with 
MEPs is not sophisticated enough for the party to coordinate policy with its 
delegation in the EP in the most rudimentary sense, let alone to enable the party to 
provide MEPs with systematic guidance regarding how to act on a day-to-day basis. 
The party does not view the idea of implementing a system of party discipline driven 
by the party leadership in Helsinki as acceptable, and it would need to make 
significant changes to the manner in which it operates if the party were to attempt to 
implement a system of party discipline. It is therefore not surprising that MEPs feel 
that they have the freedom to decide for themselves how to spend their time.221 The 
fact that party officials acknowledge that MEPs are ‘free to act … according to their 
own will’222 underscores the degree of independence which MEPs are afforded. 
 While there is regular contact between the PS’ MEP and the party leader, and 
some informal monitoring of the MEP’s work, the lack of specific requests and 
guidance from the party means that the PS does not fulfil the preconditions of 
influence either. Despite the fact that the MEP regularly consults with the party leader 
on the most problematic issues, the evidence indicates that the final decision always 
rests with the MEP.223 The MEP’s office does not feel that the MEP has ‘enough’ 
contact with the party, and feels that the relationship between the MEP and the party 
is ‘too loose’.224 As a result he is currently ‘very independent’.225 The extent of this 
independence is not felt to be necessarily beneficial to the MEP. A previous account 
of the relationship between domestic parties frames the issue in such a way as to 
suggest that MEPs may wish to take steps to free themselves from the control of their 
parties (Raunio, 2002). This is not the case for the PS’ MEP. His office intends to lead 
efforts to establish an effective system of communication, as part of a wider effort ‘to 
try to not to be so independent in the future’.226 It is felt that improving the links 
between the MEP and the party would be ‘beneficial both for the guys back home and 
for’ the MEP.227 
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Explaining the Findings 
Two assumptions that underpin the partisan control thesis are that parties view the 
work of MEPs as a means of realising party goals, and that parties wish to maximise 
the benefits they derive from having MEPs (as long as this is cost effective). Evidence 
relating to Finnish parties cast doubt on these assumptions, as they generally do not 
seek to realise goals through the activities of MEPs. The parties examined in this 
chapter do sometimes attempt to use their MEPs to realise goals, such as in the case of 
domestic electoral campaigns and in isolated cases relating to policy work. However, 
they do so very rarely, and certainly not in the systematic way that the partisan control 
thesis suggests. Party officials provide three explanations for the restraint that they 
show in dealing with their MEPs: they have little to gain from influencing voting 
behaviour due to the size of their delegations of MEPs relative to the overall size of 
the EP; they do not feel that they have a right to influence the behaviour of MEPs who 
have gained election on the basis of personal votes; and they would not be able to 
influence the behaviour of MEPs even if they attempted to do so.  
While these three considerations play a role, a further plausible explanation 
for the fact that Finnish parties do not seek to realise goals through the activities of 
MEPs is that parties place a low value on realising the policy and office goals that 
MEPs are able to assist them to fulfil. This notion is supported by the fact that while 
the parties realise that they derive some benefit from the work of their MEPs, they do 
not attempt to maximise these benefits. When party officials are questioned regarding 
the types of activities carried out by MEPs and from which the party benefits, they 
refer to activities that MEPs carry out without any support or encouragement from the 
party. In the case of KOK, officials are aware that individual MEPs are able to realise 
policy goals in the EP, yet the party offers no policy support or guidance. If the party 
did offer policy advice, it is likely that the MEPs would seek an outcome that is closer 
to the preferences of the party than would otherwise be the case, and this may even 
occur without the party applying disciplinary pressure.  
In the case of the SDP and the PS, the main value that officials claim that their 
parties derive from the work of MEPs is the information they provide. Yet these 
parties play a largely passive role in the process of sourcing information from MEPs. 
Rather than operating systems that ensure that information is exchanged 
systematically, they rely on the MEPs to take the initiative by contacting the party 
with any information they believe may be of interest. Again in relation to the PS, 
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officials note that one of the main benefits of having an MEP is that an electoral 
advantage can be gained through the MEP’s work at domestic electoral campaigns. 
Yet, the MEP was not called on to participate at the 2012 Presidential election, and 
was only expected to contribute to the party’s campaigns at weekends in the case of 
the 2012 municipal elections.228 In both cases, the MEP was afforded the freedom by 
the party to prioritize his work in the EP. This discussion reinforces the idea that 
parties prioritize the pursuit of their three goals in the context of domestic politics, 
while affording secondary importance to these goals at the EU level. As a result, tasks 
such as forming strong links with MEPs lie low on their list of priorities. 
 
The Relationship between MEPs and the EP Group 
The EPP Group has a greater degree of direct influence on the way KOK’s MEPs vote 
than the domestic party itself. In contrast to the party, the Group systematically offers 
policy guidance and voting recommendations. While MEPs note that they tend to 
wholly agree with the Group position at around half of parliamentary divisions, they 
note that they moderately disagree with their Group in around a third of instances.229 
In such cases, MEPs tend to feel compelled to vote with the Group.230 This tendency 
is not brought about by the Group putting pressure on MEPs to toe the Group line, but 
is mainly due to the fact that MEPs realise that they need to compromise in order to 
secure the support of Group colleagues at other divisions.231 One MEP explained that: 
 
If you always vote according [to] your own wishes, and never compromise, 
you are a bit [of] a single rider, and ... no one wants to work with a single 
rider. No one is going to compromise with me if I’m not compromising with 
anyone … [In such cases] you think, ‘okay, well, what the heck! I’ll just close 
my eyes and vote for it! [laughs] It’s not a good compromise, but well, it 
doesn’t destroy the world!’232 
 
While MEPs are adamant that they will not act according to the wishes of the 
national party unless those actions conform to their personal wishes, they would vote 
with their Group against their judgment at a sizeable number of parliamentary 
divisions. Despite this trend, MEPs do not feel compelled to vote with the Group at 
divisions where they disagree with the Group position in a fundamental way.233 An 
MEP estimated that such instances arise in around 10% of cases,234 reflecting the fact 
that KOK’s MEPs have voted with the Group at 94.98% of roll call divisions during 
the current term (VoteWatch.eu, accessed 18/11/13). The respondent cited an example 
 178 
which arises regularly where (s)he has campaigned against a policy which the Group 
supports. In such cases it is clear that there is no question of voting with the Group, 
because the MEP feels a duty to honour a promise made during the election 
campaign. While the respondent demonstrated a willingness to vote against the 
Group’s position in cases of irreconcilable differences, (s)he also noted the 
importance of notifying the Group in advance where (s)he did not intend to accept the 
Group’s voting guidance.235 The MEP noted that ‘it’s sort of okay [to vote against the 
Group] because what counts is the predictability’, and that it is ‘a problem’ for the 
Group ‘if they can’t predict whether I’m voting in favour or against the Group’.236 
 It does not appear that the EPP Group provides threats and incentives to entice 
its MEPs to vote with the Group’s recommendations in a systematic way. Rather, a 
subtle dynamic within the Group leads to disciplined voting (see Ringe, 2010). As 
long as there is no fundamental conflict, MEPs vote with their colleagues, knowing 
that their colleagues are far more likely to return the favour when in a similar 
position.237  However, if an MEP were to consistently diverge from the Group 
position, the Group might ask the MEP ‘why are you in our Group?’ and they may 
discuss the future for the MEP’s relations with the Group.238  
While the respondents do not believe that there is a link between the allocation 
of assignments and the regularity with which an MEP votes against the Group,239 they 
indicated that some MEPs believe that the EPP Group withholds assignments from 
affiliates whom they suspect do not share their views in the relevant policy area. An 
MEP noted that (s)he has been ‘hit hard’ by the Group when it comes to allocating 
rapporteurships in a policy area in which the MEP’s views are ‘way more radical’ 
than those of the Group.240 The MEP is aware that such threats are made to other 
MEPs as well, and believes that the denial of rapporteurships is a strong tool: ‘they 
say that you can’t have a report. Then I don’t have the report. Then they give it to 
someone [else] and I'm upset’.241 The respondent claims that such actions by the 
Group ‘doesn’t make me … change my behaviour because I can’t go and then change 
myself if I really strongly believe [in] these issues’.242 Despite feeling that (s)he could 
carry out the task in a superior way to the colleague to whom the assignment was 
entrusted, (s)he views the Group’s decision as ‘fair’, because both parties know that 
(s)he would write the report ‘against the Group line’. 243  While this MEP 
demonstrated acceptance of the costs of defying the Group, it appears highly likely 
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that some other EPP MEPs may base behavioural decisions on the will of the Group 
in order to secure positions such as rapporteurships. 
 SDP MEPs take a broadly similar approach to their Group relations. They note 
that they are very happy to source information from S&D Group advisors regardless 
of their nationality, and demonstrate a willingness to follow voting guidance issued by 
the Group in most instances. This is reflected in the fact that the SDP’s MEPs have 
voted with the Group in 98.51% of instances at roll call divisions during the current 
parliamentary term (VoteWatch.eu, accessed 18/11/13). However, one respondent 
noted that there are often fundamental policy differences within the Group, and that 
these differences are usually linked to nationality. There are therefore many instances 
where MEPs are disinclined to follow the Group’s position, although a respondent 
indicated that (s)he votes with the Group in all instances other than when the issue is 
seen as being particularly important for the domestic party.244  
While there is some degree of pressure to vote with the S&D Group, this is not 
particularly strong, and stems largely from the belief of MEPs that the Group is more 
powerful when it acts in a unified manner.245 MEPs who fail to follow the Group line 
are not ostracised, however this interviewee did feel that this might lead to the Group 
withholding parliamentary assignments.246 While such threats are not made openly, it 
is a ‘hidden rule’, of which all MEPs are aware.247 The interviewee did not refer to 
any specific examples where (s)he, or a colleague, felt under pressure to vote with the 
Group.248 The system of maintaining Group discipline is not felt to constrain MEPs’ 
behaviour greatly, and a respondent indicated that the difficulties that the SDP’s two 
MEPs have in acquiring parliamentary assignments are explained primarily by the 
small size of the SDP’s delegation relative to the Group.249 The perceived weak link 
between loyalty and the allocation of assignments is reflected in the fact that one SDP 
MEP believes that it is ‘very difficult’ for either MEP to acquire ‘important’ 
rapporteurships250 despite their loyalty at parliamentary divisions. 
 The PS is affiliated to the EFD Group. Relations between the affiliated parties 
of the EFD Group are loose, and there is very little pressure on MEPs to act in ways 
that correspond to the interests of the Group. This is largely because the Group does 
not exercise a great deal of agency and does not have a potential to develop a will that 
is independent of its affiliated national delegations, despite having a leadership organ 
in the form of the Bureau. The EFD does not provide voting recommendations, and 
rarely takes a genuinely ‘common stance’ on issues.251 This is reflected in the fact that 
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at 49.45%, its levels of voting cohesion at roll call divisions are the lowest of any EP 
Group (VoteWatch.eu, accessed 18/11/13).  
The PS’ affiliates in the EP believe that there are ‘advantages and 
disadvantages’ to being attached to a Group that operates in ‘such a free’ manner.252 
The main advantage is that ‘it’s really nice to have complete freedom … when you’re 
working in the committees’.253 There are two main disadvantages. Firstly, there is a 
feeling that ‘we are almost insignificant in the big votes’, due to the Group’s lack of 
voting cohesion and its size.254 Secondly, because of the vast differences that exist 
between the party’s views and those of the two parties that dominate the EFD, UKIP 
and the Lega Nord, the PS’ MEP is unable to rely on Group officials to form positions 
on his behalf. As a result, the MEP’s office must ‘go through every voting list’ 
pertaining to the MEP’s committees and to plenary sessions, and this places a great 
burden on the MEP and his staff.255 The challenges are exacerbated by the fact there 
is only a single PS MEP and that the level of policy support from the party centrally is 
low. This evidence strongly suggests that the PS’ MEP operates with extensive 
independence from the EFD Group. 
 
Testing the Hypotheses 
The chapter’s key finding is that the Finnish parties examined do not desire or attempt 
to influence the behaviour of their MEPs. Due to the consistency across the three 
cases of domestic parties, there is no variation to explain. Consequently, there is no 
evidence to support the nine hypotheses relating to domestic parties that the chapter 
set out to test. The degree to which the three parties attempt to, or succeed in, 
influencing the behaviour of its MEPs does not vary according to the centrality of the 
party’s position on the left–right ideological scale (Hypotheses 9a and 9b), the 
number of MEPs affiliated to the party (Hypothesis 5), the party’s governing status 
(Hypothesis 3), the party’s organizational capacity (Hypothesis 7), the party’s views 
on integration (Hypothesis 11), or the individual MEP’s level of political experience 
(Hypothesis 17). Further, these cases provide no evidence that the type of activities 
that parties require its MEPs to focus on varies according to the party’s governing 
status (Hypothesis 4), or according to its level of support for integration (Hypothesis 
12). As the degree to which the candidate selection systems used by all three parties 
are centralised are broadly similar, together with the fact that none of the parties give 
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preferential treatment to any of their candidates at EP elections, it is not possible to 
test Hypothesis 2. 
 In terms of the EP Groups, the EPP and the S&D seek and achieve influence 
on the voting behaviour of their affiliates to a greater extent than the EFD Group. This 
supports Hypotheses 6 and 8, which state that larger Groups, in terms of the number 
of affiliated MEPs and in terms of their organizational capacity respectively, are more 
likely to attempt to influence the legislative behaviour of their MEPs, and are more 
likely to succeed, than smaller Groups. As these two Groups are closer to the centre of 
the left–right ideological scale than the EFD Group, the findings also lend support to 
Hypothesis 10, which states that centrist Groups are more likely to attempt to 
influence the legislative behaviour of their MEPs, and are more likely to succeed, than 
Groups positioned away from the centre.   
While there is support for the three hypotheses discussed above, it is clear that 
the primary reason for the differences between the EFD Group on the one hand and 
the EPP and the S&D Groups on the other is the Eurosceptic views of the EFD’s 
affiliates. EFD MEPs appear to view the utility of the Group primarily as a means of 
gaining administrational resources, parliamentary assignments, and speaking time in 
plenary. Due to their Eurosceptic views, the EFD’s affiliates ensure that the Group 
does not develop a will of its own and that the national delegations retain their 
freedom to act independently of the other affiliated delegations. As a result, the Group 
is powerless to influence the behaviour of its MEPs. This discussion therefore lends 
strong support to Hypothesis 13. 
 
Conclusion 
Findings relating to the three Finnish case studies strongly contradict the claim that 
the central organizations of domestic parties extensively influence the behaviour of 
MEPs. None of the three parties fulfil the four preconditions of influence, as set out in 
Chapter 2. The evidence suggests that the parties have little interest in the work of 
their MEPs, and even less interest in influencing their behaviour. This is not entirely 
surprising, as the theoretical underpinnings of the partisan control thesis appear 
dubious: parties must bear high costs, while the potential for deriving a benefit is 
limited (Scully, 2001; Raunio, 2007). The aversion of Finnish parties to undertake this 
uncertain investment is understandable given that the costs are even more pronounced 
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for parties with relatively small organizations, and that the potential benefits are lower 
compared with domestic parties that have larger delegations in the EP.  
The low appeal of engaging with the work of MEPs is reinforced by the fact 
that the focus and goals of Finnish parties lie within the domestic political context. 
Further, these parties accept that MEPs have a right to independence due to the 
personalised nature of their mandate, and they acknowledge that they could not gain 
much influence on the behaviour of MEPs even if they so wished, due to the personal 
nature of the Finnish electoral system (cf. Raunio, 2007). What is, however, 
surprising is the degree of the parties’ passivity in dealing with their MEPs, especially 
in the case of the two more established parties. While parties acknowledge that they 
derive some benefit from the work of MEPs, they do little to maximise these gains. 
This suggests that Finnish parties rarely, if ever, turn to MEPs when seeking to realise 
goals. It also indicates that MEPs play a somewhat peripheral role in the lives of 
Finnish political parties. 
 Two of the three EP Groups examined in this chapter, the EPP and S&D, 
exercise far greater substantive influence on the parliamentary behaviour of MEPs 
than domestic parties. Both Groups systematically issue voting instructions and 
communicate their policy positions to MEPs in a very clear manner. They also 
monitor MEPs, both in terms of their parliamentary behaviour and in the sense of 
keeping abreast of the MEPs’ views. While the Groups do not apply pressure directly 
on KOK and SDP MEPs at parliamentary divisions, a subtle force compels MEPs to 
vote against their personal wishes in a large minority of divisions. MEPs are aware 
that the EPP and S&D Groups withhold parliamentary assignments from MEPs whose 
views diverge from those of the Group in the relevant policy area. It is possible that 
some MEPs refrain from voicing dissent, although all respondents that feature in this 
chapter deny that they themselves do so.  
As the goals of Groups lie exclusively within the context of EU policy-making 
(Ladrech, 1996: 294), the only aspect of an MEP’s work that they are interested in 
influencing is their parliamentary behaviour. However, it is still conceivable that the 
EPP and S&D Groups influence the way MEPs approach their work as 
representatives more broadly by compelling them to focus on parliamentary work and 
to place a weaker emphasis on carrying out political work in their Member States. 
While no evidence of this is found in the analysis presented in this chapter, the issue 
requires further investigation.  
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Supporting the four hypotheses, the findings relating to the EFD Groups are in 
stark contrast to those relating to the EPP and S&D Groups. It is clear from the way 
that the EFD Group has been structured that its activities are dominated by the 
national delegations, and that the Group does not seek to influence the behaviour of 
individual MEPs or of whole national delegations. The way that the Group operates is 
explained almost entirely by the Eurosceptic views held by its MEPs and by the way 
that this ideological stance leads MEPs to ensure that national delegations remain 
independent. These findings indicate that claims made in relation to the level of 
influence that EP Groups exercise on how MEPs carry out representation should 
reflect the nuances of these between-Group differences. 
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36 While the literal translation of the party’s name, Perussuomalaiset, might be 
‘common Finns’ or ‘ordinary Finns’, the name ‘True Finns’ was used as the English 
translation until August 2011, when the party formally adopted ‘The Finns’ as its 
official English name (Raunio, 2012b: 4). This change occurred because of the 
leadership’s view that the ‘True Finns’ name had to it ‘an extreme right or 
nationalistic slant’ (Raunio, 2012b: 4). 
 Due to the ease with which it is possible to identify the PS’ interviewees from 
their job title or location, interviews are referred to by date only. 
37 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12. 
38 As these figures stem from the period immediately prior to the PS’ breakthrough at 
the 2011 election, it is possible that the number of party members has increased. 
39 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
40 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
41 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
42 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
43 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
44 Interview with a KOK official, 28/11/12. 
45 Interview with an SDP official, 17/10/12. 
46 Interview with an SDP official, 17/10/12. 
47 Interview with an SDP official, 17/10/12. 
48 Interview with an SDP official, 17/10/12. 
49 Interview with an SDP official, 17/10/12; interview with an SDP official, 20/11/12. 
50 Interview with an SDP official, 17/10/12. 
51 Interview with an SDP official, 17/10/12. 
52 Interview with an SDP official, 20/11/12. 
53 Interview with an SDP official, 20/11/12. 
54 Interview with an SDP official, 20/11/12. 
55 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12. 
56 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12. 
57 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12; interview, PS and/or EFD, 26/6/12. 
58 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12. 
59 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 13/11/12. 
60 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 13/11/12. 
61 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 22/11/12. 
62 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 13/11/12. 
63 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 13/11/12. 
64 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 13/11/12; correspondence with a PS and/or EFD official, 
24/3/14. 
65 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
66 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
67 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12. 
68 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12; interview with a KOK official, 28/11/12. 
69 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
70 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12. 
71 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
72 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
73 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
74 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
75 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
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76 Interview with a KOK official, 28/11/12. 
77 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
78 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
79 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
80 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
81 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
82 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
83 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
84 Interview with a KOK official, 28/11/12. 
85 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
86 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
87 Interview with an SDP official, 17/10/12. 
88 Interview with an SDP MEP, 20/6/12; interview with an SDP official, 17/10/12. 
89 Interview with an SDP MEP, 20/6/12; interview with an SDP official, 17/10/12. 
90 Interview with an SDP MEP, 20/6/12. 
91 Interview with an SDP official, 20/11/12. 
92 Interview with an SDP official, 20/11/12. 
93 Interview with an SDP MEP, 20/6/12. 
94 Interview with an SDP MEP, 20/6/12. 
95 Interview with an SDP official, 25/6/12. 
96 Interview with an SDP official, 25/6/12. 
97 Interview with an SDP MEP, 20/6/12. 
98 Interview with an SDP MEP, 20/6/12. 
99 Interview with an SDP MEP, 20/6/12. 
100 Interview with an SDP MEP, 20/6/12. 
101 Interview with an SDP MEP, 20/6/12; interview with an SDP official, 17/10/12. 
102 Interview with an SDP official, 20/11/12. 
103 Interview with an SDP MEP, 20/6/12; interview with an SDP official, 17/10/12. 
104 Interview with an SDP MEP, 20/6/12; interview with an SDP official, 17/10/12. 
105 Interview with domestic SDP party official, 17/10/12. 
106 Interview with domestic SDP party official, 17/10/12. 
107 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12. 
108 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12. 
109 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12; interview, PS and/or EFD, 13/11/12. 
110 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12. 
111 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12; interview, PS and/or EFD, 13/11/12; interview, 
PS and/or EFD, 26/6/12. 
112 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12. 
113 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12. 
114 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12. 
115 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 13/11/12; interview, PS and/or EFD, 26/6/12. 
116 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12. 
117 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 13/11/12. 
118 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 13/11/12. 
119 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12. 
120 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12. 
121 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12; interview, PS and/or EFD, 13/11/12. 
122 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12; interview with a KOK official, 28/11/12. 
123 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
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124 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
125 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
126 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12. 
127 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12. 
128 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12. 
129 Interview with a KOK official, 28/11/12. 
130 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12; interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12; 
interview with a KOK official, 28/11/12. 
131 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
132 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12. 
133 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
134 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12. 
135 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12. 
136 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12; interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
137 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
138 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
139 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
140 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12. 
141 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12. 
142 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12. 
143 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12. 
144 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
145 Interview with a KOK official, 28/11/12. 
146 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12. 
147 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12; interview with a KOK official, 28/11/12. 
148 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12. 
149 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12. 
150 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12. 
151 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12; interview with an official from the Finnish 
Permanent Representation to the EU, 27/6/12. 
152 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12. 
153 Interview with a KOK official, 28/11/12. 
154 Interview with an SDP official, 17/10/12. 
155 Interview with an SDP official, 17/10/12. 
156 Interview with an SDP official, 20/11/12. 
157 Interview with an SDP official, 20/11/12. 
158 Interview with an SDP official, 20/11/12. 
159 Interview with an SDP official, 17/10/12. 
160 Interview with an SDP official, 17/10/12. 
161 Interview with an SDP official, 17/10/12. 
162 Interview with an SDP official, 25/6/12. 
163 Interview with an SDP official, 25/6/12. 
164 Interview with an SDP official, 25/6/12. 
165 Interview with an SDP official, 25/6/12. 
166 Interview with an SDP MEP, 20/6/12. 
167 Interview with an SDP official, 17/10/12. 
168 Interview with an SDP official, 17/10/12. 
169 Interview with an SDP official, 17/10/12. 
170 Interview with an SDP MEP, 20/6/12. 
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171 Interview with an SDP MEP, 20/6/12. 
172 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 13/11/12. 
173 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 13/11/12; interview, PS and/or EFD, 26/6/12. 
174 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 13/11/12; Interview, PS and/or EFD, 22/11/12. 
175 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 13/11/12. 
176 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 13/11/12. 
177 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12; interview, PS and/or EFD, 13/11/12; interview, 
PS and/or EFD, 22/11/12. 
178 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12. 
179 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 13/11/12. 
180 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 13/11/12. 
181 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 13/11/12. 
182 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 13/11/12. 
183 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 13/11/12. 
184 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12; interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12; 
interview with a KOK official, 28/11/12. 
185 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12; interview with a KOK official, 28/11/12. 
186 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
187 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
188 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
189 Interview with a KOK official, 28/11/12. 
190 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12; interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
191 Interview with an SDP official, 20/11/12. 
192 Interview with an SDP official, 20/11/12. 
193 Interview with an SDP MEP, 20/6/12. 
194 Interview with an SDP official, 20/11/12. 
195 Interview with an SDP official, 20/11/12. 
196 Interview with an SDP official, 20/11/12. 
197 Interview with an SDP official, 20/11/12. 
198 Interview with an SDP official, 20/11/12. 
199 Interview with an SDP official, 20/11/12. 
200 Interview with an SDP MEP, 20/6/12; interview with an SDP official, 25/6/12. 
201 Interview with an SDP official, 20/11/12. 
202 Interview with an SDP MEP, 20/6/12. 
203 Interview with an SDP MEP, 20/6/12. 
204 Interview with an SDP official, 25/6/12. 
205 Interview with an SDP official, 25/6/12. 
206 Interview with an SDP official, 25/6/12. 
207 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12; interview, PS and/or EFD, 22/11/12. 
208 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12; interview, PS and/or EFD, 26/6/12. 
209 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 13/11/12. 
210 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 13/11/12. 
211 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 13/11/12. 
212 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12. 
213 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 13/11/12. 
214 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
215 Interview with a KOK official, 21/11/12. 
216 Interview with an SDP official, 20/11/12. 
217 Interview with an SDP official, 17/10/12. 
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218 Liisa Jaakonsaari has been a prominent figure in Finnish political life since the 
1970s, serving as a national parliamentarian from 1979 until her entry to the EP in 
2009, and holding the post of Minister of Labour in the period 1995–1999. She has 
also held senior positions in her party, including the post of Vice-Chair from 1993 to 
1999. Conversely, Mitro Repo is an Orthodox priest, and was unaffiliated to the SDP 
until his election to the EP in 2009. As a result, has not had the same opportunity to 
build a network within the party. 
219 Interview with an SDP official, 20/11/12. 
220 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12. 
221 Interview with an SDP MEP, 20/6/12. 
222 Interview with an SDP official, 17/10/12; interview with an SDP official, 25/6/12. 
223 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12; interview, PS and/or EFD, 13/11/12. 
224 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12. 
225 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12. 
226 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12. 
227 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12. 
228 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 13/11/12. 
229 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12. 
230 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12. 
231 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12; interview with an EPP official, 2/5/12. 
232 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12. 
233 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12. 
234 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12. 
235 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12. 
236 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12. 
237 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12; interview with an EPP official, 2/5/12. 
238 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12. 
239 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12; interview with an EPP official, 2/5/12; 
interview with an EPP official, 15/5/12; interview with an EPP official, 7/6/12. 
240 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12. 
241 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12. 
242 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12. 
243 Interview with a KOK MEP, 5/6/12. 
244 Interview with an SDP MEP, 20/6/12. 
245 Interview with an SDP MEP, 20/6/12. 
246 Interview with an SDP MEP, 20/6/12. 
247 Interview with an SDP MEP, 20/6/12. 
248 Interview with an SDP MEP, 20/6/12. 
249 Interview with an SDP MEP, 20/6/12. 
250 Interview with an SDP MEP, 20/6/12. 
251 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12. 
252 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12. 
253 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12. 
254 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12. 
255 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12. 
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Chapter 5: The United Kingdom 
 
The previous chapter examined cases from Finland, a setting in which domestic 
parties are expected to have a weak incentive to seek influence on MEPs, and a 
limited potential to succeed in attaining influence. The finding that none of the 
Finnish parties examined attempt to influence how MEPs approach their work 
challenges the partisan control thesis (Hix, 2002; Hix et al., 2007; Faas, 2003), 
although the finding that two of three Groups examined do influence the voting 
behaviour of MEPs supports Raunio’s claims (2012a). This chapter examines cases 
from the UK, as British parties appear to have a greater incentive to seek influence on 
MEPs, and better prospects of success, than parties from most other Member States 
(see discussion in Introduction).  
The study’s four sub-questions are addressed in this chapter by examining 
how the Conservatives, Labour, and UKIP structure relations with their MEPs, and 
how MEPs from these three parties relate to their EP Groups. Having presented how 
the cases relate to the hypotheses, the investigation proceeds to examine whether the 
three domestic parties meet the preconditions of influence set out in Chapter 2: that 
they desire to attain influence, communicate their wishes to MEPs, provide MEPs 
with incentives to follow these wishes, and monitor the work of MEPs. The chapter 
subsequently considers whether certain factors lead to variation in the willingness of 
parties to attempt to influence MEPs and to variation in the level of success that such 
attempts meet. Ten of the eleven hypotheses relating to domestic parties presented in 
Chapter 2 are examined, together with the four hypotheses relating to the EP Groups. 
 Despite the expectation that British parties extensively seek to influence how 
MEPs approach their work (see Introduction), this chapter finds that the 
Conservatives and Labour exclusively attempt to influence the way MEPs vote, and 
do so only in rare instances. While UKIP’s leadership sets out broad principles by 
which MEPs are expected to abide, it provides little guidance regarding how MEPs 
should act from day to day. Again, these findings challenge the claim that parties 
attain extensive influence on MEPs, and dispute the notion that features of EP life 
such as voting cohesion within domestic party delegations are explained by the 
existence of centralised systems of party discipline. In summary, the evidence 
presented in this chapter largely challenges the partisan control thesis. 
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Three factors are found to explain variation in the propensity of domestic 
parties to seek influence, namely the degree of centralisation of the candidate 
selection system, status as a governing party, and the party’s attitudes towards 
integration. The findings relating to EP Groups reflects those presented in the 
previous chapter, with evidence of far weaker coordination within the two 
Eurosceptic Groups examined, the EFD and the ECR, compared with the pro-
integrationist S&D. As in the case of Finnish SDP MEPs, Labour MEPs feel 
compelled to follow the S&D’s voting recommendations unless there is a strong 
reason to do otherwise, despite the fact that the Group does not operate a strict system 
of discipline. 
 
The Cases 
By investigating the nature of the partisan relationships of British MEPs, it is possible 
to observe domestic parties that are expected to manage relations with their MEPs as 
actively as any in the EU. The three parties selected have a stronger incentive to 
attempt to influence the behaviour of their MEPs than most other parties represented 
in the EP. These three parties are the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, and the 
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). If the evidence suggests that any of the 
three parties seek to influence their MEPs, the differences between the parties make it 
possible to test ten hypotheses relating to domestic parties. The case selection also 
makes it possible to test the four hypotheses relating to EP Groups. 
 The Conservatives were the dominant force in British politics during the 
twentieth century, its leaders serving as Prime Minister for 57 years. The party won 
36.0% of the votes and 305 of the 650 seats contested at the 2010 general election 
(House of Commons Library, 2010: 1), becoming the largest party in terms of 
parliamentary representation, yet failing to secure an overall majority. David 
Cameron, the party leader, subsequently became Prime Minister having formed a 
governing coalition with the Liberal Democrats. Reflecting a broader trend in British 
politics, the number of Conservative Party members has declined markedly from a 
high of nearly three million members in the early 1950s to fewer than 150,000 
members in recent years (House of Commons Library, 2012: 3). However, while the 
current number of members is lower than some of the EU’s other large domestic 
parties (for figures relating to German political parties see Niedermayer, 2012), it is 
still high in comparison with most parties in the EU (Mair and van Biezen, 2001; 
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Scarrow, 2000: 89; Whiteley, 2011). The large number of party members suggests 
that the party has strong networks at the grassroots level. With an income of £23.7m 
and an expenditure of £22.8m in 2011 (The Electoral Commission, 2012), a mid-term 
year, it is clear that the Conservatives have access to considerable resources. 
The Conservatives have a long history of representation in the EP, having won 
five of the seven EP elections held in the UK since 1979. With 27.7% of the vote 
share, the party won the largest number of votes at the 2009 EP election and 27 of the 
73 seats available256 (BBC News, 2009a). The Conservatives ended their affiliation to 
the EPP–ED Group in 2009 and led efforts to form a new parliamentary Group, the 
European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) (Bale et al., 2010: 85–6). At the time 
of writing there was a total of 57 MEPs affiliated to the Group (European Parliament, 
2014a). It is clear that there is a considerable discrepancy between the policies of 
those within the Group on issues other than integration (Bale et al., 2010). The UK 
Conservatives dominate the Group with 27 MEPs, and the party’s Martin Callanan 
has served as chair of the ECR since December 2011 (The Conservatives, 2014). 
 The Conservatives are a centre-right party. While it supported the UK’s 
membership of the European Community in the 1960s and 1970s (Driver, 2011: 60–
1), the party has become increasingly Eurosceptic since the 1980s. EU policy has 
been a divisive and a problematic issue for the party (Driver, 2011: 70–2), and while 
an Eurosceptic consensus has emerged, it remains a particularly sensitive and a 
potentially damaging issue for the party. This is well illustrated by Cameron’s 
announcement in January 2013 that he would hold a referendum on UK’s 
membership of the EU in 2017, a decision made in reaction to pressure from staunch 
Eurosceptics within his national parliamentary party (BBC News, 2013a). The fact 
that EU policy poses such great challenges to the party suggests that it has 
considerable incentive to influence the behaviour of its MEPs. 
 Together with the Conservatives, Labour is the other major force in British 
politics. It has consistently garnered between 30% and 50% of the vote share at 
general elections in the post-war period, its weak results at the 1983 and 2010 
elections serving as the only exceptions. The thirteen years during the period 1997–
2010 was the longest that the party has spent in power, having previously spent time 
in office during the periods 1945–1951, 1964–1970, and 1974–1979. The number of 
Labour members has declined from a high of nearly a million in the early 1950’s and 
currently stands at around 193,000 (House of Commons Library, 2012: 3). With an 
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income of £31.3m and an expenditure of £30.3m in 2011 (The Electoral Commission, 
2012), Labour is currently the best funded party in the UK. 
 Labour is a centre-left party, for which – much like the Conservative party – 
EU policy has historically been a contentious issue. While the leadership supported 
British membership at the 1975 referendum, the majority of MPs campaigned for 
Britain to leave the EEC (Carter and Ladrech, 2007: 58). A consensus has emerged 
within the party in favour of a moderately pro-integrationist position since the 1990s 
(Butler and Westlake, 1995: 114), however the party’s disunited reaction to 
Cameron’s announcement regarding holding a referendum on Britain’s EU 
membership (The Economist, 2013a) suggests that there is scope for the deep-seated 
divisions to return. 
Similarly to the Conservatives, Labour has considerable experience of 
representation in the EP. Its EP electoral fortunes peaked following the 1994 EP 
elections, at which it won 62 out of 87 seats available. However, the party fared 
poorly at the 2009 election, winning 15.7% of the vote share and beaten into third 
place on that measure for the first time ever at an EP election (House of Commons 
Library, 2009: 2, 6). The votes translated into thirteen seats, another measure on 
which it suffered its weakest performance. These MEPs are affiliated to the S&D 
Group. 
Much as The Finns Party (PS) is different from the National Coalition Party 
(KOK) and the Finnish Social Democratic Party (SDP) in the Finnish case, UKIP 
displays many dissimilarities compared with the Conservatives and Labour. While the 
two traditional governing parties have histories spanning well over a century, UKIP is 
a newcomer to the British party system. Established in 1993 as a reaction to the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (Hayton, 2010: 27; Lynch et al., 2012: 736), the 
single policy objective stated in the party’s constitution is:  
 
that the United Kingdom shall cease to be a member of the European Union 
and shall not thereafter make any Treaty or join any international organisation 
which involves in any way the surrender of any part of the United Kingdom’s 
sovereignty. (UKIP, 2012a: 2.3) 
 
While Labour is moderately pro-European, and the Conservatives ‘soft’ Eurosceptics 
(Lynch and Whitaker, 2013; Whitaker and Lynch, 2014: 239) in that they oppose 
further integration but do not wish to see the UK leave the EU, the policy goal stated 
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above demonstrates that UKIP is a ‘hard’ Eurosceptic party (Taggart and Szczerbiack, 
2008; Whitaker and Lynch, 2014: 235), since the issue of integration is their primary 
concern (Lynch et al., 2012: 733–4). UKIP is one of few parties represented in the EP 
calling for the withdrawal of their Member State from the EU (Lynch et al., 2012: 
739), and is the largest ‘hard’ Eurosceptic party in existence. An examination of the 
party’s 2010 general election manifesto suggests that the party’s policies are only 
slightly to the right of the Liberal Democrats and considerably more centrist than the 
Conservatives (Lynch et al., 2012: 744). Nevertheless, most scholars agree that the 
party is best viewed as ‘right-wing’ (Abedi and Lundberg, 2009: 72; Ford et al., 2012: 
207; John and Margetts, 2009: 508), and it is conceived as such for the purposes of 
this thesis. 
UKIP’s electoral advances have taken place in the context of EP and local 
elections – two sets of ‘second order’ elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). The party 
won its first three seats in the EP following the introduction of proportional 
representation in 1999, before making a major advance in 2004, winning twelve seats 
on 16.1% of the vote share (Butler and Westlake, 2005: 152). UKIP made another 
advance at the 2009 EP elections, winning 13 seats and 16.5% of the national vote 
share, beating Labour and the Liberal Democrats into second place for the first time 
(House of Commons Library, 2009: 2, 6). UKIP has failed to replicate this success in 
the context of elections to the House of Commons. Its failure to win any seats257 is in 
no small part due to the hurdle posed for smaller parties by the first-past-the-post 
system. The party came fourth at the 2010 general election, winning 3.2% of the vote 
(Lynch et al., 2012: 736). The strong showings in recent opinion polls (The Guardian, 
2014) suggest that the party will perform strongly at the 2014 EP elections and at the 
2015 general election. 
Despite the fact that the issue of whether UKIP should take up its EP 
mandates ‘was a thorny issue in the party’s early days’ (Lynch et al., 2012: 738), the 
party has contested EP elections at every election since the party’s foundation and has 
taken up each seat that it has won. The party has acquired considerable experience of 
dealing with MEPs since it won its first three seats in the EP in 1999. However, some 
of the difficulties that the party has faced in dealing with MEPs, such as dissent and 
defections (BBC News, 2004), have continued during the 2009–14 parliamentary 
term (BBC News, 2010; BBC News, 2012; BBC News, 2013b). This suggests that the 
party may not have developed effective methods of dealing with its MEPs. The fact 
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that MEPs elected by UKIP have left the party during all three parliamentary terms 
raises questions about the effectiveness of the procedures that it uses to select 
appropriate candidates and to deal with MEPs following their election. 
Of UKIP’s nine MEPs at the time of writing (UKIP, 2014), eight are affiliated 
to the EFD Group258 (EFD, 2014), which was established under the initiative of 
UKIP’s leader, Nigel Farage. UKIP’s delegation is the Group’s largest, providing 
over a quarter of MEPs. The fact that the EFD is Eurosceptic in outlook, young in 
organizational terms, and diverse in terms of the views held by their affiliates, gives 
rise to the expectation that it has been less able to influence the behaviour of MEPs 
than other Groups. As a recent creation, it is unlikely that the EFD has developed 
strong mechanisms for asserting itself independently of the will of the national 
delegations. The strength of UKIP’s Euroscepticism and its rejection of the idea of 
political organization on a transnational basis259 suggests that it would not be willing 
to maintain an affiliation to a Group which imposes its will on the national 
delegations.  
This notion is reinforced by the fact that UKIP has a strong presence within 
the Group, and that if the Group were to develop any kind of a will of its own, it is 
likely that this would reflect UKIP’s outlook. The evidence presented in the previous 
chapter, as well as in other studies (Lynch et al., 2012: 739), indicates that the Group 
was established as a means of attracting parliamentary resources for national 
delegations, rather than as a means of coordinating policy. Further, the considerable 
policy divergences which exist within the Group, together with the fact that the Group 
is the least cohesive in terms of voting (Lynch et al., 2012: 739; VoteWatch.eu, 
accessed 20/7/13), suggests that the Group does not enforce strict discipline. 
Several factors suggest that the organizational capacity of UKIP’s central 
party machinery is limited. It takes time for new parties to develop effective 
organizations centrally and at the grassroots level. UKIP’s rise has taken place against 
the backdrop of considerable ‘internal conflict and leadership problems’ (John and 
Margetts, 2009: 501; Abedi and Lundberg, 2009), and the party has struggled to 
develop a stable party organization. Leadership changes have occurred regularly, and 
the fledgling party has faced further difficulties, include the imprisonment of two 
MEPs elected under the UKIP banner (BBC News, 2007; 2009b), the departure from 
the party of MEPs (BBC News, 2000; 2004; 2010; 2012; 2013), and a scandal 
involving the misuse of EP allowances by MEPs (The Guardian, 2012). The party’s 
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level of income and expenditure is considerably lower than that of the UK’s main 
parties. In 2011 the party spent £970,000, compared with £30.3m in the case of 
Labour (The Electoral Commission, 2012). 
As UKIP’s MEPs are the party’s main holders of major elected office,260 the 
role that they play within the party differs from that played by other MEPs in their 
parties. Holding the office of MEP provide these individuals with a platform and 
access to public funds that are unmatched by the party’s other members. This 
contrasts strongly with most of the other major British parties, as they have a number 
of representatives elected to legislatures at the state and at the devolved level, and 
MEPs are usually less well known than the representatives who serve in domestic 
settings. As this suggests that UKIP MEPs are senior party members, there may be 
less scope for the leadership to influence their behaviour. 
However, two factors suggest that the party may attempt to exercise 
considerable influence on the way they carry out their work. Firstly, the party has a 
considerable incentive to encourage MEPs to carry out particular tasks on its behalf 
and these tasks may not be appealing to MEPs. UKIP has a clear incentive to develop 
its organization at the national and the local level (The Economist, 2012), as its 
primary electoral goal is to gain seats in the House of Commons. The party has little 
to gain from allowing its MEPs to undertake parliamentary activities in the EP, as its 
main goal – withdrawal from the EU – is determined at the national level. It may 
therefore desire that its MEPs concentrate on carrying out domestic political work, 
and on developing the party’s organization. Secondly, the party is exceptionally 
leader-centric. It is dominated by its charismatic leader, Nigel Farage, who admitted 
in a TV interview that UKIP is a ‘one man party’ (Ship, 2013). The fact that few of 
the party’s MEPs other than Farage have a strong public profile suggests that the 
leader is in a strong position within the party and that the other MEPs are dependent 
on the party to a considerable degree to realise their own personal goals. This in turn 
gives rise to the possibility that the leadership is able to exercise considerable 
influence over MEPs. 
 
Testing the Hypotheses 
The differences that exist between the three British parties chosen as case studies 
provide a means to examine ten of the eleven hypotheses presented in Chapter 2 
relating to domestic parties and the four hypotheses relating to the EP Groups. By 
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examining whether the desire and ability of Labour and the Conservatives to 
influence the behaviour of their MEPs changed as the former left government in 2010 
to be replaced by the latter, it is possible to test Hypotheses 3 and 4. Hypothesis 3 
expects governing parties to have a greater desire to influence MEPs than opposition 
parties, and for their efforts to meet with greater success. Hypothesis 4 expects 
governing parties to demand that MEPs focus on legislative activity. While all three 
case studies have large national delegations of MEPs compared with most of the other 
parties represented in the EP, they vary relative to each other. It is consequently 
possible to test Hypothesis 5, which expects the Conservatives to show a greater 
willingness to attempt to influence the behaviour of MEPs, and to be more likely to 
succeed, than Labour and UKIP. 
The vast differences between Labour and the Conservatives’ level of 
expenditure compared with UKIP, together with the differing histories, suggest that 
there is considerable variation in the level of organizational capacity between UKIP 
and the two established parties. Hypothesis 7 expects the Conservatives and Labour, 
two parties with considerable organizational capacities, to be more likely to attempt to 
influence the behaviour of MEPs, and to achieve greater success, than UKIP. As 
Labour and the Conservatives are two centrist parties with UKIP positioned 
appreciably to the right of the Conservatives, it is also possible to test the two variants 
of Hypothesis 9, which relate to the ideological distance of parties from the centre. 
Hypothesis 9a expects Labour and the Conservatives to attempt to control the 
legislative behaviour of MEPs to a greater extent than UKIP, although there is no 
suggestion that they will enjoy greater success. These expectations are reversed in 
Hypothesis 9b.  
The attitudes of the three parties towards integration differ, with Labour 
moderately in favour of the status quo (The Economist, 2013b; 2014), the 
Conservatives wishing to see the UK remain a member of a reformed EU (The 
Economist, 2013c), and UKIP wishing to see the UK leave the EU. Hypothesis 11 
expects UKIP to be less likely to attempt to influence the legislative behaviour of 
MEPs than the Conservatives, who in turn are expected to be less likely to attempt to 
influence the legislative behaviour of MEPs than Labour. Hypothesis 12 expects 
UKIP to desire that their MEPs carry out more work in the UK, and to be more likely 
to succeed in determining how MEPs spend their time than the Conservatives, with 
Labour a further step behind. As differences are found to exist in the degree to which 
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the candidate selection systems are centralised, it is possible to examine Hypotheses 2. 
This hypothesis expects parties operating centralised candidate selection systems to 
be more likely to attempt to influence the behaviour of their MEPs, and to be more 
likely to succeed, than parties operating decentralised candidate selection systems. 
 Selecting these three parties as case studies also makes it possible to examine 
whether there is variation in how domestic parties structure relations with MEPs who 
have different levels of political experience. Among the MEPs elected from the lists 
of the three parties in 2009 are those who entered the EP for the first time in 2009 
with no prior experience of serving as full time politicians, as well as individuals who 
had served as MEPs for over twenty years. Consequently, it is possible to test 
Hypothesis 14, which expects parties to be able to exercise greater levels of influence 
on the behaviour of MEPs who have less political experience than on the behaviour of 
MEPs who have more political experience. 
 In addition, the case selection makes it possible to test the four hypotheses 
relating to EP Groups. Labour MEPs are affiliated to the S&D Group, which is far 
larger than the ECR and the EFD Groups, to which Conservative and UKIP MEPs 
respectively are affiliated. Hypothesis 6 expects the S&D Group to go to greater 
lengths in their attempts to influence the legislative behaviour of its MEPs, and to 
enjoy greater success, than the ECR and the EFD Groups. Hypothesis 8 reinforces this 
expectation, as larger Groups are expected to have greater organizational capacities 
than smaller Groups. As the S&D Group is positioned closer to the centre of the left–
right scale than the ECR, with the EFD further towards the right, Hypothesis 10 
expects the S&D Group to be more likely to attempt to influence the legislative 
behaviour of their MEPs, and to enjoy greater success, than the ECR, with the EFD 
less interested and successful in influencing the legislative behaviour of MEPs. 
Hypothesis 13 expects this trend to be further reinforced by the Groups’ level of 
Euroscepticism. 
 
Candidate Selection Systems 
The Conservatives used a largely decentralised system to select candidates for the 
2009 and 2014 EP elections. While prospective candidates were required to pass a 
centralised vetting procedure, known as the European Parliamentary Assessment 
Board, the selection procedure was carried out primarily by party officials at the 
regional level (The Conservatives, 2012: unpag. [3]). Selection colleges were formed 
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in each region, and these comprised of representatives of the party’s Westminster 
constituency branches together with the leaders of the party’s organizations at the 
level of the European region.261 MEPs seeking re-election required the support of 
60% of the selection college in their region to be given a preferential position on the 
party’s list relative to non-incumbents (The Conservatives, 2012: unpag. [6]). While 
all sitting MEPs passed this threshold in advance of the 2009 election, three failed in 
their attempts in advance of the 2014 election. These were the leader of the 
Conservative delegation, Richard Ashworth, who is viewed as amenable to European 
integration (KentOnline, 2013; ConservativeHome, 2013a), and two former UKIP 
MEPs, Martha Andreasen and David Campbell-Bannerman (ConservativeHome, 
2013b).262 In regions where more than one sitting MEP passes the incumbency 
threshold, party members were given the opportunity to rank the order of MEPs 
seeking re-election through a postal ballot.  
The regional selectoral college also voted to select a short-list of candidates 
from the pool of non-incumbent MEPs and those who failed to pass the incumbency 
threshold. The ranking of these candidates was decided by party members in a parallel 
postal contest (The Conservatives, 2012: unpag. [6–7]). The party ensured that the 
highest position on the list in each region not taken by a sitting MEP was allocated to 
a female candidate in advance of the 2009 election (ConservativeHome, 2008). As a 
result of this measure, seven of the Conservatives’ eight newly elected MEPs were 
female.263 Female candidates were not given preferential treatment in advance of the 
2014 election. 
As the Conservatives’ lists are formed by the regional selectoral colleges and 
ordered by party members, there is limited scope for the party leadership to influence 
the composition of lists. Nevertheless, the system is not as decentralised as the one-
member-one-vote system used by the Liberal Democrats, whereby incumbents are 
afforded no protection.264 Noting that MEPs ‘work through incentives’,265 respondents 
unanimously agreed that the system compels MEPs to remain in regular contact with 
regional party leaders and with members in their regions. One noted that he would 
‘spend less time in the region and more time in London doing what the party 
leadership tells me’ were the selection process more centralised. 266  Another 
acknowledged that her reselection strategy was to target the individuals she 
considered most likely to be chosen as members of the selectoral college in her 
region.267 
 199 
Nevertheless, this tendency to pay attention to the selectorate does not appear 
to place a particularly heavy burden on MEPs. Incumbents believe that the main task 
for MEPs seeking reselection is to communicate to the selectorate about their activity. 
They do not feel that they are required to spend a great deal of time undertaking 
activity for the benefit of those who control their re-election prospects.268 Even so, 
respondents are clear that there is a ‘noticeable’ difference in the amount of attention 
MEPs pay to their regions depending on the degree of intraparty competition in the 
region.269 These findings support the notion that the type of candidate selection 
system used influences the way MEPs carry out their work (Farrell and Scully, 2007). 
However, they do not necessarily support the view that the use of a closed-list system 
enables party leaders to compel MEPs to follow guidance. 
The system used by the Labour Party to form its lists of candidates for the 
2009 and 2014 elections was similarly decentralised, and also had a considerable 
degree of protection for MEPs seeking re-election. The highest positions on the 
party’s list in a region are reserved for MEPs who are able to overcome a ‘trigger 
ballot’,270 at which MEPs require a simple majority of votes cast by members in the 
region. Where more than one re-election seeking incumbent succeeds in overcoming 
the trigger ballot, the party membership in the region vote on the order in which those 
candidates appear on the list. To determine the composition of the lower positions on 
the party’s list, the regional party leadership draws up a short-list of non-incumbent 
nominees and the order is set on the basis of a member’s ballot.271 
The selection system includes a measure of gender protection, in that one of 
the top two Labour candidates in each region must be female, as must one of the top 
two candidates in the lower part of the list that is designated for non-incumbent 
candidates.272 The central party leadership has no direct influence on the process,273 
and the degree to which regional party leaderships are able to shape the outcome of 
the process is dependent on their ability to influence ordinary party members. The 
national leadership’s influence is even more limited in regions where the trade unions 
are strong. For MEPs seeking re-election in these areas, the imperative is to ‘stay in 
not with the party but with the trade unions’, as they can have considerable influence 
on the composition of the Labour Party’s list.274 No incumbent Labour MEP has 
failed to overcome the trigger ballot since the system was introduced in 2004,275 and 
deselection is generally held to be ‘extremely unlikely’ under the current 
arrangements.276  
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With the exception of the 1999 EP election, which was the first to feature a 
closed-list system of proportional representation, the central party leadership has not 
interfered with the selection of candidates, and Labour MEPs do not report that 
reselection concerns compel them to act in a manner that reflects the leadership’s 
wishes. One respondent noted that he ‘never’ felt he might face reselection difficulties 
if he were to vote against the leadership.277 Another noted that: 
 
Sometimes some of my colleagues are worried that they will [experience 
difficulties when seeking reselection if they do not toe the party leadership’s 
line], but they haven’t. It would be difficult because the party membership’s 
involved. People have this idea that lists are chosen by the party and the party 
leadership can put whoever they want on them. It actually doesn’t work like 
that; at least it doesn’t in the Labour party. So I think getting rid of somebody 
would be quite difficult.278 
 
This suggests that the decentralised nature of the candidate selection system 
undermines the ability of the party leadership to incentivise the behaviour of MEPs. 
 As in the case of Conservative MEPs, Labour MEPs acknowledge that there is 
a need to maintain regular contact with the party at the level of the European 
constituency, as the party’s members at the regional level play a key role in the 
reselection process.279 Supporting the findings of another study (Farrell and Scully, 
2007), a long-serving MEP noted that his focus ‘shifted’ from the constituency to the 
party at the regional level following the introduction of a proportional electoral 
system in 1999, as the party ‘essentially became your … electorate’.280 The MEP 
acknowledges that he spends more time in party meetings and in contact with party 
members than he did when elections were conducted using the first-past-the-post 
system.281  
While the system clearly compels MEPs of all parties to operate in this way, 
neither Labour’s membership nor its party organizations at the regional level appear 
to take advantage of their position. There is, for example, no pressure on Labour 
MEPs to carry out a great deal of work on behalf of the regional party organization or 
to spend more time in their constituencies than Finnish MEPs. As in the case of 
Conservative MEPs, the task that Labour MEPs feel compelled to carry out is to 
maintain regular contact with the regional party organization and with the party 
membership in the region.282 Further, Labour MEPs recognise that the need to 
maintain links with members in their regions is neither onerous nor particularly 
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unwelcome. Several noted that maintaining contact with party members assists them 
to carry out their work as representatives well.283 
 The system used by UKIP to select candidates for the 2009 EP elections was 
also largely decentralised. Nominees were interviewed by regional party grandees, 
and were given the opportunity to send a 250-word statement to party members in the 
region before participating in a series of poorly attended hustings in their regions.284 
The ordering of candidates on the party’s lists in each region was determined by a 
postal ballot of members in each region, and unlike in the case of the Conservatives 
and Labour, incumbent UKIP MEPs were not afforded special privileges.285 The party 
leadership did not remain wholly passive in the selection process. Candidates 
nominated by popular figures within the party, such as the party leader, Nigel Farage, 
fared better than others, and the leadership used this to shape the outcome of the 
contests.286 
 UKIP used a far more centralised system to select candidates for the 2014 
election. The vetting procedure was ‘considerably more stringent’.287 Prospective 
candidates were required to undertake a two-hour assessment, in which they were 
interviewed and in which their public speaking and writing skills were examined 
(BBC News, 2013c). While party members at the regional level continued to have 
some say in the composition of the party’s electoral lists, the party leadership, in the 
guise of the National Executive Committee, had ‘the final say’ over the ordering of 
candidates.288 The party’s constitution and rules of procedure were modified to enable 
this change (see UKIP, 2012a; UKIP, 2012b),289 and this was a measure taken 
specifically to address the difficulties that the party has faced in ensuring party 
discipline during the 2009–14 parliamentary term. An official explained that the party 
is ‘anxious to avoid some of the problems that we have had this time. We started with 
thirteen in the group [of UKIP MEPs] and we’re down to nine and one of them has 
been arrested.’290 
It is clear that the leadership has used its new powers to ensure that only its 
preferred candidates will be elected at the 2014 election, 291 as it did when it 
rearranged the order of the party’s list at the election to the London Assembly in 
2012.292 Speaking in advance of the selection process, an official noted that ‘If there’s 
somebody who’s predicted to give offence, then they’re not going to be chosen again, 
that’s fairly straightforward.’293 Sitting MEPs were well aware for most of the 2009–
14 term that their reselection chances was linked to the way they carried out their 
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work and to the degree to which they remained loyal to the party leadership. An MEP 
stated in advance of the selection process that colleagues who have not ‘performed the 
way the NEC would like them to’ during the term ‘will be downlisted’, and that the 
party can afford to be ‘very selective’ as ‘a lot of people want to be UKIP MEPs’.294 
This demonstrates that UKIP issues its MEPs with potent threats and rewards that are 
linked to behaviour.  
The leadership viewed incumbency as an asset. MEPs have had the 
opportunity to develop an understanding of how the EP works, and the leadership 
viewed them as less of a liability than non-incumbents, being ‘the devil they know 
rather than the devil they don’t know’.295 Nevertheless, it is clear that the party 
leadership was willing to deselect incumbent MEPs on the basis of behaviour and 
suitability for the role of MEP.296 In the event, Mike Nattrass, a former Chair and a 
former Deputy Leader of the party who had served as an MEP since 2004, was 
deselected (BBC News, 2013c), while Godfrey Bloom was unable to seek candidature 
as he had the party whip withdrawn for making controversial comments about the 
party’s female members (BBC News, 2013d). 
 This discussion demonstrates that there is a fundamental difference between 
UKIP’s approach to selecting candidates for the 2014 EP election and those of the 
other two parties. Rather than seeking to shape the outcome of the selection process to 
the detriment of any MEPs seeking re-election, the leadership of the Conservatives 
and Labour have used their influence to protect sitting MEPs in recent years. 
Incumbent MEPs from these two parties are very rarely deselected or placed in a low 
position on their parties’ lists, other than in cases of serious misconduct. The failure 
of Richard Ashworth, the Europhile leader of the Conservatives’ delegation in the EP, 
to pass the regional party’s incumbency threshold during the selection process for the 
2014 election (ConservativeHome, 2013a; KentOnline, 2013) was a rare instance of a 
sitting MEP from either party being deselected.297 As no organ within these two 
parties pays a great deal of interest in the work of MEPs, there is little scope for 
MEPs to offend any set of individuals within their parties. In contrast, UKIP’s 
willingness to deselect undesirable incumbent MEPs makes it clear that its leadership 
now takes a far more proactive approach to the selection of candidates than it, and the 
other two parties, have taken in the past (other than in the case of Labour at the 1999 
EP election). 
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Staffing and Communication 
The Conservatives do not have a formal mechanism for facilitating communication 
between their MEPs and the party’s central organization.298 This is despite the fact 
that two ECR officials are based in London to facilitate coordination between the 
Conservatives’ domestic party organisation and its delegation in the EP. The accounts 
provided by respondents indicate that there is variation in the degree of contact 
between government ministers from the party and the MEPs responsible for the 
corresponding policy area. Some respondents indicated that this type of interaction 
takes place infrequently and that ministers take little interest in the work of MEPs.299 
When visiting Brussels, ministers tend to prioritize meetings with senior figures from 
the Commission and Council rather than with the party’s delegation in the EP. One 
MEP’s assistant recalled how the MEP demanded a meeting with a minister, saying 
that:  
 
I want to talk to you and I want you to come and talk to our MEPs. You keep 
giving out that we’re not following your line. We’ve never met you because 
every time you come over you’re chauffeured up somewhere else because 
we’re not important. I want you to come over and I want to talk.300 
 
An official lent support to this view when claiming that ‘it is often reliant on us to 
make the links with [the party in] London, rather than the other way around,’ and that 
links between the delegation and the party’s front bench have become weaker since 
the party entered government in 2010. Members of the party’s front bench have made 
less time for issues relating to the EP since becoming government ministers.301  
Other respondents noted that they are in regular communication with ministers 
and with civil servants in Whitehall, and that this is the case regardless of whether the 
Conservatives are in government.302 The contrasting nature of responses reinforces 
the idea that communication does not take place systematically between MEPs and 
government ministers, and suggests that the strengths of linkages depend on the level 
of importance that individual ministers attach to maintaining links with MEPs.303 
The degree of interaction between MEPs and their staffs, and officials from 
the UK Permanent Representation to the EU (UKRep), is greater. Respondents note 
that much of the information and policy advice received from the government flows 
between the MEPs’ assistants and UKRep officials. Conservative MEPs and their 
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assistants are very happy to work with UKRep, especially since the change of 
government in 2010.304  
The ‘link system’ established between 1997 and 1999 under the guidance of 
Tony Blair to coordinate policy between the European Parliamentary Labour Party 
(EPLP) and government ministers is well documented (Ovey, 2002; Messmer, 2003; 
see also discussion in Chapter 1). Each MEP was given the task of leading the EPLP’s 
policy work in a specific area and of coordinating with their counterpart on Labour’s 
front bench in Westminster. While Messmer (2003) suggested that the link system 
enabled strong coordination between the government and the EPLP, respondents to 
the present study emphasised that there has been considerable variation in the degree 
to which different Labour (shadow) ministers have used the link system, and this 
reflects Ovey’s findings (2002: 165, 194, 207). The system has not always worked 
‘well’, not least because meetings of the ministerial teams are often held when the 
link MEP is required to attend to parliamentary work in Brussels and Strasbourg.305 
Nevertheless, the system has ‘worked well enough often enough’ and in many cases 
there is ‘good contact’ between the link MEP and the relevant ministry.306 
The appeal to senior Labour politicians of maintaining links to the EPLP is 
expected to have decreased since the publication of these accounts (Ovey, 2001; 
Messmer, 2003). The scope for Labour MEPs to influence EP policy decision has 
diminished in more recent times, as the size of the party’s delegation in the EP has 
decreased, together with the relative size of the Socialist Group within the chamber. 
The potential for the EPLP to cause the party embarrassment has similarly decreased 
since it left power in 2010, as opposition parties are subject to less intense scrutiny. 
These expectations are reflected in the perception that exists among Labour MEPs 
that links between Labour’s front bench and the EPLP have weakened since Labour’s 
time in government, and that the party is not greatly interested in the work of MEPs at 
present. This reflects the expectation of Hypothesis 3.  
Nevertheless, some of the interest shown by senior politicians during the late 
1990s has persisted,307 as some effort is made to maintain the links between MEPs 
and shadow ministers. Further, Labour MEPs meet the party leader every quarter and 
shadow ministers periodically visit MEPs in Brussels.308 Respondents report that the 
degree of contact varies according to the level of interest individuals have in 
maintaining these links, to the perceived importance of the policy area,309 and to the 
EP’s level of competence.310 
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The EPLP employs a General Secretary and a Political Officer, who are 
primarily based in Brussels. The latter plays a central role in coordinating the 
delegation’s work, by ensuring that MEPs develop policy positions for the 
delegation.311 The full-time official who is based in the parliamentary office of the 
party leader, Ed Miliband, facilitates coordination between the Labour leadership in 
the UK and the EPLP.312 In practice, what little contact takes place between Labour 
MEPs and the party tends to occur between MEPs and politicians from Labour’s front 
bench. In rare instances where MEPs feel they require guidance from the party, the 
‘usual’ practice is to discuss the issue with the (shadow) minister, and MEPs report no 
major problems when attempting to contact members of the front bench.313 In 
addition, regular communication takes place between the EPLP leader, Glenis 
Wilmott, and the party leader, Ed Miliband.314 
Since Labour’s move into opposition and the subsequent change in party 
leadership, the leader of the EPLP has sat as a member of the shadow cabinet.315 This 
development should not be interpreted as having been undertaken in order to provide 
the party leadership with a means of increasing its influence on the EPLP. Rather, it is 
viewed by MEPs as a means of strengthening coordination between the party 
leadership and the party’s delegation in the EP in a period when it is almost inevitable 
that the links between MEPs and the party’s front bench will weaken. MEPs view this 
development positively, as ‘one thing we’ve got’, rather than as a measure which was 
enacted against their will, and they note that the access that their delegation leader 
now has to the shadow cabinet enables her to be ‘clued up about the important 
issues’.316 Further, six Labour MEPs (nearly half the EPLP) are members of the 
party’s national policy forum, a party policy-making organ that consists of 186 
members and that meets two or three times a year. MEPs view membership of the 
national policy forum as ‘quite helpful’, as it provides a means of making the EPLP’s 
views known.317 
UKIP’s party organisation is considerably smaller than that of the two other 
British parties examined in this thesis. In contrast to Labour, which employs over 300 
individuals at the state and sub-state level (Webb and Fisher, 2001: 6), UKIP employs 
a total of approximately 20 staff members. Of these, half are based in London and 
focus on policy and campaigning activity,318 while the other half are based in Devon 
and undertake administrative duties.319 None of the party’s officials are specifically 
responsible for liaising between the party’s central organisations and MEPs, and 
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interaction between the party and MEPs takes place on an ‘ad hoc’ basis.320 In 
contrast to the other two parties examined in this chapter, several of UKIP’s most 
prominent party members are also MEPs, including the party’s leader and deputy 
leader. There is considerable variation in the degree of contact between MEPs and the 
party leadership, despite the fact that the leader is a member of the party’s delegation 
in the EP.321 
 
Model of Representation 
It is clear that Conservative MEPs have extensive freedom to decide for themselves 
how they wish to carry out their roles as representatives.322 The party provides no 
guidance regarding how MEPs should divide their time between different 
geographical locations or between different activities. When asked whether her focus 
on EU policy-making was driven by the wishes of the party, one Conservative MEP 
stated that ‘I don’t know what the party wants. They never said.’323 The considerable 
variation that exists in how Conservative MEPs carry out their roles as representatives 
serves as evidence that it is the individuals themselves who decide how to carry out 
their work. Respondents explain that their priorities stem from their skills and 
interests.324 
 Labour’s constitution requires the party’s candidates ‘to accept and comply 
with the standing orders of the EPLP’ if elected (Labour, 2010: 28). However, these 
are general guidelines and no Labour party organ provides guidance on how MEPs 
should divide their time, either in terms of finding a balance between carrying out 
work domestically and in Brussels and Strasbourg, or in terms of how they allocate 
time to specific tasks. This is again reflected in the variation that exists between 
MEPs in how they carry out their work, and MEPs feel that they have complete 
freedom to define their role as representatives.325 One explained that: 
 
You have a remarkable latitude in terms of defining your own job and we all 
do it differently. We all have different priorities. Personally, I see my job as 
having been elected to the Parliament to be here, to do a lot in the Parliament. 
Others, just as legitimately… and I don’t just mean for personal, opportunistic 
reasons… they think that their job is to be at home as often as they possibly 
can and get around their constituencies as much as possible. We all try to work 
out a balance between these two things, and strike different balances.326 
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There is far greater discussion within UKIP regarding how MEPs should act 
than in the other two parties featured in this discussion, and this is partly because of 
the divide that exists within the party on this issue. Elements within the party 
membership remain of the view that UKIP’s successful electoral candidates should 
not take up their seats in the EP, and regard legislative work ‘as totally nugatory’.327 
The party leadership, in contrast, increasingly views participation in the work of 
parliamentary committees as important. By undertaking committee work MEPs and 
the party’s affiliates are able to source information that can be used to further the 
party’s agenda within legislative processes and in its domestic campaigns (cf. 
Whitaker and Lynch, 2014: 242). The party leadership does not attempt to deter 
MEPs from attending parliamentary committee meetings or to compel MEPs to focus 
their energies exclusively on carrying out activities in the UK.328 
While there is no formal model that UKIP MEPs are required to follow, the 
party does have certain expectations of how MEPs should carry out their work. 
Successful UKIP candidates at the 2009 election were expected to sign a 9-point code 
of conduct. This document outlines general principles to which MEPs promise to 
adhere, but does not provide a detailed model of representation. The principles 
include remaining loyal to the party and its leader, supporting party policy, attending 
plenary sessions in Strasbourg, becoming affiliated to the party’s choice of EP Group, 
pooling the EP-financed communications budget, and ensuring that no acts are 
undertaken which bring the party into disrepute.329 The latter principle implies that 
MEPs are not to criticise the party or the leadership. The party’s successful candidates 
at the 2014 election were expected to sign a ‘more greased up’ document, which 
Nigel Farage confirmed included a clause requiring MEPs to contribute financially to 
the party (The Politics Show, 2014).330 This indicates that the party leadership is 
seeking to enforce stricter discipline within the delegation and greater influence over 
the way MEPs carry out their work. 
UKIP MEPs are expected to pay considerable attention to their regions, and 
are likely to face difficulties when seeking reselection if their regional party 
organization feel that they have neglected their constituency work.331 MEPs are 
expected to organize public meetings, to make regular media appearances at the 
regional level, and to employ a press officer.332 They are also expected to be active in 
their constituencies on weekends and during green weeks. 333  UKIP MEPs are 
provided little incentive to carry out parliamentary work, other than to participate in 
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parliamentary divisions. MEPs are unwise to provide the party and its members with 
any evidence that they are in the process of ‘going native’, as this is viewed as ‘one of 
the worst crimes’ that a UKIP MEP can commit. 334  To date none has been 
permanently based in Brussels.335 However, the interview evidence does not suggest 
that the party’s expectations shape the decisions that UKIP MEPs make regarding 
how to spend their time. The views of the party and those of its MEPs on this issue 
correspond to a considerable degree. 
As a small party with no representation in the House of Commons, UKIP may 
be expected to demand that MEPs use their parliamentary allowances to employ as 
many assistants in the constituency as possible. While most MEPs from other British 
parties divide their staffing allowance relatively evenly between Brussels and their 
Member States, UKIP MEPs employ far more assistants in their constituencies than 
they do in Brussels.336 However, there is no evidence to suggest that the party puts 
pressure on MEPs to focus their staffing allowances on their constituencies, despite 
the stipulation that MEPs operate an office in ‘a major population centre’ (UKIP, 
2012b: W.10). Two explanations that are unrelated to the wishes of the party can be 
provided for the trend identified. Firstly, as many UKIP MEPs do not engage in 
parliamentary work as intensely as most MEPs, they can rely extensively on EFD 
advisors for EP-based assistance.337 Secondly, MEPs can use their allowances as a 
form of patronage to strengthen their position within the regional party organizations. 
One interviewee stated that the practice of MEPs employing members of the regional 
party board had become a ‘problem’ for the party, and was one reason for modifying 
the candidate selection system in favour of the central party leadership.338 
 
Policy Guidance and Voting Instructions 
The Conservative Party’s central office does not systematically provide MEPs with 
policy advice or voting instructions, and one MEP noted that he had ‘never received a 
direct instruction from anyone for how I should be voting’ in over twenty years as an 
MEP. 339  Nevertheless, the government does provide guidance and voting 
recommendations to all British MEPs through UKRep.340 Conservative MEPs note 
that they regularly consult with the government on issues relating to their EP 
Committees, that they follow the guidance received ‘nine times out of ten’, and that 
they do so of their own volition.341 
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The government periodically attempts to persuade Conservative MEPs to 
follow its policy positions on ‘core issues’, however this does not happen regularly, 
and such attempts usually have ‘remarkably little effect’ on the behaviour of MEPs.342 
Domestic politicians tend to be interested solely in the voting behaviour of MEPs, as 
they are concerned that the national press will publicise instances where the 
Conservative delegation in the EP votes against government policy.343 The party’s 
central organization puts ‘very little’ pressure on MEPs to modify their behaviour.344 
While UKRep provides ‘firm instructions’ relating to how they would like MEPs to 
act, its officials are limited to putting ‘subtle pressure’ on MEPs due to the 
organization’s remit as part of the UK’s civil service.345  
 While the evidence suggests that Conservative MEPs are only rarely subject to 
pressure from the party or from governmental actors, the dynamics within the 
delegation of Conservative MEPs are more complicated. The delegation defines 
policy positions independently of the party and of the government, based on the 
judgment of the MEP who is responsible for the issue in question.346 These policy 
positions are relayed to the other MEPs by the delegation whip. There is a general 
expectation within the delegation that MEPs follow the recommendations made by 
their colleagues, unless there is good reason to object.347 MEPs note that they feel a 
greater sense of loyalty to their Conservative colleagues in the EP than to their 
colleagues in London, and that they are generally inclined to support their colleagues 
in the EP by following the delegation’s recommendations.348  
During Labour’s time in office, government representatives provided voting 
instructions on a regular basis,349 however the party leadership’s tendency to mandate 
MEPs has declined since leaving office and is now weak. The EPLP currently 
receives requests from London approximately once every other month across all 
subject areas. The party leadership only takes an interest in the work of MEPs on the 
rare ‘controversial’ issues which attract publicity, and it is clear that MEPs view this 
practice as acceptable, as it does not take place very often.350 In terms of day-to-day 
committee work, one MEP noted that she rarely receives or requires policy advice 
from the party. Issues tend to be ‘pretty clear’ and politicians ‘instinctively know’ 
how the party and the Group position themselves, even if they do not make it 
explicit.351 Party officials are ‘not normally’352 able to provide policy advice and 
certainly do not seek to influence the delegation’s behaviour. MEPs are not required 
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to seek the party’s approval when undertaking policy work, although they periodically 
do so of their own volition on controversial issues.353  
 Similarly to MEPs from all parties examined, UKIP MEPs are required to 
publicly adhere to the core policy positions taken by their party. While there may be 
considerable latitude for MEPs from other parties to interpret party policy when 
negotiating within the EP, the clarity of UKIP’s core principles restrict the scope of its 
MEPs to make their own policy judgments. The party’s domestic organization does 
not provide policy guidance or voting instructions. Respondents suggest that it would 
be impossible for the NEC or for any other body within the party to provide 
systematic policy guidance, due to the large volume of work with which the EP deals, 
together with the speed at which negotiations take place.354 Instead, UKIP MEPs 
receive voting recommendations from the delegation’s whip. These are drawn up by 
EFD advisors specifically for UKIP MEPs at the request of the delegation’s whip, and 
are discussed and amended by MEPs, who meet in advance of voting sessions.355 
 
Reporting Requirements and Monitoring 
The Conservative Party does not monitor the work of MEPs, and while some regional 
organizations ask MEPs to provide periodic written reports on their activities, the 
central party organizations places no reporting requirements.356 Respondents indicated 
that the party is ‘largely disinterested’ in their work,357 and MEPs feel that the party 
should work more closely with them even in policy areas where some interest is 
shown, such as the single market.358 While there are no reporting requirements, many 
(if not all) MEPs regularly send reports about their work to party supporters in their 
region. MEPs are very clear that they do so to promote their reselection prospects,359 
and they exhibit no concern that the information provided may be used by the party as 
part of attempts to influence their behaviour. Asked if there should be more oversight 
of the work of MEPs, bearing in mind that voters are not afforded the opportunity to 
choose between the party’s candidates, an MEP replied by saying that ‘I see no point 
in inventing systems to oversee work when you have no sanction’.360 This reinforces 
the point that the party does not operate a system of threats and rewards. 
As in the case of the Conservatives, Labour’s central party leadership does not 
actively monitor the behaviour of MEPs and carries out little oversight of their work. 
Nevertheless, as the party has a large number of MEPs and as the EPLP employs 
officials, it is certain that party leaders would be informed if an MEP acted in a 
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manner that contradicted the party’s aims and values.361 MEPs are aware that the 
party leadership does not pay attention to their work other than in the case of highly 
salient issues. There is considerable variation in the degree to which leaders keep 
abreast of the work of individual MEPs depending on the committee membership of 
MEPs, and the leadership appears to have no interest at all in certain policy areas, 
such as culture.362 There is a perception among the EPLP that the party’s diminished 
engagement in EU affairs since 2010 is explained not only by its departure from 
government, but also by the fact that its new leaders do not view the European project 
to be as ‘important’ as previous leaders.363 This perceived lack of interest frustrates 
MEPs, who argue, similarly to Conservative MEPs, that the party leadership should 
pay more attention to their work.364 
The degree to which Labour’s regional organizations follow the work of 
MEPs varies, but is limited in most cases. All regional organizations are required to 
hold a ‘European Forum’ every year (Labour, 2010: 43), and this setting provides 
MEPs with an opportunity to provide an overview of their work to party members. 
Many MEPs also attend meetings of their regional party board. An MEP from a 
region where the party’s organization is strong noted that one of the two MEPs 
reports to the monthly regional party board, as well as meeting with an umbrella trade 
unions organization on a monthly basis.365 Despite the frequent contact, the MEP 
claimed that regional party leaders were ‘by and large … unaware’ of the work that he 
carried out. He estimated that ‘half of the members of the Labour Party’ in his region 
were oblivious to the fact that he was working on an issue that generated considerable 
publicity within EU circles, and noted that ‘not even a dozen people’ knew that he 
was working on another issue, which he regarded as ‘important’.366 An MEP from 
another region in which the party also holds two seats was more typical of other 
respondents, providing a more casual account of her relationship with the regional 
party organization. Claiming that ‘no one seems to mind too much’ about the MEPs 
reporting back to the organization, she noted that one of the MEPs would attend the 
bi-monthly regional party board meetings, which she described as a ‘quite informal’ 
affair.367  
UKIP does not take any formal steps to monitor the work of MEPs368 and 
there is no formal requirement for MEPs to report to the party centrally. The leader of 
the party’s delegation in the EP selects two MEPs to attend meetings of the NEC 
(UKIP, 2012b: E.9), however attendance is not viewed as a means for the party to 
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monitor the work of individual MEPs. Further, party-affiliated officials who are based 
in the EP, such as EFD staff with ties to the party, state that they are not asked to 
report to the party about the activities of MEPs. Officials do not monitor the voting 
behaviour of their own MEPs, although they do pay attention to that of MEPs from 
the three large British parties with a view to capitalising domestically on pro-
integrationist behaviour.369 Officials state that monitoring the voting behaviour of 
UKIP’s delegation is not currently necessary as most MEPs vote according to the 
recommendations provided,370 and it is possible that officials would take a closer look 
if a problem emerged. However, respondents suggest that it would be difficult for the 
party to introduce a system whereby officials working with UKIP’s delegation in the 
EP report to the party about the behaviour of MEPs ‘even on an informal basis’.371 
UKIP is far smaller than the three main British parties, and officials noted that they 
would feel ‘uncomfortable’ reporting back other than in ‘extreme cases’ due to the 
lack of anonymity within the party.372 
 The level of contact between Nigel Farage and members of his delegation 
appears to be lower than is the case between delegation leaders and the MEPs of the 
two other parties featured in the analysis. Nevertheless, the party leader remains 
sufficiently informed about the work of his colleagues to be able to evaluate their 
behaviour. An official explained that: 
 
Nigel knows pretty well who is up to what and what they’re doing, and he has 
a pretty crude idea about who are the ones who work hard. He knows only too 
well who are the loyalists, so in that sense he doesn’t actually need us to 
[report on the work of MEPs].373 
 
In contrast, there is a ‘sense of disconnect’ between MEPs and the party in the UK,374 
and the evidence presented above suggests that the party’s domestic organs have little 
knowledge regarding the work of MEPs. 
 
Enforcing Party Discipline 
The Conservative Party leadership does not operate a system of centralised party 
discipline. MEPs have a considerable degree of freedom to act against government 
and party policy where they feel this is necessary. One MEP claimed that he did not 
vote with the party’s recommendation ‘if I don’t want to vote’ in that way.375 Another 
MEP noted that she had negotiated on the basis of policy positions that differed from 
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that taken by the British government in its Council negotiations on several occasions 
and that this had not caused any problems in terms of her relationship with party 
leaders.376 While she views herself as ‘instinctively loyal’ to the party and has ‘always 
worked hard’ to avoid being in a position where she must act against the wishes of her 
party leaders, she noted that she would not be deterred from acting against the 
preferences of the party leadership where there existed ‘fundamental’ differences.377 
The fact highlighted earlier in the chapter that Conservative MEPs seek the views of 
the government rather than simply receive it378 reinforces the claim that MEPs have 
the freedom to diverge from the government’s positions. If they were constantly under 
pressure from the government, it appears reasonable to expect MEPs to avoid 
contacting government ministers and officials as far as possible lest they draw 
attention to any divergences in opinion. 
There are three main reasons why Conservative MEPs do not feel under 
pressure to act according to the wishes of the party or the government. Firstly, MEPs 
are aware that the government’s policy positions are compromises between the 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats and that they are therefore often distinct from 
those of the Conservative Party. In such instances, MEPs feel that they have a 
mandate and a duty to develop their own policy positions which correspond more 
closely to the party’s policies. MEPs note that diverging from the government 
position ‘is often popular’ with party members and with constituents.379 Members of 
the Conservative delegation in the EP inform relevant government officials and 
Minsters when the delegation does not intend to follow the government’s position on 
important issues. This is seen by MEPs as a courtesy measure rather than as a means 
of requesting the Government’s permission to diverge from its position.380 
Secondly, Conservative MEPs believe that they are in a better position to 
define appropriate negotiation positions and strategies than government ministers and 
officials, whom they believe lack understanding of the negotiating process within the 
EP. This perceived lack of understanding is reflected in the government’s tendency to 
fail to engage with MEPs until a stage in the negotiations at which it is too late for 
MEPs to modify their negotiation positions.381 Conservative MEPs see little reason to 
follow the guidance received from London where they view it as inappropriate.382 
Thirdly, there is the perception among MEPs that there is little that the party 
or the government can do to compel them to follow policy guidance. One MEP noted 
that ‘the only real power the party has is to take the whip away’, which would mean 
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that the MEP would not be able to seek reselection as a Conservative candidate. This 
is not a threat that the party has used during the respondent’s parliamentary career.383 
While MEPs are aware that this is an instrument that the party can use, none of the 
respondents interviewed believed that party leaders would view any issue related to 
EU policy-making as being of sufficient importance to warrant the use of this ‘nuclear 
weapon’.384 
Respondents speculated that their relationship with the government and their 
attitudes towards the government’s policy positions would almost certainly be 
different were the Conservatives in government alone. One MEP noted that were this 
the case ‘we as Conservatives would feel more loyalty to the government and more 
obliged to follow the government line because not following the government line 
would have an effect on how the party is perceived’.385 The phrasing of this statement 
suggests that, realising that there is a greater potential for MEPs to cause 
embarrassment to the party and to the government, MEPs would, of their own accord, 
feel a greater compulsion to follow the government’s policy positions were the party 
in government alone. In this situation, the behaviour of MEPs would still be based on 
their view of the party’s interests rather than on the party’s ability to coerce MEPs to 
follow guidance. The party may have a greater ability to influence the behaviour of its 
MEPs in this situation. However, this is because the arguments that party leaders 
could use in attempting to persuade MEPs to toe the party line would be more 
persuasive, rather than because they would have more effective instruments of 
control. 
There is similarly no evidence to suggest that the Conservative delegation in 
the EP employs a disciplinary system based on threats and rewards. However, MEPs 
note that in some instances the delegation whip tries to persuade the MEP to support 
the delegation’s policy position by emphasising the importance of maintaining unity. 
The degree to which the delegation exerts pressure on MEPs to follow its position 
varies considerably depending on the nature of the issue. The guidance provided by 
the delegation on issues such as foreign affairs, a policy area in which the powers of 
the EP are weak, is viewed by MEPs as ‘advisory only’, and there is relatively little 
pressure to conform to the delegation’s position.386 The delegation places stronger 
pressure on MEPs to follow its position on more ‘important’ legislative and budgetary 
divisions.387 Those not intending to follow the guidance issued by the delegation 
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leadership are expected to notify the delegation whip and to provide an explanation 
for the intended voting behaviour.388 
Long-serving Labour MEPs claim that ‘heavy pressure’ was placed on MEPs 
to follow the government’s position during Labour’s time in government.389 Senior 
politicians largely refrained from using ‘explicit’ threats when encouraging MEPs to 
support the government, and tended to offer ‘government carrots’ in the form of 
ministerial access ‘rather than sticks’.390 Messmer argues that the link system enabled 
government ministries to develop ‘a strong voice in the voting of the EPLP’ and a 
great degree of ‘control’ over MEPs (2003: 208; 215). While the link system 
strengthened the position of the party leadership in relation to the EPLP, the level of 
the leadership’s influence over MEPs should not be overstated. The EPLP did not 
systematically follow the government in cases where there was a divergence of views 
between itself, the Labour government, and the S&D, but rather deliberated ‘on a case 
by case basis’.391 A respondent noted that: 
 
If it was a matter which we thought was very important for domestic political 
reasons and the government had a good case, and especially if it was 
something that had been mentioned in the party manifesto, then we’d follow 
[the government’s position] … In most other cases, we’d actually follow what 
the Socialist Group would have decided with us being part of the Socialist 
Group.392 
 
Labour MEPs contradicted the government ‘quite often’ during Blair and 
Brown’s premierships.393 In many instances, the EPLP believed that voting with the 
Group rather than with the government best served the purposes of its long-term 
strategy, as loyalty to the Group would strengthen its position within it, as well as the 
Group’s position within the EP. This thinking was exemplified in the EPLP’s decision 
to vote against the government on the Working Time Directive, the issue on which the 
delegation came under ‘the most intense’ pressure from the party leadership during 
the years in government.394 Respondents also argue that the degree of influence that 
the party leadership can hope to exert on the EPLP is also limited in the many 
instances where the views of trade unions diverge from those of the Labour party 
leadership.395 
MEPs are aware that they are afforded ‘more freedom’ to act independently of 
the leadership since 2010.396 One MEP firmly stated that the decline in the party 
leadership’s interest in the work of the EPLP is explained by the fact that policy 
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discrepancies between the party leadership and the MEPs are less salient and less 
embarrassing for the party since its leaders no longer partake in Council meetings.397 
However, while MEPs have extensive freedom from the party when carrying out 
legislative activities, especially when writing reports, there is a limit to their 
independence. The party grants MEPs the freedom to carry out their work as they best 
see fit, as it ‘trusts [them] not go off on a complete tangent and do something that 
would be at odds with the party values’.398 MEPs believe that they would experience 
difficulties being reselected if they were to act in ways that contravened party policy 
in a clear way.399 
Not a great deal of pressure is placed on UKIP MEPs to follow the 
delegation’s recommendations on ordinary parliamentary divisions, despite the fact 
that one UKIP MEP serves as a whip.400 A former UKIP MEP who ‘sometimes’ voted 
against the recommendations of the delegation confirmed that ‘no action’ is taken 
against MEPs who fail to maintain party discipline.401 The party’s unwillingness to 
undertake the investment necessary to enforce party discipline at parliamentary 
divisions is explained by the fact that the party views voting primarily as a means of 
ensuring that MEPs receive their full allowances, rather than as a means of realising 
policy goals within the EP.402 
Nevertheless, the evidence strongly suggests that there is a disciplinarian 
element within UKIP and that power is centralised within the office of the party 
leader. While there may be some scope for MEPs to vote against the delegation’s 
recommendations on unimportant votes, there is a strong expectation for them to 
follow the guidance provided on issues relating to the party’s core principles. An 
official explained that: 
 
UKIP stands on a specific policy platform which is laid out pretty clear[ly] 
and if you want to be a member of the party then these are the policies. As a 
UKIP MEP you are expected to follow the party line. You’re more than 
welcome to join another party or start up your own party if you like, but as a 
UKIP MEP you are expected to follow the UKIP policy. … If you don’t 
follow the party line, well the party’s not for you and off you go.403 
 
Reflecting this account, a former UKIP MEP claimed to have been subjected to 
considerable pressure from the party leader and other MEPs to conform to the 
leadership’s wishes on a key issue.404  
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An MEP supported these accounts, explaining that it is the party leader who 
‘has the ultimate say on the majority of things’.405 Two UKIP MEPs who defected to 
the Conservatives during the 2009–14 parliamentary term have publicly stated 
concerns regarding the power exercised within the party by its leader 
(LondonLovesBusiness, 2013a; LondonLovesBusiness, 2013b). Martha Andreasen 
claimed that the party’s revised constitution gave the leader ‘full power on everything, 
including the establishment of strategy, policies and selection processes for candidates 
for elections’ (The Independent, 2013). She stated further that ‘the party has become a 
dictatorship’ under Farage’s leadership and that he has ‘a Stalinist way of operating’, 
securing career advancement within the party for those who ‘never contradict him’ 
(LondonLovesBusiness, 2013b). An interviewee supported these claims, asserting that 
‘if you don’t agree with the great leader you are a troublemaker, you are a traitor, and 
you are pushed out’.406 
These remarks may be disregarded as being those of disaffected former UKIP 
affiliates. However, the apparent expulsion of one MEP from the party for refusing to 
join the EFD Group (BBC News, 2010), the withdrawal of the whip from another 
MEP for behaviour that was viewed by the leadership as particularly damaging to the 
party (BBC News, 2013d), and the proactive role played by the leadership in the 
selection of candidates for the 2014 EP election, all lend weight to this interpretation. 
It is clear that UKIP attempts to enforce a system of discipline on MEPs that is far 
more rigid than the other two parties, who are largely disinterested in the work of 
MEPs. This is not surprising. As the professional arm of UKIP is far smaller than the 
other two parties, both the role that MEPs play within the party and the opportunities 
provided to the party from securing seats in the EP are greater. 
 
Within-Party Variation 
There is a strong sense in which Conservative and Labour MEPs organize themselves 
as delegations, rather than operating as a loose collection of largely independent 
MEPs. Policy positions are coordinated at the level of the delegation on the basis of 
recommendations put forward by the individual MEP tasked with following the work 
of a specific committee. The use of the delegation structure provides more junior 
MEPs, who may otherwise be more susceptible to central party influence, with a 
measure of protection. MEPs can present their own views to the delegation, together 
with those of the party, and come to a decision together with their colleagues in the 
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EP. Were the delegation to support the MEP’s position and to reject that of the party 
leadership, the MEP would be able to draw on this support to resist pressure from the 
party’s central organization.407 As a result, neither of these two parties is able to gain 
a greater level of influence on MEPs with less political experience than on more 
experienced MEPs. 
The evidence suggests that UKIP MEPs operate a looser EP delegation model. 
The degree of contact between UKIP MEPs and the party leadership varies 
considerably depending on the nature of the relationship between the individual MEP 
and the party leader. While some UKIP MEPs work closely with the party leader, 
others have no direct contact with him.408 This suggests that the leadership is better 
placed to influence the behaviour of some UKIP MEPs than others. However, in 
practice, the MEPs who are in more regular contact with the leadership appear to be 
more closely aligned to the leadership in any case.409 
 
Fulfilling the Preconditions, and Perceptions on the Degree of Independence 
The Conservative Party fulfils the four preconditions of influence only in rare cases, 
and succeeds in shaping the behaviour of its MEPs exclusively when MEPs agree 
with the guidance provided by the party. The Conservative-led government provides 
guidance to MEPs relating solely to legislative behaviour, and as no measures are 
taken by the party or by the government to enforce discipline, MEPs view any 
guidance issued purely as a request. Further, the party rarely monitors the work of 
MEPs, and does not require MEPs to report to the party centrally concerning their 
activities. As a result, MEPs claim that they feel ‘entirely free’ to decide for 
themselves how they wish to approach their role as representatives.410  
It is consequently of little surprise that Conservative MEPs have a stronger 
attachment to the idea of territorial representation than to the notion of party 
representation.411 One MEP remarked that: 
 
I’m here to represent the people that voted for me, but … I don’t just represent 
those [XX]% [who voted for me], I represent everybody in the [name of 
region] … I don’t represent the party … I know I have the party label … [and] 
they could argue that they put me in a position where I could get voted for … 
But I see myself as representing everyone in the region.412 
 
Another Conservative MEP provided a similar account, stating that ‘I’m definitely 
here to represent the [name of region] and more generally, the UK PLC … And when 
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I say [the] British interest, I think the taxpayer.’ 413 While there is likely to be a 
considerable correspondence between how the MEP and his party understand the 
‘British interest’, it is clear that the MEP arrives at his interpretation independently of 
the party. Reflecting this, Conservative MEPs do not think of themselves as agents of 
their party, but rather as independent actors whose views correspond to a considerable 
degree with those of their party. 
The Labour Party only fulfils the preconditions of influence in rare instances, 
and exclusively in the context of specific parliamentary divisions. The party 
leadership provides voting instructions periodically, puts some pressure on MEPs to 
comply, and is made aware of whether MEPs do so. The leadership often does not 
succeed in its efforts to shape the behaviour of MEPs, and this is explained in part by 
the lack of compelling threats and rewards that the party has to offer. The leadership 
employed such measures more regularly during Labour’s time in government. While 
the ability to control the access of MEPs to government ministers provided the 
leadership with more compelling carrots and sticks during this period, the party’s 
efforts at mandating MEPs similarly met with varying degrees of success. This 
underscores the difficulties that parties experience when attempting to compel MEPs 
to act according to the wishes of its leaders even in cases where the party has a strong 
desire and a considerable potential (in relative terms) to influence the behaviour of 
MEPs. 
 Other than in these rare instances, the leadership affords Labour MEPs 
extensive freedom to carry out legislative activity according to their own judgment. 
One MEP explained that the party displays no ‘control-freakery’ in its dealings with 
MEPs or any ‘desire to control’ them, noting that he could only recall two instances in 
twenty years ‘when I’ve ended up having a fight with the party at home over 
something I’ve said or done’ in the EP.414 Further, there is no pressure on MEPs to 
focus on certain activities or to spend a certain amount of time in different locations. 
This is likely to continue as long as MEPs pay a reasonable level of attention to the 
tasks that are traditionally associated with the role of the representative, such as 
constituency, media, and party activity.  
Moreover, while Labour MEPs have placed a greater focus on their regional 
party organizations since the introduction of a new electoral system in 1999, this does 
not mean that these organizations seek or achieve influence on MEPs. These 
organizations do not seek to shape the behaviour of MEPs or to make any great claims 
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on their time, and several MEPs noted that their links to their regional organizations 
are weak.415 As the regional organizations know very little about the parliamentary 
work of MEPs, a space is created for MEPs to carry out their legislative work 
independently of their selectorates. 
 As a result, it comes as little surprise that Labour MEPs do not feel that they 
carry out their work as representatives in a way that is strongly orientated towards the 
party, or that they operate under the direction of the party. Recalling a period in the 
1980s when Labour’s national parliamentarians were expected to prioritize the 
interests of the party over those of other groups, one MEP noted that this is not how 
her colleagues view their role as representatives. 416  All Labour respondents 
emphasised that elected representatives need to strike a balance between the needs of 
the party and those of constituents, and that the party provides them with the freedom 
to do so. 
UKIP fulfils the preconditions of influencing the behaviour of MEPs to a far 
greater extent that the other parties examined. Its leadership communicates 
preferences regarding the way MEPs carry out their work on certain issues, provides 
MEPs with very clear incentives and disincentives to follow this guidance, and keeps 
abreast of the activities of MEPs. UKIP MEPs are aware that their ability to realise 
goals such as re-election and office through the party depends on the degree to which 
their behaviour corresponds to the wishes of the leadership. UKIP MEPs have a clear 
idea of how their party leader would like them to act, and they realise that they are 
unlikely to be reselected as candidates if their behaviour does not correspond to the 
leader’s wishes. Further, the code of conduct that MEPs sign sets out the boundaries 
in which MEPs are permitted to operate, and the apparent expulsion of an MEP at an 
early stage of the 2009–14 parliamentary term on the basis of having violated the 
agreement (BBC News, 2010), sent a clear signal to MEPs that the party expects them 
to comply with these principles. 
However, there is a duality in the manner in which party discipline operates 
within UKIP. While MEPs are strongly discouraged from crossing certain boundaries, 
they enjoy considerable freedom to define their role as representatives within the 
parameters set by the leadership. MEPs are largely free to decide for themselves how 
they spend their time and are permitted to engage in parliamentary work, as long as 
they return to the UK regularly and do not support integrationist measures. A current 
MEP was typical of other respondents in noting that ‘I try to strike a balance … but it 
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is up to me how I do that’,417 while a former MEP more sceptically claimed that UKIP 
MEPs are generally free to operate as they wish ‘as long as you shut up and do as 
you’re told’.418 It is clear that there are some boundaries on the freedom which they 
enjoy, as an MEP admitted that ‘if the leader says we’re doing something, then we go 
and do it’.419  
While there is no doubt that UKIP’s leadership fulfils the preconditions of 
influence with regards to certain aspects of the role of MEPs, the party leadership 
clearly struggled to compel MEPs to modify their behaviour during the 2009–14 
parliamentary term. The level of dissent within the delegation was far greater than 
that observed within the other British parties with representation in the EP. Three 
MEPs who had been openly critical of the leader left the party during the 2009–14 
term (BBC News, 2010; BBC News, 2012; BBC News, 2013b), rather than attempt to 
be reselected under the new centralised system, while another attacked the party 
leadership following his failed reselection attempt (BBC News, 2013c). An official 
acknowledged that the party had found it ‘difficult to impose’ discipline,420 while 
another explained that there is little that the party can offer MEPs in terms of 
patronage for compliant behaviour, as UKIP is affiliated to a small Group.421 
However, with the party going to great lengths to ensure that its candidates for the 
2014 elections are more closely aligned to the leadership, it is eminently plausible that 
the party will come to exercise a greater level of influence in the next parliamentary 
term. 
 
Explaining the Findings 
It is clear that the Conservatives and Labour’s limited engagement with MEPs is 
primarily aimed at minimising the potential for instances of conflict between their 
front benches in Westminster and their delegations in the EP to cause embarrassment 
domestically.422 This is partly due to the fact that the parties have had few issues with 
MEPs defying the delegation whips.423 It is also because the leadership of these two 
parties focus on domestic politics, and place little emphasis on making the most of the 
opportunities provided by MEPs to realise policy goals in the context of the EP. This 
analysis is supported not only by the accounts provided by interviewees, but also by 
the fact that the party leaderships’ engagement with their MEPs takes place almost 
exclusively in the context of (potential) conflict. That the parties primarily mobilise in 
such contexts may appear unsurprising, as there is little reason for parties to interfere 
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in the work of MEPs in the absence of conflict, especially as their resources are 
limited. However, if these two parties were highly motivated to realise policy goals in 
the context of the EP, they would ensure that the coordination mechanisms between 
the delegation and the front bench in Westminster were far stronger. 
 It is clear that the way UKIP’s leadership relates to its MEPs is different from 
the other two British parties examined. While Conservative and Labour MEPs 
generally play a marginal role within their parties and are provided with little 
guidance from their leaders, most UKIP MEPs are in regular contact with their leader, 
who also leads their delegation in the EP. It is unsurprising that UKIP’s leadership 
takes a somewhat more proactive approach to providing guidance than the other two 
parties examined, and a far more active role in candidate selection. Officials are aware 
that UKIP attracts ‘more independently minded’ individuals than the more established 
parties,424 and that some of the party’s former MEPs have harmed the party’s 
progress.  
The changes made to UKIP’s selection system for the 2014 elections can be 
viewed as a reaction to the party’s difficulties in dealing with its MEPs from a party 
seeking to professionalise. The fact that the guidance issued by the leadership places a 
greater emphasis on the broader model of representation that MEPs carry out, rather 
than on voting behaviour, is also to be expected. As an Eurosceptic party, UKIP has 
little hope of enacting change from within the overwhelmingly pro-integrationist EP. 
As a party with a small organization, and one in which the MEPs are its most senior 
public office holders, it is natural that UKIP’s leadership is interested in the work of 
MEPs and wish to see them actively develop the party’s brand within a domestic 
context. 
 
The Relationship between MEPs and the EP Group 
It is clear that the national delegations that are affiliated to the ECR Group play a far 
stronger role in coordinating the work of MEPs than the Group itself. While the 
Group does provide policy guidance and voting instructions, it is sensitive to the 
wishes of national delegations. The Group is willing to change its recommendations 
where there is even a moderate level of disagreement, and it gives individual national 
delegations the freedom to depart from these policy positions.425 An MEP explained 
that: 
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There is no pressure from the ECR Group for a national delegation to change 
its whip. And that’s because of our political philosophy that we believe the 
nation states are the important building blocks in Europe, not the EU. And we 
reflect this in our Group: that if a national delegation wants to depart from the 
Group line, then that’s fine. The only rule we have is: no surprises. You must 
tell [the Group’s chief whip].426 
 
There is a fundamental difference between the role of the Group whip compared with 
the role of the whips of the national party delegations, as the ECR’s whip ‘exerts no 
force whatsoever on individual MEPs’.427 ECR officials note that it would be ‘very 
difficult’ for the Group to use the allocation of rapporteurships as a disciplinary tool 
even if it so wished. Since the Group does not have a large number of MEPs there is 
no fierce competition for (shadow) rapporteurships. 428  Despite the reservations 
regarding Group discipline, and despite the fact that the delegation produces its own 
voting lists,429 the Conservatives are the ECR’s most loyal national delegation, voting 
with the Group in 97.20% of instances at roll call votes since 2009 (VoteWatch.eu, 
accessed 13/6/13). This apparently high degree of loyalty is not surprising, bearing in 
mind that the Conservative delegation provides close to half of the ECR’s MEPs.430 
 Practical considerations limit the extent to which the Group is able to act 
assertively. Established in 2009, the ECR Group is a young organization, which has 
far fewer staff members than the larger Groups. Policy advisors cover broader policy 
areas than in the larger Groups, and this makes it more difficult for them to develop 
an expertise. MEPs complain that the support they receive from the Group’s advisors 
is not always adequate, claiming that the advisors are ‘not always experts’ and are in 
some cases ‘as inexpert’ as the MEPs themselves.431 
As affiliated MEPs view the ECR Group as ‘a construct for the convenience of 
European Union politics’, rather than as a project of political integration, it is not 
surprising that the Group does not act with greater agency.432 It is difficult for the 
Group to develop a transnational identity, as it does not have a remit to form political 
strategies that prioritize the good of a specific political movement over that of an 
individual national delegation, as may be the case for more integrationist Groups. 
Viewing the Group in instrumental terms, the sense of loyalty MEPs have towards the 
Group is considerably less than that felt towards the Conservative Party, and it is 
unlikely that the way that MEPs relate to the Group will change as the Group 
becomes more established. Together with the philosophical reasons Eurosceptic 
MEPs have to avoid developing an attachment to a transnational political entity stands 
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the fact that the Group is unable to provide MEPs with a means of realising core goals 
as extensively as the domestic party. An MEP explained that while ‘I will not get 
elected as an MEP without the [party] label … the Group provides me with none of 
those’ benefits.433 
 The relationship between Labour’s MEPs and their Group has historically 
been ‘up and down’, but has improved in recent years.434 Interviewees note that the 
delegation frequently voted against the Group’s position during the 1990s, a period in 
which the EPLP dominated the Group, but that this is no longer the case.435 
Nevertheless, of the 31 national delegations affiliated to the S&D, only two vote with 
the Group less regularly than the EPLP. Between the 2009 election and the time of 
writing, Labour MEPs have voted with the Group in 87.31% of instances, while the 
mean of the Group’s voting cohesion is 91.37% (VoteWatch.eu, accessed 7/6/13). In 
light of this difference, it is not surprising that the EPLP has its own whip system.436 
Until the early 2000s, the EPLP developed positions independently of the Group on 
all issues, before considering how this stance related to that of the Group. At present, 
the initial presumption is that the EPLP will follow the S&D’s position, unless MEPs 
or EPLP officials decide that it is necessary to examine the issue in greater detail.437 
Respondents from the EPLP emphasise that they work closely with their colleagues in 
the S&D, with the aim of influencing the Group’s positions where possible. 
 Despite the expectations that may arise from the S&D Group’s high level of 
cohesion, Labour MEPs do not feel that it enforces discipline ‘overtly’.438 The Group 
does not employ ‘severe sanctions’, such as ‘fining Members, suspending them, [or] 
withdrawing the Group whip’,439 although MEPs who systematically vote against the 
Group are unlikely to receive the support of the Group when seeking 
rapporteurships.440 The Group accepts that MEPs will feel that it is necessary to vote 
against its recommendations at times, and shows particular leniency where MEPs vote 
against the Group as part of their national delegation.441 
 A number of reasons explain the high level of cohesion within the Group, and 
the EPLP’s loyalty, despite the fact that the Group does not proactively employ 
disciplinary measures. Firstly, a lack of willingness to compromise with Group 
colleagues leads to strained relationships and a sense of unease. An MEP emphasised 
that ‘nobody likes the opprobrium’ that ensues when the Group narrowly loses a 
parliamentary division with one’s delegation having voted against the Group.442 
Secondly, and supporting Ringe’s (2010) findings, MEPs acknowledge that they are 
 225 
unable to follow every piece of legislation and that they therefore regularly defer to 
the judgment of the MEP that the Group has tasked with dealing with an issue. While 
relying on ‘experts is sometimes a dangerous thing’, MEPs view it as a necessary 
evil.443 Thirdly, MEPs are aware that the S&D’s position within EP negotiations are 
stronger when it acts cohesively. It is this realisation, together with the fact that the 
Group strives to ensure that there is an accepted consensus within the S&D, ‘that 
keeps the Group cohesive, rather than a disciplined system’.444 
The organizing philosophy of the EFD is similar to that of the ECR Group. 
The EFD exists to provide its affiliated delegations with assistance and with access to 
additional funding (cf. Whitaker and Lynch, 2014), and facilitates the coordination of 
positions where delegations find common ground. It does not enforce discipline, other 
than in cases of misconduct. The right of individual MEPs and affiliated delegations 
to ‘vote as they see fit’ (EFD, 2009: 3) and ‘to act in accordance with his/her own 
conviction’ (EFD, 2009: 4) are enshrined in the Group’s statutes and is observed in 
practice. As the Group’s power in relation to the national delegations is strictly 
limited, the loose relationship between UKIP MEPs and their parliamentary Group 
resembles more closely that which Conservatives MEPs enjoy with the ECR than that 
between the EPLP and the S&D. 
  UKIP MEPs source policy advice on issues relating to parliamentary affairs 
mainly from EFD advisors, and tend to spend the better part of their personal 
allowances on employing assistants who are based in their constituencies. The 
extensive support that Group advisors provide UKIP MEPs includes drawing up lists 
of voting recommendations in preparation for committee and plenary meetings. 
However, the EFD as a Group does not provide voting guidance.445 When EFD 
officials provide UKIP MEPs with voting recommendations, they do so specifically 
for the delegation and at the request of the delegation’s whip. The reliance of UKIP 
MEPs on EFD advisors should not be interpreted as providing the Group with a 
means of influencing the behaviour of MEPs. Several EFD officials have links to 
UKIP, and any advice received from Group advisors aligned with other delegations is 
verified before MEPs take action. 
 As the EFD does not enforce Group discipline, the concept of Group loyalty in 
the context of UKIP’s MEPs is somewhat abstract. Of all the national delegations 
affiliated to an EP Group, UKIP’s delegation of MEPs has shown the lowest levels of 
Group loyalty at roll call parliamentary divisions between the 2009 election and the 
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time of writing. UKIP’s EFD affiliates voted with the Group in only 49.91%446 of 
instances (VoteWatch.eu, accessed 6/6/13). This is surprisingly low; the potential for 
UKIP MEPs to form coalitions within their Group appears to be considerable, as the 
delegation provides the EFD with around a third of its affiliates. The low level of 
loyalty is explained by the lack of common ground between UKIP and its less 
staunchly Eurosceptic fellow Group affiliates. The willingness of UKIP MEPs to vote 
against their Group colleagues, together with the lack of disciplinary tradition within 
the Group, strongly suggests that the EFD Group has little influence on the manner in 
which UKIP MEPs carry out their work. 
 
Testing the Hypotheses 
The factors that are expected to lead to variation in the propensity of partisan 
organizations to attempt to influence the behaviour of MEPs, and the degree to which 
they succeed, were presented in Chapter 2 and accompanied by hypotheses. As none 
of the three Finnish parties examined in the previous chapter attempt to influence the 
behaviour of their MEPs, it was not possible to use the evidence relating to those 
cases to test the hypotheses. Unlike the Finnish parties, the three British parties 
examined in this chapter demonstrate at least some desire to influence certain aspects 
of the way MEPs carry out their work. As there is variation in the degree to which 
Labour and the Conservatives, on the one hand, and UKIP, on the other, wish to 
influence the behaviour of their MEPs and fulfil the preconditions of influence as set 
out in Chapter 2, it is possible to test ten of the eleven hypotheses relating to domestic 
parties. However, due to the limited number of cases examined, the degree to which 
the evidence presented in this chapter can be used to conclusively test the hypotheses 
is limited.  
 The evidence presented in this chapter supports, or partly supports, three of 
the hypotheses relating to domestic parties. The more proactive manner in which 
UKIP structures its relations with MEPs supports the first part of Hypothesis 2, which 
states that parties operating centralised candidate selection systems are more likely to 
seek influence than parties operating decentralised candidate selection systems. 
However, as a result of the inability of UKIP to maintain discipline during the 2009–
14 term, the second part of Hypothesis 2, which states that parties operating 
centralised selection systems are better able to influence the behaviour of MEPs, is 
unsupported. Hypothesis 3, which states that governing parties are more likely to 
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attempt to influence the behaviour of their MEPs in the context of policy work than 
opposition parties, is supported to some extent by the finding that Labour and the 
Conservatives show greater interest in the policy work undertaken by MEPs when in 
government compared to when they are in opposition. However, there is some 
evidence to suggest that links between the Conservative front bench in Westminster 
and its delegation in the EP have become weaker since the party entered government 
in 2010. Further, there is no evidence to suggest that governing parties are more likely 
than those in opposition to succeed in their efforts to influence MEPs.  
The evidence also supports Hypothesis 12, which expects Eurosceptic parties 
to desire that their MEPs carry out more work in the home country compared with 
pro-integrationist parties. This is certainly the case for UKIP compared with both the 
Conservatives and Labour. However, while UKIP MEPs spend more time in the UK 
compared with Conservative and Labour MEPs, it is difficult to establish whether this 
is a result of the party’s expectations or whether UKIP MEPs arrive at the decision to 
divide their time in this way independently of the party. 
 Seven of the hypotheses presented are unsupported. There is no evidence to 
support Hypothesis 4, which states that governing parties desire that their MEPs focus 
on legislative activity in the EP, while opposition parties desire MEPs to focus on 
political work in their Member State. Labour and the Conservatives do not provide 
guidance to MEPs relating to this issue, regardless of whether they are in government 
or in opposition. Neither is there evidence to support Hypothesis 5, which expects 
domestic parties with large delegations of MEPs to be more likely to attempt to 
influence the behaviour of MEPs, and to be more likely to succeed, than domestic 
parties with small delegations of MEPs. While UKIP is more proactive in attempting 
to influence the behaviour of MEPs than the other two parties examined, it won the 
same number of seats as Labour at the 2009 EP election and far fewer than the 
Conservatives. 
 There is also no evidence to support Hypothesis 7, which states that domestic 
parties with large organizational capacities are more likely to attempt to influence the 
behaviour of MEPs, and are more likely to succeed, than domestic parties with limited 
organizational capacities. While Labour and the Conservatives have considerably 
larger organizational capacities in terms of human resources and spending power, 
UKIP makes greater expectations of its MEPs. 
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Hypothesis 9a expects domestic parties that are positioned towards the centre 
of the ideological spectrum to attempt to control the legislative behaviour of MEPs to 
a greater extent than domestic parties that are positioned further from the centre, 
while that expectation is reversed in the case of Hypothesis 9b. Dealing with a similar 
issue, Hypothesis 11 expects Eurosceptic domestic parties to be less likely to attempt 
to influence the legislative behaviour of MEPs than pro-integrationist parties. As the 
degree of interventionism is low in all three parties, there is little variation in the 
dependent variable – the degree to which the party leaderships attempt to control the 
legislative behaviour of MEPs – between the three cases. The Conservative and 
Labour leaderships only rarely seek to influence the legislative behaviour of MEPs, 
and while UKIP’s leadership seldom pays attention to parliamentary divisions there is 
a general expectation that MEPs vote against integrationist measures. Consequently, 
Hypotheses 9a, 9b, and 11, are unsupported by the data. Further, there is no evidence 
to suggest that parties are able to exercise greater levels of influence on the behaviour 
of MEPs who have less political experience than on the behaviour of MEPs who have 
more political experience. Hypothesis 14 is therefore unsupported. 
The evidence presented in this chapter supports the four hypotheses relating to 
EP Groups presented in Chapter 2. Hypotheses 6 and 8, which respectively expect 
larger EP Groups in terms of the number of affiliated MEPs and in terms of 
organizational capacity to be more likely than smaller Groups to attempt to influence 
the legislative behaviour of their MEPs, and to be more likely to succeed, is 
supported. The evidence similarly supports Hypothesis 10, which makes the same 
expectations of more centrist Groups. Unlike in the case of the ECR and EFD, 
officials of the more centrist S&D Group actively attempt to persuade national 
delegations to support its policy positions. Labour MEPs are more susceptible to 
being persuaded to act according to the wishes of their Group compared with 
Conservative and UKIP MEPs, especially as the S&D holds clearer preferences.  
Despite the fact that the evidence presented in this chapter supports 
Hypotheses 6, 8, and 10, attitudes towards integration offer a far more plausible 
explanation for the variation identified. It is primarily because of their anti-
integrationist outlook that the ECR and the EFD do not put pressure on its affiliated 
delegations to follow specific policy positions, rather than because of their size or 
positioning on the left–right ideological spectrum. This lends support to Hypothesis 
13, which expects Eurosceptic Groups to be less likely to attempt to influence the 
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behaviour of MEPs than pro-integrationist Groups, and to be less likely to succeed. 
Nevertheless, in relation to Hypothesis 6, it is likely that the large number of MEPs 
affiliated to the S&D Group encourages Labour MEPs to follow the Group’s voting 
recommendations. Since affiliates of larger Groups have a greater potential for 
realising policy goals within the chamber compared with those of smaller Groups, 
they have a greater incentive to support their colleagues in the hope of receiving the 
support of colleagues at a later date.  
 
Conclusion 
In contrast to the findings presented in the previous chapter, the evidence relating to 
the three British cases examined in this chapter lend limited support to the notion that 
parties attempt to influence the behaviour of their MEPs. While the desire of the 
Conservatives and Labour to influence the actions of MEPs is limited to their voting 
behaviour at parliamentary divisions in rare instances, UKIP’s leadership has clearer 
preferences regarding how it wishes its MEPs to divide their time and to approach 
policy-related activity. Nevertheless, UKIP’s leadership limits its intervention in the 
affairs of its MEPs largely to setting out broad principles by which MEPs must abide, 
and the party provides little guidance regarding how MEPs should act from day to 
day. The chapter found evidence that three factors explain variation in the propensity 
of partisan actors to attempt to influence the behaviour of MEPs, namely the degree of 
centralisation of the candidate selection system, status as a governing party, and the 
party’s attitudes towards integration. 
Labour and the Conservatives only fulfil the preconditions of influence as set 
out in Chapter 2 in a very limited sense, and it is clear that their MEPs do not feel 
under pressure to modify their behaviour to correspond to the party’s wishes in the 
rare instances where the party intervenes in their work. The leaders of the 
Conservatives and Labour show little interest in the work of their MEPs and do not 
operate a centralised system of party discipline. As they have little control over the 
candidate selection process, their ability to modify the incentive structure in which 
MEPs operate is limited to offering rewards to MEPs for compliant behaviour. UKIP 
fulfils the preconditions of influence to a far greater extent than the other two parties. 
Although the party does not operate a formalised system of party discipline, MEPs are 
made aware that their reselection is dependent on the degree to which their behaviour 
corresponds to the wishes of the leadership. Despite the proactive stance to party 
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discipline taken by UKIP’s leadership, the open dissent witnessed during the 2009–14 
term, reflecting the party’s experiences in previous terms (BBC News, 2000; BBC 
News, 2005), suggests that the party has so far failed to exercise an appreciable 
measure of influence on the behaviour of MEPs. 
Despite the new approach that UKIP has developed during the current 
parliamentary term, and the rare instances where the leadership of the Conservatives 
and Labour have put pressure on MEPs to follow voting guidance, the account 
provided in this chapter extensively contradicts the partisan control thesis. The 
findings cast doubt in particular on the notion that cohesive voting within the national 
delegation of MEPs occurs because party leaderships operate centralised systems of 
party discipline. While it may not be surprising that Finland’s small parties do not 
attempt to influence the behaviour of MEPs, the fact that the UK’s two largest parties 
do not relate to their MEPs in a more proactive manner is more unexpected. As is the 
case with the Finnish parties examined, it is clear that these two parties are largely 
disinterested in the policy goals which may be attained through the work of MEPs. 
The focus of the party leaders and members alike remain on realising their three core 
goals – election, policy, and office – at the state level. 
 The chapter’s findings relating to the relationship between MEPs and their EP 
Groups reflect those of the previous chapter. While there is a contrast between 
integrationist and Eurosceptic Groups in how they relate to MEPs, even integrationist 
Groups enforce discipline in a reserved manner. Despite the differences in the number 
of Labour MEPs and those from the Finnish SDP who are affiliated to the S&D 
Group, MEPs from both parties note that they relate to the Group in a similar manner. 
While the Group does not operate a strict system of discipline, they feel compelled to 
follow its recommendations unless there is a moderately strong reason to do 
otherwise. This also reflects the findings of Chapter 3, which found that MEPs are 
either content with the degree to which their Groups enforce discipline, or wish to see 
their Group go to greater lengths to ensure cohesive behaviour. In contrast, and 
reflecting the findings relating to the EFD in Chapter 4, neither the EFD nor the ECR 
Groups place any pressure on UKIP or Conservative MEPs. The variation identified 
reinforces the argument presented in the previous chapter that scholars wishing to 
develop understanding of the nature of MEP–Group relations need to pay greater 
attention to the differences that exist between Groups. 
 
 231 
                                                
256 This figure includes the seat awarded to Jim Nicholson, who was elected in 
Northern Ireland as the joint candidate of the Ulster Unionist Party and the 
Conservatives under the title ‘Ulster Conservatives and Unionists – New Force 
(UCUNF)’. It also includes the additional seat that the party received following the 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. 
257 Bob Spink MP briefly claimed an affiliation to UKIP following his departure from 
the Conservatives in 2008 (Lynch et al., 2012: 736). 
258 Trevor Colman does not have an affiliation to an EP Group. 
259 UKIP is the only established British party that is not affiliated to a pan-European 
political party. This remains the case despite the fact that Nigel Farage has 
campaigned in favour of joining the European Alliance for Freedom, claiming that the 
party would stand to gain by £1m from becoming affiliated (Lynch et al., 2012: 740). 
260 UKIP is represented in the House of Lords by three former Conservative peers and 
in the Northern Ireland Assembly by an MLA elected under the Ulster Unionist Party 
(UUP) banner since October 2012. However, UKIP is not currently represented in the 
House of Commons or in the Scottish or Welsh devolved legislatures. 
261 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 10/5/12. 
262 In the event, these three individuals won the contest for non-incumbents and were 
therefore placed in the positions immediately below the other sitting MEPs 
(ConservativeHome, 2013b). 
263 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 10/5/12; interview with an assistant to a 
Conservative MEP, 15/6/12. 
264 Interview with a former Conservative MEP, 25/4/12. 
265 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 20/6/12. 
266 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 20/6/12; interview with an assistant to a 
Conservative MEP 8/6/12. 
267 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 10/5/12. 
268 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 20/6/12. 
269 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 20/6/12; interview with an assistant to a 
Conservative MEP, 15/6/12. 
270 Interview with a Labour MEP, 6/6/12; interview with a Labour MEP, 19/6/12; 
interview with a former Labour MEP, 4/6/12; interview with a Labour official, 
4/10/13. 
271 Interview with a Labour MEP, 6/6/12; interview with a former Labour MEP, 
4/6/12. 
272 Interview with a Labour MEP, 6/6/12; interview with a former Labour MEP, 
4/6/12; interview with a Labour official, 4/10/13. 
273 Interview with a former Labour MEP, 8/5/12. 
274 Interview with a Labour MEP, 19/6/12; interview with an assistant to a Labour 
MEP, 19/6/12. 
275 Interview with a former EPLP official, 22/11/13. 
276 Interview with a Labour official, 4/10/13. 
277 Interview with a former Labour MEP, 4/6/12. 
278 Interview with a Labour MEP, 6/6/12. 
279 Interview with a Labour MEP, 6/6/12; interview with a Labour MEP, 19/6/12; 
interview with a former Labour MEP, 4/6/12. 
280 Interview with a Labour MEP, 19/6/12. 
281 Interview with a Labour MEP, 19/6/12. 
 232 
                                                                                                                                      
282 Interview with a Labour MEP, 19/6/12; interview with a former Labour MEP, 
4/6/12. 
283 Interview with a Labour MEP, 6/6/12; interview with a Labour MEP, 19/6/12. 
284 Interview with an UKIP MEP, 28/11/12; interview with a former UKIP MEP, 
28/11/12; interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 28/6/12. 
285 Interview with an UKIP MEP, 28/11/12. 
286 Interview with a former UKIP MEP, 28/11/12. 
287 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 28/6/12. 
288 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 28/6/12; interview with an UKIP MEP, 28/11/12. 
289 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 28/6/12. 
290 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 28/6/12. 
291 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 28/6/12. 
292 Interview with an UKIP MEP, 28/11/12. 
293 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 28/6/12. 
294 Interview with an UKIP MEP, 28/11/12. 
295 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 28/6/12. 
296 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 28/6/12. The official stated that the party would give 
preferential treatment to ‘better qualified’ individuals. 
297 Martha Andreasen and David Campbell Bannerman, both of whom defected from 
UKIP to the Conservatives during the 2009–14 parliamentary term also failed to pass 
the incumbency threshold. However, these cases are different, as they had not 
previously been elected as Conservative candidates. 
298 Interview with an assistant to a Conservative MEP, 8/6/12; interview with an 
assistant to a Conservative MEP, 15/6/12; interview with an ECR official, 3/5/12. 
299 Interview with an assistant to a Conservative MEP, 8/6/12. 
300 Interview with an assistant to a Conservative MEP, 8/6/12. 
301 Interview with an ECR official, 10/5/12. 
302 Interview with an assistant to a Conservative MEP, 15/6/12. 
303 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 7/6/12. 
304 Interview with an assistant to a Conservative MEP, 8/6/12; interview with a 
Conservative MEP, 10/5/12; interview with an ECR official, 3/5/12.  
305 Interview with a former Labour MEP, 4/6/12. 
306 Interview with a former Labour MEP, 4/6/12; interview with a former MEP, 
8/5/12; interview with a Labour MEP, 6/6/12. 
307 Interview with a former Labour MEP, 4/6/12. 
308 Interview with a Labour MEP, 6/6/12; interview with a Labour official, 4/10/13. 
309 Interview with a Labour MEP, 6/6/12. 
310 Interview with a Labour official, 4/10/13. 
311 Interview with a Labour MEP, 7/5/12; interview with a Labour official, 4/10/13. 
312 Interview with a Labour official, 4/10/13. 
313 Interview with a Labour MEP, 6/6/12. 
314 Interview with an assistant to a Labour MEP, 28/6/12; interview with a Labour 
official, 4/10/13; interview with a former Labour MEP, 8/5/12. 
315 Interview with a Labour MEP, 6/6/12; interview with a Labour MEP, 19/6/12. 
316 Interview with a Labour MEP, 6/6/12; interview with a Labour MEP, 19/6/12. 
317 Interview with a Labour MEP, 6/6/12. 
318 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 31/3/14. 
319 Interview with an UKIP MEP, 13/1/14. 
320 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 31/3/14. 
 233 
                                                                                                                                      
321 Interview with a former UKIP MEP, 28/11/12. 
322 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 20/6/12; interview with a Conservative MEP, 
10/5/12. 
323 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 10/5/12. 
324 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 10/5/12; interview with an assistant to a 
Conservative MEP, 15/6/12; interview with an assistant to a Conservative MEP, 
17/4/12. 
325 Interview with a Labour MEP, 19/6/12; interview with a Labour MEP, 6/6/12; 
Interview with a former Labour MEP, 4/6/12; interview with a Labour MEP, 22/6/12 
326 Interview with a Labour MEP, 19/6/12. 
327 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 28/6/12; interview with an UKIP MEP, 28/11/12. 
328 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 28/6/12. 
329 Interview with an UKIP MEP, 28/11/12; interview with a former UKIP MEP, 
28/11/12; interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 28/6/12. 
330 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 28/6/12. 
331 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 21/6/12; interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 28/6/12. 
332 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 28/6/12; interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 21/6/12. 
333 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 21/6/12. 
334 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 21/6/12; interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 28/6/12. 
335 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 28/6/12. 
336 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 21/6/12. The information provided as part of the 
MEPs’ profiles on the EP website supports this claim 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/search.html), as does the author’s 
experiences when conducting interviews in the EP. 
337 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 21/6/12. 
338 Interview with an UKIP MEP, 28/11/12. 
339 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 7/6/12. 
340 Interview with an UKRep official, 22/6/12; interview with an assistant to a 
Conservative MEP, 15/6/12. 
341 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 20/6/12. 
342 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 20/6/12; interview with an ECR official, 
3/5/12. 
343 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 10/5/12; interview with an ECR official, 
10/5/12. 
344 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 10/5/12. 
345 Interview with an assistant to a Conservative MEP, 8/6/12; interview with an 
assistant to a Conservative MEP, 15/6/12; interview with an ECR official, 3/5/12; 
interview with an UKRep official, 22/6/12. 
346 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 20/6/12; interview with a Conservative MEP, 
26/6/12. 
347 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 20/6/12. 
348 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 10/5/12. 
349 Interview with a former Labour MEP, 4/6/12. 
350 Interview with a Labour MEP, 19/6/12; interview with a Labour MEP, 22/6/12. 
351 Interview with a Labour MEP, 6/6/12. 
352 Interview with a former Labour MEP, 4/6/12. 
353 Interview with a Labour MEP, 6/6/12. 
354 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 21/6/12. 
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355 Interview with an UKIP MEP, 28/11/12; interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 21/6/12; 
Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 21/6/12; interview with a former UKIP MEP, 28/11/12. 
356 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 20/6/12; interview with a Conservative MEP, 
10/5/12; interview with a Conservative MEP, 26/6/12; interview with an assistant to a 
Conservative MEP, 15/6/12; interview with an ECR official, 10/5/12; interview with a 
Conservative official, 28/10/13. 
357 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 20/6/12. 
358 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 20/6/12. 
359 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 20/6/12. 
360 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 10/5/12. 
361 Interview with a Labour official, 4/10/13. 
362 Interview with a Labour MEP, 6/6/12. 
363 Interview with a Labour MEP, 6/6/12. 
364 Interview with a Labour MEP, 6/6/12. 
365 Interview with a Labour MEP, 19/6/12. 
366 Interview with a Labour MEP, 19/6/12. 
367 Interview with a Labour MEP, 6/6/12. 
368 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 21/6/12; Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 31/3/14. 
369 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 21/6/12. 
370 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 21/6/12. Of the nine MEPs elected by UKIP in 2009 
and that remain affiliated to the party’s delegation in the EP, six have voted with the 
majority of their colleagues in at least 96.70% of divisions, while the other three 
MEPs have only voted with the delegation in 81.35–87.72% of instances 
(votewatch.eu, statistics correct as of 4/6/13). 
371 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 28/6/12. 
372 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 28/6/12. 
373 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 28/6/12. 
374 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 28/6/12. 
375 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 7/6/12. 
376 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 10/5/12. 
377 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 10/5/12. 
378 Interview with an assistant to a Conservative MEP 8/6/12; interview with an 
assistant to a Conservative MEP 15/6/12. 
379 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 20/6/12. 
380 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 20/6/12. 
381 Interview with an assistant to a Conservative MEP 15/6/12; Interview with an ECR 
official, 3/5/12. 
382 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 10/5/12; interview with an assistant to a 
Conservative MEP 15/6/12. 
383 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 20/6/12. 
384 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 20/6/12. 
385 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 20/6/12. 
386 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 20/6/12. 
387 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 20/6/12. 
388 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 20/6/12. 
389 Interview with a Labour MEP, 19/6/12; interview with a former Labour MEP, 
8/5/12. 
390 Interview with a Labour MEP, 19/6/12. 
391 Interview with a former Labour MEP, 4/6/12. 
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392 Interview with a former Labour MEP, 4/6/12. 
393 Interview with a former Labour MEP, 4/6/12. 
394 Interview with a Labour MEP, 19/6/12; interview with a former Labour MEP, 
8/5/12; interview with a former Labour MEP, 4/6/12; interview with a Labour MEP, 
6/6/12. 
395 Interview with an assistant to a Labour MEP, 19/6/12. 
396 Interview with a Labour MEP, 19/6/12. 
397 Interview with a Labour MEP, 19/6/12. 
398 Interview with a former Labour MEP, 4/6/12. 
399 Interview with a former Labour MEP, 4/6/12. 
400 Interview with an UKIP MEP, 28/11/12. 
401 Interview with a former UKIP MEP, 28/11/12. 
402 Interview with a former UKIP MEP, 28/11/12. 
403 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 21/6/12. 
404 Interview with a former UKIP MEP, 28/11/12. 
405 Interview with an UKIP MEP, 26/6/12. 
406 Interview with a former UKIP MEP, 28/11/12. 
407 Conversely, if there were little coordination at the level of the delegation, the 
leadership of the two parties may attempt to sway some MEPs to follow London-
issued recommendations, while being aware that other, more senior, MEPs may be 
more likely to defy the party line. 
408 Interview with a former UKIP MEP, 28/11/12. 
409 Interview with a former UKIP MEP, 28/11/12. 
410 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 20/6/12; interview with a Conservative MEP, 
10/5/12; interview with an assistant to a Conservative MEP, 8/6/12; interview with a 
Conservative MEP, 26/6/12. 
411 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 7/6/12; interview with an assistant to a 
Conservative MEP, 15/6/12; interview with a Conservative MEP, 26/6/12. 
412 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 10/5/12. 
413 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 20/6/12. 
414 Interview with a Labour MEP, 19/6/12; interview with a Labour MEP, 22/6/12. 
415 Interview with a Labour MEP, 19/6/12; interview with a Labour MEP, 6/6/12. 
416 Interview with a Labour MEP, 6/6/12; interview with a former Labour MEP, 
8/5/12. 
417 Interview with an UKIP MEP, 28/11/12; interview with an UKIP MEP, 26/6/13. 
418 Interview with a former UKIP MEP, 28/11/12. 
419 Interview with an UKIP MEP, 26/6/12. 
420 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 28/6/12. 
421 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 21/6/12. 
422 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 10/5/12; interview with a Labour official, 
4/10/13; interview with a former EPLP official, 22/11/13. 
423 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 20/6/12; interview with a Labour official, 
4/10/13. 
424 Interview, UKIP and/or EFD, 28/6/12. 
425 Interview with an assistant to a Conservative MEP, 15/6/12; interview with an 
ECR official, 3/5/14; interview with an ECR official, 7/5/14. 
426 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 20/6/12. 
427 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 20/6/12. 
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428 Interview with an ECR official, 3/5/14; interview with an ECR official, 7/5/14; 
interview with an ECR official, 10/5/12. 
429 Interview with an ECR official, 7/5/12. 
430 This figure is based on 25 MEPs who were affiliated to the Conservatives and to 
the ECR on 13/6/13. It does not include Jim Nicholson, who was elected under the 
banner of the Ulster Conservatives and Unionists-New Force, or Martha Andreasen, 
who defected from UKIP to the Conservatives in 2013. The figure includes David 
Campbell Bannerman, who defected from UKIP, for the time that he has been 
affiliated to the Conservatives and to the ECR. 
431 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 10/5/12. 
432 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 10/5/12. 
433 Interview with a Conservative MEP, 10/5/12. 
434 Interview with a Labour MEP, 6/6/12; interview with a Labour MEP, 8/5/12. 
435 Interview with a former Labour MEP, 4/6/12; interview with a Labour MEP, 
19/6/12; interview with an assistant to a Labour MEP, 19/6/12. 
436 Interview with a former Labour MEP, 8/5/12; interview with a Labour MEP, 
19/6/12. 
437 Interview with a Labour MEP, 19/6/12. 
438 Interview with a former Labour MEP, 4/6/12. 
439 Interview with a Labour MEP, 19/6/12; interview with a former Labour MEP, 
4/6/12. 
440 Interview with a former Labour MEP, 4/6/12. 
441 Interview with a former Labour MEP, 4/6/12. 
442 Interview with a Labour MEP, 19/6/12. 
443 Interview with a Labour MEP, 19/6/12; interview with a Labour MEP, 6/6/12. 
444 Interview with a former Labour MEP, 4/6/12. 
445 Interview, PS and/or EFD, 9/5/12. 
446 This figure includes the voting behvaiour of Trevor Colman, a UKIP MEP who is 
not affiliated to an EP Group. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
This concluding chapter is divided into four main parts. The first part directly 
addresses the thesis’ central research question and its four sub-questions. It compares 
the empirical findings across the three empirical chapters, and re-examines the 
evidence cross-nationally. This discussion finds that neither domestic political parties 
nor EP Groups exercise the degree of influence on the behaviour of MEPs that the 
partisan control thesis suggests. The three factors identified as being linked to the 
propensity of national parties to attempt to influence MEPs are the electoral system, 
the degree to which the candidate selection system is centralized, and the size of the 
party’s delegation in the EP. A further three factors determine the desire and ability of 
Groups to influence MEPs. These are the size of the EP Group in terms of the number 
of affiliated MEPs, the centricity of the Group on the left–right scale, and attitudes 
towards integration.  
The second part of the Conclusion relates these empirical findings to the 
literature which presents the partisan control thesis. It argues that the party control 
literature overemphasises the degree of influence that domestic parties exercise on 
MEPs, while the broader literature on MEPs underplays the degree to which the 
behaviour of MEPs within the chamber is shaped by EP Groups. The third section sets 
out the broader implications of the thesis’ findings. These relate to scholarly 
understanding of the institutional context in which MEPs operate, to the issue of the 
focus of representation in relation to MEPs, and to national political parties as 
political organizations operating at different levels of governance. The section also 
argues that Eurosceptic Groups need to make fundamental changes to how they relate 
to MEPs if they are to gain greater influence within the chamber. Further, the section 
argues that one aspect of the EU’s supranational party system – its manifestation 
within the EP – is more highly developed that most scholars acknowledge. 
The fourth and final section provides a normative response to the thesis’ 
findings. While the freedom that MEPs enjoy to carry out their work according to 
their judgment is to be welcomed, the low levels of attention that domestic parties pay 
to the activities of MEPs gives rise to concerns regarding the existence of an 
‘accountability deficit’ in the EU. The pessimistic conclusion is that this deficit is 
unlikely to be addressed unless parties come to place greater value on election, policy, 
and office goals that lie within the context of the EU’s political system. 
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Addressing the Central Research Question 
This thesis set out to examine whether two partisan actors – domestic political parties 
and the parliamentary Groups in the EP – influence how MEPs approach 
representation. The investigation was structured around the four sub-questions that are 
presented together with the central research question in the Introduction. Sub-
questions 1a and 1b were concerned with whether the domestic political parties to 
which MEPs are affiliated influence their behaviour, and if so, which factors are 
linked to variation in the extent to which they exercise this influence. Sub-questions 
2a and 2b relate these concerns to EP Groups. 
 
Domestic Parties and the Partisan Control Thesis 
 
Sub-question 1a: Do domestic political parties influence the way MEPs think about 
and carry out representation? 
 
This thesis has found very little evidence to suggest that domestic party leaders 
exercise influence on the behaviour of MEPs. It is clear that party leaders do not have 
the means to compel MEPs to vote as cohesively as they currently do, and it is not 
appropriate to think of the relationship between domestic parties and MEPs in terms 
of ‘control’ (Hix et al., 2007: 132). While three of the parties examined in detail in the 
case studies – the Finnish KOK, SDP, and PS – do not seek influence at all, the other 
three parties – the British Conservatives, Labour, and UKIP – only seek to influence 
the behaviour of MEPs in very limited ways, and the evidence suggests that their 
attempts are largely, if not wholly, unsuccessful. The Conservatives and Labour make 
infrequent requests that relate to the parliamentary activity of MEPs. It is clear that 
MEPs only comply with these requests when they agree with their parties that such 
activity is appropriate. As a result, these MEPs should not be viewed as acting as 
party delegates (Eulau et al., 1978: 118) even when acting in accordance with the 
wishes of their parties. UKIP has sought to impose a model on how MEPs should act 
in a more general sense. And yet, while the party has sought to incentivise compliant 
behaviour, the indiscipline witnessed during the 2009–14 parliamentary term suggests 
that its efforts have failed thus far. 
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The case study findings also indicate that party leaders from across all six 
cases do not tend to intervene in the work of MEPs, and that the degree of interaction 
between party leaders and MEPs is low in most cases. These findings are supported 
by the statistical data relating to parties from across the EU. The data suggest that 
while most party leaders maintain some degree of contact with MEPs, they seldom 
issue voting instructions, unlike the leadership of the national delegation of MEPs. 
When considering the work of MEPs more broadly, both the quantitative and the 
qualitative evidence suggest that partisan actors do not compel MEPs to focus 
disproportionately on promoting partisan interests. While MEPs attach a great deal of 
importance to representing a number of groups, they emphasise the promotion of 
territorial interests to a greater degree than those of their domestic parties. In addition, 
findings relating to both data sources cast doubt on the central tenet of the partisan 
control thesis, which is the claim that domestic party leaders are able to use their 
control over the reselection prospects of incumbents to systematically control their 
behaviour. In many cases, the role played by party leaders in selecting candidates was 
found to be either subordinate or complementary to those of other sections within the 
party, such as regional leaders and ordinary members. 
As the level of interest shown in the work of MEPs by party leaders and by 
ordinary party members is low, it is not surprising that MEPs feel that they are free to 
define how they carry out their work independently of their domestic parties. MEPs 
acknowledge that there is a considerable degree of correspondence between how they 
carry out their work and how their parties would like them to carry out their work. 
This is reflected in the high levels of cohesion within national delegations identified 
by the literature (Hix et al., 2007: 137). However, it is also clear from the analysis 
presented in this thesis that this correspondence is not the result of party discipline, as 
MEPs often do not follow their parties’ guidance in the rare instances where conflicts 
emerge. This strongly suggests that party leaders do not influence how MEPs think 
about different groups whom they may wish to represent through their activities. In 
other words, MEPs are largely able to define their focus of representation 
independently of partisan constraints. 
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The Partisan Control Thesis and Domestic Party Variation 
 
Sub-question 1b: What factors explain variation in the level of influence that domestic 
political parties have on the way MEPs think about and carry out representation? 
 
No domestic political party examined in this thesis was observed to exercise 
significant influence on MEPs, and the observed differences between parties in the 
degree to which they seek influence are small. Despite the fact that the degree of 
variation observed between the domestic parties is slight, it is possible, and 
appropriate, to attempt to explain this variation.  
The statistical analysis presented in Chapter 3 yielded few insights into the 
sources of variation that are linked to the degree to which domestic parties seek 
influence, or into the sources of variation that are linked to the degree to which MEPs 
emphasise party representation. Few factors are linked to the dependent variables 
examined, and no theoretically compelling explanation can be offered for any of the 
trends identified. The inability of the statistical analysis to identify trends is arguably 
best explained by the low number of cases included in the analysis. It is consequently 
necessary to base the explanation of the factors that are linked to variation in the 
desire of domestic parties to influence MEPs on an analysis of the qualitative data 
available.  
The analyses presented in Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the evidence relating to 
parties from Finland and the UK respectively. There are two reasons for re-examining 
the evidence by taking a cross-national perspective. Firstly, by bringing together the 
findings relating to all six domestic parties examined, it is possible to examine the 
effects of the electoral system, and therefore to test Hypothesis 1. This is done in the 
first part of this sub-section. Secondly, by examining the findings across all six cases, 
it is possible to corroborate the trends identified in Chapters 4 and 5. To this end, the 
second part of this sub-section re-examines the sources of variation identified in 
Chapters 4 and 5, and establishes that two of the findings require revision. The third 
part re-examines the data relating to the factors that are not identified as predictors of 
variation in Chapters 4 and 5, and finds that one further revision is required to the 
findings presented in earlier chapters. 
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Electoral system effects and an alternative explanation 
While the three Finnish parties do not seek influence at all, the three British parties 
seek limited influence. It is worth noting that this finding runs contrary to the 
statistical analyses reported in Chapter 3, which suggested that party leaders in 
countries operating open-list electoral systems are slightly more, rather than less, 
likely than others to issue voting instructions. Nevertheless, the contrast between the 
Finnish and British parties is striking, and strongly suggests that there is a link 
between the degree to which domestic parties seek to influence the behaviour of 
MEPs and the country in which the party is based. Indeed, of the factors examined in 
the thesis, this is the factor that is most clearly linked to the propensity of domestic 
parties to seek influence. 
 The finding that British parties, who operate under closed-list systems, are 
more likely to seek influence than Finnish parties, who operate under open lists, 
strongly suggests that the type of electoral system is linked to the degree to which 
domestic parties seek to influence their MEPs. This finding reflects the expectations 
of the partisan control thesis and directly supports the first part of Hypothesis 1, 
which states that parties operating under more closed electoral systems are more 
likely to seek to influence their MEPs. The findings do not support the second part of 
Hypothesis 1, which states that such parties are also more likely to achieve influence. 
There are strong theoretical grounds for interpreting the contrast between the 
evidence relating to the Finnish and British parties in this way. Firstly, in contrast to 
parties operating under open lists, parties that control the candidate selection process 
may feel that they are able to provide MEPs with a threat credible enough to compel 
MEPs to follow guidance. Secondly, such parties may feel that they have a more 
legitimate claim to mandate MEPs compared with parties whose MEPs are elected 
largely on the basis of a personal vote.  
However, the cross-national differences observed may be unrelated to the 
electoral system. It is possible that they are a product of a broader consideration 
relating to political culture. Despite the rise of the Finnish PS in recent years, the 
nature of political discourse in the UK is far more Eurosceptic compared with that in 
Finland. This is reflected both in the attitudes of the main parties towards integration, 
and in the degree of public support for the EU (European Commission, 2013). The 
greater propensity of British parties to seek influence may be explained by the fact 
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that they are more sensitive to the potential for their MEPs to cause them 
embarrassment domestically.  
As this alternative explanation is plausible, it would be valuable to examine 
parties from settings other than the two countries examined in this thesis as part of 
further research, as this would further understanding of the role that the electoral 
system plays in this context. Parties from a large Member State using a closed-list 
system, such as France, Germany, or Spain, would serve as appropriate case studies to 
corroborate the findings presented in this thesis relating to British parties. Similarly, it 
would be possible to compare findings relating to parties from a small Member State 
operating an open-list system, such as Denmark and Luxembourg, directly to those 
relating to Finnish MEPs presented in this thesis. Examining parties from countries 
using ordered-list systems, such as those from the Netherlands, Austria, and Sweden 
(Lühiste, [undated]: 96; Sudulich, 2014), would provide an additional means of 
corroborating the findings relating to the effects of the electoral system.  
 
Re-examining trends identified previously 
The evidence relating to British parties reported in Chapter 5 suggested that two 
factors are linked to variation in the degree to which parties seek influence, namely 
the degree to which the candidate selection system is centralised, and status as a 
governing party. The analysis also found that Eurosceptic parties are more likely to 
desire that MEPs focus on domestic political work. In contrast, the analysis of the 
evidence from Finland did not identify any factors as being linked to variation in the 
way parties relate to MEPs. Due to the consistency across the Finnish cases regarding 
the degree to which they seek influence, there is no variation to explain in the Finnish 
context. This discrepancy raises the possibility that there is a contradiction between 
the findings relating to the Finnish and the British parties. 
Hypothesis 2 posited that domestic parties operating centralised candidate 
selection systems are more likely to attempt to influence their MEPs than parties 
operating less centralised selection systems. There is no fundamental conflict between 
the finding that British parties using centralised candidate selection systems are more 
prone to seeking influence on MEPs than those operating decentralised systems, and 
the finding that none of the three Finnish parties seek influence. As it is the electorate 
who rank order the candidates at EP elections in Finland, and as no MEP seeking re-
election has ever been excluded from the lists of the three parties examined, the 
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candidate selection system within Finnish parties can be regarded as entirely 
decentralised. The degree of centralisation within the Conservatives and Labour can 
be regarded as slightly higher, as is their propensity to seeking influence on the 
behaviour of MEPs, relative to Finnish parties. UKIP has centralised its selection 
procedures considerably, with the specific intention of influencing how its MEPs act. 
As a result, the cross-national analysis corroborates the finding from the British 
context that there is a link between the degree to which candidate selection is 
centralised and the degree to which parties seek to influence the behaviour of MEPs. 
In contrast to the above finding, two factors identified in the British context as 
predictors of variation in how domestic parties deal with MEPs, namely status as a 
governing party and attitudes towards integration, require revision in light of cross-
national analysis. Hypothesis 3 posits that governing parties are more likely to attempt 
to influence their MEPs than opposition parties. In investigating this issue, it is 
possible to consider the Conservatives, Labour, KOK, and the SDP as parties who 
spent time in government and in opposition during the 2009–14 parliamentary term, 
and to consider UKIP and the PS as parties who have no experience of governing. 
While the evidence suggests that leading figures within the British Conservatives and 
Labour pay marginally greater attention to their MEPs when they are in government, 
this is not reflected in the cases of the Finnish KOK and the SDP. As regards the non-
governing parties, the UKIP’s leadership pays some attention to the activities of its 
MEPs, whereas the PS’ leadership largely does not. These observations suggest that 
the trend observed within British parties, whereby they pay greater attention to their 
MEPs when they are in government, is not reflected cross-nationally.  
A similarly trendless cross-national picture emerges when examining 
Hypothesis 12, which expects Eurosceptic parties to be more prone to demand that 
MEPs focus on work in their home countries compared with integrationist parties. 
UKIP, the British Eurosceptic party, clearly wishes that its MEPs limit the time they 
spend in Brussels and Strasbourg, and it is clear that this is directly linked to the 
party’s Eurosceptic views. However, of the three Eurosceptic parties examined in this 
thesis, this tendency applies exclusively to UKIP. Its Finnish counterpart, the PS, was 
fully supportive of Sampo Terho’s decision to base himself in Brussels and to focus 
on parliamentary work when he replaced Timo Soini as the party’s only MEP in 2011. 
Similarly, the more moderately Eurosceptic British Conservative Party does not issue 
its MEPs with guidance on how to divide their time between different settings, and 
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nor do the more pro-integrationist Labour, KOK, or SDP parties. As UKIP is the only 
party of the six examined that places limits on the amount of time it wishes its MEPs 
to spend on parliamentary activity, it must be regarded as an outlier, at least until 
further cases are examined. Consequently, the thesis does not find evidence to support 
the notion that Eurosceptic parties are more likely to demand that MEPs limit the time 
they spend in Brussels and Strasbourg. 
 
Re-examining other potential explanatory variables 
There is a theoretical basis for expecting several factors to be linked to the propensity 
with which parties seek to influence their MEPs, and these are outlined in Chapter 2. 
The empirical analysis presented in Chapters 4 and 5 was unable to identify such a 
link in the case of many of these factors. This suggests that these factors are not 
linked to how parties relate to their MEPs. By comparing the evidence across the six 
cases it is possible to re-examine whether these factors are, in fact, linked to variation 
in the way parties relate to MEPs. 
Most of these findings do not require revision when subjected to cross-
national analysis. Regarding the individual-level factor examined, there is no 
evidence to suggest that parties vary in how they relate to MEPs depending on the 
MEPs’ level of political experience (Hypothesis 14).447 Similarly, in the context of 
factors relating to the parties, there is no suggestion that ideological centrism 
(Hypothesis 9a and 9b) or the size of the party in terms of its organizational capacity 
(Hypothesis 7) is a relevant factor. As regards the latter issue, the PS and UKIP are 
considerably smaller organizations than the other four parties, yet UKIP certainly 
pays greater attention to its MEPs compared with KOK or the SDP. These findings 
reinforce the notion that the variation is best explained with reference to country level 
phenomena. 
However, it is necessary to make one revision to the findings presented in 
earlier chapters when examining the evidence across the six cases. Hypothesis 5 states 
that domestic parties with large delegations of MEPs are more likely to attempt to 
influence the behaviour of MEPs than domestic parties with small delegations of 
MEPs. While this expectation is not supported in the analysis of the Finnish or British 
parties, a pattern emerges when examining the six cases together. The Conservatives, 
Labour, and UKIP, the three British parties examined, returned 26, 13, and 13 MEPs 
respectively following the 2009 election, while the three Finnish parties, KOK, the 
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SDP, and the PS, returned 3, 2, and 1 MEP respectively. The empirical findings 
suggest that the three parties with the larger delegations are more prone to seeking 
influence. In contrast to the findings of Chapters 4 and 5, this finding lends support to 
the first statement of Hypothesis 5, namely that domestic parties with larger 
delegations of MEPs are more likely to attempt to influence the behaviour of MEPs. 
There is, however, no evidence to support the second clause, which expects parties 
with larger delegations to exercise a greater level of influence than those with smaller 
delegations.  
 
A summary 
To conclude, the analysis of the qualitative data suggests that there is a link between 
three factors and the degree to which domestic parties seek influence on the behaviour 
of MEPs. These are the electoral system, the degree to which the candidate selection 
system is centralized, and the size of the party’s delegation in the EP. There is a 
strong correlation between the three factors and whether the party’s country of origin 
is Finland or the UK. As a result, further research is necessary to identify the relative 
effects of the three factors. By examining evidence relating to cases from Member 
States other than Finland and the UK, such future research may shed light on whether 
the tendency of the British parties to seek influence is explained by a broader issue 
related to political culture. 
 
EP Groups and the Partisan Control Thesis 
 
Sub-question 2a: Do EP Groups influence the way MEPs think about and carry out 
representation? 
 
While the evidence relating to domestic political parties contradicts the partisan 
control thesis, the evidence relating to two of the four EP Groups examined supports 
the notion that partisan actors influence the behaviour of MEPs. The EPP and the 
S&D fulfil the four preconditions of influence and exercise a measure of substantive 
influence on the parliamentary behaviour of MEPs. Parliamentarians do not blindly 
follow the voting guidance issued by these Groups, as demonstrated by the fact that 
they vote with their domestic parties more often than with their Groups (Hix et al., 
2007: 137). However, it appears that MEPs from the EPP and the S&D routinely vote 
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with Groups, other than where there is a fundamental conflict between the position of 
the Group and the preferences of individual MEPs or whole national delegations. As 
approximately 5,000 divisions take place in the EP annually (Corbett et al., 2011: 
200), there is ample scope for issues to arise on which the preferences of MEPs and 
their Groups diverge moderately. This suggests that Groups influence the voting 
behaviour of MEPs regularly. 
Further, these two Groups may exercise influence on the way that MEPs voice 
their opinions. As the EPP and the S&D prefer to allocate parliamentary assignments 
to MEPs who share the views of the majority of their affiliated MEPs, there is an 
incentive for MEPs to keep their views private on issues where their views diverge 
from those of their Group colleagues. While this thesis finds no definitive evidence 
that this factor does lead MEPs to refrain from voicing their opinions, it clearly has 
the potential to affect how MEPs act. 
The primary factor underlying the ability of Groups to influence the behaviour 
of MEPs, according to the party control literature, is their control over the ability of 
individual MEPs to realise policy and office goals within the EP. Some support is lent 
to this view by the evidence that there is a general understanding among MEPs 
affiliated to the EPP and to the S&D that MEPs risk being denied assignments on 
issues where their views conflict with those of their Group colleagues. However, a 
variety of explanations are provided by respondents from the EPP and the S&D for 
their propensity to vote with their Groups when conflicts emerge. The most prevalent 
of these is that most MEPs share the norm that they should vote with their Groups 
unless there is a fundamental conflict, as indiscipline weakens the Group. MEPs 
certainly reject the notion that Groups use threats and rewards to compel them to vote 
according to the Groups’ recommendations. The statistical findings reported in 
Chapter 3 reinforce this claim, as they suggest that MEPs are moderately in favour of 
strengthening Group cohesion, a development that would necessarily entail greater 
use of disciplinary methods by the Groups.  
On the basis of evidence relating to the EPP and the S&D Groups, it is 
possible to state that while the partisan control thesis is correct in arguing that Groups 
exercise some influence on the behaviour of MEPs, their ability to compel MEPs to 
adapt their behaviour is limited. The influence of the EPP and the S&D Groups is 
largely restricted to the context of parliamentary divisions, which is only one of many 
settings in which MEPs act as representatives. It is not the use of disciplinary tools 
 247 
that primarily enables them to influence how MEPs vote. Rather, their ability to 
compel MEPs to follow voting guidance arises primarily as a result of the widely 
accepted norm that it is in the long-term interests of MEPs who seek to realise policy 
goals within the EP to ensure that the Group operates as cohesively as possible. 
In contrast, the evidence relating to the ECR and the EFD Groups challenges 
the partisan control thesis’ claim that Groups influence the behaviour of MEPs. These 
Groups do not seek to influence the behaviour of individual MEPs or of national 
delegations. Indeed, the degree of coordination within these Groups is far weaker, 
especially in the case of the EFD. The norm observed within the EPP and the S&D is 
not shared among the ECR or the EFD, and it appears that these latter two Groups 
were formed to maximise their constituent domestic parties’ access to resources rather 
than to advance policy positions collectively within the EP. The contrast observed 
between the EPP and the S&D Groups on the one hand, and the ECR and EFD 
Groups on the other, suggests two things. Firstly, some Groups wish to influence the 
policy-related behaviour of MEPs, while others do not. Secondly, Groups that wish to 
influence the policy-related behaviour of MEPs succeed. This second finding lends 
support to the logic underlying the partisan control thesis in relation to EP Groups. 
Despite the fact that two of the Groups examined exercise a degree of 
influence on the behaviour of MEPs, there is little evidence that the EPP and the S&D 
Groups influence the way MEPs think about representation in the sense of shaping 
their focus of representation. The statistical analysis clearly demonstrates that MEPs 
do not place a great deal of importance on representing their Groups, and this finding 
is reinforced by the qualitative data. This suggests that when MEPs vote against their 
consciences and with the preferences of their Groups, their ultimate goal in doing so 
is not to promote the interests of the Group. Rather, they do so primarily because they 
view such behaviour as a means of promoting the interests of the societal grouping(s) 
which they have selected as the object of their activities as representatives.  
 
The Partisan Control Thesis and EP Group Variation 
 
Sub-question 2b: What factors explain variation in the level of influence that EP 
Groups have on the way MEPs think about and carry out representation? 
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The thesis has drawn on data relating to four EP Groups to examine the factors that 
are linked to variation in the level of influence that such actors exercise on MEPs. The 
analysis presented in the section above suggests that EP Groups do not influence how 
MEPs make decisions regarding which interest they prioritize through their work as 
representatives. However, the discussion does suggest that certain Groups influence 
how MEPs carry out their parliamentary duties, especially in the context of voting. 
The research design has made it possible to examine how the S&D and the EFD 
Groups operate from the perspective of two of their national delegations in both cases, 
the SDP and Labour in the case of the S&D Group, and the PS and UKIP in the case 
of the EFD Group. The practices employed by the EPP were examined from the 
perspective of KOK, while the ECR was examined from the perspective of the 
Conservatives. 
 Chapters 4 and 5 identify four factors as being linked to the degree to which 
EP Groups seek and achieve influence on the parliamentary behaviour of MEPs. The 
four factors are the size of the EP Group in terms of the number of affiliated MEPs 
(supporting Hypothesis 6) and in terms of organizational capacity (supporting 
Hypothesis 8), the centricity of the Group on the left–right scale (supporting 
Hypothesis 10), and attitudes towards integration (supporting Hypothesis 13). These 
findings are based on two separate sets of analyses, the first relating to MEPs from 
Finland and reported in Chapter 4, and the second relating to MEPs from the UK and 
reported in Chapter 5. This section corroborates the findings by re-examining the data 
from all the cases examined in this thesis. It confirms that the findings relating to the 
S&D and to the EFD presented in Chapters 4 and 5 are consistent between both 
chapters. However, it finds that only three of the four factors identified in those 
chapters are in fact linked to variation in the propensity of Groups to seek and achieve 
influence on MEPs. The size of the Group in terms of organizational capacity should 
not be viewed as a factor that is related to the practices employed by Groups. 
There is a clear difference between the EPP and the S&D on the one hand, and 
the ECR and the EFD on the other, in terms of the degree to which they seek and 
achieve influence on the behaviour of MEPs. While the EPP and the S&D Groups do 
not exercise a considerable degree of influence on how MEPs operate as 
representatives, and while their MEPs certainly do not place a great emphasis on 
Group representation, it is clear that they do exercise some influence on how MEPs 
vote at parliamentary divisions. In contrast, the MEPs affiliated to the ECR and EFD 
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Groups vote virtually exclusively on the basis of the recommendations made by their 
national delegations. The four factors that are identified in Chapters 4 and 5 as being 
linked to this variation are consistent across the two pairs of Groups. Compared with 
the ECR and the EFD, the EPP and the S&D Groups are larger, both in terms of the 
number of affiliated MEPs and in terms of organizational capacity, are positioned 
closer to the centre on the left–right scale, and are more amenable towards integration. 
It is not surprising that these four factors are all identified as being linked to 
the variation examined, as they are interrelated. There is a direct and causal link 
between the number of MEPs affiliated to a Group and its organizational capacity. 
Indeed, the measure of a Group’s organizational capacity that underlies the analysis is 
primarily based on the number of MEPs affiliated to the Group, together with the 
number of years that the Group has existed. Further, in terms of the case studies 
selected for this study, the two largest Groups are also the most centrist and the most 
integrationist. Generally speaking, these two trends are reflected in the chamber. The 
largest Groups tend to be more centrist than smaller Groups, and while they also tend 
to be more amenable towards integration, this latter correlation is not as strong. 
Despite the interrelated nature of the four factors identified as being linked to 
variation in the degree to which EP Groups seek and achieve influence, it is possible 
to reach certain conclusions regarding the relative degrees to which they serve as 
determinants of variation in the dynamics within Groups. The empirical findings 
suggest that Group attitudes towards integration is the key explanatory variable in this 
context. Respondents from the Eurosceptic Groups examined uniformly state that the 
basic principle upon which their Groups operate is that national delegations have 
complete independence to act as they wish, as long as they do not bring the Group 
into disrepute. Unlike the EFD, the ECR does make some attempt to coordinate policy 
positions. However, the ECR does not put pressure on individual MEPs or on national 
delegations to follow its guidance. In contrast, the leadership of the integrationist EPP 
and S&D desire that affiliated MEPs follow the guidance issued by the Group, and a 
norm is shared among the MEPs from these two Groups that MEPs should follow the 
Group’s guidance unless it conflicts with the preferences of the national delegation in 
a fundamental manner. 
While it is likely that the other three factors identified play a far more limited 
role in the degree to which Groups seek and achieve control of their MEPs, it is 
plausible to make a link between the willingness of MEPs to follow Group guidance 
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and the number of MEPs affiliated to the Group. In a context of fluid majorities, 
larger Groups have a greater incentive to act in a disciplined manner than smaller 
Groups, as they are more likely to be part of a winning coalition. Realising that their 
Group have a realistic chance of being on the winning side in a given parliamentary 
division, MEPs affiliated to larger Groups have a stronger incentive to compromise 
with their Group colleagues by following the Group’s guidance, especially if they 
trust their colleagues to return the favour at a later division.  
The prediction that the larger Groups exercise greater influence on MEPs is 
usually linked to the argument that the larger Groups control the most desirable 
parliamentary assignments and positions and can use this control to shape the 
behaviour of MEPs (Hix, 2002: 690–1). This thesis has not found evidence suggesting 
that Groups use their powers of patronage to influence MEPs. Rather than suggesting 
that the larger Groups have greater means of influencing their MEPs, the logic 
presented in this discussion is that MEPs affiliated to larger Groups have greater 
reason to be willing to conform to the wishes of their Groups than MEPs from smaller 
Groups. This consideration may go a long way in explaining the norm that exists 
within the integrationist Groups that MEPs should remain loyal unless they object 
strongly to the Group’s policy position. 
It is arguable that centrism in terms of left–right ideology plays a limited role 
in explaining the degree to which Groups seek and achieve influence. Nevertheless, 
MEPs from centrist Groups do have a stronger incentive to act cohesively than MEPs 
affiliated to Groups positioned away from the centre of the left–right ideological 
scale. Again, this is because these Groups are more likely to be able to negotiate their 
way into a winning coalition. Other than in the exceptionally unlikely event that a 
Group positioned towards either extreme were able to command a majority in the 
chamber, or where Groups on the two extremes are willing and able to work together 
to form a majority, the support of at least one centrist Group will always be required 
to form a parliamentary majority. As the centrist Groups always play a pivotal role in 
the process of forming coalitions in practice, they always have at least as strong an 
incentive to remain cohesive as Groups that lie towards the extremes. Consequently, it 
is reasonable to conclude that Groups that lie towards the centre on the left–right 
ideological scale are more likely than others to seek and achieve influence on the 
behaviour of MEPs relative to more extremist Groups. 
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The discussion linked to Hypothesis 8 presented the notion that Groups with 
greater organizational capacity are more likely to seek and achieve influence on 
MEPs than those with fewer resources, as they are in a stronger position to operate a 
system of partisan discipline. While the two larger Groups examined achieve greater 
influence on MEPs, the analysis suggests that this trend has little to do with the ability 
of Groups to deploy resources in a manner which enables them to maintain a system 
of partisan discipline. This is because the two Groups which are able to influence the 
behaviour of MEPs do not use the traditional means of partisan influence – providing 
legislators with overt threats and promises of rewards – to achieve this influence. 
Rather, the influence that the two larger Groups achieve stems at least in part from the 
norm shared within their ranks that it is a courtesy to colleagues for MEPs to follow 
the Group’s voting guidance in cases where the level of conflict is low.  
This discussion suggests that the organizational capacity of the Group plays a 
very marginal role at most in explaining the degree to which they seek and achieve 
influence. As a result, the finding relating to Hypothesis 8 should be regarded as a 
spurious finding that emerges due to the fact that organizational capacity is 
empirically interrelated to factors such as attitudes towards integration and the size of 
the Group in terms of the number of MEPs.  
 In conclusion, in comparing the four EP Group case studies together, this 
section finds that it is necessary to make a revision to the findings presented in 
Chapters 4 and 5. Only three factors are linked to the degree to which EP Groups seek 
and achieve influence on the parliamentary behaviour of MEPs. These are the size of 
the EP Group in terms of the number of affiliated MEPs (supporting Hypothesis 6), 
the centricity of the Group on the left–right scale (supporting Hypothesis 10), and 
attitudes towards integration (supporting Hypothesis 13). The discussion challenges 
Hypothesis 8 and the notion that the size of the Group in terms of organizational 
capacity is linked to the degree to which Groups seek and achieve influence. 
 
A Discussion on the Findings 
The empirical findings of this thesis provide a strong challenge to the partisan control 
thesis. They make clear that neither domestic political parties nor EP Groups exercise 
the degree of influence on the behaviour of MEPs that other accounts either suggest 
(Hix, 2002; Hix et al., 2007) or assume (Meserve et al., 2009; Lindstädt et al., 2011, 
2012; Raunio, 2012a). Indeed, this thesis has found little evidence that domestic party 
 252 
leaders influence how MEPs think or act. In fact, they show little interest in the 
activities of MEPs, and even less desire to influence their behaviour. This is because 
party leaders seldom wish to realise goals in the contexts in which MEPs operate. The 
findings suggest that integrationist EP Group leaders have a limited ability to 
persuade MEPs to act contrary to their own judgment, but that this is primarily linked 
to a norm that encourages cohesive behaviour within integrationist Groups rather than 
to the enforcement of discipline. 
The thesis also informs theoretical understanding of the factors which shape 
the degree to which partisan actors seek and achieve influence on MEPs. Three 
factors are linked to the propensity of national parties to attempt to influence MEPs, 
namely the type of electoral system, the degree to which the candidate selection 
system is centralized, and the size of the party’s delegation in the EP. Three factors 
are also identified as being linked to the propensity of EP Groups to seek and to 
achieve influence. These are the size of the EP Group in terms of the number of 
affiliated MEPs, the centricity of the Group on the left–right scale, and attitudes 
towards integration. 
 
Understanding national political parties: why no discipline, why no influence? 
Although the thesis finds little empirical support for the partisan control thesis, its 
findings do not challenge the logic underlying the partisan control thesis, which is that 
partisan actors are able to use threats and rewards as part of efforts to compel MEPs 
to follow guidance (Hix et al., 1999, 2007; Raunio, 2007; Scully, 2001). No evidence 
is found to suggest that domestic parties or EP Groups could not influence the 
behaviour of MEPs if they were ready to make the necessary investment. This 
investment would take the form of employing officials to monitor developments in 
the EP with the aim of providing appropriate guidance to MEPs, and to monitor the 
work of their own MEPs. Parties would also need to be more willing to issue credible 
threats and offers of rewards. 
The empirical findings indicate that most domestic party leaders do little to 
maximise their potential for influencing their MEPs. The three Finnish parties 
consciously refrain from interfering in the affairs of their MEPs. The leaders of two of 
the three British parties, the Conservatives and Labour, forgo the potential for 
influencing the behaviour of MEPs that is offered by control of the candidate 
selection system. By using decentralised candidate selection systems, the leadership 
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of these two parties relinquish both their ability to shape the outcomes of the selection 
process and their ‘ultimate’ tool for incentivising the behaviour of MEPs (Raunio, 
2007: 141). UKIP is the only party that has sought to implement centralised party 
discipline, and its attempts have largely been unsuccessful due to the preference of its 
MEPs to leave the party rather than to follow its guidance. 
By evaluating the theoretical underpinnings of the partisan control thesis, and 
by drawing on the empirical insights provided by this thesis, it is possible to explain 
why national parties structure relations with their MEPs in a manner that is too 
passive for them to be able to influence their MEPs. In explaining why parties tend 
not to issue voting instructions, Scully argues that party leaders do not have an 
incentive to mandate MEPs. He argues that leaders may feel that the party’s interests 
are best served when MEPs are afforded the freedom to act on the basis of their own 
judgment, as MEPs require a degree of flexibility to form winning coalitions (Scully, 
2001: 14–15, 23). The findings presented in this thesis suggest that party leaders do 
not make a calculated decision regarding the use of discipline. Party leaders tend not 
to mandate MEPs primarily because they have little interest in realising goals through 
the work of MEPs, and therefore have little interest in influencing their behaviour. 
 
If MEPs are largely free agents, what explains the high degree of cohesion? 
The high degree of partisan cohesion evident at parliamentary divisions, together with 
the range of disciplinary tools available to partisan actors, highlights the attractiveness 
of claiming that partisan organizations ‘control’ MEPs (Hix et al., 2007: 132) and that 
the ‘electoral connection’ operates via parties in the case of MEPs (Farrell and Scully, 
2007: 201–2; Mayhew, 1974). Rather than setting out to examine how decision-
making takes place in the EP (Ringe, 2010), this thesis is concerned with the issue of 
whether MEPs are subject to partisan discipline. However, as the findings indicate 
that partisan actors make limited use of discipline, it is clearly necessary to provide an 
explanation for the high degree of partisan cohesion.  
Of course, the EP is not unique as a legislature in which the high degree of 
voting cohesion observed is explained with reference to considerations other than the 
enforcement of strict partisan discipline. Jensen finds that ‘the extremely high party 
cohesion in Nordic parliamentary parties is voluntary and consensual’ (2000: 234), 
while Norton (2003) demonstrates that the degree of cohesion among the parties in 
the House of Lords is near absolute, despite the fact that the whips have virtually no 
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means whatsoever of compelling peers to follow guidance. Norton explains that peers 
are usually ‘unaware of the issue on which the vote is taking place ... [and] simply 
follow the guidance of the whips’ (2003: 68). Decision-making in the EP partially 
reflects these findings relating to Nordic legislatures and to the House of Lords. 
 The thesis’ empirical findings suggest that the high levels of partisan cohesion 
within the EP is best explained with reference to the need of MEPs and their national 
parties ‘to establish divisions of labour and mechanisms of coordination in the face of 
an overload of decision-making’ (Hix and Lord, 1997: 147; Ringe, 2010). The 
European Parliament’s twenty committees all deal with a number of reports at any 
given time. As only eight national parties have more than twenty MEPs (European 
Parliament, 2014b), it is reasonable to assume that few parties are able to divide the 
task of following every issue under discussion within the EP between their MEPs. 
With individual MEPs, and most national delegations, only able to develop an 
expertise on a certain number of issues, their ability to develop preferences 
independently of their Groups is limited. This suggests that the overwhelming 
majority of MEPs and their national delegations are reliant to a considerable extent on 
the policy support provided by their Groups.  
The propensity of MEPs to vote with their Groups is explained both by their 
reliance on the guidance which the Groups provide, and by the fact that the 
preferences of national delegations on issues where they are able to develop an 
expertise is likely to be conditioned extensively by those of their Group colleagues. 
Indeed, as MEPs operate in a context of fluid majorities, it is natural that their 
preferences are shaped both by those of other national delegations within their Groups 
and by the preferences of rival Groups.448 MEPs need to negotiate their way into 
winning coalitions if they are to influence policy outcomes, and this requires a 
willingness to compromise on their part. 
 Yet MEPs and their national delegations are not completely powerless to form 
preferences independently of their Groups, as even individual MEPs and small 
national delegations can develop an expertise on certain issues. On issues where 
preferences can be developed independently of Groups, it is inevitable that national 
delegations will, on occasion, be able to identify differences between their own 
preferences and those of their Groups. It is reasonable to assume that MEPs will 
follow the guidance provided by national party colleagues when that conflicts with 
the recommendations issued by their Group colleagues from other Member States. 
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This is because there is likely to be a higher degree of ideological convergence within 
national delegations, and because the guidance issued by a national party colleague is 
more likely to take account of how the issue affects their own Member States.  
The evidence presented in this thesis therefore supports the account provided 
by Ringe (2010). Most MEPs vote on the basis of the guidance provided by their 
Groups in the overwhelming majority of instances, but tend to vote with their national 
party delegations on the small minority of issues where national colleagues indicate 
that there is a fundamental conflict in preferences. This explains both why the degree 
of cohesion is higher within national delegations than within Groups, and why the 
degree of cohesion within the two partisan organizations is high despite the limited 
use of discipline. 
 
Understanding EP Groups: influence without discipline? 
It is possible to draw on the argument presented above when considering an issue 
which has provided one of the main stimuli of research in this area, namely whether it 
is the national parties or the EP Groups that exercise the greatest degree of influence 
on the behaviour of MEPs. The literature’s discussion (Hix et al., 2007; Raunio, 
2012a) is based on the assumption that partisan actors can compel MEPs to act 
contrary to their wishes, and the conclusion is that national parties have the greatest 
means of inducing compliant behaviour.  
While this study demonstrates that neither type of actor exerts much, if any, 
systematic control on MEPs, its findings suggest that the influence of national party 
colleagues is higher in relative terms than that of Group colleagues. When colleagues 
from the national delegation and the Group compete to persuade MEPs to follow 
contrasting guidance, MEPs are more prone to follow the guidance provided by their 
national party colleagues. However, at least in the case of the majority of MEPs, who 
are affiliated to relatively small national delegations and integrationist Groups, it is 
the EP Groups that exercise the greatest degree of influence on MEPs in absolute 
terms. Most MEPs affiliated to integrationist Groups usually vote on the basis of 
recommendations developed by their Groups rather than by their national parties. This 
indicates that Groups shape the parliamentary behaviour of MEPs to a greater extent 
than national party colleagues. 
 
 
 256 
Broader Implications 
The findings presented in this thesis have implications for a number of important 
issues relating to MEPs, to their partisan organizations, and to the state of the EU’s 
supranational party system. 
 
MEPs and the institutional context  
The first set of implications relates to the institutional context in which MEPs operate 
as representatives. The partisan control thesis suggests that MEPs are severely 
constrained in their ability to make decisions independently of their domestic parties 
and EP Groups. It posits that MEPs are deterred from acting in ways that conflict with 
the interests of the leaders of the two partisan organizations, and are offered 
incentives to comply with the guidance issued. However, this is not an accurate 
portrayal of the institutional context in which MEPs operate. Rather than being 
subject to strong pressure from partisan actors, this thesis demonstrates that MEPs 
enjoy a considerable degree of independence in deciding how they wish to operate as 
representatives. They are largely free from partisan pressures when making decisions 
regarding how to divide their time between different activities and geographical 
settings. As most party leaders do not incentivise parliamentary behaviour by linking 
it to goal-related threats and rewards, MEPs are largely protected from partisan 
pressures when making behavioural decision within the chamber.449  
Indeed, rather than indicating partisan control, evidence relating to the degree 
of cohesion within domestic parties and Groups can be interpreted as indicating that 
MEPs enjoy significant freedom to act according to their own judgment. 
Approximately 1,000 parliamentary divisions are taken by roll call vote each year, 
and MEPs vote against their colleagues from their national parties in nearly 5% of 
instances, and against their EP Groups in nearly 10% of instances (Hix et al., 2007: 
137). Due to the technical nature of the issues considered by the EP, together with the 
high number of divisions, it is widely held that MEPs are unable to form an opinion 
on a considerable portion of the issues that arise (Ringe, 2010; Hix and Lord, 1997: 
147). The number of votes on which an MEP has a clear preference, and one which 
conflicts with that of the national delegation or the Group, can therefore be expected 
to be fairly low. Considering that MEPs vote against their partisan organizations 
relatively regularly, these observations suggest that MEPs are inclined to vote against 
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their delegations and EP Groups when preferences diverge. The findings therefore 
present a stern challenge the partisan control thesis. 
 
MEPs and the focus of representation 
The second set of implications relates to scholarly understanding of MEPs as 
representatives. Despite the fact that they operate with extensive independence from 
their domestic party organizations, MEPs have a strong sense of acting on behalf of 
their domestic parties. Most appear to promote policy issues in ways that are 
consistent with their parties’ core policies and carry out party-related work in their 
domestic settings. All party officials interviewed for this thesis other than those from 
UKIP indicated that they are perfectly content with the way that their MEPs carry out 
their work. It is clear that MEPs realise that there is little to compel them to focus on 
the party’s interests.450 This suggests that the importance MEPs place on party 
representation does not result from the fact that MEPs feel that they are under 
pressure from the domestic party to prioritize party interests, as Farrell and Scully 
suggest (2007: 9). Rather, the strong focus on party representation stems from the 
desire of MEPs to promote party interests. Unsurprisingly, most MEPs feel an 
ideological attachment to their domestic parties. It is therefore appropriate to think of 
MEPs largely as voluntary or willing partisan agents, rather than as agents who seek 
to evade the control of their domestic partisan principals. 
While the quantitative and the qualitative evidence examined indicates that 
most MEPs share a strong sense of representing their domestic parties, the evidence 
also demonstrates that even MEPs affiliated to integrationist Groups do not feel a 
strong sense of attachment to their Groups. What little importance MEPs place on 
Group representation stems from the belief that they are able to advance their interests 
– and those of their constituents – by working through their Groups. This indicates 
that MEPs from all four Groups examined in this thesis primarily view their Groups 
in instrumental terms. Both sets of data suggest that MEPs tend to place a stronger 
emphasis on geographical representation than on either form of partisan 
representation. All the British MEPs interviewed demonstrated a willingness to 
promote the interests of their region and of the UK more broadly. In the case of the 
Finnish MEPs interviewed, the emphasis tended to be on representing the whole of 
Finland, with only a few respondents noting a desire to place a special emphasis on 
representing a particular region. 451  This suggests that MEPs primarily wish to 
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represent people, rather than partisan organizations or political ideologies, and that 
they enjoy the freedom to do so. Considering the normative position presented in 
Chapter 1 that citizens are ‘always the ultimate principals’ where democracy is 
understood as popular sovereignty (Strøm, 2003: 64), this finding is reassuring.  
 
National parties as political organizations: three implications 
The Conclusion has argued that the passivity with which domestic parties structure 
relations with their MEPs is explained largely by the fact that their leaders have little 
interest in engaging with the work of MEPs. This key claim informs the 
understanding of three important issues. It informs theoretical understanding of how 
domestic parties structure relations with their MEPs, understanding of how domestic 
parties act in multi-level settings, and understanding of why parties have undertaken 
such limited organization change, despite the vast changes made to the structure of 
governance in Europe. 
Firstly, institutionalist theories of how partisan actors structure relations with 
their MEPs need to take greater account of the degree to which partisan actors wish to 
realise goals through the work of MEPs. Scholars have developed sophisticated 
theoretical accounts, which postulate the conditions under which partisan actors are 
likely to seek and to achieve influence on MEPs (Scully, 2001; Raunio, 2002, 2007; 
see also Chapter 2 of this thesis). These are compelling, and this thesis lends support 
to the claims that three of these factors – the electoral system, the degree to which the 
candidate selection system is centralized, and the size of the party’s delegation in the 
EP – are linked to the degree to which domestic parties seek to influence the 
behaviour of MEPs. However, these accounts ignore the fact that domestic parties 
rarely show an interest in the work of their MEPs, or in the affairs of the EP. The 
findings suggest that the factor that is central to understanding how parties structure 
relations with their MEPs is the degree to which the partisan actor desires to realise 
goals such as election, policy, and office through the work of MEPs. 
Secondly, the passive nature of domestic parties’ engagement with the affairs 
of the EP informs theoretical understanding of how parties operate in multi-level 
settings. Chapter 2 discusses Strøm’s (1990) claims that the behaviour of parties is 
driven by their desire to realise three types of goals – election, policy, and office – 
and that parties are required to make trade-offs between these goals in certain 
instances. Parties based in the EU may seek to realise these three goals at different 
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levels, including at the level of the EU, of the state, and at sub-state levels. As a 
result, there will be instances where they must prioritize not only between the three 
goals, but also between the different levels. 
Despite the growth in the powers of the EU and of the EP, the domestic parties 
examined in this thesis are far more interested in realising their goals in the context of 
domestic politics than at the EU level (cf. Hix et al., 1999: 8). While these parties 
operate in a system of multi-level governance, it does not appear that they are multi-
level goal-seekers. This thesis does not seek to explain why this is the case, or to 
identify which factors explain the propensity of domestic parties to prioritize goals on 
some levels of governance over those on other levels, and these are issues which 
require further research. However, the findings presented in this thesis provide 
grounds for postulating that parties systematically prioritize goals that may be pursued 
on certain levels of governance over those relating to other levels, and that the state 
level remains the most important one for domestic political parties. 
Thirdly, the observation that party leaders have limited interest in realising 
goals in the context of the EP also informs understanding of how parties have adapted 
to changes taking place at EU level, that is, of the Europeanization of political parties. 
The empirical findings support the claims of those who find that parties have made 
few changes to their organizations despite the transformation that has taken place in 
how governance is structured (Poguntke et al., 2007). The degree to which parties 
engage with issues relating to EU policy-making, especially in the context of the EP, 
is low. In most cases, the investment that parties make to develop a capacity to deal 
with politics beyond the state takes the form of employing an EU (or an International) 
Officer, who is not expected to follow EP policy-making processes closely. As a 
result of this lack of investment, most parties allow MEPs to take sole responsibility 
for dealing with the affairs of the EP, especially with regards to developing policy on 
a day-to-day basis. Indeed, the freedom that MEPs are provided to carry out 
representation independently of their parties is largely explained by the fact that they 
are in most cases the only individuals from their parties that pay any attention to 
politics within the EP. 
 These insights provide grounds for furthering understanding of why parties 
have been so impervious to change despite the extensive changes that have taken 
place at the EU level. Ladrech explains the limited degree of Europeanization by 
arguing that as the EU does not affect the ability of party leaders to realise core goals, 
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the ‘necessary condition to trigger party organizational change are … absent’ (2007: 
222). The discussion on which this claim rests relates exclusively to the effect that the 
EU has on the ability of party leaders to realise goals that lie within domestic politics. 
However, it is possible to develop this explanation further by making a more explicit 
claim relating to how party leaders view EU-level goals. The limited degree of party 
organizational change taking place in response to developments at the EU level is 
explained both by the fact that EU-related factors largely do not affect the ability of 
parties to realise domestic goals (Ladrech, 2007: 222), and by the fact that party 
leaders have limited desire to realise goals that lie at the EU level. 
 
Eurosceptic Groups and influence within the chamber 
The empirical findings relating to practices of policy coordination within Eurosceptic 
Groups have implications for the degree to which these Groups can hope to influence 
policy-making within the chamber. The fact that Eurosceptic Groups allow affiliated 
national delegations to define policy positions independently limits their ability to act 
cohesively. The most Eurosceptic Group, the EFD, is currently the second least likely 
Group to feature in a winning parliamentary coalition (Frantescu, 2013: 3), and this 
suggests that its ability to influence policy outcomes is currently limited. There is at 
present little incentive for the larger Groups to seek the EFD’s support, as they are 
always able to turn to Groups holding more similar views in order to find a 
parliamentary majority. However, the number of Eurosceptic MEPs has increased 
considerably in recent years, and the secular decline in public support for the EU 
suggests that their ranks will swell in the future. As a result, it is not inconceivable 
that Eurosceptic Groups such as the EFD will be in a position where they can 
systematically influence policy outcomes at some point. 
Nevertheless, even if the number of MEPs affiliated to Eurosceptic Groups 
were to increase substantially during the coming parliamentary terms, the findings 
presented in this thesis suggest that the Groups would have to fundamentally change 
how they operate if they are ever to develop a means of influencing policy processes 
within the EP. If they are to become more relevant in coalition formation processes 
within the chamber, the EFD in particular (and the ECR to a lesser extent) will need 
to act in a more cohesive manner. This clearly requires compelling national 
delegations to vote together at parliamentary divisions. Cohesion can be achieved 
either by using traditional disciplinary means, or by fostering the norm that there is a 
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value to voting cohesively even when preferences diverge, as exists within the 
integrationist Groups. The thesis’ findings suggest that it would require a radical 
rethinking within these Groups for either of these developments to take place. Bearing 
in mind that there is a fundamental tension between Euroscepticism and the notion of 
transnational political co-operation, such a transformation is unlikely to happen. As a 
result, Eurosceptic Groups are unlikely to gain serious influence within the EP even if 
their ranks did swell considerably in the future. 
 
The state of the supranational party system in the EU 
The thesis’ findings inform understanding of the current state of the supranational 
party system in the EU. Studies which examine the development of the EU’s 
supranational party system invariably conclude that Marquand’s wish regarding the 
development of an ‘Europe des partis’ rather than a ‘Europe des patries’ (1978) has 
not been realised (Raunio, 1997; Hix and Lord, 1997; Kreppel, 2002). Pessimists may 
also draw on this thesis’ finding that Groups do not enforce discipline to argue that 
the dynamics of transnational partisan cooperation are too weak to spur on the 
development of truly supranational party system. From this perspective, it is 
competition between collections of national party delegations that provides the basis 
for politics in the EP, rather than competition between unified transnational party 
Groups. 
 Demonstrating that EP Groups are highly influential actors within the EP, this 
thesis presents an alternative view. As national parties lack the capacity to deal with 
issues relating to day-to-day policy-making in the EP, MEPs are reliant on their 
Groups for guidance on how to act within the chamber, most notably at the thousands 
of parliamentary divisions that take place annually. In addition, on issues where the 
MEP or the national party has the expertise to develop preferences, those preferences 
are likely to be shaped extensively not only by those of their Group colleagues, but 
also by the preferences of rival Groups. As others have noted (Hix et al., 2003: 327; 
Kreppel, 2002: 216; Scully, 2001: 14–16; Whitaker and Lynch, 2014: 240), the 
dynamics of coalition formation processes provide an incentive for Groups, national 
delegations, and MEPs to take the preferences of others into account when developing 
negotiating positions. This suggests that the supranational party system is highly 
influential in one context, namely within the EU’s directly elected parliament. 
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Free From Party Control, But Also Free From Scrutiny? A Normative Response 
Two observations can be made as a response to these findings from a normative 
perspective. The first is that there is clearly reason to welcome the fact that MEPs 
enjoy the freedom to act on the basis of their own conception of the public good, and 
are not excessively constrained by partisan considerations. There is more scope for 
MEPs to act in the public interest when they are able to act on the basis of their own 
judgment compared with when they are rigidly compelled to act in ways that conform 
to the wishes of their partisan leaders.  
 However, the second normative observation is less positive and relates to the 
degree to which citizens can rely on partisan actors to assist them to minimise agency 
loss by scrutinising the work of MEPs. As noted in Chapter 2, agency theory assumes 
that a degree of scrutiny is necessary if legislators (agents) are to prioritize the pursuit 
of the interests of citizens (principals) ahead of the advancement of their own 
interests. The EP is a context in which citizens are particularly vulnerable to agency 
losses, as the scope for ‘adverse selection’ and ‘hidden action’ (Strøm, 2003: 85–6; 
Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991: 25–6) is acute. Citizens know little about the 
preferences of candidates before they are elected, and have little means of indicating a 
preference for the candidates that share their preferences most closely in the majority 
of Member States. The low level of public and media interest in the work of the EP 
suggests that MEPs are afforded considerable scope to pursue any set of interests that 
they wish once elected.  
As parties play a central role in the chain of delegation between citizens and 
the exercise of power (Strøm et al., 2003a), the public may legitimately expect parties 
to scrutinise the work of MEPs on their behalf. This is especially the case in contexts 
where citizens have little or no control over which candidates are elected from a 
party’s list, as is the case in countries operating closed- and ordered-list systems. 
However, the findings presented in this thesis indicate that citizens cannot rely on 
partisan actors to scrutinise the work of MEPs. The domestic parties examined are 
unwilling to make the investment required to enable them to subject the work of 
MEPs to any meaningful level of oversight. In the language of some of the theoretical 
principal–agent literature (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984), not only are there no 
‘police patrols’ of the agents, but the ‘fire alarm’ does not have a battery fitted! As 
public knowledge and understanding of EP Groups is virtually non-existent, the 
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Groups cannot reasonably be expected to act as organizations that assist citizens in 
holding MEPs to account.  
The fact that partisan actors do little to assist citizens to scrutinise the work of 
MEPs, despite the pressing need for them to do so, is clearly problematic. The level of 
political authority delegated to MEPs is considerable, and the growth in their power in 
recent years was viewed as a means of increasing the degree to which the EU political 
system is responsive to citizens. In the absence of mechanisms of accountability there 
can be no guarantee – and it should not even be expected – that MEPs will act in a 
manner that is responsive either to the wishes or to the interests of citizens. The EU’s 
failure to develop a strong sense of legitimacy has been linked to the inability of 
citizens to oversee how their national governments act in the various settings of the 
Council (Follesdal and Hix, 2006: 553; Raunio, 1999). It follows that if there is no 
scrutiny of the work of MEPs, there is little reason to expect that they will able to 
address this legitimacy deficit through the representation that they provide. 
Of course, it is not inconceivable that MEPs will act in ways that are 
responsive to citizens despite the fact that there is a lack of institutional mechanisms 
providing them with inducements to advance the interests of citizens. After all, as the 
discussion presented above makes clear, MEPs place a great deal of importance on 
geographical and partisan representation even though parties and citizens provide 
MEPs with few incentives to promote their interests. However, as Follesdal and Hix 
have argued (2006: 556), the fact that those currently in authority happen to promote 
the interests of citizens is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of normative 
democratic theories. A strong democratic political system requires mechanisms that 
ensure that decision-makers advance the interests of the citizenry. 
Greater levels of oversight by domestic political parties would not necessarily 
act as a means to ensure that MEPs act on the basis of the interests of the citizenry. 
Indeed, the concern underpinning the first normative observation is that MEPs may be 
more sensitive to the wishes of their parties than to their conception of the interest of 
citizens if parties were to pay closer attention to their work. However, if MEPs were 
subject to greater scrutiny by their parties, the scope for them to promote interests that 
diverge both from those of citizens and of the parties for whom citizens vote would 
become more limited.  
Therefore, it is arguable that the contribution that domestic parties make in 
assisting citizens to contain agency losses in relation to the work of MEPs would be 
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greater if parties paid closer attention to the activities of their MEPs and to EU policy 
processes more broadly. Parties should also ensure that those involved in the process 
of selecting candidates have a genuine means of evaluating the activities of incumbent 
MEPs, possibly by circulating information generated by party officials during the 
parliamentary term.  They should also be clear about their willingness to deselect 
MEPs seeking re-election, despite the adverse publicity that taking such a step can 
attract. These reforms would naturally raise concerns regarding the degree of 
independence that MEPs enjoy from their parties. However, on balance, the notion 
that MEPs act on the basis of their parties’ wishes is more palatable than the idea that 
they are free to act without needing to be overly concerned about being held to 
account at a later date. 
Domestic parties are unlikely to implement these recommendations because 
they have little incentive to do so. In the normative sense, domestic parties serve the 
public by providing various forms of linkage between citizens and the state (Lawson, 
1980, Römmele et al., 2005; Dalton et al., 2011: 7). However, they are not selfless 
organizations. Not only are they goal-seeking organizations, they also exist to assist 
party leaders and other party members to realise goals. Directing party resources away 
from domestic concerns and towards the work of the EP does not increase the ability 
of these individuals to realise their core goals, which lie primarily within the domestic 
sphere. Moreover, party leaders have a disincentive to task officials with engaging 
with EU policy processes. The consequence of doing so would be to create a new 
group of experts within the party, who could use their expertise to challenge party 
leaders. These officials may also undermine the efforts of domestic party leaders to 
keep issues relating to the EU off the domestic agenda (Ladrech, 2007: 226). 
Farrell and Scully argue that the EP is a ‘failure as a representative institution’ 
(2007: 9). One of potentially several reasons for this is that ‘the electoral systems used 
to elect most MEPs promote the interests of political parties and other organized 
interests over those of individual voters’ (2007: 9). The result is that the EU suffers 
from a ‘representation deficit’ (2007: 9). This thesis challenges the view that MEPs 
are subject to considerable pressures from their domestic parties, and that the 
institutional context in which they operate compels them to prioritize the interests of 
partisan organizations to the detriment of citizens’ concerns. However, it shares the 
deep concern regarding how representation is carried out in the context of the EP.  
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The low levels of engagement by domestic partisan actors, and the apparent 
reliance of many MEPs on the policy guidance issued by their EP Groups, indicate 
that the relationship between citizens and the EP is characterised by an ‘accountability 
deficit’. MEPs are able to make use of the considerable political authority that has 
been delegated to them largely without needing to be concerned that their actions are 
subject to oversight by citizens, political parties, or the media. As domestic parties 
clearly perceive that their main goals lie within domestic politics, they have little 
reason to change how they structure relations with their MEPs. Consequently, the 
prospect of addressing the EU’s perceived democratic deficit by relying on the 
representative capabilities of MEPs is not promising. 
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447 The party leaders who are also MEPs may serve as exceptions to this general rule, 
as the potential for them to come under pressure from the ‘party leadership’ appears 
to be more limited than in the case of MEPs who do not hold the position of party 
leader.  
448 The degree of ideological centrism and support of integration is likely to affect the 
extent to which this statement applies to different MEPs. As extremist and 
Eurosceptic national party delegations are less likely to be able to negotiate their way 
into a winning coalition, there is less incentive for their MEPs to compromise with 
other national delegations within their Groups or with rival Groups. 
449 It remains possible that MEPs are subject to some partisan pressure in the context 
of parliamentary voting due to the dynamics operating within national party 
delegations. However, this issue lies outside the scope of this thesis as it does not 
relate to pressure from the party leadership. 
450 This observation holds across the cases, other than in the case of UKIP MEPs and 
in the case of a minority of British MEPs who are in competition with other sitting 
MEPs for a place on their parties’ list and who realise that their party is likely to win 
fewer seats at the next EP election. 
451 The differences identified between the geographical focus of Finnish and British 
MEPs reflect the differences in the nature of constituencies between the two 
countries. 
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Appendix A: Ordinal Regression Tables 
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Appendix B: List of Interviews 
 
Date Position 
16/04/2012 Assistant to a Labour MEP 
17/04/2012 Assistant to a Conservative MEP 
17/04/2012 Assistant to a Conservative MEP 
25/04/2012 Former Conservative MEP 
02/05/2012 EPP Group official 
03/05/2012 ECR Group official 
07/05/2012 Labour MEP 
07/05/2012 ECR Group official 
08/05/2012 Former Labour MEP 
09/05/2012 PS and/or EFD  
10/05/2012 Conservative MEP 
10/05/2012 ECR Group official 
11/05/2012 S&D Group official 
11/05/2012 EPP Group official 
11/05/2012 S&D Group official 
15/05/2012 Assistant to a Conservative MEP 
15/05/2012 EPP Group official 
04/06/2012 Former Labour MEP 
05/06/2012 KOK MEP 
06/06/2012 Labour MEP 
07/06/2012 EPP Group official 
07/06/2012 Conservative MEP 
08/06/2012 Assistant to a Conservative MEP 
15/06/2012 Assistant to a Conservative MEP 
19/06/2012 Assistant to a Labour MEP 
19/06/2012 Labour MEP 
20/06/2012 EPP Group official 
20/06/2012 SDP MEP 
20/06/2012 GUE-NGL official 
20/06/2012 Conservative MEP 
21/06/2012 UKIP and/or EFD  
21/06/2012 UKIP and/or EFD  
22/06/2012 Assistant to a Conservative MEP 
22/06/2012 Labour MEP 
22/06/2012 UKRep official 
23/06/2012 A former assistant to SDP MEPs 
25/06/2012 S&D Group official 
26/06/2012 PS and/or EFD 
26/06/2012 UKIP MEP 
26/06/2012 Conservative MEP 
27/06/2012 Official from the Finnish Permanent Representation to the EU 
28/06/2012 Assistant to a Labour MEP 
 280 
28/06/2012 UKIP and/or EFD  
29/06/2012 Assistant to a Labour MEP 
17/10/2012 SDP official 
13/11/2012 PS and/or EFD 
20/11/2012 SDP official 
21/11/2012 KOK official 
22/11/2012 PS and/or EFD 
28/11/2012 UKIP MEP 
28/11/2012 KOK official 
28/11/2012 A former UKIP MEP 
28/11/2012 Former Conservative official 
04/10/2013 Labour official 
28/10/2013 Conservative official 
22/11/2013 Former Labour official 
19/12/2013 Former Labour official 
13/01/2014 UKIP MEP 
31/03/2014 UKIP and/or EFD  
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